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ABSTRACT 
 
When even seemingly benign and routine processes fail in healthcare, people 
sometimes die. The profound effect on the patient’s families and the 
healthcare staff involved is clear (Vincent and Coulter, 2002), while further 
consequences are felt by the institution involved, both financially and by 
damage to reputation. The trend in healthcare for learning through experience 
of adverse events is no longer a viable philosophy (Department of Health,Sir 
Ian Carruthers OBE and Pauline Philip, 2006).  
In order to make progress towards preventative learning, three Prospective 
Hazard Analysis (PHA) methods used in other industries were evaluated for 
use in the area of ward based healthcare. Failure Modes and Effects Analysis 
(FMEA), Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) and Hazard and Operability Analysis 
(HAZOP) were compared to each other in terms of ease of use, information 
they provide and the manner in which it is presented. Their results were also 
compared to baseline data produced through empirical research. 
Oxygen Therapy was used in this research as an example of a common ward 
based therapy. The resulting analysis listed 186 hazards almost all of which 
could lead to death, especially if combined. 
FTA and FMEA provided better system coverage than HAZOP and identified 
more hazards than were contained in the initial hazard identification method 
common to both techniques. FMEA and HAZOP needed some modification 
before use, with HAZOP requiring the most extensive adjustment. FTA has a 
very useful graphical presentation and was the only method capable of 
displaying causal linkage, but required that hazards be translated into events 
for analysis.  
It was concluded that formal Prospective Hazard Analysis (PHA) was 
applicable to this area of healthcare and presented added value through a 
combination of detailed information on possible hazards and accurate risk 
assessment based on a combination of expert opinion and empirical data. 
This provides a mechanism for evidence based identification of hazard 
barriers and safeguards as well as a method for formal communication of 
results at any stage of an analysis. It may further provide a very valuable 
vehicle for documented learning through prospective analysis incorporating 
feedback from previous experience and adverse incidents. The clear definition 
of systems and processes that form part of these methods provides a 
valuable opportunity for learning and the enduring capture and dissemination 
of tacit knowledge that can be continually updated and used for the 
formulation of strategies for safety and quality improvement. 
 
Keywords: 
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Observation; Questionnaire; Incident Report  
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Chapter 1 Background and Research Definition 
Abstract 
This chapter provides an introduction by describing the background to the 
research and identifying its need and contribution. The relationship with the two 
hospitals that collaborated in this work is also discussed. 
The research question which formed the aims and objective is stated, which 
leads on to the description of the structure of both the research and the thesis. 
The methodology is generally described as evaluation, action research aimed at 
comparing the outcomes from three structured hazard analysis methods to that 
produced through the use of empirical methods. 
1.1 Introduction 
If allowed to go unchecked, patient safety hazards can lead to the death of a 
patient (James Meikle 2002; Hoyle, 2005). Almost every ward based activity, no 
matter how routine or benign, harbours such risk. Those entering hospital place 
an enormous amount of trust in the professionals providing their care (Vincent 
and Coulter, 2002). In some cases, the care they need poses a known risk to 
them and this is discussed with their clinician in careful consideration. What is 
almost never discussed however is the risk they face from the ‘forgotten’ or 
hidden hazards present in even the most banal processes common on every 
hospital ward. It is further impossible to discuss those that are as yet unknown. 
This work was undertaken to place tools for the discovery and illumination of 
these hazards at the disposal of healthcare professionals. 
Little work has been done in evaluating industrial hazard and risk analysis 
methods for use in healthcare. This may be partly due to the difficulty of 
evaluating their outcomes in practice, as well as some degree of suspicion by 
the healthcare ‘establishment’ regarding the motivation for their use. This 
research aims to address both these issues by providing an evaluation and a 
discussion of the contribution of formal hazard analysis to patient safety. 
1.1.1 Aims and Objective 
The following research question was formed from the general consideration of 
the problem of hazard analysis in healthcare:  
What is the contribution that formal hazard analysis can make to the 
assessment of patient safety within ward based therapies? 
Based on this, the hypothesis that a number of hazard analyses based on a 
common frame of reference, using formal methods, will produce comparable 
value-added results when tested against empirical research was formed. 
This was translated into the following aims: 
1. To construct a comprehensive hazard list and risk assessment of a ward 
based therapy using empirical research. 
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2. To conduct a small number of structured hazard analyses using different 
formal methods, each based on a common frame of reference built from 
empirical research. 
3. To evaluate the suitability, advantages and disadvantages of these 
structured methods to the context of ward based care by comparing the 
formal hazard analyses to the results from empirical research. 
The objective was thus to use evaluation data in the form of a validated, refined 
hazard list and risk analysis for the assessment of a small number of hazard 
analysis methods applied to a ward based therapy. This would have the added 
result of simultaneously producing a comprehensive hazard and risk analysis of 
the therapy analysed.  
1.1.2 The Background and Collaborations 
The research focused on an evaluation of three ‘industrial’ methods for 
prospective hazard analysis, exploring their applicability and contribution to the 
assessment of patient safety within ward based health care in the United 
Kingdom.  
Oxygen Therapy was used as the subject for the research because senior 
healthcare professionals at Bedford Hospital were concerned about some 
obvious, yet unaddressed hazards related to it. They were keen to contribute to 
the research in the hope that it would help improve the level of care they could 
provide, especially when oxygen cylinders are in use. Although oxygen therapy 
is thought to be relatively harmless, in extreme cases, failure can result in the 
death of a patient.   
Having the interest of clinical professionals, especially those in leadership 
positions, proved to be essential to the research; especially when negotiating 
access (Mulhall, 2003; Robson, 2002e) and in understanding the 
clinical/medical issues. 
A collaboration was formed between the researcher and the head of the 
Anaesthetics Department at Bedford Hospital. This was later extended to three 
further Consultant Anaesthetists in the same department. An honorary contract 
was extended to the researcher by the Bedford Hospital Research and 
Development Department. 
Conducting research of this nature on only one site is limiting. Having access to 
two sites opens a wider range of variability, gives access to a larger population 
and introduces the possibility of comparison between establishments. 
A second collaboration was therefore formed with Stoke Mandeville Hospital, 
part of the Buckinghamshire Hospitals NHS Trust. An honorary contract was 
also granted to the researcher by the Research and Development department 
of this hospital.  
A further relationship was established with the National Patient Safety Agency 
(NPSA) for whom it was felt this research may be of use. 5755 anonymised 
Incident reports were supplied by them for application to this research and an 
NPSA Research Associate took part in one of the larger studies. 
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This research was funded by the ‘Cranfield Health Partnership’ which exists 
between Cranfield University and a number of local hospitals which includes 
Bedford Hospital.  
1.1.3 Definition of Scope  
In the context of this research, oxygen therapy was at normal atmospheric 
pressure; hyperbaric oxygen therapy was excluded as it is not a common ward 
based procedure. 
Both piped and cylinder supplied arrangements were considered, but the details 
of the pipeline systems and their associated oxygen supplies were not 
assessed. When a cylinder was used at the bedside however, the whole system 
including the cylinder was assessed. The reason for these two approaches is 
that in pipeline supplied arrangements the ward staff have no real input to the 
management of the system beyond the wall port, while they have total 
responsibility when cylinders are in use (besides the central allocation of 
resources). 
Although the research was focussed on ward based oxygen therapy, the 
movement of patients within the hospital and via ambulance was addressed as 
a special case of a ‘mobile ward’ environment.  
Patients being cared for in the recovery area after surgery were also taken into 
account since it is a ward environment and almost all post operative patients 
have some oxygen therapy. 
Intensive Care and High Dependency units were not directly assessed in this 
research since they have very different management systems compared to 
other wards. Patients are often mechanically ventilated and are cared for by 
highly trained staff on an almost one to one basis. There were however some 
overlapping issues and for this reason they were not completely excluded.  
Operating theatres were excluded due to their highly specialist nature and 
because they are so far removed from a ward-like environment. 
1.1.4 The Need and Contribution of this Research 
A literature search for the use of hazard analysis methods in healthcare yielded 
little. Some work in the USA (Spath, 2003) and the Netherlands (Van Tilburg et 
al., 2006) has been undertaken in specialist secondary healthcare using Failure 
Modes and Effects Analysis, while work is beginning at Cambridge University 
(WARD et al., 2007) examining primary healthcare using a range of hazard 
analysis techniques. 
 Since the publication of two landmark documents in 1999 (Kohn et al., 1999) 
and 2000 (Department of Health Expert Group (Chairman, CMO), 2000), the 
number of publications on Patient Safety has increased dramatically. Figure 1-1 
shows the results per decade of a search of the Scopus (Elsevier B.V.) 
database for items with the terms “Clinical Risk” or “Patient Safety” in the title, 
keywords or abstract, published between 1960 and 2007. A total of 9175 items 
were listed, with 81% (7414) published in the eight years from 2000 to 2007 and 
47% (4272) of all items published in the three years from 2005 to 2007. Over 
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80% of the references found in Scopus were thus published since these key 
documents. 
Only 19 references had the terms “Ward” and “Therapy or Therapies” in the 
title, keywords or abstract, with the oldest dating to 1994. Only 5 of these 
(Schmidt and Bottoni, 2003; Runciman et al., 2003; Daudelin and Selker, 2005; 
Croskerry et al., 2004; Agnoletti et al., 2005) dealt specifically with hazards or 
risks, all of which were between 2003 and 2007. Most address fairly specific 
issues and none employ structured hazard analysis methods. 
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Figure 1-1. The number of publications from 1960 to 2007. 
There is a recognition by respected professionals that ward based care 
constitutes a large proportion of adverse incidents (Nguyen et al., 2001b) and 
yet, despite a huge interest in patient safety, almost nothing has been published 
regarding hazard analysis and risk management of this area of healthcare.  
This indicates a desperate need for an investigation of structured techniques for 
the analysis of patient safety on hospital wards. The value of this research is the 
provision of evidence to illustrate the need for tools to facilitate decision making 
and implementation of informed risk management strategies and protection 
against hazards.  
The contribution of this research is twofold:  
1. It addressed the issue of the apparent lack of techniques available for 
assessing hazards inherent in ward based therapies by testing a small 
number of established methods by application within this context. It 
discussed these ‘industrial’ prospective hazard analysis methods, taking 
account of the difficulty and value-added contribution of each by 
comparison to specially constructed evaluation data. 
2. The trials and comparisons provided the first comprehensive analysis of 
the hazards and risks associated with the administration of oxygen 
therapy. 
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1.2 The Research Structure and Methodology 
The validation of a hazard analysis method is concerned with testing the 
accuracy, precision and relevance of a method to a given subject (Kirwan, 
1996)(Kirwan et al., 1997; Kirwan, 1997). The objective is normally to either 
endorse or reject its use. This requires a very structured approach and often 
entails the use of meticulous statistical analysis for the measurement of key 
parameters. Very detailed validation data is needed and multiple experiments 
should be conducted. 
Such a validation process is not yet, to the author’s knowledge, possible in the 
domain of ward based therapies. Attempting to produce accurate probabilistic 
assessments on risk likelihood is one area where such an endeavour might fail 
as there is scant data available for this type of analysis. Multiple experiments 
are difficult to arrange due to the heavy workload of most clinical professionals 
and may be prohibitively expensive. 
This research was therefore concerned not with the validation of the hazard 
analysis methods, but to provide an evaluation in this specific context based on 
comparison to data produced through empirical research and basic risk 
analysis. This is the closest to a full validation possible given currently available 
data. The result might be used to help guide informed choice on hazard 
analysis methods and it may also be possible for it to have some use in future 
validation studies. 
Inspiration was drawn from the methodology of evaluation and action research 
(Robson, 2002e; Breakwell and Millward, 1995) for both aspects of this project. 
The hazard analysis methods were evaluated for their effectiveness and 
relevance while the current practice in the application of oxygen therapy was 
evaluated for risk with a view to improvement. 
This research is the first known attempt at the comparison and practical 
evaluation of these industrial prospective hazard analysis methods within ward 
based therapy. 
Observation
Questionnaire Incident Report 
Review
Combined 
evaluation 
data
System Diagram
Process Charts
Fault Tree Analysis
FMEA
HAZOP
Hazard Analysis Hazard Analyses
Comparison
Common Frame of Reference  
Figure 1-2. A flow chart representing the structure and progression of the project. 
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The structure and progression of the research can be seen in Figure 1-2. There 
were three phases: 
1. The construction of a hazard analysis from the results of three empirical 
studies. These results were also used to produce a system diagram and 
process flow chart which formed the common frame of reference for the 
formal hazard analyses. 
2. The application of three hazard analysis methods to a ward based 
therapy based on the common frame of reference produced from the 
research conducted in phase one. 
3. The comparison of the results of the hazard analysis methods to the 
hazard list constructed during phase one. The methods were also 
compared to each other in terms of output, presentation of results and 
‘usability’. 
Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA)(McDermott, 1996), Hazard and 
Operability Analysis (HAZOP)(Redmill et al., 1999b) and Fault Tree Analysis 
(FTA)(Ericson II, 2005c) were the prospective hazard analysis methods 
identified, following a structured selection process, as having the potential for 
application to ward based therapies.  
The evaluation data was constructed as shown in Figure 1-3 by combining the 
results from an observational study and a health care ‘practitioners’ 
questionnaire. A structured review of NHS incident reports was used to validate 
the hazard list and amend it where necessary. It also provided a risk analysis 
from an alternative perspective. 
 
Figure 1-3. The construction of combined evaluation data from three empirical methods. 
The hazard analysis methods were applied to Oxygen Therapy and compared 
in terms of their difficulty to use, presentation of results and the range of 
hazards analysed. The effectiveness and further contribution of the hazard 
analyses was assessed by comparison to the evaluation data and by 
discussion.  
A final comprehensive hazard and risk analysis of Oxygen Therapy, combining 
all of the results, was produced. Only patient safety was assessed, even though 
hazards to staff also exist. The effectiveness of the therapy was only considered 
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if, as a result of some error, there was a failure to provide what was intended; 
the general clinical efficacy of the therapy was not assessed. 
The research was conducted with the co-operation of two similar sized hospitals 
from different NHS Trusts. They are separated by approximately 40 miles (64 
Kilometres) and were considered independent as they had no known formal 
relationship during this research.  
A favourable ethics opinion for a multi site project was given by the 
Bedfordshire Local Research Ethics Committee on 11th May 2006 with a notice 
of substantial amendment receiving a favourable opinion on the 9th Nov 2007. 
1.3 The Thesis Structure 
The thesis structure is shown in Figure 1-4 and can be divided into five 
sections: 
1. Introduction:  
Chapter one provides the background and description of the 
research, illustrates the thesis structure and states the contribution 
to knowledge.  
2. Literature Review:  
Chapter two contains a literature review focussed on the subjects 
of Patient Safety, Hazard Analysis, Oxygen Therapy and 
Complexity.  
3. Philosophy and Science: 
Chapter three discusses the subjects of methodology and 
methods and their relationship to this research, with an overview 
of the resulting choice of research methods.  
4. The Research: 
Chapter four describes a ward based observational study and a 
questionnaire of healthcare professionals, a combined method 
used for the mining of hazards associated with oxygen therapy. 
Chapter five details a highly structured taxonomic study used to 
validate and amend the hazard list by review and analysis of 
reported incidents. 
Chapter six explores the use of Failure Modes and Effects 
Analysis, Fault Tree Analysis and Hazard and Operability 
Analysis, describing how these methods were evaluated and 
presenting the results and conclusions. 
5. The Conclusion: 
Chapter seven, influenced by chapter one, provides a roundup of 
results, a discussion on whether the research questions have 
been adequately addressed and what the final answers were. The 
results specific to oxygen therapy are discussed along with 
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possible hazard barriers and risk management strategies as 
solutions to some of the issues identified. 
Future work is identified, including a discussion on how this 
research might be extended to other therapies and processes. 
 
Figure 1-4. The thesis structure. 
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1.4 Conclusion 
In the introduction to this chapter (Section 1.1.1, page 18), the objective of the 
research was stated as:  
‘To use evaluation data in the form of a validated, refined hazard list and 
risk analysis for the assessment of a small number of hazard analysis 
methods applied to a ward based therapy.’ 
This then informed the research question: 
‘What is the contribution that formal hazard analysis can make to the 
assessment of patient safety within ward based therapies?’ 
Based on this, the hypothesis was formed that a number of hazard analyses 
based on a common frame of reference, using formal methods, will produce 
comparable value-added results when tested against empirical research. 
The research strategy outlined comprised of three phases. Phase one, during 
which a hazard list was constructed using empirical research methods, also 
produced the common frame of reference on which to base the three formal 
hazard analyses, which were conducted In phase two. The final phase involved 
the evaluation of these methods by comparison to each other and to the hazard 
list produced in phase one. 
The background to this research was discussed, the scope defined and the 
need explored with reference to published literature. The contribution was 
identified as: 
1. The research addressed the issue of the apparent lack of techniques 
available for assessing hazards inherent in ward based therapies by 
testing a small number of established methods by application within 
this context. It discusses these formal hazard analysis methods, 
taking account of the difficulty and value-added contribution of each 
by comparison to specially constructed evaluation data. 
2. The trials and comparisons undertaken in this research provided the 
first comprehensive analysis of the hazards and risks associated with 
the administration of oxygen therapy. 
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Chapter 2 The Research Context 
Abstract 
This chapter explores the subjects of Patient Safety, Hazard Analysis, Oxygen 
Therapy and Complexity. These form the core context within which this 
research takes place. 
Patient safety has evolved from a need for risk management in healthcare and 
the recognition of the importance of both high quality care and the wider 
implications of adverse incidents. Healthcare is now at a point where many of 
the lessons learned by industry can be applied; Prospective Hazard Analysis is 
one of them. 
Seven hazard analysis methods from a total of over 100 were available to the 
researcher. These were FMEA, FTA, ETA, HAZOP, SWIFT, HEART and 
THERP. They are described and their previous use in healthcare is explored, 
with only FMEA, FTA, ETA and HAZOP having any published accounts. 
Oxygen Therapy was used as the exemplar in this research and as such the 
various modes of delivery were explored and previous published work reviewed. 
There are numerous administration methods and variations of these, making 
many opportunities for error. Previous research into the administration of 
oxygen has focused on fairly specific subjects, while other work has been 
concerned with the physiological effects of the gas. 
The complex nature of ward based therapies and where it fits into the system of 
healthcare is discussed in the final section. An influence diagram (Figure 2-8) 
graphically illustrates this complexity and the six principles of complexity and 
how they relate to this subject reinforce this concept. 
2.1 Patient Safety 
2.1.1 The History of Patient Safety in the United Kingdom 
Under Crown Immunity, hospitals in the UK could not be prosecuted for 
incidents that occurred within their premises. When this was removed in 1990 
(Centre for Corporate Accountability, 2003)(Steele, 2002; Chapman, 2001), 
individual professionals were covered under the new Crown Indemnity against 
negligence claims, but not against criminal prosecution. NHS trusts are now 
responsible for paying successful negligence claims, which they may not 
attempt to transfer to individuals they employ. To protect themselves from these 
claims, trusts are covered by indemnity insurance under the ‘Clinical Negligence 
Scheme for Trusts’ (CNST)  which was set up in 1995 (NHS Litigation Authority, 
2008a)(Walshe, 2001), with all claims handled by the NHS Litigation Authority 
(NHSLA) (NHS Litigation Authority, 2008b). 
Risk management has, until relatively recently, been primarily concerned with 
protecting the organization against litigation. Part of the motivation behind many 
improvements is the resulting discount applied to CNST premiums. These 
discounts depend on the robustness of a Trust’s procedures and systems, 
measured against CNST standards.  
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Jones, in chapter 6 of ‘Patient Safety Research into Practice’ (Walshe and 
Boaden, 2006)  is very keen to point out though, that the perceived relationship 
between costs from litigation and risk management is far less significant than 
expected(Jones, 2006). Jones states that even if improved risk management 
leads to better patient safety, that does not mean that there will be fewer claims 
or that they will cost less. The sheer volume of potential claims means that 
there is likely to always be a growth in successful claims. 
“If there are 85,000 patients per annum who suffer injury as a result of 
negligence and only 7,000 claims (of which some 75 per cent may be 
unsuccessful) then if a risk management system was dramatically 
successful and reduced adverse events by, say, 50 per cent there would 
still be plenty of potential claimants, who currently do not make a claim, 
who could produce an increase in claims.” (Jones, 2006) 
A further motivator for improvement is the Clinical Governance framework by 
which trusts are assessed and awarded star ratings. In December 1997, The 
government published a white paper “The new NHS: modern, dependable” 
(Department of Health, 1997). In response, the Department of Health issued a 
consultation document entitled “A first class service: Quality in the new NHS” 
(Department of Health, 1998), in which the framework for clinical governance in 
the new NHS was outlined. These documents introduced the concept of clinical 
governance and stated the intention to establish the National Institute for 
Clinical Excellence (NICE) and the Commission for Health Improvement.  
NICE was set up in 1999 and was changed in the 2004 White Paper ‘Choosing 
health: making healthy choices easier’ (Department of Health, 2004a) to the 
National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence (NICE, 2009). NICE makes 
assessments of new drugs, treatments and devices as well as gathering 
information from the national confidential enquiries to produce standards and 
guidance for the provision of healthcare. The Healthcare Commission (formerly 
the Commission for Health Improvement) makes an annual assessment of NHS 
trusts and produces star ratings placing these trusts in a league table system. 
Continual improvement in quality of care and maintaining core standards is the 
responsibility of the Chief Executive for every trust, which provides some 
impetus from the top levels of leadership. 
A growing awareness of Patient Safety within the Healthcare sector, resulted in 
the UK Department of Health report “An Organisation with a Memory” 
(Department of Health Expert Group (Chairman, CMO), 2000), which followed 
shortly behind another landmark publication by the Institute of Medicine in the 
United States; “To Err is Human: Building a Safer Health System” (Kohn et al., 
1999). Both these documents had a substantial effect on how patient safety was 
perceived, with the emphasis changing from litigation avoidance to one where 
prevention of extended hospital stays and quality of care is strongly promoted.  
Litigation was costing the NHS around £400 million in 2000(Department of 
Health Expert Group (Chairman, CMO), 2000; Jones, 2006), but the costs 
incurred in NHS hospitals due to extended hospital stays was estimated at 
about £2 billion per year, without taking into account the further economic 
costs(Department of Health Expert Group (Chairman, CMO), 2000). It is thus 
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more important to focus on the quality of care and patient safety as a combined 
package to reduce costs by minimising extended hospital stays rather than the 
cost of litigation alone. 
Damage to reputation is an important aspect of any service industry and is set 
to become more so in the future of the NHS when patients are given more 
choice on where they receive treatment or care (Department of Health, 
2004b)(Department of Health, 2007; NHS Choices, 2008). As stated in ‘The 
NHS Improvement Plan: Putting people at the heart of public services’ 
(Department of Health, 2004b), quality will be a major factor in the informed 
decisions made by patients on where to go for their care, but the issue of 
reputation is only, almost subliminally, inferred. This is also only touched on in 
“An organisation with a memory”. 
“Stories about very poor care regularly hit the headlines and they worry 
people. They give the impression that the NHS is powerless to prevent 
such disasters and they generally undermine public confidence in 
services. Rightly or wrongly, accounts of particular health service failures 
lead to the perception that they may be only the tip of an iceberg beneath 
which much more poor quality lies.” An organisation with a memory 
(Department of Health Expert Group (Chairman, CMO), 2000) 
This issue is not even directly addressed in the Department of Health report 
‘Choice matters: 2007-08 - Putting patients in control’ (Department of Health, 
2007), but there is a statement that makes it clear that there would soon be 
competition between NHS and private hospitals. 
“From April 2008, patients referred by their GPs for most types of 
planned treatment will be able to choose from any hospital or clinic (i.e. 
any NHS trust, Foundation Trust, Independent Sector hospital or 
Independent Sector Treatment Centre) that can meet NHS prices and 
NHS standards.” Choice matters: 2007-08 - Putting patients in control. 
The National Patient Safety Agency (NPSA) was set up in 2001 as a direct 
result of “An Organisation with a Memory” and was part of the UK government’s 
plan to engineer a safer National Health Service. Their primary brief is to collect 
and analyse adverse incidents and near misses from NHS institutions with the 
aim of learning from them. This is done through the Reporting and Learning 
System (RLS)(NPSA, 2008b) and communicated via three routes: Patient 
Safety Alerts, Safer Practice Notices and Rapid Response Reports. Feedback 
reports are also available to NHS institutions and provide information specific to 
a particular trust, quarterly reports are available generally and provide summary 
information on incident numbers and trends. Until recently, newsletter style 
bulletins which contained commentary and articles relevant to current issues 
were also produced. 
Since 2000 there has been a lot of debate about the best way to measure and 
improve patient safety in general. There are three key books which cover this 
subject, the first is edition two of ‘Clinical Risk Management’(Walshe, 2001) 
edited by Charles Vincent. This is an essential text for those wishing to gain an 
in depth insight into the subject of clinical risk management, including its history 
in healthcare, with contributions from most of the key people in the field.  The 
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two further texts, ‘Patient Safety’ by Charles Vincent(Vincent, 2006b) and 
‘Patient Safety Research into Practice’ edited by Kieran Walshe and Ruth 
Boaden (Jones, 2006) both bring the subject up to date from two rather different 
but complimentary points of view. Walshe and Boaden provide a structured 
exploration of current research and the avenues for improvement in practice, 
while Vincent gives a stimulating discussion of the major themes and illuminates 
the possible paths the subject might still take. 
The patient safety agenda became international with the launch on 27 October 
2004 of the World Health Organization’s ‘World Alliance for Patient Safety’ 
(WHO, 2009), currently chaired by Sir Liam Donaldson, Chief Medical Officer 
for England. Their ambitious plan for 2006-7 set out in their ‘Forward 
Programme 2006-2007’ (World Health Organization and World Alliance for 
Patient Safety, 2006) details the ten areas of action they have undertaken. 
It is therefore clear that clinical governance and patient safety play key roles in 
the continued improvements in quality of care and patient choice being 
introduced by the Department of Health in the UK. These factors cannot be 
separated completely as improvement in one affects the other. Being in the 
position to clearly identify hazards to patient safety and implement barriers to 
prevent harm will thus have a positive effect on quality of care and provide clear 
evidence for sustained clinical governance. This would in turn place an 
institution in a better position to be chosen by patients for their care and 
treatment and promote patient satisfaction.  
The National Audit Office (NAO) publication “A Safer Place for Patients: 
Learning to improve patient safety” in November 2005(National Audit Office, 
2005) stated that 974,000 adverse events were reported during 2004/5 and that 
2,180 of these were reported to have resulted in death. These figures compare 
well with those extrapolated from results reported by Vincent and colleagues 
(Vincent et al., 2001) in their pilot study to assess the extent of the patient 
safety problem in the UK. They concluded that approximately 10.8% (918,000) 
of the 8.5 million patients admitted to hospital every year experience adverse 
incidents and that 8% (73,000) of these might lead to death.  The large 
difference in the number of deaths between the two publications can likely be 
attributed to a range of factors including: Under-reporting of serious events 
affecting the National Audit office figures, differences in the classification of 
harm (especially by those reporting the incident), the exclusion of hospital 
acquired infections by the National Audit Office publication and the inclusion of 
contributory factors leading to death in the work by Vincent et al (2001). 
In March 2000, the British Medical Journal (BMJ) published a themed issue on 
patient safety that had a strong focus on human error and reliability. It included 
a very insightful editorial by the eminent Lucian Leape and Donald Berwick 
(Leape and Berwick, 2000), which is reported as having been cited 83 times in 
Scopus. Their comment on the contents of that issue of the BMJ also provides 
something of an overview of the state of the art of patient safety in 2000. Leape 
and Berwick comment on what is known on the subject and acknowledge the 
breadth of knowledge contained within healthcare that would be useful to the 
improvement of patient safety if it was properly used.   
31 
“We have learnt that the problem of medical error is not fundamentally 
due to lack of knowledge. Though clearly we have much more to learn 
about how to make our systems safe, we already know far more than we 
put into practice.” BMJ, March 2000 (Leape and Berwick, 2000) 
Taking proper notice of the views and opinions as well as the qualified 
judgments of high calibre healthcare professionals is paramount to this cause.  
Although much has been done generally in the domain of patient safety since 
2000, e.g. the establishment of the National Patient Safety Agency, not much 
has changed in healthcare practice on hospital wards that could be attributed to 
these efforts. It is quite obvious from this apparent lack of progress that the task 
is more complex and difficult than it would at first seem (Vincent, 2006b).  
James Reason speaks quite plainly in that same issue of the BMJ about the 
‘person centred’ approach to human error prevalent in the health 
service(Reason, 2000), which attributes the causes for incidents on the actions 
of individuals. This paper, cited over 500 times in Scopus, makes clear that 
there needs to be a shift from the person centred approach to a systems 
approach, where human error is seen as a failure of the system to account for 
how people perceive their tasks and environment, something that appears to be 
very slow in coming.  
“Health care alone refuses to accept what other hazardous industries 
recognized long ago: safe performance cannot be expected from workers 
who are sleep deprived, who work double or triple shifts, or whose job 
designs involve multiple competing urgent priorities.”(Leape and Berwick, 
2000) 
“The pursuit of greater safety is seriously impeded by an approach that 
does not seek out and remove the error provoking properties within the 
system at large.”(Reason, 2000) 
Reason makes a very strong case for the health service to learn from high 
reliability organizations like the US Navy, nuclear fuels and air traffic control 
centres. Nolan gives some examples of the use of reliability engineering in 
systems such as automated teller machines and discusses how these 
approaches might be employed in healthcare (Nolan, 2000). The use of 
automation is advocated only as a means of supporting and improving human 
reliability and there is an emphasis on error detection as well as prevention.  
Many of the errors in systems with a high level of technology occur either at the 
human – machine interface(Lin et al., 2001) or are due to ‘latent errors’ 
introduced through imperfect design (Reason, 1999b), both are difficult to 
detect. Adding more technology is therefore not always the answer and can 
indeed introduce unexpected complexity. No system is perfect and to assume 
such is unrealistic, therefore a pre-emptive approach to error identification and 
prevention has much to commend it. 
Public concern over the safety of patients on hospital wards is high.  Currently 
the focus is on hospital acquired infections with many newspaper and television 
articles devoted to this topic. A search of just the ‘Times Online’ produced 
numerous examples (BBC NEWS, 2006; BBC NEWS, 2005b; BBC NEWS, 
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2005a; Hawkes, 2007; Rose, 2007), including the following quote from an article 
entitled “Blundering hospitals kill 40,000 a year” (Woolcock and Henderson, 
2004), in which the problem of care on wards is highlighted and mention is 
made of one problem with incident reporting; that not all incidents ever get 
reported. 
“Approximately 25 per cent of errors occur during surgery, and another 
25 per cent in diagnosis or pre-care. The other half of all mistakes are 
made during treatment on the ward. They can range from providing 
patients with inadequate nutrition to prescribing the wrong dose of 
medication.  
The figures do not include any hospital-acquired infections or 
complications of childbirth, and almost 10 per cent of the trusts surveyed 
claimed an unlikely error rate of zero.  
“It shows there is not enough transparency,” Mr Taylor1 said. “Sometimes 
no one ever finds out if a patient died as a result of something going 
wrong — it may never go outside the group involved in that patient’s 
care.””  
The article was reporting a study by Aylin et al, which looked at the incidence of 
the recording of adverse events within hospital episode statistics (Aylin et al., 
2004). This study did not look at death as a criterion, nor was it reporting on 
this. The 40,000 deaths a year comes from the first line of the article, which 
refers to a presentation at the ISO General Assembly 2001, Sydney (Emslie), 
which was used by the authors to illustrate the need for better methods of 
collecting and using this type of data. 
In 2001, Nguyen  wrote in a letter (Nguyen et al., 2001a) responding to a 
publication by Vincent et al in the same year (Vincent et al., 2001) that “Most 
[serious] adverse events have their genesis in general wards…”, and went on to 
call for more work to be done on finding solutions. It would be logical to add that 
we should be looking for ways to identify and manage hazards in the hospital 
wards where it seems the bulk of incidents occur.  
                                            
1 Roger Taylor, research director of healthcare research group, ‘Dr Foster’. 
33 
2.2 Hazard Analysis Methods in Industry and Healthcare 
Formal hazard analysis methods allow those responsible for design, planning or 
management of products, systems or processes to understand how these can 
fail (before they do) and to take steps to prevent this or mitigate the 
consequences.  
It was previously rare for formal risk assessments to be used in healthcare for 
the planning or management of treatments and ward based activities, with 
virtually no risk management in place in the UK until the late 1980’s (Walshe, 
2001). Risk assessment is now routinely used in the NHS for complex decision 
making on issues like surgery or the aggressive treatment of serious conditions, 
but little is done for more routine processes. 
As matters have progressed, the need has arisen for a more structured 
approach covering more aspects of the patient experience in a prospective, 
preventative manner. The NHS, as directed by the Department of Health 
(Department of Health,Sir Ian Carruthers OBE and Pauline Philip, 2006; 
Department of Health, 2002) and advocated by the NPSA (National Patient 
Safety Agency; National Patient Safety Agency, 2006), has begun to make use 
of hazard analysis as a means to address this. Since most prospective hazard 
analysis methods remain untried in a healthcare setting, this evaluation was 
undertaken to fill this need. 
There are over 100 methods for hazard analysis in existence (Lyons et al., 
2004). Many are variations of each other, but even when this is considered, 
there are still numerous techniques available. In his book ‘Hazard Analysis 
Techniques for System Safety’ (Ericson II, 2005c), Ericson details 22 that are 
often used, mainly in heavy industry. There are others regularly used in the 
‘softer’ side of many industries (e.g. customer services), that are not included in 
Ericson’s book. 
Seven techniques generally considered as well established within industry and 
presented at training courses held at Cranfield University (Tetlow et al. 2005) 
and at an external seminar (Boult et al., 2006) were considered for this 
research. They were all accessible to the researcher and expert knowledge on 
most of these was available on campus. A brief description of each follows, 
including any previous applications in healthcare. More detailed explanations 
and in depth discussions are available in Redmill (Redmill et al., 1999b), 
McDermott (McDermott, 1996) and Ericson (Ericson II, 2005c). Some further 
description of three of these is also provided in chapter 6. 
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2.2.1 Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) 
FMEA is described as an inductive2 method best suited for use as a detailed 
design technique (Ericson II, 2005b)(McDermott, 1996). It is useful for 
evaluating the effects of individual failures, but does not consider the effects of 
multiple failures.  
FMEA is capable of analysis down to system component level and can be 
generally applied; although it is more commonly used for device design or 
manufacturing process analysis (Arvanitoyannis and Varzakas, 2007). In normal 
practice, process assessments are undertaken separately from the analysis of 
physical system components. The results are presented in tabular form and 
include a Risk Priority Number (RPN) based on a ‘three dimensional’ risk 
assessment of ‘Likelihood’, ‘Severity’ and ‘Detection’ of each ‘Failure Mode’.   
Failure Modes and Effects Criticality Analysis (FMECA) is a slightly extended 
version of FMEA, with the additional assessment of the criticality of a failure to 
system reliability. 
There has been some application of FMEA in healthcare, and its use is 
advocated by organizations such as the Joint Commission (The Joint 
Commission, 2008), the Healthcare Commission and the NPSA. It has been 
applied in the assessment of the use of infusion devices(Fechter and Barba, 
2004) and is described by Spath in ways more generally applicable to 
healthcare(Spath, 2003).  Dhillon describes its use in the design of medical 
devices, paying particular attention to the consideration of human error(Dhillon, 
2000).  
It has been modified and used in healthcare by the Veterans Association in the 
USA, who renamed it ‘Healthcare FMEA (HFMEA)’. DeRosier et al mention in a 
publication describing HFMEA(DeRosier et al., 2002) that an assessment of 
FMEA was made, but their evaluation is not described and very little is provided 
on the outcome. HFMEA has been used to assess children’s oncology in the 
Netherlands (Van Tilburg et al., 2006) and the sterilization of surgical 
instruments(Linkin et al., 2005). 
                                            
2 Inductive and deductive refer to types of logic {{389 Ericson II, Clifton A. 2005; }}.  
Deductive reasoning is fact based and relies on the truth of a premise. It assumes an error has 
occurred and further analysis is based on known effects. Inductive reasoning is based on a 
wider premise and is more probabilistic in nature. It is less rigid, asking questions like ‘if this 
fails, what might happen?’ 
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2.2.2 Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) 
 
Figure 2-1. An example of part of a Fault Tree applied to oxygen therapy. 
FTA is, according to Ericson, a deductive method in the ‘system design hazard 
analysis type’ category (Ericson II, 2005b). The final result is mainly graphical in 
the form of a gated logic tree as in Figure 2-1, but can also include quantitative, 
probabilistic analysis. 
One of the results of an FTA is the production of ‘Cut Sets’, which are the 
minimal failures that can cause an adverse event and ‘Tie Sets’, which are the 
minimal conditions required for a functional system. Unlike FMEA, FTA is 
particularly useful for identifying multiple cause events and cascade failures, in 
which an initiating event causes a series of failures, one triggering the other. 
Fault trees have been used as part of ‘root cause analysis’ for the investigation 
of adverse events within healthcare for some time(Vincent, 2006b; National 
Patient Safety Agency). Their focus when applied in this way is retrospective 
and limited in scope to the event under investigation. No specific use of 
prospective FTA in a healthcare setting could be found in the literature, but 
some general comments on its use can be found in various places(Durand et 
al., 2007), most notably on the National Patient Safety Agency website(National 
Patient Safety Agency) and a discussion by Dhillon on its use for assessment of 
the reliability of medical devices(Dhillon, 2000). 
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2.2.3 Event Tree Analysis (ETA) 
ETA is also a deductive, mainly graphical method(Ericson II, 2005b). It focuses 
is on the events leading to an adverse event and the effect of barriers or 
contingencies. Figure 2-2 is an example of an Event Tree in both its generic 
descriptive form (top tree), and how it might be applied to one aspect of oxygen 
therapy (lower tree).  
Initiating Event
Contingency 1
Success
Failure
Success
Contingency 2
Cylinder Depletion
Depletion Detected
No Harm
Severe Harm or 
Death
Minor Harm
Patient monitoring warns of 
low blood oxygen
Yes
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
 
Figure 2-2. Example of an Event Tree 
A range of outcomes can be included to give a very thorough analysis of event 
sequences. Probability information can be added to the tree at each event 
branch, but these sometimes have a large element of uncertainty (Gressel and 
Gideon, 1991), especially in areas such as healthcare. It is possible to 
transcribe the tree into a tabular notation which focuses on the failure pathways 
and thus minimises the tree. 
Only one example of the use of Event Trees in healthcare could be found which 
focussed on the assessment of cardiac services in ambulances (Stoykova et al., 
2004).  
2.2.4 Hazard and Operability Analysis (HAZOP) 
HAZOP is both a deductive and an inductive method with a tabular format 
(Redmill et al., 1999a). Ericson places it in the preliminary and detailed design 
hazard analysis type categories (Ericson II, 2005b), making it an extremely 
versatile method. Developed by ICI in the 1970’s, HAZOP is applicable to many 
situations, including device, task or process analysis, but it is mostly used for 
process analysis. It is a team based method requiring a multidisciplinary panel 
of experts to provide input. It is based on the use of word models, applying 
guidewords to system or component attributes to describe possible deviations 
from intent. The results are presented in a tabular form with columns containing 
the hazard identification, the applied guideword, a description of the deviation, 
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the possible causes and the possible consequences. It also contains risk 
management information such as safeguards that might prevent an incident and 
a list of the actions necessary to put these in place. HAZOP is not supposed to 
be a one-off technique, but was designed to be a complete risk management 
system with feedback routes enabling constant updating of the assessments 
and risk management strategies (Redmill et al., 1999a). The technique is very 
useful during a design process for identifying hazards so that they can be 
“designed out”. 
No published reference to the use of HAZOP in any healthcare setting was 
found. Indirect reference was found as described by Redmill (Redmill et al., 
1999b). It is not clear why HAZOP seems unpopular, but it may be due to it 
being perceived as a purely engineering design method while methods which 
appear similar, like FMEA, have been used in a variety of applications from an 
early stage. It may also be that HAZOP is often seen as being very similar to 
FMEA, whereas the two are in fact quite different and complimentary (Redmill et 
al., 1999b). It is not unusual to find an FMEA, FTA or ETA within a HAZOP to 
clarify points of detail, causality or effect.  
2.2.5 The ‘Structured What-If Technique’ (SWIFT) 
SWIFT is a very creative, inductive method with both a graphical and a tabular 
outcome (Boult, 2006). What-if techniques of various types have been used 
widely in industry and are particularly suited to the construction of computerised 
expert decision support software (L. Fortuna, S. Graziani, M. G. 
Xibilia,G.Napoli, 2006; Thereska et al., 2005; Philippakis, 1988). SWIFT models 
can be drawn as event trees or entered into worksheets similar to those used in 
FMEA. The process involves brainstorming a topic to identify hazards which are 
then explored in sequence using ‘what-if’ questions to identify both causes and 
consequences (Anglia Ruskin University). Checklists constructed from a hazard 
list are used to ensure all identified hazards are examined and that no 
duplications occur. 
No specific examples of the use of SWIFT in healthcare and very little 
instructional literature could be found.  
2.2.6 Human Error Assessment and Reduction Technique (HEART) 
HEART is an inductive method with a tabular result designed for application to 
human factors only (Williams 1986). It does not identify hazards, but rather uses 
a numerical method to assign human error probabilities (HEPs) to events 
identified by task analysis. No published examples related to healthcare could 
be found. 
2.2.7 Technique for Human Error Rate Prediction (THERP) 
THERP is also used to assess only human factors. It uses a similar numerical 
method to HEART, but is more prescriptive in the task analysis categories used. 
Use is also made of an event tree and the associated algebra to assign 
probabilities and weighting factors to events. As with HEART, no published 
examples relating to healthcare could be found. 
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2.3 Oxygen Therapy 
2.3.1 Description 
Oxygen therapy is the practice of administering oxygen at concentrations higher 
than normal air to a patient for the reasons of: 
1. Alleviating symptoms of a condition affecting their ability to make full use 
of the 21% concentration of oxygen found in air. Examples include 
Asthma or dyspnoea (Nicola Cooper, 2004; Thomas, 2005) and Chronic 
Obstructive Pulmonary Disease (COPD)(Plant and Elliott, 2003; 
Wouters, 2004; Durrington et al., 2005). 
2. Attempting to prevent the possible onset of complications after surgery 
by pre and peri-operative oxygen supplementation (Belda et al., 2005; 
Kabon and Kurz, 2006; Weissman, 2005). 
The supply source is either a free standing cylinder, or a piped supply delivered 
to an outlet port on the ward. Pipelines are fed from a Vacuum Insulated 
Evaporator (VIE) or banks of cylinders. Flow is set by the use of an indexed 
fixed orifice selector or a combined flow meter and needle valve restrictor. Flow 
meters used in this application are usually Thorpe Tube rotameters of the type 
depicted in Figure 2-3.  
 
Figure 2-3. Thorpe Tube Flowmeter. 0 to 15 lpm at 60 Psi (4bar). 
From Therapy Equipment Ltd Specification sheet available at 
http://www.therapyequipment.co.uk 
Humidifiers should be employed when the flow rate is higher than about 2 Litres 
per Minute (Lpm), or if therapy is administered over prolonged periods. These 
are normally simple bubble humidifiers (White, 2004a). The guideline at Bedford 
Hospital states that the therapy should be humidified after a patient has 
received general anaesthetic or requires more than 28% of oxygen.  
Tubing is used to conduct the oxygen to a patient connected device such as a 
face mask or nasal cannula (also known as prongs or specs). If the therapy is 
not to be humidified, a standard tubing set of 1.5m to 3m long and internal 
diameter of 5mm can be used. If the therapy is to be humidified, 22mm 
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diameter tubing must be used to prevent water being forced into the tube thus 
creating a drowning or tube occlusion hazard. 
Nasal cannulae are simple hollow tubes with prongs that insert into the nostrils. 
Figure 2-4 shows a typical example. Nasal cannulae produce a variable 
concentration of oxygen that depends on the oxygen flow rate and the breathing 
characteristics of the patient. They can easily become blocked by nasal 
discharge and often cause irritation to the ears, nose and upper lip. If a patient 
breathes through the mouth, very little supplemental oxygen will be taken into 
the lungs. They allow the patient to talk and eat normally and can be worn while 
asleep. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2-4. Nasal cannula. 
©BMJ Publishing Group Ltd, Reproduced with permission from the BMJ Publishing 
Group. Cooper, N; Acute care: Treatment with oxygen; student BMJ 2004;12:45-88 
February; http://www.studentbmj.com/issues/04/02/education/56.php 
Figure 2-5 is an example of a simple face mask, also known as a Hudson mask. 
This device also produces a variable oxygen concentration dependent on flow 
rate and breathing. Some people find them uncomfortable or completely 
intolerable. They become dislodged easily and cannot be comfortably worn 
while sleeping. Talking is difficult and eating or drinking is impossible. 
 
 
Figure 2-5. Simple or Hudson mask. 
©BMJ Publishing Group ltd, Reproduced with permission from the BMJ Publishing 
Group.  Cooper, N; Acute care: Treatment with oxygen; student BMJ 2004;12:45-88 
February; http://www.studentbmj.com/issues/04/02/education/56.php 
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Figure 2-6 is an example of another variable concentration mask. This type is 
usually called a non-rebreathing mask, trauma mask, or sometimes a reservoir-
bag mask. They are used when a high concentration of oxygen up to 
approximately 90% needs to be delivered. These mostly overcome the dead 
space problem with the Hudson mask by using a series of one way valves and 
a reservoir of oxygen from which the patient can draw. They are however, still a 
variable concentration device.  
In order to give high concentrations of oxygen, the flow of oxygen to the bag 
needs to be higher than the volume breathed in by the patient per minute 
(Minute Volume). The bag needs to be refilled during the time the patient is 
breathing out (expiration). For this to happen, the flow of oxygen needs to at 
least equal to:  
n timeInspiratio
FlowOxygen -Volume) Tidal (Inspiredin  breathed  volumeThe  
Equation 2-1. Calculation of minimum flow rate for reservoir bags. 
Due to the one way valves, there is a danger of severely increasing the work 
required for breathing if too little oxygen is flowing to refill the bag.  
 
 
Figure 2-6. Non-rebreathing mask. 
©BMJ Publishing Group ltd, Reproduced with permission from the BMJ Publishing 
Group.  Cooper, N; Acute care: Treatment with oxygen; student BMJ 2004;12:45-88 
February; http://www.studentbmj.com/issues/04/02/education/56.php 
When a more accurate oxygen percentage is required, a ‘venturi’ mask is used, 
as shown in Figure 2-7. These can give up to 50% oxygen at high flow rates, 
which eliminates the problem of re-breathing by expelling all expired gasses 
from the mask. These masks work on the Bernoulli principle to generate an 
increase in flow rate and the viscous shearing effect (White, 2004b) to entrain 
air to mix with the injected oxygen. 
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Figure 2-7. Venturi mask. 
©BMJ Publishing Group ltd, Reproduced with permission from the BMJ Publishing 
Group.  Cooper, N; Acute care: Treatment with oxygen; student BMJ 2004;12:45-88 
February; http://www.studentbmj.com/issues/04/02/education/56.php 
2.3.2 Hazards 
The two most significant adverse outcomes for patients receiving oxygen 
therapy are hyperoxia (too much oxygen) and hypoxia (too little oxygen). 
Hyperoxia affects only a small proportion of patients; neonates and those with 
CO2 retention. Hypoxia affects everyone, but those with a high need for 
supplemental oxygen are at greater risk. 
If one considers the old saying "it's not the fall that kills you, it's the sudden stop 
at the end", then hypoxia and hyperoxia are analogous to the sudden stop. It 
was however, the hazards that form the reasons for the “fall” which were of 
most interest in this research.  
A hazard is defined by Ericson as “Any real or potential condition that can cause 
injury, illness or death to personnel; damage to or loss of a system, equipment 
or property; or damage to the environment (MIL-STD-882D). A potentially 
unsafe condition resulting from failures, malfunctions, external events, errors or 
a combination thereof (SAE ARP-4761).”(Ericson II, 2005a) In the context of 
this research, these are a range of errors and failures which often combine to 
construct the events that create an incident.  
Human error has been the focus of much of the research in the area of oxygen 
therapy, with some studies looking at the way in which accessories are used 
(Small et al., 1992)(Attia et al., 2004; Cooper, 2002; Gravil et al., 1997), while 
others have explored the use of patient monitoring (Al-Mobeireek and Abba, 
2002), prescriptions (Dodd et al., 2000) or the effects of training and guidelines 
(Akbar and Campbell, 2006; Kor and Lim, 2000). 
Latent errors (Reason, 1999b) are those made at a higher level in a system and 
can remain dormant until specific conditions are met. They form one of a 
number of external factors and are usually innocently made management 
decisions affecting systems such as purchasing or operating procedure. The 
purchase of a particular brand or type of consumable, combined with the 
omission of another, may place a patient with a rare condition at risk. A decision 
on ward layout may mean that a particular bed space may have no piped supply 
and has to rely on cylinders; which places that patient at risk of cylinder 
depletion. Latent errors also include poorly written or erroneously compiled 
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protocols or guidelines, which may be more hazardous than having no 
guidelines at all. 
2.3.3 Hyperoxia 
If caught quickly many complications are reversible, but permanent lung injuries 
are possible and retinal damage is especially likely in preterm infants. Most of 
the literature involving hyperoxia is to do with premature infants who are given 
high doses of oxygen. This group of patients can be affected by a condition 
called ‘Retinopathy of Prematurity (ROP)’, previously known as ‘Retrolental 
Fibroplasia’ or ‘Terry’s syndrome’(Patz 1975). The blood vessels in the retina 
are affected which causes retinal detachment. The retina is then converted to a 
fibrous retrolental (behind the lens) membrane.(CJ et al., 1997; Harling et al., 
2005; Hay and Bell, 2000)   
Incidents where oxygen therapy exacerbated breathing problems affecting 
paediatric patients have also been reported (Berger et al., 2000). Death is 
possible but is thought to be mostly as a result of complications caused by the 
resultant injury, or the patients’ existing condition, rather than the injury itself.  
Various problems can result from hyperoxia in adults. The one which appears to 
be of most concern is ‘oxygen induced hypercapnia’, which seems to have a 
number of causes. It is probably some combination of the following and possibly 
more: Constriction of vessels in the lungs as a response to high levels of 
Oxygen causes a change in the way gasses are perfused in the lungs, and 
partial pressure of CO2 in the blood rises as a result. Reduced ventilatory drive 
and hence low minute ventilation is a further possible contributory factor 
(Calverley, 2000).  
Another problem exists where a combination of elevated O2 and too little CO2 in 
arterial blood can cause an over-reactive constriction of the cerebral blood 
vessels. This can cause dizziness, confusion, convulsions and lack of 
consciousness until the balance is restored (Cooper, 2004).  
The Haldane effect contributes when haemoglobin is saturated with Oxygen. 
The molecule’s ability to carry CO2 is therefore reduced, causing elevated levels 
of free CO2. (Van Wynsberghe et al., 1995b) This in turn means that there is an 
increase in the number of hydrogen ions in solution, which may have an effect 
on a number of chemical balances in the gas transport mechanism.  
Nitrogen is required as a medium for maintaining the inflation of the alveoli in 
the lungs. If 100% oxygen is used for too long, the nitrogen is expelled and the 
alveoli can collapse, causing absorption atelectasis (collapsed lung).  
Patients with Chronic Obstructive Pulmonary Disease (COPD) appear to be the 
adult group most at risk to hyperoxia. A few of these patients have a high 
baseline CO2 level to which their physiology has adapted. This means that they 
rely on the hypoxic drive mechanism to increase their respiratory rate. If they 
then receive a high concentration of oxygen which pushes their levels of oxygen 
over a threshold specific to them, their respiration rate falls and they can 
experience type two respiratory failure.  
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Some clinical scientists claim that inspired oxygen concentrations of as low as 
24% can be dangerous to these patients, and advise that it is better to maintain 
a blood Oxygen saturation of 87% to 92% in patients with COPD rather than to 
aim at the more usual 98%(Plant and Elliott, 2003).  
Most agree that these patients are very rare and that the advantages of 
applying oxygen outweigh the possible adverse effects. There is also the 
argument that since oxygen therapy is applied in a clinical setting where prompt 
action is possible, it should be given in all cases (Benditt, 2000). 
Oxer seems to make light of the risks to some patients of having too much 
oxygen, describing the hazard as “myth” (Oxer, 1999). Oxer strongly criticises 
the various authorities for giving the impression that supplemental oxygen is an 
advanced, skilled procedure that requires special training, thereby discouraging 
some people from using oxygen in emergency situations.  Numerous studies 
are sited that show the benefit of oxygen therapy, but none that conclusively 
prove there to be any major risk.  
The main thrust of Oxer’s paper is that during resuscitation following cardiac 
arrest, as much oxygen as possible needs to get to the alveoli in order for there 
to be a good chance that hypoxic tissue will become re-oxygenated. The breath 
of someone giving expired air resuscitation (mouth-to-mouth) contains only 16% 
oxygen at best. It is easy to follow the reasoning that a face mask capable of 
delivering a flow of oxygen to increase the amount available to the patient 
during resuscitation can only help give them a better chance of survival.  
2.3.4 Hypoxia 
The problems associated with hypoxia (too little inspired oxygen) and 
hypoxaemia (too little oxygen in the blood) are well known. Hypoxia can cause 
permanent brain damage or death after only a few minutes. Sometimes, when 
the hypoxic event occurs at birth or soon after, the damage is difficult to asses 
and is only evident under extreme diagnostic procedures such as Magnetic 
Resonance Spectroscopy (Gadian et al., 2000). It would appear however that if 
no symptoms are present at 18 months, that no further significant problems are 
likely to occur later (Kjellmer et al., 2002). The consequences are however more 
often catastrophic in everyone; hypoxia is definitely to be avoided. 
There are some patients who are at a higher risk due to an increased likelihood 
of hypoxia. Ventilatory responses are adversely affected in patients who are 
receiving or taking opiate drugs like morphine or heroin, which can lead to 
respiratory rate changes and hypoxia (Teichtahl et al., 2005). Patients with 
asthma, COPD, bronchitis or other lung infections are at high risk of hypoxia if 
oxygen therapy is interrupted. 
There are also some special cases. Weinberg et al describe the factors which 
affect the care of the pregnant trauma patient (Weinberg et al., 2005). The 
trauma team have, in effect, two patients to deal with. Pregnant women are less 
tolerant to sudden changes in available oxygen, and care must be taken to 
protect mother and child. The functional residual capacity of a pregnant woman 
at term is reduced by about 20% due to the enlarged uterus pushing the 
diaphragm up into the chest cavity. This combined with the increase in oxygen 
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consumption of ‘both patients’ predisposes pregnant women to rapid 
desaturation. 
2.3.5 Prescription and Administration 
It has long been known that oxygen is not well prescribed by doctors, especially 
when compared to other medications. Small et al (Small et al., 1992) conducted 
a study in 1990 of the use of oxygen compared to antibiotics in a general 
hospital in the United States of America. It was discovered that approximately 
28% of patients were having oxygen therapy and had oxygen therapy noted in 
their nursing and medication chart without a doctors’ prescription. They also 
noted that there was oxygen therapy equipment in the rooms of approximately a 
further 18% of patients without a prescription and no note made in the nursing 
chart. It is not clear whether this equipment was in use at the time, but its 
presence implies that it may have been in use at some time. There was no 
mention of instances of antibiotics being used without a prescription.  
Oxygen therapy is not always well administered and is often poorly monitored. 
Small et al (1992) noted that in 34% of cases where patients had been 
prescribed oxygen, the oxygen supply was found to be turned off. They also 
found that face masks and cannulae were incorrectly worn in 57% of cases.  
There appeared to be far fewer cases of misadministration of antibiotics, but the 
limitations of the comparative study must be considered. For example; they do 
not know that the nurses administered the antibiotic correctly, only that they 
wrote on the chart that they had administered it. It is perhaps impossible to tell if 
a patient has received antibiotics without a prescription and without a note in the 
nursing chart.  
This is partly acknowledged by Small et al (1992), who made the assumption 
that the notes on antibiotics administration on the patients nursing chart were 
correct. The cooperation of the patient is also required. Together, these points 
make a comparison very difficult, and only loosely relevant. It does however 
serve the purpose of illustrating that there is a lack of care in the use of oxygen. 
It might be argued however that antibiotics are more likely to cause adverse 
reactions, making staff more cautious in their use. Antibiotics are also more 
strictly monitored through procedure and by pharmacists and thus less likely to 
be misused.  
The chart system for the notation of drug dispensing widely used on wards may 
not be very appropriate for the setting up or monitoring of oxygen therapy. Dodd 
et al (Dodd et al., 2000) conducted two audits of prescriptions of oxygen therapy 
in the North West Lung Centre in Manchester in the UK during 1997 and 1998. 
One was done before and one after a prescription chart specifically for oxygen 
was introduced instead of the standard form.  
They found after the first audit using the original chart that only 55% of patients 
having oxygen therapy had actually had it prescribed. They also found that only 
7% of prescriptions were accurately written out. The accuracy of prescriptions 
improved after the new chart was introduced, going from 7% to 94% for those 
patients with the new chart and to 63% for those still with the original.  
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Akbar et al discovered in a similar audit of a teaching hospital in the UK during 
1999, that only 30% of patients had been accurately prescribed oxygen therapy 
(Akbar and Campbell, 2006). This compares well with Small et al (1992).  
2.3.6 Guidelines 
An extensive search for guidelines on the administration of oxygen therapy was 
undertaken, but very little was found on this subject. Local guidelines were 
available on the intranet site of one hospital in the study and a guideline 
produced by the American Association for Respiratory Care was found 
(Kallstrom 2002). This guideline is not very detailed and gives no advice on 
assessment of cylinder content or the need for humidification. 
During their study, Akbar et al (2006) implemented new guidelines on oxygen 
prescription. They found that doctors’ prescription practices did not change after 
implementation of new guidelines, but that nurses did improve their practices. 
The studies by Dodd et al (2000) and Akbar et al (2006) show how different 
professional groups are affected by different strategies. Nurses appear more 
likely to be influenced by guidelines, whereas doctors were not influenced to 
any significant degree. Doctors and nurses were however both influenced by a 
new prescription chart.  
Guidelines are thus not enough on their own. If not used or badly constructed, 
they can be detrimental and need to be backed up with policy to encourage 
good practice. Alan McLenaghan, Managing Director of Saint-Gobain Glass, UK 
said in an article on page 22 of the December 2007 issue of ‘Engineering and 
Technology’:  
“If you ask me, while company policies don’t act as motivators, a distinct 
lack of or poorly formulated policies can very quickly demotivate people.” 
Kor and Lim also found a significant number of cases where masks and 
cannulae were incorrectly worn (Kor and Lim, 2000). More importantly, they 
found that 78% of patients were receiving inappropriate therapy; 3% were 
getting too little oxygen, while 75% were getting too much. This was so even 
after an educational programme to encourage the use of oxygen saturation 
monitors.  
Al-Mobeireek and Abba also found deviations from prescriptions and 
inappropriate use of oxygen therapy in two hospitals in Saudi Arabia (Al-
Mobeireek and Abba, 2002). This and the study by Kor and Lim (2000) were 
also concerned with cost saving; they both mention the excessive amount of 
oxygen used. A 63% reduction was possible in the case of the study by Al-
Mobeireek and Abba (2002). 
2.3.7 Clinical Concerns 
Many studies have been carried out to examine the effects of oxygen in terms 
of the human physiology, or a particular disease or condition (Berger et al., 
2000; Bitterman, 2004; Cohn, 2001; Fisher, 1980). Many of the clinical risks are 
known, especially relating to high risk patient groups like those with Chronic 
Obstructive Pulmonary Disease (COPD)or the very young (Patz 1975; Hay and 
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Bell, 2000; Cohn, 2001; Reedy, 2004). The advantages for the very ill are also 
known, and likely outweigh the risks when it comes to the decision on whether 
to administer oxygen (Benditt, 2000).  
Benditt presents many of the clinical hazards of oxygen therapy (Benditt, 2000) 
and provides a very interesting discussion on the pros and cons of oxygen for a 
range of disorders, especially COPD. Again though very little, except fire, is 
mentioned about the non clinical hazards, with no mention at all about the risk 
of undetected sudden total loss of supply.  
These publications and others (Cooper, 2002; Fisher, 1980) look at very 
specific issues and seem to completely overlook the serious issue of patients 
not receiving oxygen when they need it. Gravil et al even go so far as to make a 
rather disturbing statement in their ‘Audit of Oxygen Therapy’ in 1997 (Gravil et 
al., 1997) that “oxygen therapy should not be routinely administered without 
knowledge of arterial blood gases and oxygen saturations.” Taking arterial 
blood samples is a painful procedure and by the time they have the results, the 
patient could be dead. 
2.3.8 Fire 
West provides a detailed examination of the problem of fire with oxygen 
enrichment, focusing on long term home therapy (West and Primeau, 1983). 
They found for example, that below about 40% oxygen concentration, ignition 
could not be sustained in nasal cannulae. This may be valuable if there is ever 
a consideration to limit the concentration for home use. 
The American Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM) published a collection 
of papers (Various, 1988) focussing on the problem of materials becoming 
flammable in oxygen enriched environments. A more recent publication is also 
available (Hervve Barthelemy et al., 2006). 
Hydrocarbons and some metal alloys become explosively flammable in the 
presence of compressed oxygen, making the use of some common materials 
such as aluminium and steel unsuitable for use in this context.  
Nylon cannot be used with high pressure oxygen and so polytetraflouroethylene 
(PTFE) is commonly used for sealants and lubricants because it is more 
compatible with oxygen. 
2.3.9 Current Interest 
There is ongoing interest in oxygen therapy within the academic literature. A 
recent publication in India by Jindal expresses the need for a review of oxygen 
therapy, describes how patients should be assessed and how the therapy 
should be specified (Jindal, 2008). Surprisingly little detail is given of the 
hazards associated with administering oxygen from a clinical management 
perspective.  
A literature search for the keywords “oxygen” and “elderly” found 80 results, 
most of which (22) related to surgery and anaesthesia. eleven related to 
exercise and O2 consumption, and nine to lung disease. The rest were a mix of 
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psychiatry, general physiology, metabolic physiology and the effectiveness of 
long term O2 therapy. 
It is very difficult to find any statistics to assess the level of serious harm caused 
by oxygen therapy itself. A report sent to the researcher from the National 
Patient Safety Agency (NPSA) suggests that the number of people harmed 
each year could be quite a lot higher than most expectations. The sample in the 
report is too small for any meaningful statistical analysis, but suggests that 
approximately nine deaths could be caused each year as a result of adverse 
incidents where a failure of oxygen therapy was the focus of the incident.  
2.4 Systems and Complexity 
Of considerable importance in this research was the consideration of a ward 
based therapy as a sub system of ward based healthcare. This in turn is a 
complex subsystem as depicted in Figure 2-8, one of many in the extremely 
complex system of healthcare. Although it is not necessary for the reader to be 
fully versed on the finer points of complexity science, it is useful to have a 
description of how its fundamentals relate to ward based care. 
 
Figure 2-8. The complex system of ward based care. The arrows indicate influence, with 
the size providing an indication of level. 
A complex system is defined by some as one that contains elements from the 
six principles of complexity assimilated by Webb from work by Stacey in which 
Patient 
Nurse 
Consultant 
Doctor 
Organisation 
Government 
Therapy Monitoring 
Porter 
Technologist 
48 
eight insights to complex systems are discussed (Webb, 2006; Stacey, 2003) 
All these are found in ward based care in the following ways: 
Self organization and emergence: 
This is evident from the autonomy by which senior nurses and especially ward 
doctors conduct their duties. Both these professions are based on training 
which is firstly theoretical and then heavily practice based. This allows 
individuals to find the methods and techniques that work best for them and to 
formulate their own. 
Diversity: 
Diversity is manifest in a variety of forms, from the range of professional and 
practical skills present to the differences in attitudes, personalities and abilities 
of those delivering the care. 
Edge of chaos: 
Some of the work done on hospital wards requires dealing with situations that 
are unprecedented and can at times be extremely dynamic. An incredible 
amount of creativity is required when dealing with these situations on ‘the edge 
of chaos’, and they can lead to highly valuable learning and innovation. 
History and time: 
History and time play an important role in any experience based endeavour. It is 
not only the history within the ward that has an effect however, but also that of 
the health service in general, which percolates down to the front of healthcare.  
Time and timing are both crucial for a number of reasons. The more time a 
patient spends on the ward, the more likely they are to experience an adverse 
event. “A patient is at some risk of an incident throughout their hospital stay, 
and it follows that the longer their stay, the longer the exposure to the risk of an 
adverse incident.” (Scobie and Thomson, 2005). The length of the patients stay 
also affects the cost incurred in their treatment. The bed occupancy needs to be 
constantly assessed so that hospital management can plan patient movements 
and admissions; longer stays result in less flexibility. 
Unpredictability: 
Almost every situation facing clinical professionals is unique. No two patients 
are the same and often provide their carers with some new challenge. Ward 
staff also have to deal with the admission of patients outside their own 
speciality. When bed occupancy is high, a Chinese puzzle ensues in which 
patients are moved between wards to make room. This leads to cases where 
surgical patients may end up on medical wards or vice versa. This 
unpredictability requires a dynamic system, but it needs to be robust as well to 
give all patients the level of care they require and society and legislation expect. 
Patterns: 
As unpredictable, dynamic and sometimes chaotic the system is, patterns still 
emerge. Patients are monitored, fed, medicated, washed and many other things 
to schedule. Porters and nurses move patients to and from surgery and 
diagnostic imaging using the same procedure time after time. Some of these 
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processes are formalised, many are not; emerging from a combination of local 
leadership and personal preference. 
These descriptions leave no doubt about the validity of placing ward based 
healthcare in the domain of complex adaptive systems (Scobie and Thomson, 
2005). To therefore expect such a system to run smoothly without proper 
hazard management is not logical or professional.  
Hazard analysis of a complex system cannot be carried out without clear 
system representations. To facilitate a robust hazard assessment, the oxygen 
therapy system had to be defined in a way that helped make sense of the 
complexity and identified the boundaries within which the analysis was to be 
undertaken. The system diagram and task analysis flow chart for oxygen 
therapy (Figure 4-9 and Figure 4-10) were constructed from the author’s own 
experience combined with information gathered during observational research 
and verified by consultation with senior nurses and consultant anaesthetists.  
2.5 Conclusion. 
The healthcare environment is a complex and dynamic one with loosely defined 
methods and procedures that result in a widely variable range of approaches to 
most therapies and styles of patient and ward management. This makes it a 
very difficult area for hazard and risk assessment. The safety of patients in any 
health care environment and the quality of care they receive are of paramount 
importance. A failure to provide these fundamental needs has devastating 
effects on the patient, their families (Vincent, 2006a) and the professionals 
caring for them (Leape, 2006). 
There are also financial, economic and efficiency issues to consider. If a patient 
is killed or severely injured, large compensation settlements can result. 
Prolonged stays in hospital cost the establishment more (Jones, 2006), 
especially if additional care is required to deal with incident induced injury.  
The patient’s extended stay may have detrimental effects on their own finances, 
which may be passed on to the hospital through litigation. The extended 
occupation of a bed may also mean that other patients requiring care or 
treatment have to wait longer than expected, increasing waiting lists and making 
bed management difficult. Bad press due to publicly perceived sub-standard 
care can have additional severe detrimental effects on the reputation of 
individuals, hospitals and the healthcare organization as a whole. 
Examining what can go wrong ‘at the coal face’ of secondary healthcare is a 
difficult task and has, in general, been poorly addressed. It was to begin to 
identify a suitable approach for hazard analysis in this context that this research 
was undertaken. The choice of methods for hazard analysis is staggering 
(Lyons et al., 2004). Very few have been used in healthcare and those that 
have were applied to very specific subjects. The seven reviewed in this chapter; 
FMEA, FTA, ETA, HAZOP, SWIFT, HEART and THERP, were those available 
to the researcher and they are briefly described. Of these, direct reference to 
use in healthcare could only be found for FMEA, FTA and ETA. Some indirect 
references were found relating to HAZOP. A further choice reduction is made in 
chapter 6, based partly on the results from this review. 
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Oxygen therapy was described focusing on its administration and management. 
Some of the major hazards and current research interests were discussed. It is 
concluded that the variation in process and practice combined with the variation 
in equipment available for administering oxygen makes for a complex stew of 
hazards and potential error. 
The concept of complexity is discussed in the final section, illustrating how the 
six principles of complexity apply to ward based care. The methods used to 
make sense of oxygen therapy before any hazard analyses could be made 
were also briefly discussed. 
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Chapter 3 Methodology and Methods 
Abstract 
This chapter discusses the methodological philosophy and how the ‘Pragmatist’ 
epistemological position taken informed the formulation of the research 
protocol. 
The nature of this research necessitated the use of evidence based data to 
inform the compilation of a comprehensive hazard list. A range of empirical 
research methods were considered, including; direct observations, interviews, 
questionnaires, evaluation tests, simulation and document review. 
The research design process, including the choice of methods for the empirical 
studies is discussed. The methods and their application are examined along 
with the expectations of problems and planned contingencies. 
3.1 Methodology 
3.1.1 The Pragmatist Philosophy 
The last two decades have seen a lot of debate on the philosophy of research 
and the various stances taken in the researchers ‘view of the world’. Although 
claimed mainly by those involved in the Social Sciences, these philosophies 
have wide ranging relevance. The research in this project is strongly linked to 
organizational and clinical risk management which are subjects related to the 
Social Sciences.  
The methodology adopted in this research is based around the ‘Pragmatist’ 
approach advocated by Colin Robson in his book entitled “Real World 
Research” (Robson, 2002e), in which he provides a clear explanation and 
literature review on the subject of approaches to social research.  
Positivism, which according to Robson was first described by the 19th century 
philosopher Auguste Comte, takes a very narrow view of explanation. One of its 
central tenets is that if an observation can be directly related to a general law, 
then it has been explained. It also holds the belief that fact born from the 
application of stringent procedures to quantitative data is the only path to the 
truth and that science is ‘value free’. Positivists believe that reality exists in one 
form only and that scientists must strive to discover and describe it(Silverman, 
2006).  
Post positivism is a slightly less entrenched view than the original positivist 
philosophy. In this view, although there is still only one reality, it cannot be fully 
known or accurately described. Objective testing of hypotheses is still the 
central creed, but tempered with the understanding that it is possible for the 
researchers own values and underlying biases to affect the result of their 
observations.  
Relativism is the other end of the scale, where the belief is that there is no 
reality other than that created in the human consciousness.  In contrast to 
positivism, there is no more truth in a ‘scientific opinion’ than any other and 
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personal values play an important role in describing the world.  Purely 
qualitative methods are used and no attempt is made to discover a common 
reality. 
Constructivism is the slightly more tempered version of relativism in which it is 
still held that there are many social constructs (hence the name) of reality, but 
that a construct can be formed which is acceptable and understood by more 
than one person. Qualitative methods are used which allow the researcher to 
view a subject from more than one perspective. 
The ‘Pragmatist’ approach is located on the continuum between the ‘Post 
Positivist’ and ‘Constructivist’ approaches. It is part of the ‘Critical Realist’ 
philosophy and allows the researcher the freedom to make use of the research 
methods which work best for the task at hand, providing the choice of the best 
of both methodologies. This endows the research with a rich mix of qualitative 
and quantitative methods, providing the ‘value laden results from enquiry and 
the theory laden results from proven fact’ (Robson, 2002e). 
Critical realism adopts the ontology of an underlying reality that is complex and 
perceived differently by individuals in various ‘strata’ such as society, biology, 
institutional and more. In epistemological terms, it is concerned with the diverse 
outcomes dependent on the actions of various ‘mechanisms’ applied in a range 
of contexts (Robson, 2002e). 
For example: A candle will light when a mechanism for combustion such as a 
flame is applied (along with fuel and oxygen) in the action of touching it to a 
wick bound in wax when there is a requirement for light (the context). A number 
of counter mechanisms, like a strong breeze or the presence of rain, may 
prevent the candle from being lit. The action may not take place if no 
mechanism is available, light is not required or is available in a different form. 
It is the role of the researcher to observe, either directly or through 
experimentation, the various outcomes resulting from the range of actions, 
mechanisms and counter mechanisms within an assortment of contexts in order 
to describe the strata of reality available to them. Although these descriptions 
can be made, they cannot be used to precisely predict outcome. They can 
however be used to determine the probability of possible outcomes. 
In terms of this research: Structured hazard analysis is being tested as a means 
to describe the mechanisms which may come into play when certain actions 
take place in a range of contexts within ward based therapies. The probability of 
outcomes may be assessed with this knowledge and if the outcome looks more 
likely to be adverse, counter mechanisms might be engaged to swing the 
probability closer to a preferred outcome. 
Robson explains that research should be carried out with a ‘scientific attitude’ 
(Robson, 2002a), which entails being: 
1. Systematic; taking care to clearly define the scope and reasons for the 
research. The methods must be well designed with due consideration 
given to exactly how the research will be conducted and the researcher’s 
role in it. 
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2. Sceptical; having an open mind, allowing for ideas to be rejected and 
providing a platform for scrutiny. 
3. Ethical; ensuring that the interests of all parties affected by the research 
are taken into account and safeguarded. 
While these positions are likely true for any philosophical viewpoint, they fit 
particularly well with the pragmatic stance.  
3.2 The Consideration of Empirical Methods  
3.2.1 Observation 
Direct observation has been used before in healthcare research, including 
nursing based studies (Zeitz 2005; Thomas et al., 2004; Hasson et al., 2005). 
There are two main categories of observational methods; participant and non-
participant (Mulhall, 2003; Carthey, 2003; Blaxter et al., 1996b; Robson, 2002d). 
These can have a structured approach in which some key elements are 
watched for and noted according to frequency or other quantitative metrics, 
while qualitative data like clarity of speech or fluency of action might also be 
collected.  
They might have an unstructured approach in which an observer notes 
deviations from normal practice or mannerisms or patterns of action. These can 
be combined in a wide variety of ways to suit the particular research subject. 
Data collection can be in written form such as structured pro-forma, free text or 
in diary format, or in electronic form like video or vocal recordings. 
In a search for previous observational research designs, no pre-existing flexible 
qualitative tool could be found in the literature, although some advice on their 
design was available from Mulhall (Mulhall, 2003) and Robson (Robson, 
2002d).  
Fitzpatrick et al give an account of their experience in the use of a structured 
quantitative tool, but do not supply many details about the tool itself (Fitzpatrick 
et al., 1996). Their review of the literature however, provides useful insights into 
many of the problems encountered in non-participant observation. 
Most observational studies in healthcare research have followed a very 
structured and controlled method such as those described by Fitzpatrick et al, 
Undre et al (Undre et al., 2006) and Zietz, (Zeitz 2005), employing quantitative 
methodologies and relying mainly on statistical analysis.   
Much of the research found was concerned with the behavioural aspects of 
those involved in healthcare. A study by Creedon for example, used a 
combination of observations and questionnaires to investigate the behaviour of 
healthcare professionals with relation to hand hygiene (Creedon, 2006). 
A few studies have been, in a way, slightly covert with the observer integrating 
into the group being studied and participating in the activity under scrutiny so 
that there is a total immersion. An example of this is the doctoral research by 
Andrews investigating another behavioural issue; that of nurses making a case 
to clinicians to review patients (Andrews, 2003).  As a registered nurse, he was 
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able to insinuate himself into the research environment and thus become 
unobtrusive and almost invisible as a researcher. 
Those studies that addressed the issue of healthcare provision itself as the 
focus of the research mostly took the form of audits (Gravil et al., 1997)(Kor and 
Lim, 2000)(Dodd et al., 2000)(Al-Mobeireek and Abba, 2002).  
It was seen that each of the methods of observation and audit had merit in this 
subject area and so a combination of the two was devised that complimented 
each other. Structured observations entered into a pro-forma to ensure the 
collection of some core data was combined with open free text to describe the 
events observed. The fast-paced, cross-sectional snapshot method often used 
in audits, facilitated some descriptive statistics and targeted observations. 
Observational studies can be very time consuming as they require considerable 
manual effort at every stage of the process. Making notes while observing 
events in real time can be very tiring as a great deal of concentration is 
required. This leads to the need for frequent breaks which also consumes more 
time.  
The notes have to be transcribed, entered into a database or some other 
analysis device and these transcriptions have to be read and coded and 
analysed in some way. It is therefore important to clearly define the methods 
used for this and to set limits of time and/or number of observations to prevent 
taking too long while still collecting enough relevant data. 
It was felt that direct observation was essential for this research as it could 
provide both an evidence base for the compilation of a hazard list and give the 
researcher an insight and ‘feel’ for the unquantifiable qualities of ward activities. 
A flexible approach was taken with a combination of structured audit and free 
narrative text. The data from these was entered into a custom built database for 
review and analysis. 
The presence of a researcher in the field of study can influence the behaviour of 
those undertaking the task being observed. This is well documented in the 
literature (Mulhall, 2003; Robson, 2002e; Fitzpatrick et al., 1996; Grady and 
Wallston, 1988a). In order to minimise these effects, neither the ward staff nor 
the patients were told exactly what was being observed, except that it was 
linked to patient safety. Information sheets (Appendix A1) were available to 
those who required a more detailed explanation. Notices were also posted on 
the wards (see Appendix A2) to indicate that observations were being carried 
out. 
3.2.2 Interviews 
Interviews are commonly used in operational and social research. They too can 
be structured or unstructured and are sometimes combined with observational 
methods (Robson, 2002e). A rich depth of information can be gained from them 
by a skilled practitioner, especially with the use of devices like prompts 
(suggestions made by the interviewer) and probes (enquiring glances, periods 
of silence or “hmmmm”). They are especially useful if qualitative analysis is to 
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be carried out to detect subtle details like body language or to collect useful 
vignettes. 
Interviews suffer many of the same problems as observations, with some added 
complications like subjects that don’t want the interview to end, or are late for 
appointments. Transcription from recording equipment can also be tedious and 
error prone.  
Due to the fact that ward staff would have to have been removed from their 
duties for an extended time while being interviewed, there was a risk to the 
quality of patient care; it was thought very likely that many would choose not to 
participate for this reason. Interviews were therefore deemed inappropriate. 
3.2.3 Questionnaires 
Some researchers seem to consider questionnaires to be a purely quantitative 
method (Silverman, 2006) and others appear to see them only as one of the 
tools for the collection of survey data (Robson, 2002e). If however, they are 
viewed as a simplified extension of an interviewer, they can be used as an 
alternative to interviews when access to interviewees is an issue or there is a 
large sample population.  
Some time is still required from the participants, but this can be reduced and the 
responder can complete it according to their own schedule. A questionnaire can 
however cause a loss of depth to the data as body language, tone and side 
remarks can not be recorded (Robson, 2002e). 
A great deal of thought and design is required in order for questionnaires to be 
effective (Blaxter et al., 1996a) and although validated designs are available for 
purchase or distribution from specialist survey agencies (e.g. MORI (Ipsos 
MORI, 2008)), these are mostly marketing or politically focussed.  
Transcription of interviews is extremely time-consuming whereas much of a 
questionnaire may not require this. Instead of the time being consumed talking 
to people as in interviews, there is often a long wait for the required number of 
responses to be returned, although this time can be constructively used. 
Response rates to questionnaires can be extremely low, possibly invalidating a 
study. 
Since interviews were not feasible, it was decided that a questionnaire would be 
the most effective alternative in order to benefit from the valuable tacit 
knowledge and experience of professionals engaged in ward based care.  
Questionnaires are common in healthcare research and have been used in 
many topic areas including domiciliary oxygen therapy (Neri et al., 2006/5). 
Those studies concerned with hazards or risk have tended to focus on the 
attitudes of the respondents (Kobbeltvedt and Brun, 2004), or their knowledge 
and competence within legislation or guidelines (Askarian et al., 2004; Ayranci 
and Kosgeroglu, 2004). 
Few publications give details on the questionnaire design process and most use 
pre-designed, verified questionnaires (Neri et al., 2006/5; Itoh et al., 2006), 
while some quote the standards on which they are based (Leliopoulou et al., 
1999). No suitable verified questionnaire was found for this research, resulting 
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in the need for one to be custom designed. In order to allow frank and open 
answers, questionnaire respondents needed to be completely anonymous.  
The methods of distribution and return or collection had to be carefully 
considered to provide the best likelihood of a high return rate. In this case, the 
researcher distributed them by hand to ward managers and they were returned 
via the internal mail systems of each hospital. 
3.2.4 Task Evaluation 
Task evaluations are normally conducted for the assessment of an operator’s 
ability to complete a given task to a required standard (Breakwell and Millward, 
1995)(Kirwan and Ainsworth, 1992). Role-play within a defined simulated event 
is a common format (Garnerin et al., 2007). Evacuation tests and cockpit 
simulations are used in the aviation industry, while the emergency services use 
this technique to conduct evaluations of their ability to cope with large scale 
crises.   
Task evaluation tests have to be very well designed and a validation process 
should be undertaken to ensure their usefulness, which in combination causes 
an extended design stage. They are also time-consuming in their execution with 
similar issues to interviews, questionnaires and observations coming into play in 
their analysis.  
These would require the participants to volunteer their own time or for the 
institution to allow them the time to take part. It was thought that this was 
unlikely to be possible and task evaluation was therefore rejected. 
3.2.5 Computer Simulation 
Computer simulation is comparable to task evaluation in that it is an artificial 
construct of an event or situation, but uses a computer model rather than real 
people and spaces. Detailed descriptive data of all aspects of the subject under 
review has to be assimilated and embedded within the model in order to define 
the behaviour of each element.  
This, however, requires that much of the knowledge that this research was 
expected to produce should already be known. Computer simulation was 
considered inappropriate for this stage of this research, but might be useful as 
an optimization method in future work. 
3.2.6 Document Review 
Document review requires the use of coding methods to allow a document to be 
read and markers attached to the text. This enables a wide range of qualitative 
and quantitative analysis. Specialist software is available for this method 
(Robson, 2002e; Silverman, 2006), or bespoke software programs are 
sometimes designed. Documents may be transcripts of interviews, historical 
texts, or even novels.  
They work best with multiple readers and a logical design to ensure their validity 
and reliability; much time can be wasted through poor design. Reading and 
categorizing or coding text is also very tedious and requires high levels of 
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concentration. Over-taxing readers can cause them to lose interest in the task 
and so become bored and thus errors can be introduced. 
In the context of this research, Local incident reports, patient complaints and 
clinical notes were all considered as potential sources. Also considered were 
national incident reports filed by clinical staff into a national electronic database 
held by the National Patient Safety Agency (NPSA). It was resolved that the 
best option was that of local and national incident reports and access to these 
potentially sensitive documents was negotiated with each trust, while that of 
national data was made with the NPSA. 
It was decided that this was a useful way of testing the hazard list and 
amending it if required. A method was devised to add to the risk analysis 
conducted in the observational study. 
3.3 Research Design 
3.3.1 Requirement 
The eventual result from the empirical research and that of each of the hazard 
analysis methods had to be comparable. It was decided that the most logical 
common form was that of a hazard list and an associated risk analysis. A 
selection of a number of empirical methods had to be made to facilitate the 
generation of the hazard list. These had to offer differing perspectives in order 
to compliment each other and one needed to be used for the final testing and 
validation of the hazard list. 
A validation process was required to provide the most reliable hazard list 
possible. It was felt that the best way to do this was to apply the hazard list to 
some recorded data, such as; local incident reports, patient notes, patient 
complaints or national incident reports and use the results and the opinions of a 
number of readers to assess validity through discussion and by applying a 
statistical measurement of reliability. Incident reports were felt to be the most 
relevant to this research and were more likely than the other sources to identify 
hazards. 
 As reliable probabilistic data is almost impossible to generate with this sort of 
research, some other metric needed to be found as the basis for a risk analysis. 
Various options were considered as denominator data, including; bed days, 
therapy hours, patient admissions and patients per ward. These were felt to be 
either unreliable due to sampling difficulties or not specific enough.  
A measure of relevance based on the number of times a particular hazard was 
recorded and the reliability of the count was thought to be of most use in this 
context. Once a valid hazard list was achieved, the final step was to apply the 
list to a large sample of data and use the statistical computation of 
Krippendorff’s Alpha (Kα) (Krippendorff, 2003a) for reliability combined with a 
weighted score of recorded harm as the basis for a risk analysis. 
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3.4 Research Design Considerations 
3.4.1 Ethics 
The ethical issues in healthcare research have to be carefully considered. 
Patient confidentiality and privacy are high on the list of concerns, especially 
when observations are made on hospital wards. Hospital patients can be very 
vulnerable, especially children or those with special needs. Ward staff also need 
assurance of confidentiality in both observational studies and questionnaires or 
interviews (Grady and Wallston, 1988b).  
Care was taken in the design of the studies in this research to avoid adverse 
impact on these issues. In hospital settings, informed consent is not always 
possible. This was the case in this research as many patients would have been 
unable to provide such consent due to their state of consciousness or simply 
because they would not have been able to give due consideration (Grady and 
Wallston, 1988b). 
No information specific to the patient or any member of staff was collected or 
inspected. During observations, patient privacy was given high priority and great 
care was taken to avoid making patients or staff members feel uncomfortable. 
It was important that ward staff were at ease about the intention of the 
researcher and the research, especially in clinical areas. The patients also had 
to be comfortable with the presence of the researcher, especially during clinical 
or nursing procedures of a personal nature. If participating in interviews or 
questionnaires, they had to feel secure about answering any questions. 
At no time was patient or staff safety to be compromised as a result of the 
research. Every action had to be carefully assessed. Getting in the way of ward 
staff, taking up too much of their time or causing them to be distracted were all 
carefully avoided. 
Children and vulnerable adults are just as likely as anyone else to need ward 
based care. It was thus inevitable that these patients would in some way be 
included in this research (Grady and Wallston, 1988b; Robson, 2002b). Special 
attention was paid to ensure that they were not frightened, confused or misled 
about the presence, role or purpose of the researcher. Prisoners would have 
been treated as any other patient if on open wards, but excluded if in a private 
room; none were however part of this research. 
The need and value of the research has also to be justified when making ethics 
approval applications. Research for purely commercial reasons or to gain some 
leverage or influence would be hard to defend {{}}(NPSA, 2008a). In the context 
of this type of research, there should be some demonstrable advantage for 
patient care or treatment, whether directly in the form of improved therapeutic or 
diagnostic methods or indirectly through better quality of patient management or 
general operational procedures. 
This research directly affects patient safety through the hazard assessment of 
oxygen therapy, thus providing valuable information for the improvement of 
59 
hazard barriers to prevent adverse events. It also indirectly affects patient safety 
generally by providing an evaluation of assessment methods through a 
comparison with results from empirical research.  
Ethics considerations for the storage of data and security arrangements for its 
protection were also made. These were managed by the careful use of the 
established I.T. infrastructures of the institutions involved.  
The likelihood of completion of the research is extremely important when 
proposals are being considered by ethics committees. It is unacceptable for 
research to be conducted that incurs costs and intrudes into the lives of people 
and then produces no result. Likelihood of completion, and quality of research 
design and analysis were monitored and supervised by senior staff at Cranfield 
University. 
Ethics approval for this research was awarded in the first instance by favourable 
opinion from the Bedfordshire Local Research Ethics Committee on the 11th 
May 2006. This gave approval for a multi-site project without the need for site 
specific assessment and covered the observational studies, the questionnaire 
and the review of local incident reports at the participating hospitals. A number 
of possible hazard analysis methods were listed in the application, but none had 
been finally decided on at that stage. 
A notice of substantial amendment was submitted to the National Research 
Ethics Service, now under the management of the NPSA, on the 25th of 
October 2007.  The amendment was given a favourable opinion on the 9th of 
November 2007. It included the review of national incident reports and held 
more detail about the hazard analysis trials, especially the HAZOP as this was 
expected to be the most resource intensive method to be evaluated. 
3.4.2 Access to the ‘Field’ 
Research of this nature requires a certain amount of negotiation with the 
‘gatekeepers’ at the relevant institutions (Mulhall, 2003). Not only do they need 
to assess the ethical content of the projects presented to them, but also the 
effects it may have on their patients, the staff and the institution in terms of 
resource management, publicity and legal position. 
As this research was in a sense ‘commissioned’ by Bedford Hospital NHS Trust, 
many of the problems usually encountered with access were eliminated at that 
hospital. It was however, for governance reasons, still necessary to submit a 
proposal detailing the studies based within the hospital and to apply for an 
honorary contract. 
The first major problem to overcome was getting the co-operation of the senior 
staff in charge of the wards to allow the observational study to take place. This 
entailed lengthy introductions by a senior member of hospital staff, which in 
itself generated a small amount of suspicion. Some of the ward staff were 
concerned that this was a management based project with the aim of 
“squeezing more blood from the workers” as Robson puts it (Robson, 2002c).  
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Staff availability played an important role in deciding on how the research was 
to proceed. The amount of time any method took for participants had to be 
judged, as their absence from the wards might have jeopardised patient care.  
To avoid the effects the knowledge of the research subject might have on staff 
behaviour (Robson, 2002e), it was necessary to limit the detail supplied to them 
about what was being observed. Care had to be taken not to withhold too much, 
as research codes of practice and ethics requires that the researcher be as 
open as possible (Grady and Wallston, 1988b; MRC, 2008). The ward staff 
were also apprehensive about the disruption the presence of a researcher might 
have to the normal operation of the unit. There was therefore, a balance to be 
struck, not only to limit contamination of the observations while maintaining 
rapport with the staff, but also ensuring ethical practice.  
One particular issue never resolved was that of access for night shift 
observations. It meant that night observations were not made as getting in 
contact with the staff involved was difficult and some of them were 
uncomfortable with the presence of a researcher on the night shift.  
The researcher’s previous employment as a Senior Technologist at Stoke 
Mandeville Hospital gave him some advantage in that he was known to many of 
the ward and management staff. A very similar procedure for research 
registration and approval to that at Bedford Hospital was followed, with the 
exception that introductions of the same type were not required. A lot of time 
was still spent negotiating access, and similar problems were encountered 
regarding the night shift. 
Adequate access to both sites was agreed and maintained throughout the 
project and no irresolvable problems (besides the night shift observations) were 
encountered in any of the studies. Active interest from the senior anaesthetists 
at Bedford Hospital resulted in their involvement in the incident report review 
study. This made it possible to extend this study beyond the local reports 
originally intended to involve a large number of nationally reported incidents.  
A data sharing agreement was made with the National Patient Safety Agency 
for access to the national incident reports held by them. The main point of the 
agreement was to maintain patient confidentiality and ensure that the anonymity 
of those making incident reports was not breeched. 
The security of all involved had to be considered. Valuable items required for 
the research may have been at risk to theft in some more public areas and so 
required safe storage or remained in the possession of the researcher at all 
times. Arrangements were made to give the researcher the right to be in the 
clinical areas and all concerned needed to be notified. Some means of 
governance and protection needed to be afforded to the researcher. Many of 
these issues were resolved by each trust awarding an honorary contract to the 
researcher. This provided the required security protection and governance, as 
well as access to clinical areas and local data. Access to wards or other clinical 
areas still required the negotiation of permission with ward managers and 
patients and staff had to be notified that research was being conducted on the 
ward. 
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3.4.3 Time and effort 
Designing the research, data acquisition, analysis and writing all consumed 
project time and required considerable effort. This had to be considered when 
choosing methods and setting boundaries.  
3.4.4 Analysis 
Any chosen methods had to produce results that could be analysed using 
mainly qualitative techniques such as risk analysis and content analysis. Some 
descriptive statistics could be used to augment and supplement the analysis, 
but as the data was unlikely to have high levels of accuracy or precision, it was 
seen as pointless to try and rely on quantitative methods. 
3.5 Expected Problems 
3.5.1 Researcher Bias 
As this is primarily a single researcher project, the possibility for the researcher 
to inadvertently affect the result is strong, especially with the observational 
study. It was anticipated that the questionnaire and the document review ought 
to minimise the effects of any such bias. 
Another bias issue is that of ‘contamination’ of the results of the hazard 
analyses through prior knowledge gained from previous analyses, e.g. the 
experience from a FMEA affecting the outcome of a HAZOP.  
To try and minimise this, the empirical research was conducted before any 
hazard analyses were attempted. This was intended to impress a good insight 
into oxygen therapy upon the researcher which reduced the learning provided 
by the act of conducting the hazard analyses. 
The drawback to this was that there was now a chance for the researcher to 
subconsciously ‘fit’ the results of the hazard analyses around the results of the 
empirical research. This was thought to be less of a problem as it would at least 
be similar for all three hazard analysis methods. The hazard identification 
processes for all three hazard analysis methods would be partly produced 
through discussion with others and so would be further minimized.  
3.5.2 Access 
Problems associated with access to busy staff and clinical areas was 
anticipated and dealt with through tactful and sensitive negotiation and 
involvement with key personnel. 
3.5.3 Assessment of patient safety risk 
Obtaining or producing probabilistic information for risk assessments in this 
context is almost impossible. Many observed events were also not likely to be 
taken through to their eventual consequence.  
For the observational study, the risk assessments were made once all the 
observations were complete so that some informed estimate could be made of 
the likelihood of an event. The outcomes were also in the most part judgments 
62 
on whether there was an increased likelihood of failure, aversion of an incident 
or an improvement to the therapy. 
During the risk analysis within the document review of incident reports, instead 
of probability, a measure of relevance was needed somewhat similar to those 
used by search engines for the ranking of results. These use a variety of 
methods, all kept well guarded, that make use of the number of times an item is 
found and the choices made by previous searches of a similar nature. 
An algorithm was developed for this research making use of the number of 
times a taxonomy element was selected and the level of agreement on this by 
the researchers reading the incident reports. 
More details are given on these in later chapters. 
3.6 Conclusion 
This chapter discussed the philosophical side of the methodology explaining 
how the ‘Pragmatist’ position was adopted for this research. 
The various empirical methods available were considered and their selection for 
use in this research was discussed. It was decided that observations in the 
ward environment were crucial and that a practical solution to learning from the 
experience of healthcare professionals was to make use of a questionnaire. 
Document review was used as a means of validating the hazard list resulting 
from the observations and questionnaire, with incident reports used as the 
source for this review. 
The early expectations of results were briefly discussed as were solutions to the 
initially anticipated problems. The issues surrounding researcher bias, ethics, 
access to the field and the difficulties of constructing a risk assessment were 
examined in some detail. 
 
 63
Chapter 4 Observing Events and Asking the 
Experts 
Abstract 
This chapter describes two empirical studies linked by the common aims of:  
1. Producing a hazard list to be used for comparison with the results of 
each of the hazard analysis methods 
2. Construction of a common frame of reference for the hazard analyses. 
Observations followed by a questionnaire, forming two points of the triangle 
describing the ‘Combined Evaluation Data’ in Figure 1-2 (section 1.2), were 
undertaken at two NHS Trust hospitals. 
The observations identified 684 discreet events, 43 of which (6%) were 
assessed as adverse. The results of an audit forming part of the observational 
study were used to provide a denominator for these results and suggested that 
if 6% of therapy episodes resulted in an adverse event, as many as 81,454 
patients may experience an oxygen therapy related incident per year. 
The questionnaire identified 54 hazard themes. Patient compliance, concern 
over the management of patients with Chronic Obstructive Pulmonary Disease 
(COPD) and the issue of empty cylinders were some of the major themes, along 
with prescriptions either not made out or incorrectly written, dosage errors, staff 
training and inadequate guidelines. 
Over 600 combined hazard themes were distilled down to 119 distinct hazards. 
These are included in the hazard list in Appendix C1. A system diagram with 
three sub-systems and twelve elements was constructed (Figure 4-9) as was a 
simplified process map (Figure 4-10).  
4.1 Introduction 
Direct, non-participant observations with a mainly qualitative focus were made 
at Bedford and Stoke Mandeville Hospitals from the 8th of June to the 7th of 
December 2006. These were followed by a questionnaire study at each site 
beginning from the 20th of October 2006 until the 19th of March 2007.  
The primary purpose of this part of the research was to observe events during 
the administration of ward based oxygen therapy and make use of the 
experiential knowledge of professionals in the field in order to identify and 
define possible hazards. A secondary function was to allow the researcher to 
gain familiarity with the context of this therapy, since hazards cannot be defined 
or analysed without clear contextual association. This information was then 
used to construct a common frame of reference, which later in the research 
became the basis for the formal hazard analyses. This was therefore not only 
an attempt to look for hazards or errors, but also a more holistic non participant 
immersion in order to get “a feel” for the process and its setting.  
As thorough as any observational study might be, it is highly unlikely that every 
type of event will be observed. The questionnaire study was therefore 
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conducted as an adjunct to the observations, with the intention of capturing 
some of the tacit knowledge possessed by professionals who work with oxygen 
therapy daily. In order that the questionnaire could not interfere with the 
observations by alerting the clinical staff to the subject under scrutiny, it was 
distributed at each of the two sites only once the observations there were 
completed. 
The questions underlying this combined study were: 
1. What hazards related to oxygen therapy can be identified and 
defined in terms of hazardous elements, initiating mechanisms 
and threats? 
2. What common frame of reference for the formal hazard analyses 
can be constructed from the knowledge gained on the context of 
ward based oxygen therapy? 
The common aims were: 
1. To construct a hazard list using the combined data from both 
studies. 
2. To construct a common frame of reference for later use in the 
formal hazard analyses by: 
a. Identifying all the components of the oxygen therapy system. 
b. Gaining familiarity with the practical issues faced by those 
involved in the administration of oxygen therapy on wards. 
The objectives of the observational research were: 
1. To identify and define hazards by: 
a. Observing events surrounding the administration and 
monitoring of oxygen therapy including the interactions 
between staff, patients, visitors and the oxygen therapy 
equipment. 
b. Assessing the threat posed by the identified hazards through 
the consideration of possible outcomes of observed events. 
2. To obtain an estimate of the denominators for this research by: 
a.  Identifying methods commonly used on hospital wards for the 
delivery of oxygen therapy and how these are set up, 
monitored and managed.  
b. Calculating an approximation of the number of patients 
receiving oxygen therapy daily and the frequency of methods 
of administration. 
The questionnaire had the following objectives: 
1. To identify hazards experienced by practitioners. 
2. To estimate how often practitioners experience cases of harm to 
patients due to failures of oxygen therapy. 
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3. To rank some previously identified hazards by proportional 
frequency. 
4. To gauge the attitudes and perceptions of practitioners with regard 
to patient safety with oxygen therapy. 
4.2 The Observational Research 
4.2.1 Observation of Events 
Detailed observations were made over a six month period, first at Bedford 
Hospital and then at Stoke Mandeville. These were recorded by hand in both 
tabular and narrative formats. Event descriptions were written in a diary format 
before being converted to discrete events, while structured audit data were 
entered into an observation chart (see Figure 4-2). Both were then entered into 
a database. 
Studies were conducted in a variety of wards and departments in the two 
hospitals in order to ensure as much variation as possible. The researcher 
moved about within each ward or floor, noting the way that the therapy was set 
up for each subject and how it was managed. Some preliminary, less structured 
observations were made very early in the research to get an idea of what 
should be included in pre-defined lists and to make any amendments to the 
observation chart or database design. 
Information on ward layout was collected and notes were made of some general 
activities which together shaped the environment that formed part of the context 
for the therapy. As much detail as possible about the observed subject and the 
surrounding environment was collected. Notes were made of peripheral tasks 
such as those related to other therapies or activities on the ward. Where 
possible, annotations were included about how these might affect oxygen 
therapy or be affected by it. Ease of movement and access to patients and 
equipment were observed as were difficulties for the staff to see patients and 
monitor them. Some simple trace studies were also performed by following 
patients during transfers from one hospital area to another, looking for any 
specific environmental or task related hazards. 
An effective general strategy for each study was found to be as follows: 
1. An audit round of each ward within a defined area of the hospital was 
conducted. This was an adaptation made towards the end of the period 
at Bedford Hospital and continued at Stoke Mandeville. 
2. A ward or floor was chosen for detailed observations. 
3. Introductions were made to the staff and permission gained from those in 
charge for access to the ward where observations were to be performed. 
4. Where required, a diagram of the ward layout was drawn. This helped to 
keep track of where subjects were and aided in assessing the layout for 
hazards. 
5. Details of the therapy set-ups and any observed hazards or problems 
were noted. 
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6. Three to five minute watches were made on an area, taking up a different 
position each time when possible. This period was extended when an 
event was in progress or a trace study was made. It was important not to 
appear to be staring at a patient to prevent unnecessary uneasiness. 
7. Awareness of the following general ward activities was maintained: 
a. General nursing tasks 
b. Doctors rounds 
c. Drug rounds 
d. Catering, cleaning and other ‘hotel’ services 
e. Visitors’ movements and actions 
f. Shift changes 
g. Other therapies 
h. Actions of other patients 
i. Estates and operational services activities 
The research was structured as a collection of studies at each research site as 
depicted in Figure 4-1. A site was defined as the collection of buildings forming 
a hospital. A study was defined as a group of observations at a particular site 
within a single visit. A location was defined as the department or ward where 
the research was being conducted. An observation was a number of events 
relating to the same subject during any study. A subject was the combination of 
a patient receiving oxygen therapy and the bed-space occupied by them. An 
event was defined as any instance where an action or task was carried out on 
or near a subject. 
There was some curiosity from both staff and patients regarding the presence of 
the researcher and a mixture of questions and comments were received. Most 
patients and members of ward staff were very pleased that there was some 
consideration of patient safety taking place.  No hostility was experienced other 
than one instance where a ward sister was reluctant to allow the researcher 
access to the ward until completion of a rather lengthy exercise in verifying that 
permission had been given for site-wide access. 
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Figure 4-1. Observational Research Structure 
 
4.2.2 Audits 
Audits were used both during and before event observations to collect 
information about the number of patients on oxygen and the methods of 
administration. The details of the equipment and some basic information on the 
subjects were collected using the structured observation chart of Figure 4-2. 
This allowed an estimate of the daily frequencies of these to be calculated. 
Types of events and interactions were also noted when observed. 
When performed before full observations commenced, they also helped in the 
identification of suitable subjects and in some cases to observe specific 
hazards. This information was used immediately to identify areas of the hospital 
where the most subjects for observation were, or to locate subjects with specific 
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characteristics; like those that might soon be transferred or those using 
cylinders. 
 
No. Time Ward Subject Flow Accessories Source Details 
        
Figure 4-2. The table headings used for audits and structured observations. 
The tabular and discrete event data were both entered into a database and 
linked as part of the same observation where appropriate. The data were 
analysed by open categorization and consequence analysis and the results 
used to produce some descriptive statistics and assist in the formulation of a 
hazard analysis. 
Some general descriptive observations made separately to those linked to 
events remained as diary entries only and were not entered into the database. 
These were mainly annotations and comments which provided a useful source 
of qualitative data and contextual linkage. 
4.2.3 The Database 
A bespoke database system was constructed for the collection and analysis of 
audit and event data. The structure of the tables forming the core data and their 
relationships is shown in Figure 4-3. 
 
Figure 4-3. Core database tables and relationships 
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The data was analysed by: 
• Extracting events from the diary and the observation chart and 
entering them into the database. 
• Identifying hazard themes through open categorization of events to 
produce a list of hazard categories refined using a process of 
rationalization.  
• Estimation of event risk by selection of possible outcomes from a pre-
defined list. 
• Using a combination of hazard categories, outcomes and diary 
entries to produce a hazard list and basic analysis. 
• Using descriptive statistical analysis to identify: 
o the most common methods of administration 
o the most common events and interactions 
4.2.4 Event Extraction 
Events were identified from the diary as any discrete occurrence with an 
apparent or possible local effect. The identification was not limited to adverse 
events, but included those that were neutral or favourable in order to aid in 
observing safe or correct occurrences. 
4.2.5 Categorization 
The categorization emerged from the data along the lines of the grounded 
theory method used in social research (Robson, 2002e; Silverman, 2006). Each 
event had any number of categories of hazard attached. These were not taken 
from a pre-defined list, but merely short descriptions of the hazardous elements 
within the event. 
Once an initial list of categories was constructed by an analysis of the complete 
set of events, it was rationalized by giving the same label to those categories 
that were essentially the same. The result of this rationalization combined with 
the outcomes assessments were the basis for a preliminary hazard list which 
was further developed from the results of the questionnaire. The later review of 
incident reports was used to validate and amend this basic hazard analysis. 
4.2.6 Outcomes Assessments 
The pre-defined list of possible outcomes in Table 4-1 was devised by taking a 
systems analysis approach. Not all events had a negative outcome; some had 
no effect (Neutral) while others prevented an otherwise negative outcome 
(Aversion) or made a failure less likely (Decreased Probability of Failure). 
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Table 4-1 Possible outcomes ranked in order of 1= most negative, 13= most positive. 
Rank Consequence Definition 
1 Death Patient dies as a result of the event 
2 Serious Injury/Severe Worsening Patient is permanently harmed or life is threatened 
3 Minor Injury/Slight Worsening Harm is not permanent or life threatening 
4 Discomfort No actual harm 
5 Delay An action or result is delayed 
6 Next Event Trigger This event causes a negative outcome in a future event
7 Increased Probability of Failure Postulated worsening of system reliability 
8 Near Miss Negative outcome narrowly escaped 
9 Undetermined Outcome could not be defined 
10 Neutral Event had no effect on the system 
11 Decreased Probability of Failure Postulated improvement in system reliability 
12 Improvement Outcome reduced to neutral by planned action  
13 Aversion Negative outcome avoided by planned action 
 
4.2.7 Categorization Results 
Twenty five observational studies were conducted across both sites (eighteen at 
Bedford and seven at Stoke Mandeville), during which 499 observations were 
made. 
There were 102 categories of events identified, resulting in 223 unique 
category/subcategory pairs. The categories with the highest frequency are 
shown in Table 4-2. Unsurprisingly, given that mainly task related events were 
observed, most of these have a strong human factors bias. Related factors such 
as environment and staff levels are likely to have also played a role in the 
events surrounding these categories. A table of all 223 category/subcategory 
pairs is given in Appendix A3, Table Appendix A.3-1. 
Table 4-2. Category Frequencies 
Category Count % of Events 
Nursing Tasks 106 15% 
Nurse Actions 102 15% 
Patient Actions 94 14% 
Accessory Displacement 74 11% 
Therapy Administration/Monitoring 71 10% 
Therapy Adjustment 69 10% 
Patient Monitoring 55 8% 
Patient Transfer 47 7% 
Other Therapy 47 7% 
Supply Change 46 7% 
 
A total of 684 events were analysed; 151 had favourable outcomes, 297 were 
neutral or undetermined and 236 were less favourable with 43 of the latter seen 
to have been adverse. Most outcomes, as shown in Table 4-3, pointed to an 
increased probability of failure (193, 25.63%). Of these, the most common type 
of event was setup issues (75, 9.96%), with accessory issues (22, 2.92%) being 
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the most frequent within these. The complete outcomes assessment is shown in 
Appendix A3, Table Appendix A.3-2. 
Table 4-3. Outcomes and Frequencies 
Consequence Count Unfavourable Neutral/Undetermined Favourable 
Increased Probability of Failure 193 193     
Neutral 176   176   
Undetermined 121   121   
Decreased Probability of Failure 88     88 
Improvement 50     50 
Discomfort 22 22     
Aversion 13     13 
Near Miss 9 9     
Next Event Trigger 8 8     
Minor Injury/Slight Worsening 3 3     
Delay 1 1     
Serious Injury/Severe Worsening 0       
Death 0       
Totals 684 236 297 151 
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Figure 4-4. Pareto Analysis of 43 adverse events. 
A Pareto analysis of the 43 adverse events is presented in Figure 4-4. This 
indicates that events related to the setup of the therapy, those involving actions 
focussed on other therapies, patient’s actions, general nursing tasks, patient 
comfort and communication make up approximately 80% of the adverse 
outcomes. 
General observations that could not be classified as events pointed to:  
- Poor management of cylinders: Very few wards had designated 
storage areas and those that did made poor use of them. Full and 
partly used cylinders were stored together and even some empty 
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ones were found among these. Ward staff were sometimes unsure 
whether replacement cylinders had been ordered. When full cylinders 
were delivered, these were often left in the same position where the 
empty ones had been and no-one was notified about their arrival. 
- Procedural and communication issues during patient transfers and 
handovers: The use of checklists either before or after transfers was 
not observed. The ward staff were sometimes unaware that a patient 
was due to arrive or be collected by porters. Details about the patient 
were often hastily called out to seemingly no-one in particular and 
there was one instance where a patient’s written notes were mislaid. 
Many events were benign or undetermined in outcome and these helped to 
form an overall idea of the system of oxygen therapy and its contextual basis. 
Using the categorical data in combination with the outcomes, a hazardous 
element list was compiled (Appendix A3, Table Appendix A.3-3).  
4.2.8 Audit Results 
Audits of therapy methods, accessories used and an estimate of the number of 
patients on oxygen therapy yielded the following results: 
Standard Hudson masks were the most common accessory observed with 236 
(47.3% of events). Nasal cannulae were the next most common with 113 
(22.6%). Together these account for approximately 70% of the patient 
connected accessories in observed events. The full range of accessories and 
the number of times they were observed can be seen in Table 4-4 along with 
the corresponding percentage of events. (These add up to more than 100% 
because more than one accessory was often observed per event.)   
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Table 4-4. Accessory Count 
Accessory Description Count % of Events 
Hudson mask 236 47.3% 
Nasal Cannula (specs) 113 22.6% 
Humidifier 60 12.0% 
Large Bore Tubing 57 11.4% 
Non Re-breathing Mask 49 9.8% 
Laryngeal mask 26 5.2% 
Head box 26 5.2% 
24% Venturi (Blue) 16 3.2% 
Venturi Mask 11 2.2% 
Nebulizer 10 2.0% 
Resuscitation Bag 8 1.6% 
Paediatric Mask 8 1.6% 
Tracheostomy mask 7 1.4% 
28% Venturi (White) 6 1.2% 
Tracheostomy T-piece 5 1.0% 
Ventilator Assisted 2 0.4% 
40% Venturi (Red) 2 0.4% 
35% Venturi (Yellow) 1 0.2% 
Mouth Piece 1 0.2% 
Resuscitation Circuit 1 0.2% 
 
Fifty five (23.2%) of the 236 events involving face masks were at flow rates 
lower than five Litres per Minute even though advice (Cooper, 2004; Kallstrom 
2002) and  guidelines (Fulmer et al., 1984), including those in place at Bedford 
Hospital state that they should not be used at these low flow rates. This may be 
indicative of incorrect or out of date guidelines, or a disregard or lack of 
awareness of them. Of the remaining 181 events, 156 were at flow rates of five 
Litres per Minute and over. All of these should, according to advice (Fulmer et 
al., 1984; Bateman and Leach, 1998) and local guidelines, have been 
humidified, but only thirty were; meaning that almost 81% of the therapies that 
should have been humidified were not. 
An estimate of the daily percentage of admitted patients on oxygen was made 
according to Table 4-5. The average number of beds audited, together with the 
average number of patients seen to be on oxygen, indicates approximately 
eight percent of admitted patients receiving oxygen therapy per day. 
Table 4-5. Average Daily Percentage of patients on Oxygen. 
Audited beds at Bedford Hospital 235 
Audited beds at Stoke Mandeville Hospital 230 
Average total beds per audit 232.5 
Average no of patients on oxygen per audit day 18.25 
Average % patients on oxygen per day 7.85% 
 
This concurs with two published audits (Gravil et al., 1997; Akbar and Campbell, 
2006) and when combined with others (Small et al., 1992; Attia et al., 2004; 
Akbar and Campbell, 2006) as in Table 4-6, shows that an average of 22.4% of 
admitted patients receive oxygen. The Australian study was of short duration 
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and only included medical wards, which may account for the high percentage of 
patients on oxygen.  
Akbar and Campbell performed two separate audits in their study, hence they 
have two entries in the table. These audits were not designed to collect this 
particular statistic and excluded many patients who might have been on oxygen 
therapy but were missing from their beds, having other respiratory treatment, 
were eating, had visitors or were being seen by their doctor. Patients who had 
been included in the first audit were also excluded from the second.  
Small et al also based their study only in medical wards and included patients 
where oxygen therapy equipment was present even if it was not in use. These 
together possibly account for the high percentage of cases. 
The Gravil et al and Durand studies are similar in methodology in that they were 
‘snapshot audits’ which gathered data on single days separated by an 
intervening period. The Gravil study was however of shorter duration, covering 
three observation days separated by at least a week. The Durand study also did 
not cover all the wards on every occasion, as the main aim of the study was to 
observe process rather than perform an audit.  
As these studies vary in methodology and purpose, it is felt likely that the 
averaged result is a valid, but cautious reflection of the generalized proportion 
of admitted patients that receive oxygen therapy. 
Table 4-6. Average Percentage of Patients on Oxygen. 
Study % Patients on oxygen 
Attia (Australia) 65.33 
Akbar (UK) 16.36 
Akbar (UK) 10.73 
Small (USA) 29.09 
Gravil (UK) 5.00 
Durand (UK, This study) 7.85 
Average percentage 22.39 
 
The above average was assumed to be valid over a year and was applied to 
admission episodes reported in national statistics in the UK for 2006/7 (Health 
and Social Care Information Centre). It was estimated that 22.4% of the 
12,976,273 reported admissions approximates to a staggering 2.9 million 
patients receiving oxygen per year in the UK alone. Even taking a conservative 
approach using just the UK based studies which average to about 10%, 
amounts to approximately 1.3 million oxygen therapy episodes. 
Disregarding the 193 observed incidents shown in Table 4-3 with outcomes 
believed to have produced an increased probability of failure, 43 (6%) of the 
total 684 observed events were seen to have been adverse, suggesting that as 
many as 82,000 patients may experience an oxygen therapy related incident 
per year. 
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4.3 The Questionnaire 
4.3.1 Design and Deployment 
In designing the questionnaire, the following points were considered: 
1. The respondents had to be engaged by the introduction. 
2. The research aims had to be addressed. 
3. The questionnaire had to be as short and concise as possible. 
4. The deployment method had to be as targeted as possible. 
5. The respondents had to remain anonymous. 
6. The questionnaire could not be allowed to inform the clinical staff of 
the precise subject of the research before the end of the 
observational study; thereby causing interference.  
7. The return method had to be simple and efficient. 
8. The analysis had to meet the research aims. 
As one of the aims was to elicit opinion on hazard types, it was necessary to 
consider the use of open ended questions. The use of such questions in self 
administered questionnaires is quite rare, mainly because most are analysed 
using quantitative, statistical methods (Sudman and Bradburn, 1982; Blaxter et 
al., 1996c; Hague, 1993). Open ended questions were possible in this 
questionnaire because the analysis was mainly qualitative. Although there was 
a risk that they could result in a low return rate, the belief was that professionals 
with an interest in the subject might be eager to respond and would provide high 
quality data. They were interspersed with and integrated into closed questions, 
so that those respondents unable to provide more qualitative information would 
at least have the opportunity to contribute to some quantitative data. 
The final design and layout can be seen in appendix B1. There were two 
versions, each tailored to the site at which it was deployed. The only differences 
were in the instructions for returning the completed document within the 
introduction and a small change to the wording of the final question which asks 
about the length of the respondents experience in healthcare. 
The introduction was written to engage with a wide range of professionals at all 
levels. Some very simple instructions were provided on how to complete the 
questionnaire and return it.  
The first question was used to collect some professional demographic data and 
allowed the respondent to make a selection from eight listed professions or to 
specify their profession if not listed. 
Question two asked: “How many times have you ever seen patients harmed or 
badly affected in some way as a result of Oxygen Therapy?” and was the first to 
offer an open option within which to expand on the reasons for problems 
experienced. This was an attempt to gauge frequency of harm and to collect 
descriptions of the more serious hazards. 
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The third question listed nine previously identified hazards and asked: “In those 
instances where there have been problems with Oxygen Therapy, even if no-
one has been harmed, what proportions were from the following causes?” Six 
options were given: None, Very Few, Few, Many, Most or All. The question also 
allowed for additional hazards to be specified and for the same selection of 
proportional occurrence for these. This was linked directly to the third aim of this 
study, which was to estimate the frequencies at which these hazards might 
occur. 
Question four asked: “Approximately how many instances, even where no-one 
was harmed, have you seen in the last 12 months where there have been 
problems with Oxygen Therapy?” Further details were requested in a similar 
way as question two. The intention was to assess the frequency and nature of 
all witnessed incidents. It was limited to 12 months to provide a time frame to 
help the respondent answer the question. 
Question five asked: “Do you think current guidelines are adequate in ensuring 
patient safety during Oxygen Therapy?” Six options were offered: Not at all, 
Poorly, Partly, Adequately, Mainly or Completely. Further comment was invited. 
The aim of this question was to get some idea of whether guidelines were seen 
as useful as well as whether respondents were aware of them. This together 
with the two open questions, were intended to provide some idea of the 
attitudes of professionals towards patient safety with oxygen therapy. 
Finally, question six asked: “When did you start working in healthcare? Please 
include your time as a trainee.” This, combined with the information from 
question one, would help establish the type of professional with the most 
interest in the subject of the research. This information would be useful in the 
selection of panel members and participants for the later formal hazard 
analyses. A points system was used to score the level of involvement from each 
respondent. A point was given for each question answered and extra points 
awarded for additional information supplied. 
The questionnaire was piloted at a workshop held during the monthly meeting of 
senior nurses at Bedford Hospital and a number of changes were made based 
on their feedback. Further comment was received from colleagues at Cranfield 
University and members of the local research ethics committee, who were 
researchers experienced in the use of questionnaires. 
Changes made included a re-written introduction emphasizing the respondent’s 
anonymity and more clarity regarding the purpose of the questionnaire. The 
questions on numbers of incidents witnessed had previously contained check 
boxes against value ranges. These were removed and replaced with a single 
box for the respondent to write their own number, removing possible bias and 
memory influence. The order of the questions was also changed along with the 
wording of the final question, which was possibly still slightly confusing for 
some. 
Distribution commenced at Bedford Hospital on the 20th October 2006 with 
another delivery on the 27th, resulting in a total of 809 deployed copies. Three 
deliveries totalling 930 copies were made to Stoke Mandeville Hospital on the 
9th, 13th and 19th of March 2007. Each department or ward manager was 
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personally handed a number of questionnaires according to how many staff 
they managed. The purpose and scope of the research was discussed with 
them and a request was made for them to hand out the questionnaires.  
By the 3rd of May 2007, 210 completed questionnaires were returned, 
representing 12.08% of the 1739 distributed in total. Each of the 2000 copies 
printed cost just under £0.14, resulting in a total of £274.36 and a cost per 
return of £1.31. 
4.3.2 Questionnaire Results 
Questions two and four were the main vehicles for the collection of hazard 
themes and these were added to by the last part of question three and the open 
section of question five. The results from these were combined to produce the 
graph of Figure 4-5, which provides a count of the number of times the 
particular theme was identified. 
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Figure 4-5 Hazard Themes and Occurrences. 
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A total of 54 hazard themes were identified from the 293 separate statements in 
the responses. This suggests an occurrence rate for individual professionals of 
between one and twenty eight, with an average of about six per year. The most 
frequently identified were problems with patient compliance, concern over the 
management of patients with Chronic Obstructive Pulmonary Disease (COPD) 
and the matter of empty cylinders. Some of the clinical and operational issues 
with high frequencies were problems with prescriptions (either not made out or 
incorrectly written), dosage errors, staff training and inadequate guidelines. 
Many of these were indicated as possible sources of harm. Question two asked 
specifically about harmful events and all the themes identified from the 
responses to this question are listed in Figure 4-6, along with the number of 
times they were mentioned.  
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Figure 4-6 Themes Identified as Harmful 
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The percentages for the themes common to these two questions were summed 
in order to apply a weighting to those linked with patient harm. These numbers 
were then divided by 200 (the total denominator from two percentage scales) to 
provide a proportional risk value as shown in Figure 4-7, effectively ranking the 
categories by perceived risk. 
Proportional Risk
0.000
0.020
0.040
0.060
0.080
0.100
0.120
C
O
P
D
 M
an
ag
em
en
t
E
m
pt
y 
C
yl
in
de
r
D
os
ag
e 
E
rro
r
P
at
ie
nt
 C
om
pl
ia
nc
e
La
ck
 o
f O
xy
ge
n 
(H
yp
ox
ia
)
P
re
sc
rip
tio
n
U
se
r K
no
w
le
dg
e/
S
ki
ll
S
et
up
 E
rro
r
P
at
ie
nt
 C
om
fo
rt
Tr
ai
ni
ng
G
ui
de
lin
es
La
ck
 o
f T
he
ra
py
 M
on
ito
rin
g
La
ck
 o
f P
at
ie
nt
 M
on
ito
rin
g
P
at
ie
nt
 T
ra
ns
fe
r P
ro
bl
em
W
ro
ng
 G
as
P
at
ie
nt
 C
on
di
tio
n
C
yl
in
de
r F
al
l
C
om
m
un
ic
at
io
n
S
m
ok
in
g
In
ad
eq
ua
te
 P
at
ie
nt
 C
ar
e
R
et
ro
le
nt
al
 F
ib
ro
pl
as
ia
Tr
ac
he
os
to
m
y
A
cc
es
so
ry
 F
it 
P
ro
bl
em
H
um
id
ifi
er
 S
et
 U
p
La
ck
 O
f E
qu
ip
m
en
t
A
cc
es
so
ry
 N
ot
 C
on
ne
ct
ed
C
lin
ic
al
 E
rro
r
C
P
A
P
/B
IP
A
P
 P
ro
bl
em
s
C
yl
in
de
r R
ep
la
ce
m
en
t/R
ef
ill
in
g
D
el
ay
ed
 A
ct
io
n
La
ck
 O
f W
al
l P
or
ts
M
an
ua
l H
an
dl
in
g 
- C
yl
in
de
rs
A
ct
io
ns
 o
f P
at
ie
nt
's
 P
ar
en
ts
D
el
ib
er
at
e 
S
el
f H
ar
m
 - 
Tu
bi
ng
E
nt
an
gl
em
en
t -
 T
ub
in
g
Fl
ow
 M
et
er
 N
ot
 T
ur
ne
d 
O
n
H
um
an
 E
rro
r
M
as
k 
R
el
at
ed
 S
uf
fo
ca
tio
n
W
ro
ng
 T
yp
e 
O
f A
cc
es
so
ry
La
ck
 O
f C
yl
in
de
rs
E
xc
es
si
ve
 W
or
k 
Lo
ad
Fl
ow
 M
et
er
 F
au
lt
La
ck
 O
f S
ta
ff
P
at
ie
nt
's
 N
ot
es
C
om
m
un
ic
at
io
n 
W
ith
 P
or
te
rs
C
yl
in
de
r I
de
nt
ifi
ca
tio
n
C
yl
in
de
r P
la
ce
m
en
t
P
at
ie
nt
 A
cc
es
s
P
os
tu
re
/P
os
iti
on
in
g
R
eg
ul
at
or
 F
au
lty
Ta
m
pe
rin
g
W
al
l S
up
pl
y 
Fa
ul
t
Hazard Themes
R
is
k 
Sc
or
e
 
Figure 4-7 Proportional Risk 
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Figure 4-8 Proportional ranking of frequencies of causes 
Question three provided the opinions of respondents on the proportional 
frequencies of nine pre-identified hazard themes. The matrices used for the 
calculations can be found in Appendix B2.  The indication as shown in Figure 
4-8 is that events caused by patients’ actions are by far the most frequent while 
problems with the wall supply are the least. Those categorized as “Other” are 
addressed separately within the previous analysis of proportional risk from 
identified hazard themes. 
The responses to question five which asked about the usefulness of guidelines 
produced a varied response. Approximately nine percent of respondents 
indicated that they were unfamiliar with any guidelines and most of these were 
therefore unable to comment on their adequacy.  
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Of all respondents, 190 (90.5%) either made a selection from the choices given 
as in Table 4-7, or provided comment on the adequacy of guidelines (Table 
4-8). Both these tables express these counts as a percentage of the 190 
responses to this question.  Issues with the prescribing of oxygen, training of 
clinical staff and the communication of guidelines were the most commonly 
expressed. Many comments made it clear that guidelines on their own were 
insufficient and needed to be backed up with training and clearly presented in 
an accessible format. 
Table 4-7. Opinions on Guidelines. 
Adequacy Count % 
Adequately 63 33.2% 
Mainly 40 21.1% 
Partly 32 16.8% 
Poorly 17 8.9% 
Completely 14 7.4% 
Not at all 11 5.8% 
 
Table 4-8. Themes Indicated From Comments on Guidelines. 
Themes Count % 
Unfamiliarity with guidelines 17 8.9% 
Prescriptions 9 4.7% 
Training 7 3.7% 
Communication of guidelines 7 3.7% 
Administering the Therapy 3 1.6% 
Misinformation on COPD 2 1.1% 
Patient/Therapy Monitoring 1 0.5% 
Unrealistic guidelines 1 0.5% 
 
Table 4-9. Respondent Demographic. 
Profession Count % 
Ave 
Involvement 
Ave Years in 
Healthcare 
Other Clinical 1 0.5% 16.0 21.04 
SAS Doctor 4 1.9% 15.5 8.63 
Trainee Doctor 24 11.5% 15.2 5.67 
Technologist 1 0.5% 15.0 18.78 
Qualified Nurse 109 52.4% 14.5 16.61 
Therapist 7 3.4% 14.3 12.86 
Student Nurse 13 6.3% 13.9 3.03 
CSW 25 12.0% 13.4 7.81 
Consultant 14 6.7% 13.3 24.28 
Midwife 10 4.8% 11.6 15.82 
 
In Table 4-9, the professions of the respondents are sorted by average 
involvement score. The number of responses from each professional group is 
shown alongside the proportion this represents, expressed as a percentage of 
the total responses. The average number of years spent in healthcare for each 
of these professions is also shown. 
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The spread of professions responding to the research follows the pattern one 
would expect to be representative of the overall professional demographic in a 
hospital, suggesting that they are all equally concerned with patient safety. This 
is further supported by the involvement score which had a standard deviation of 
only 1.29 across professions. 
This information was used to build the contextual reference and would also be 
used later in the research to provide denominator data and aid in planning the 
formal hazard analyses. 
4.4 Combined Analysis 
4.4.1 Hazard List 
The hazard themes from the observations and the questionnaire were 
combined to form a hazard analysis in which the three main hazard 
components; Hazardous element, Initiating mechanism(s) and Threat(s) were 
identified. The list was further rationalized and each hazard was given an 
identification number to aid later cross-referencing. This preliminary hazard 
analysis is available in Appendix C1. There were 684 observed events and 54 
questionnaire themes which were distilled to 119 distinct hazards. The 
distillation was similar to that used for the observed themes, in which the 
common hazardous elements were identified and named through an iterative 
process. 
4.4.2 Context and the Common Frame of Reference 
During the formulation of the hazard list, there emerged the perception of the 
system as having three sub systems: Supply, Therapeutic and Clinical. These 
were used as the starting point for the production of a system diagram, which is 
provided in Figure 4-9. The diagram shows each sub-system and identifies the 
components within each. The components and sub-systems are linked by 
arrows indicating both direction of oxygen flow and influence between them. 
Component attributes which may have an influence on system safety are also 
defined.  
Further to this, the management of the system was considered within a task 
analysis which is shown in Figure 4-10, with eight main elements in three 
horizontal strata. These are related to the clinical processes and functions, 
while a fourth contains the management influences. 
Both these diagrams were heavily based on the information contained in the 
results from both the observations and the questionnaire. They were verified 
through discussion with clinicians including Consultant Anaesthetists and Senior 
Nurses. 
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Figure 4-9. Oxygen Therapy System Block Diagram. 
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Figure 4-10. Oxygen Therapy Task Analysis. 
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4.5 Conclusions 
4.5.1 The Observations 
The objectives for the observational study were met as follows: 
1. To identify and define hazards by: 
a. Observing events surrounding the administration and monitoring of 
oxygen therapy including the interactions between staff, patients, 
visitors and the oxygen therapy equipment. 
This was achieved by making use of a complimentary combination of 
“unstructured” observations recorded by narrative text and “structured audits” 
recorded by pro-forma. These were combined in a database to allow the 
identification of hazards from events through qualitative thematic categorization.  
b. Assessing the threat posed by the identified hazards through the 
consideration of possible outcomes of observed events. 
The events were analysed for possible outcomes, which were judged to be 
adverse, neutral or favourable by making use of thirteen pre-defined 
consequences.  Six percent of the observed events were seen to have resulted 
in an adverse outcome. 
Using these two types of information, an analysis was constructed, defining 250 
hazards by hazardous element, initiating mechanisms and threats. 
2. To obtain an estimate of the denominators for this research by: 
a.  Identifying methods commonly used on hospital wards for the 
delivery of oxygen therapy and how these are set up, monitored 
and managed.  
b. Calculating an approximation of the number of patients receiving 
oxygen therapy daily and the frequency of methods of 
administration. 
Making use of mainly audit data, it was found that simple, standard (or Hudson) 
masks and nasal cannulae (or specs) together constitute about 70% of the 
accessories used for oxygen therapy on wards. Many other accessories are 
also used and there appears to be some confusion over the issue of when the 
therapy should be humidified. Problems with the management of cylinders were 
also observed.  
It was estimated that approximately eight percent of patients admitted to 
hospital receive oxygen. This concurs with other UK based studies and when 
applied to hospital episode statistics, indicates that about 1.3 million inpatients 
receive oxygen daily. If combined with the finding that six percent of these 
patients may experience a problem with oxygen therapy, it leads to the 
possibility that over 80,000 patients are affected by an adverse incident per 
year. 
Many more positive observations were also made which aided in the definition 
of the therapy system and promoted an understanding of its context. 
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4.5.2 The Questionnaire 
The objectives of the questionnaire study were met as follows: 
1. To identify hazards experienced by practitioners. 
The use of four open ended questions facilitated the collection of hazard 
themes from the experience of healthcare professionals.  A total of 293 
separate statements were made resulting in the identification of 54 hazard 
themes. These were combined with those gained from the observations to 
produce a hazard analysis. 
2. To estimate how often practitioners experience cases of harm to 
patients due to failures of oxygen therapy. 
The open questions mentioned above were embedded within closed questions 
which supplied some data on the frequencies of adverse events. These pointed 
to an average of approximately six adverse events experienced by individual 
professional per year. The themes, ranked by frequency are shown in Figure 
4-5. 
The results from questions two and four were used to produce a proportional 
risk score for the hazard themes. The results shown in Figure 4-7 indicate that 
there is most concern about the management of patients with COPD, the 
problem of cylinder depletions and incorrect dosage levels. Of least concern are 
the issues of equipment failures and problems with piped supplies. 
3. To rank some previously identified hazards by proportional frequency. 
Question three addressed this aim directly and the results are presented in 
Figure 4-8. These closely agree with the combined risk estimate from questions 
two and four, with the addition of general setup errors, which was also indicated 
as a prominent source of risk. 
4. To gauge the attitudes and perceptions of practitioners with regard to 
patient safety with oxygen therapy. 
The combination of responses to the question about guidelines and the 
demographic and involvement data indicated a general consensus over the 
issue of patient safety with oxygen therapy. No particular professional group 
showed more concern than the others and all were interested in aiding patient 
safety. 
Most agreed that guidelines are inadequate on their own and need to be 
supported through training and communication. 
4.5.3 The Combined study 
In addition to the objectives of the individual studies, there were two combined 
aims: 
1. To construct a hazard list using the combined data from both studies. 
This was achieved by combining the themes identified in both studies and 
constructing a hazard analysis. The result is available in Appendix C1. Hazards 
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are defined by stating the hazardous elements, considering possible initiating 
mechanisms and evaluating possible threats. 
2. To construct a common frame of reference for later use in the formal 
hazard analyses by: 
a. Identifying all the components of the oxygen therapy system. 
b. Gaining familiarity with the practical issues faced by those 
involved in the administration of oxygen therapy on wards. 
These were both addressed through the knowledge and appreciation obtained 
from the immersion experienced while conducting the observational research. 
This is expressed in the production of a block diagram of the system (Figure 
4-9), which divides the system into three sub-systems, defines the components 
within each and assigns attributes to each component. A further definition of the 
practical processes is provided in the form of the task analysis presented in 
Figure 4-10. 
The following chapter describes the use of retrospective analysis of reported 
incidents to both validate and add to the hazard list constructed through the 
observations and questionnaires. 
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Chapter 5 Finalising the Hazard List: Making 
Use of Incident Reports. 
 
Abstract 
This chapter describes the validation and refinement of the hazard list created 
in the previous chapter. It continues to address the first research aim (section 
1.1.1) within the first phase of the project as described in section 1.2. This forms 
the point labelled ‘Incident Report Review’ on the triangle labelled ‘Combined 
Evaluation Data’ in Figure 1-2 and Figure 1-3. 
There were 5,755 incidents relating to oxygen therapy reported across England 
and Wales during 2006. These records, containing descriptions of the reported 
events, were reviewed and categorised. This was achieved through the use of a 
specifically designed taxonomy and an electronic form linked to a database.  
The results were used to provide a qualitative assessment of the validity of the 
previously constructed list of 119 hazards based on the results of observations 
and questionnaires, which also provided the basis of the taxonomy. The high 
level of similarity between the previous list and the results from this research 
endorsed the hazard list. New hazards were also identified through the incident 
reports and these were added to the list, bringing the total number of hazards to 
188.  
The novel use of a measure of relevance for each hazard identified through the 
incident reports enabled a risk assessment to be attached to 71% of the 
hazards in the full list. This aggregated hazard list and risk assessment would 
be used in the next stage of the research to evaluate the contribution from three 
hazard analysis methods. 
5.1 Introduction 
5.1.1 Background 
Following construction of the list of 119 hazards in Appendix C1, which was 
produced from the observational research and questionnaire, it was felt 
necessary to both validate and amend its content by making use of historical 
data. Two options were considered; the review and analysis of patient 
complaints, or the same of incident reports. The latter were chosen as they 
were thought to be the most likely to clearly indicate hazards. 
Clinical incident reports contain as a minimum, a description of the 
circumstances and events surrounding an incident. In the UK, they are recorded 
in two ways: Locally through an internal reporting system and nationally through 
the Reporting and Learning System (RLS) held by the National Patient Safety 
Agency (NPSA). Many local systems are now totally electronic, although there 
are still some trusts with a paper based form which is transcribed to a database. 
These local records are sent via custom software to the NPSA where they are 
processed and entered into the RLS database. 
 90
Local reports were initially briefly explored as a data source while a request was 
made to the NPSA for an analysis of data from the RLS. The resulting NPSA 
report (see Appendix D.1) was compelling, as was the prospect of reviewing 
national data. An agreement was therefore made with the NPSA for access to 
anonymised data.  
Interest in this research was expressed by the Research Associate from the 
NPSA who wrote the initial report mentioned above and by a group of five 
Consultant Anaesthetists. A research group, which included these and the 
author, was thus formed for the review of national incident reports pertaining to 
oxygen therapy.  
5.1.2 Taxonomy 
The development of a taxonomy as the basis of a categorization framework for 
these incident reports was undertaken and there were various influences on 
this. In chapter seven of “Patient Safety” (Walshe and Boaden, 2006), Dovey 
and colleagues give an account of how to go about developing a taxonomy and 
the limitations and pitfalls in using them (Dovey et al., 2006). 
Examples of taxonomies in the field of Patient Safety include the Joint 
Commission on the Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations (JCAHO) Patient 
Safety Event Taxonomy (Chang et al., 2005) and the Australian General 
Occurrence Classification (Dovey et al., 2006). Both are built into custom 
software packages. These were briefly examined for applicability to this study, 
but were found to be too complex and wide ranging. It was felt that they were 
beyond the scope of this research as they are generalized systems used for the 
analysis of all types of adverse events. As a more specific taxonomy was 
required, it was necessary to construct it from first principles. 
Section 5.2.2 describes the process of development of both the taxonomy and 
the incident reviewing software. Two trials were undertaken, evaluating the 
combination of the taxonomy and software, before attempting the full study 
described in section 5.2.7. 
5.1.3 Purpose 
Incident reports have historically been used in healthcare primarily to record the 
specifics of an incident in order to have a full account for the purposes of 
litigation and assessment of responsibility or error. The Department of Health 
has been working towards moving the emphasis of incident reporting away from 
blame and closer to learning for the purpose of prevention (Department of 
Health,Sir Ian Carruthers OBE and Pauline Philip, 2006; Department of Health 
Expert Group (Chairman, CMO), 2000; Department of Health, 2002). This part 
of the research is an example of one way that this might be achieved. 
The objective was to construct a hazard list based on the results of the 
categorization of incidents reported by healthcare professionals. This was 
expected to go some way towards the verification of the previously constructed 
hazard list based on the results from the observational and questionnaire 
research, by comparing it with this one.  
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After combining the two hazard lists, an aggregated analysis, including a risk 
assessment of hazard themes was conducted. This was later used in a 
comparison with the risk assessments produced through the formal hazard 
analysis methods. It was hypothesized that prospective risk assessments based 
on expert opinion would be similar to those based on extrapolation from 
empirical research. 
It was believed that most incidents would be the result of a number of hazards 
in combination, rather than single causes. In order to assess the validity of this 
belief and to investigate the nature of these causal links, an analysis of patterns 
of causality present in the categorized data was undertaken. 
It was also thought possible that there might be a number of particular 
circumstances or contexts within which oxygen therapy is administered that 
could be more hazardous than others. As there were no suitable categorical 
data already available from the NPSA, the researchers needed to ascertain this 
from the descriptive text of the report. It was noted that there was uncertainty 
about whether this could be reliably achieved. 
The following aims were identified: 
1. To design a taxonomy, specific to oxygen therapy, based on the results 
from previous research and verified through discussion and trial. 
2. To design a method that made use of this taxonomy for reading and 
categorizing incident reports. 
3. To analyse the resulting data for: 
a. Occurrences of hazardous elements. 
b. Risk to patient safety from hazardous elements. 
c. Combinations of hazardous elements. 
d. Specific issues related to the contexts within which oxygen therapy is 
applied. 
e. Validity; by statistical analysis of interrater reliability. 
f. Efficiency of the technique developed through analysis of time taken 
per record. 
4. To assess the validity of the hazard list previously produced from the 
observations and questionnaire by comparison to themes identified from 
incident reports. 
5. To construct an aggregated hazard list using the combined data from all 
three studies, incorporating the risk assessments of hazardous elements. 
A total of 5,755 anonymised incident reports covering the calendar year 2006, 
filtered for terms relevant to oxygen therapy were supplied by the NPSA. These 
were reviewed by six researchers over the two months between the 1st June 
and the 31st July 2007. 
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5.1.4 Limitations 
Many of the elements in the applied taxonomy were classes of factual 
occurrences, like “Wrong Gas” or “Empty Cylinder”, which are very often 
expressly stated in incident reports. Others were more speculative, informed 
assumptions of contributory factors; like “Patient Condition” or “Institutional 
Management” which are rarely stated in incident reports. It was understood that 
no definitive statement could be made about the cause of any incident from 
reported information without a complete investigation including root cause 
analysis, interviews and other investigative studies (Woloshynowych et al., 
2005; Taylor-Adams and Vincent, 2004). It was however felt that educated 
assumptions could be used to prospectively consider the types of hazards 
encountered. 
The use of incident reports for researching patient safety risk has been limited 
in the past, primarily due to valid concerns relating to the reliability of reported 
incident data (Olsen et al., 2007; Vincent, 2004). Incident reporting is often 
intended for the purpose of trend analysis, which depends rather heavily on the 
effectiveness of the taxonomy employed and can also be criticized for being 
rather subjective. These issues were dealt with in this research by making use 
of a very specific taxonomy, thus maximizing its effectiveness and through the 
valid professional opinion provided by the research group.  The group members 
had a high level of expertise and experience in a mix of specialities with a 
strong clinical knowledge base. 
5.2 Method 
5.2.1 Data Acquisition 
The 5,755 incident reports supplied through a data sharing agreement with the 
NPSA were selected by means of a search of the Reporting and Learning 
System (RLS) for the United Kingdom using the following criteria:  
“All incidents, excluding slips, trips and falls, reported between 
01/01/2006 and 31/12/2006, in acute and general hospitals or ambulance 
trusts that contain the text ‘Oxygen’ or ‘O2’ in any of the free text fields.”  
The records were received in the form of two Microsoft Excel spreadsheets 
containing the raw data and another detailing some of the analysis codes used 
by the NPSA. These were combined and exported to Microsoft Access 
database tables for preparation before review by the researchers. 
Of most interest for this research, were the free text fields containing the 
description of each reported incident and the record of actions taken 
immediately after each event. These were used as the main source of 
information for the categorization of each incident. There were also two fields 
relating to outcome; one (Reported Harm) is completed by the person making 
the initial report, the other (Consequence) is the result of an assessment made 
by clinical reviewers at the NPSA. These were used for ranking the incidents by 
outcome and for risk assessments.  
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5.2.2 Taxonomy and Software Development 
The taxonomy was developed by taking the hazardous elements identified from 
the analysis of the observational and questionnaire studies and using the 
combined knowledge and experience of the research group to identify thematic 
categories. These were then grouped into three sections; Equipment, Human 
Error and External. 
A method was required to allow the researchers to read and categorize the 
reported incidents using the developed taxonomy. An electronic form linked to a 
database was felt to be the most efficient and secure way of presenting both the 
data and the taxonomy to the readers, while also allowing them to analyse each 
record.  
The database contained a simple structure of three tables. One held the 
incident reports and another the taxonomy elements linked to the reports by an 
identity number. The third table contained an activity log, which recorded the 
time and date of each ‘transaction’ as well as the incident report accessed.  
The data was password protected. Following a logging on procedure, the 
readers were presented with the single window shown in Figure 5-1. The form 
contained, in the top left, information about the reader’s position in the record 
list along with the control buttons for navigation within the database. Next to this 
were the selection lists for case validity (Yes, No or Don’t Know) and context 
(see Table 5-3). Below these, were the text windows for the descriptive fields 
from the incident report, as well as a notes area for the readers to record their 
comments.  
On the right hand side of the page was the full taxonomy with check boxes to 
enable the reader to select those elements deemed as contributing to the 
reported event. Also included were help buttons (containing a question mark 
icon) to provide the reader with guidance on definitions, use of the form and 
application of the taxonomy. Further guidance was provided to the readers in a 
document entitled ‘Using the Oxygen Incident Categorization Program’ which is 
available in Appendix D.2. 
The software was built using Microsoft Access and Visual Basic for Applications 
(VBA). Both the taxonomy and the software were trialled before full 
implementation. 
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Figure 5-1. The layout of the software application main window. 
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5.2.3 100 Record Trial 
There was a concern at an early stage that a detailed taxonomy may cause 
confusion and thus introduce error. The initial structure (presented in Figure 
5-2) was therefore made as wide and unspecific as possible while trying not to 
be vague. This was assessed in a trial of the electronic form and the taxonomy 
that made use of the first 100 of the 5,755 records in the NPSA data. 
 
Figure 5-2. The first taxonomy structure. 
 
The 100 trial records were collected and distributed to all seven readers on USB 
flash memory devices. The readers were given just over two weeks to analyse 
these records. They were encouraged to make notes about any problems 
encountered and to express their opinion on the difficulty of the task.  
Information gathered automatically by the software on time spent per record 
was used to assess how long it would take to analyse a full portion of the data 
(approximately 2,000 records per reader).  
The level of agreement on whether any record was a valid case or not was 
measured using a scoring system that ranked “Disagreement” according to the 
spread of opinions. There were three possible answers: “Yes”, “No” or “Don’t 
Know”. For each record, the number of readers that chose each answer was 
counted.  
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Table 5-1.Case Agreement Scores 
Ans1 Ans2 Ans3 Score 
0 0 7 0 
0 1 6 1 
0 2 5 2 
0 3 4 3 
1 1 5 4 
1 2 4 5 
1 3 3 6 
2 2 3 7 
 
With three answers and seven readers, disregarding the order, there were eight 
unique permutations. A score was allocated to each record according to Table 
5-1, which shows the number of readers selecting each answer. Full agreement 
was indicated by all seven readers choosing one answer, and assigned a score 
of zero. Complete disagreement was assigned a score of seven.  
The total case disagreement (Dgmt) was obtained by adding the scores across 
all records. It was expressed as a percentage of the worst case disagreement 
which was calculated as 7x100 = 700. Since agreement and disagreement are 
the only two values in this percentage scale, subtracting the percentage 
disagreement from 100 gives the total percentage agreement as:  
Percentage agreement = ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ ×− 100
700
100 Dgmt  
Equation 5-1: Case Percentage Agreement. 
The agreement of reader’s choices of taxonomy elements was analysed using 
another scoring system. Each element in every record was examined for either 
“selected” or “not selected”. Each instance of either state was counted and the 
results multiplied to give a score according to Table 5-2. A score of twelve 
indicates the most disagreement, while a score of zero indicates no 
disagreement.  
Table 5-2. Element Choice Agreement Scores 
Selected Not Selected Score 
7 0 0 
6 1 6 
5 2 10 
4 3 12 
3 4 12 
2 5 10 
1 6 6 
0 7 0 
 
The total disagreement (Dgmt) for each element was calculated by adding the 
scores for that element from all 100 records. This was then expressed as a 
percentage of the highest possible disagreement. (Since there were 100 
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records under review, the highest possible disagreement score per element was 
12 x 100 = 1200.) Since agreement and disagreement are the only two values 
in this percentage scale, subtracting the percentage disagreement from 100 
gives the total percentage agreement for each element.  
Percentage Agreement = ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ ×− 100
1200
100 Dgmt  
Equation 5-2: Element Percentage Agreement. 
Percentage agreement of this type is not as definitive as more accepted 
statistical tests (Krippendorff, 2003b). In this application however, it is not being 
used to assess research validity but to assist in a judgment of suitability of the 
method and is therefore sufficient (Salkind, 2006). 
5.2.4 First Trial Results and Outcomes 
Case agreement was high; with the readers able to agree on which cases were 
valid for this research 78% of the time. Opinion from the readers was consistent 
with this result, with most finding the identification of cases fairly simple for most 
records. There were however, some incidents that contained ambiguous 
statements making identification more difficult, while others lacked enough 
detail for a clear choice.  These were discussed and strategies developed which 
were included in the help and guidance notes. The most important of these was 
to assume a ‘worst case’ for each incident where outcome or action was 
unclear. It was felt more important to try to extrapolate hazards rather than to 
exclude incidents as this is primarily prospective research and not definitive 
case analysis. 
The proportional agreement for the taxonomy elements depicted in Figure 5-3 
shows a level of consistency above 70%. Although this indicated that the 
existing taxonomy structure (Figure 5-2) could be reliably applied, the research 
group felt that there was insufficient detail to provide a clear enough 
categorization of all the relevant cases.  
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Figure 5-3. Taxonomy element agreement. 
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All the readers agreed that the software was easy to use. A few modifications 
were however identified. The first was to display information on the readers’ 
position in the data. Another was an additional start-up window to give the 
option of starting from the last recorded position or from the beginning of the 
data file for instances when the researchers were returning to the analysis after 
closing the form. 
An analysis of the average time spent per record can be seen in Figure 5-4 and 
shows a fairly wide range of investment. On average, it took 80.5 seconds to 
categorize each record, which meant that it could take a reader on average 45 
hours ranging between 22 and 78 hours to complete a set of 2,000 records. 
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Figure 5-4. Analysis of time spent per record. 
 
5.2.5 50 Record Trial 
After making the amendments identified after the first trial, which included 
integration of a more detailed 35 element taxonomy into the form, it was 
decided that a smaller trial would be sufficient to test the method.  
Fifty records were randomly selected from the total population for use as the 
trial data. Agreement regarding case selection was measured in the same way 
as previously. Agreement regarding taxonomy choices was also done in a 
similar way, with the scoring system adjusted to enable assessment of the 
higher number of choices produced by the larger structure. Both also had to be 
slightly adjusted to account for the fact that there were now only six readers. 
One of the anaesthetists in the group left Bedford hospital after the first trial, 
accounting for the fact that there were seven readers originally and only six 
from this point on. 
5.2.6 Second Trial Results and Conclusions 
Agreement on case validity increased to 92% compared with 78% on the first 
trial. This may be attributable to the smaller sample size, clearer guidance on 
case selection and some acquired learning through experience. 
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The percentage agreement for the taxonomy elements is shown in Figure 5-5. 
This indicates an average 90% consistency ranging between 67% and 100%, 
which is very similar to the result from the first trial. This suggests that the more 
detailed taxonomy had no detrimental effect on the level of agreement between 
readers. 
The analysis of time taken is shown in Figure 5-6 and is also very consistent 
with the first trial. An average of 76.6 seconds per record was achieved which 
equates to an average of 42.5 hours for 2,000 records (ranging between 24 and 
57.6 hours). 
The final 49 element taxonomy structure shown in Figure 5-7 was agreed after 
a discussion following this second trial. 
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Figure 5-5. Percentage agreement from second trial results 
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Figure 5-6. Time analysis from the second trial 
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Figure 5-7. The final 49 element taxonomy.  
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5.2.7 The live study 
The 5,755 incident reports were split into three groups as shown in Figure 5-8. 
One hundred and fifty records were randomly selected and placed aside to 
provide a common set for agreement analysis. This number was chosen as the 
closest to ten percent of 1,918 (5755/3) that would not extend the data much 
further than the agreed preferred maximum of 2,000 records.  
The remaining 5,605 records were divided into three groups and the 150 
previously removed records added to each. Two readers were assigned to a 
group and given their own copy of the software package with the relevant 
records embedded. Two of the groups received 2,018 and the third 2,019 
records. 
 
Figure 5-8. Data distribution. 
The readers decided on the validity of each incident by application of the 
following guidance:  
‘Any incident where oxygen therapy was not administered when it should 
have, failed during therapy or was in some way implicated in the incident. 
External factors such as other therapies or medications that caused the 
patient’s condition to change and thus affect the therapy should be 
included. Instances where oxygen therapy was correctly administered as 
a result of some other incident should not be included’.  
There are various contexts within which oxygen therapy is administered. It was 
thought possible that there may be a number of these that pose more threat or 
contain specific, singular hazards. The reader’s opinions on the context of each 
incident were recorded by selection from a dropdown list as detailed in Table 
5-3. This list was generated by considering the circumstances within which 
oxygen therapy is administered. Some of these are positional such as a ward or 
department, others are situational such as during a transfer or an emergency 
event. Guidance on these choices was provided to the readers both in the 
software and the written guidance of Appendix D.2. 
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Table 5-3: Context list. 
Context Description 
Don't Know  
In a ward 
During Internal Transfer 
In a Critical Care area 
During Recovery 
In A & E 
In Maternity or during Delivery 
In an Ambulance 
Other Hospital Areas 
Internal Emergency (e.g. Crash Call) 
External Emergency (e.g. Car Accident) 
Other- Please explain in Notes box 
 
The readers indicated which of the elements they thought might have 
contributed to each incident by placing a tick in a check box next the relevant 
elements as shown in Figure 5-1. The software application again automatically 
collected information on the amount of time spent per record.  
5.3 Analysis and Results 
5.3.1 Case Selection and Data Recombination 
A list of valid cases from each of the three groups was compiled by application 
of the matrix defined in Table 5-4. The lists were then combined, including all 
cases with a ‘Yes’ or ‘Maybe’ result to allow aggregated analysis. The 
aggregation was achieved by applying an ‘OR’ function to the tables containing 
the taxonomy selections for each group, such that if any reader had selected a 
taxonomy element, that choice went forward to the aggregated data. This 
follows with the philosophy that even if only one reader identified the presence 
of a particular element in an event, it was considered to be a valid identification. 
Table 5-4. Combined Case Decision 
Reader 1 Reader 2 Result 
Yes Yes Yes 
Don’t Know Yes Yes 
No No No 
Don’t Know No No 
Don’t Know Don’t Know Don’t Know
Yes No Don’t Know
 
The combination of results from the 150 common records had to be handled 
separately because it involved the opinions of more than just the two readers in 
each group. Following the screening of valid cases, the common records were 
removed from the rest of the data. These were then subjected to a separate 
‘OR’ function process taking into account the choices made by all six readers. 
The resulting two separate sets of choices were then recombined to form the 
final data for analysis of identified hazardous elements. 
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There were 3,078 (53.5%) of the 5,755 records which were judged to be valid 
cases for this research. 11,288 Taxonomy selections were made, averaging to 
3.67 (SD 2.2) hazardous elements per record and a very variable 230.4 (SD 
252) selections per taxonomy element. 
5.3.2 Interrater Reliability 
Interrater reliability was measured using Krippendorff’s Alpha (Kα) 
(Krippendorff, 2003a). This is a statistical method based on the Spearman rank 
correlation. It is similar to Cronbach’s Alpha (Salkind, 2006), except that it is 
able to deal with multiple ‘readers’ and also takes into account the possible 
effects of readers making selections by chance (Krippendorff, 2003b). A macro 
written for the statistical software ‘SPSS’ was used for the analysis (Hayes and 
Krippendorff, 2007). Two analyses were made; one across all six readers using 
the 150 common records and another between the two readers in each group. 
These were compared to give an indication of the relationship between the 
common records and the full data set. 
Kα computed for the selections on the validity of cases and incident context 
scored 0.68 and 0.54 respectively, indicating moderate to high reliability. Kα 
across the 150 common records, ranged from zero (no agreement) to one (full 
agreement). 
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Figure 5-9. Comparison of interrater reliability scores. 
 
A trend analysis comparing the agreement scores for each of the 49 elements is 
shown in Figure 5-9. The trend lines show similar patterns across much of the 
graph, suggesting that there are no major differences between the groups. This 
indicates a high likelihood that the reliability of the full data set is similar to that 
of the common control group and shows a clear consistency in the use of the 
taxonomy.   
Ten taxonomy elements could not initially be given a reliability score due to 
insufficient variation between researchers and a low number of occurrences, 
both of which are vital in an accurate reliability analysis using Kα (Krippendorff, 
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2003a). This is mainly due to the possibility that the readers made these exactly 
matching choices by chance or that they may have conferred and thus made 
the same decisions. Some of these were considered as full agreement in later 
analyses because the reason for there being no variation was that everyone 
agreed separately. It was felt that this was a valid assumption given the high 
level of specific knowledge held by the readers, and not the result of pure 
chance or collusion between readers. 
Some elements had very low reliability scores. This is possibly due to the very 
few occurrences of some of these and the simple fact that the readers did not 
agree. The diversity among the group members, combined with the subjective 
nature of the element selection process may well have contributed to this. The 
range of reliability scores is seen as advantageous in this context. The prime 
reason for selecting a diverse group of readers was to elicit a variation in 
opinion, these variations in reliability indicate that this variation has been 
achieved. 
5.3.3 Ranking by Element Occurrence 
Some basic descriptive statistics were collected about the frequency of 
occurrence of taxonomy elements and a ranking by number of occurrences was 
produced. 
A relevance score (Ruthven et al., 2002) was calculated by multiplying the 
number of occurrences of an element (NHaz) by its average reliability ( X Kα) 
across the three groups. This indicated the probability of its contribution to an 
incident and was used as a second ranking metric. This was felt to be the 
closest to a determination of occurrence versus opportunity that was possible 
with this dataset.  
To indicate the difference between the use of frequency and relevance, the 
ranking by frequency of element occurrence is presented in the left hand 
column of Table 5-5 and shows ‘Procedure/Protocol’ to be most common, 
followed closely by ‘Staff Knowledge and skill’ then ‘Clinical error – Patient 
Management’. In contrast to this, the ranking by relevance (calculated from the 
reliability scores) on the right hand side of the same table illustrates that ‘Staff 
Knowledge and Skill’ is now placed most prominently, with ‘Empty Cylinders’ 
moved up from 14th to 2nd place and ‘Clinical Error - Patient Management’ 
demoted from 3rd to 16th position.  
It would seem that the effect of bias from individual readers has been removed 
by the use of this metric, producing a more normalized result. If, for example, a 
single reader had attributed almost every incident to ‘Institutional Management’ 
then the frequency for this element would have been very high. If the other 
readers did not agree well with this observation, then the relevance score for 
that element would be low, effectively cancelling out some of the bias 
introduced by the single reader. This example is well evidenced in Table 5-5. 
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Table 5-5. Taxonomy elements ranked by frequency (Left) and relevance (Right). 
Taxonomy Elements By Frequency Freq  Taxonomy Elements By Relevance Rel 
Institutional - Procedure/Protocol 1124  Ward Management - Staff knowledge and skills 358.2 
Ward Management - Staff knowledge and skills 1045  Cylinder - Empty 219.1 
Clinical Error - Patient Management 806  Lack of Resources - Cylinders 164.6 
Clinical Error - Treatment 636  Clinical Error - Treatment 164.3 
Other human error 601  Patient Actions - Compliance/Intentional 121.8 
Institutional - Structure/Communication 495  Institutional - Procedure/Protocol 110.9 
Patient Monitoring - Patient Condition 474  Setup and Admin - Assembly 99.7 
Institutional - Management 447  Patient Monitoring - Pulse Oximetry 98.1 
Patient Monitoring - Pulse Oximetry 370  Communication - Prescription/Treatment order 96.9 
Lack of Resources - Cylinders 328  Lack of resources - Accessories 95.4 
Communication - Prescription/Treatment order 320  Patient Monitoring - Patient Condition 92.6 
Setup and Admin - Assembly 306  Other Equipment - Faulty 90.4 
Setup and Admin - Monitoring the therapy 304  Institutional - Structure/Communication 83.6 
Cylinder - Empty 265  Communication - Clinical Assistance/Examination 74.9 
Lack of resources - Accessories 258  Setup and Admin - Flowrate 68.8 
Communication - Clinical Assistance/Examination 245  Clinical Error - Patient Management 68.2 
Communication - Patient Notes 240  Lack of resources - Wall ports 64.4 
Institutional - Maintenance 234  Institutional - Procurement/Stores 61.4 
Institutional - Procurement/Stores 220  Other Equipment - Use Error 58.2 
Institutional - Environment/Infrastructure 196  Communication - Patient Notes 56.2 
Patient Actions - Compliance/Intentional 179  Ward Management - Staff numbers 50.0 
Other Equipment - Faulty 170  Lack of resources - Beds 48.1 
Other External 160  Cylinder - Falling Cylinder 44.6 
Accessory - Out of Place 157  Patient Monitoring - BGA 35.1 
Other Equipment - Use Error 153  Accessory - Out of Place 33.6 
Accessory - Use Error 140  Institutional - Environment/Infrastructure 33.5 
Lack of resources - Wall ports 138  Other human error 30.7 
Setup and Admin - Flowrate 133  Cylinder - Regulator/Pressure Gauge 30.2 
Ward Management - Staff numbers 130  Pipeline - Wrong Gas 30.1 
Lack of resources - Beds 119  Monitoring Equipment - Fault 29.7 
Monitoring Equipment - Fault 110  Institutional - Maintenance 27.5 
Patient Actions - Unintentional 95  Accessory - Faulty 26.7 
Patient Monitoring - BGA 76  Cylinder - Wrong Gas 26.5 
Accessory - Faulty 74  Accessory - Use Error 25.6 
Cylinder - Regulator/Pressure Gauge 63  Patient Actions - Unintentional 24.7 
Pipeline - Wrong Gas 59  Setup and Admin - Humidification 16.7 
Clinical Error - Diagnosis 54  Tampering - Visitor 16.4 
Cylinder - Falling Cylinder 53  Pipeline - Port Fail 15.3 
Ward Management - Shift management or strategy 47  Flow meter - Faulty 14.0 
Setup and Admin - Humidification 40  Monitoring Equipment - Use Error 7.6 
Cylinder - Wrong Gas 39  Other External 6.4 
Monitoring Equipment - Use Error 39  Tampering - Unauthorised staff 4.2 
Tampering - Visitor 32  Pipeline - Supply Fail 3.2 
Pipeline - Port Fail 31  Ward Management - Shift management or strategy 3.1 
Pipeline - Supply Fail 27  Flow meter - Smashed or Broken 2.7 
Flow meter - Faulty 25  Flow meter - Incorrect Indication 0.0 
Tampering - Unauthorized staff 20  Clinical Error - Diagnosis -0.2 
Flow meter - Smashed or Broken 6  Setup and Admin - Monitoring the therapy -2.9 
Flow meter - Incorrect Indication 5  Institutional - Management -10.0 
 
5.3.4 Risk Analysis 
Risk assessments of the form Risk = Likelihood x Harm were carried out on 
each hazardous element. As no direct indication of likelihood was available, the 
relevance score calculated previously was used as a measure of the probability 
of each element’s contribution to an incident.  
 106
Even though a generalised proportional determination had been made in 
paragraph 4.2.8, this could not be applied to the individual taxonomy elements 
as the actual number of occurrences is unknown. There are two reasons for 
this: Firstly this study used reported events, which cannot be assumed to 
indicate overall rates of occurrence. Secondly, the readers were asked to be 
somewhat speculative and not rely entirely on ‘reported fact’. 
The weighting values from Table 5-6 were applied to each occurrence of an 
element within an incident. The weighted values were then added to produce a 
harm score per element. 
Table 5-6 Harm Weighting 
Harm Value 
Death 10 
Severe 6 
Moderate 3 
Low 1 
No Harm 0 
 
A risk score was then calculated using the relevance score and multiplying this 
by the weighted score of reported harm. Where NHaz is the number of 
occurrences of a hazard and X Kα is the average agreement for that hazard: 
Risk = (NHaz x X Kα) Harm score 
Equation 5-3: Element Risk. 
Risk analyses of this type are useful as an indication of a quantitative ranking of 
hazards, but lack the qualitative judgments necessary to make decisions on 
whether to take a certain course of action. The intention in this study was not to 
make recommendations on action, but to aid in understanding the relationship 
between hazards in terms of possible harm and likelihood of occurrence. It was 
therefore felt adequate to use a context free score to make this determination. 
Application of the risk analysis based on the relevance of a taxonomy element 
rather than pure frequency, produced the ranked results listed in Table 5-7. The 
relevance scores were scaled in order to remove negative values and to 
produce a minimum relevance of one. This was mainly to prevent negative risk 
scores, which are meaningless. 
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Table 5-7. Risk analysis by taxonomy element 
Categories Codes Harm Relevance Risk 
Ward Management - Staff knowledge and skills WMSK 1007 369.2 371784.4 
Clinical Error - Treatment CET 730 175.3 127969.0 
Institutional - Procedure/Protocol IPP 1023 121.9 124703.7 
Clinical Error - Patient Management CEPM 936 79.2 74131.2 
Patient Monitoring - Patient Condition PMPC 587 103.6 60813.2 
Patient Monitoring - Pulse Oximetry PMPO 445 109.1 48549.5 
Institutional - Structure/Communication ISC 415 94.6 39259.0 
Lack of Resources - Cylinders LRC 199 175.6 34944.4 
Cylinder - Empty CE 144 230.1 33134.4 
Setup and Admin - Assembly SAA 242 110.7 26789.4 
Communication - Prescription/Treatment order CPT 248 107.9 26759.2 
Communication - Clinical Assistance/Examination CCE 279 85.9 23966.1 
Lack of resources - Accessories LRA 201 106.4 21386.4 
Patient Actions - Compliance/Intentional PACI 138 132.8 18326.4 
Other human error OHE 435 41.7 18139.5 
Communication - Patient Notes CPN 228 67.2 15321.6 
Other Equipment - Use Error OEUF 159 69.2 11002.8 
Other Equipment - Faulty OEF 90 101.4 9126.0 
Setup and Admin – Flow rate SAF 111 79.8 8857.8 
Lack of resources - Wall ports LRWP 108 75.4 8143.2 
Institutional - Procurement/Stores IPS 112 72.4 8108.8 
Institutional - Environment/Infrastructure IEI 159 44.5 7075.5 
Lack of resources - Beds LRB 112 59.1 6619.2 
Accessory - Out of Place AOP 145 44.6 6467.0 
Institutional - Maintenance IMC 131 38.5 5043.5 
Accessory - Use Error AUE 130 36.6 4758.0 
Ward Management - Staff numbers WMSN 77 61.0 4697.0 
Patient Monitoring - BGA PMBG 92 46.1 4241.2 
Patient Actions - Unintentional PAU 93 35.7 3320.1 
Monitoring Equipment - Fault MEF 77 40.7 3133.9 
Pipeline - Wrong Gas PWG 71 41.1 2918.1 
Setup and Admin - Monitoring the therapy SAM 270 8.1 2187.0 
Cylinder - Falling Cylinder CFC 39 55.6 2168.4 
Other External OE 119 17.4 2070.6 
Accessory - Faulty AF 48 37.7 1809.6 
Cylinder - Regulator/Pressure Gauge CRP 31 41.2 1277.2 
Setup and Admin - Humidification SAH 36 27.7 997.2 
Cylinder - Wrong Gas CWG 22 37.5 825.0 
Clinical Error - Diagnosis CED 71 10.8 766.8 
Monitoring Equipment - Use Error MEUE 35 18.6 651.0 
Ward Management - Shift management or strategy WMSS 43 14.1 606.3 
Tampering - Visitor TV 15 27.4 411.0 
Pipeline - Port Fail PPF 14 26.3 368.2 
Institutional - Management IMT 365 1.0 365.0 
Flow meter - Faulty FF 13 25.0 325.0 
Pipeline - Supply Fail PS 16 14.2 227.2 
Tampering - Unauthorized staff TUS 8 15.2 121.6 
Flow meter - Incorrect Indication FII 7 11.0 77.0 
Flow meter - Smashed or Broken FSB 4 13.7 54.8 
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Figure 5-10 Scatter plot of Harm versus Relevance 
Figure 5-10 shows the risk relationship between the elements and gives a 
slightly different relational meaning to risk than simply ranking by score as in 
Table 5-7. For the sake of clarity, only those elements that can be individually 
identified are labelled. Table 5-7 provides a key to the category codes used.  
The fifteen elements with the highest risk scores also fall above or near the line 
drawn between the 50% points on each axis of Figure 5-10. This line, labelled 
‘A’, indicates an assumed approximate ‘As Low As Reasonably Practicable’ 
(ALARP) zone. This is a term commonly used in Hazard Management referring 
to an area on a graph such as this where efforts need to be made to reduce the 
risk as much as possible. Any items beyond this need the most urgent attention. 
There was no analysis made in order to choose the position of this line other 
than looking at the graph and selecting an approximate point where the top 
fifteen elements would be addressed with the most urgency. 
Three elements in Figure 5-10: ‘Ward Management - Staff knowledge and 
skills’, ‘Institutional - Procedure/Protocol’ and ‘Clinical Error - Patient 
Management’, followed closely by ‘Clinical Error – Treatment’ are indicated as 
the highest risk, especially as they are associated with high levels of harm. All 
the other labelled categories fall near the ALARP line. 
5.3.5 Element Combinations 
It was recognized early in the research that most incidents would be the result 
of a number of contributory hazards. An examination of combinations of 
taxonomy elements, looking for patterns of contributory factors leading to death 
or serious harm was made through selective sorting. 
The full results of the selective sorting of elements to look for patterns of 
occurrence can be found in Appendix D.3, Table D.3-1. 
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The most common combinations contained the elements: 
- Institutional - Procedure/Protocol 
- Clinical Error - Patient Management 
- Ward Management - Staff knowledge and skills  
- Clinical Error – Treatment 
- Patient Monitoring - Patient Condition 
- Patient Monitoring - Pulse Oximetry 
The highest number of deaths was attributed to ‘Clinical Error – Treatment’, 
which accounted for six fatalities.  
‘Clinical Error - Patient Management’, ‘Patient Monitoring - Pulse Oximetry’, 
‘Communication - Clinical Assistance/Examination’ and ‘Lack of resources – 
Beds’, were each associated with three deaths. 
5.3.6 Context 
Unlike the choices of taxonomy elements, the opinions on the apparent contexts 
within which each reported incident may have occurred could not be combined 
for aggregated analysis and were therefore examined separately. A similar 
method to assessing harm per element was used to score the harm related to 
each context. This was then used together with the number of occurrences to 
assess the risk per context. The one with the highest risk was examined more 
closely, looking for any specific hazards or prominent issues. This is still a very 
polarized, quantitative view of risk applied to context categories. It remains a 
‘context free’ assessment because there is no subjective judgement being 
made. 
The frequency of occurrence, harm score and risk value per context are shown 
in Table 5-8. Frequency is a simple count of occurrences. The harm score was 
calculated using a matrix method employing the same weighting as the 
assessments per element (see Table 5-6). The risk value is a scaled multiple of 
frequency and harm. 
Table 5-8. Context risk. 
Context Description Freq Harm Risk 
In a ward 1799 1692 14092 
Don't Know 921 617 2631 
During Internal Transfer 761 553 1948 
In a Critical Care area 447 313 648 
Other Hospital Areas 264 138 169 
In an Ambulance 214 180 178 
In A & E 205 181 172 
In Maternity or during Delivery 213 151 149 
Internal Emergency (e.g. Crash Call) 137 193 122 
Other- Please explain in Notes box 117 75 41 
During Recovery 95 32 14 
External Emergency (e.g. Car Accident) 12 18 1 
 
As expected, the context with the highest frequency and risk was that of therapy 
applied ‘In a Ward’. It is also evident from the high number of times researchers 
 110
chose ‘Don’t Know’ that it is very difficult to attribute context to many reported 
incidents.  This is one of the limiting factors in the use of ‘pure’ empirical 
research for hazard analysis.  
As the ward context was already under examination, the one with the next 
highest risk, ‘Internal Transfers’, was discussed and some further detail sought. 
Three researchers spent one week re-examining as many as possible of the 
844 incidents in association with transfers for origin and destination. 133 
records were analysed. The origins were mainly wards (36.8%) or Accident and 
Emergency (19.5%). Destinations were most commonly wards (32.3%), critical 
care areas (19.5%) or medical imaging departments (17.3%). Table 5-9 shows 
the three most common routes taken during internal transfers. 
Table 5-9. Most common transfer routes. 
Route Count % of Total 
Ward to Imaging 15 11.3
Ward to Critical Care 14 10.5
A&E to Ward 14 10.5
 
5.3.7 Time and Effort 
Analysis of time spent was made by first removing any transaction records over 
six minutes long as this was assumed to be the longest a reader was likely to 
be actively assessing a record. This was felt to be a reasonable assumption 
because most of the incident descriptions were very short. Anything longer was 
most likely due to leaving the form active while not engaged in the research. 
The remaining data was analysed for mean time per record and total time 
spent. 
The researchers were also asked to provide some feedback on their experience 
of using the software and taxonomy. 
It was projected from the results of the second trial that it would take an average 
of 42.5 hours to complete 2,000 records, with readers spending approximately 
76.6 seconds per record. The breakdown of time taken shown in Table 5-10 
indicates that the analysis of the incident reports took less time than expected, 
with an average of just 27.5 Hours total or 49 seconds per record. 
Table 5-10. Time analysis 
Group Tot Hrs Ave Hrs Ave Seconds Per Rec 
1 37.8 18.9 33.7 
2 58.9 29.5 52.6 
3 68.1 34.1 60.7 
Combined 164.8 27.5 49.0 
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Table 5-11. Analysis of activity 
Group Reader 
Total 
Time 
(Hrs) 
Seconds 
per 
Record 
Total 
Element 
selections Difference
Group 
Average 
Ka 
1 18.4 32.9 9281 
2 19.3 34.5 1671
743 0.28 
3 26.7 47.7 21762 
4 32.2 57.4 2238
62 0.33 
5 48.1 85.8 32463 
6 20.0 35.7 1629
1617 0.36 
 
As shown in Table 5-11, reader one tried to be very precise in assigning 
hazardous elements according to ‘reported fact’ rather than expressing opinion. 
This was not the intention of the study and was possibly the result of their being 
unable to attend many of the pre-study meetings. As a result, since in most 
cases evidence was scant, this reader made the fewest selections and spent 
less time per record. Interestingly; this seems to have had only minimal effect 
on the interrater reliability for that group. Reader five spent the most time on the 
task and recorded the highest number of selections. This too seems to have 
had no detrimental effect on the reliability scores. 
Most readers found the method and the taxonomy easy to use and all stated 
that they had gained knowledge and insight from the experience. Most felt that 
they had completed the task quicker than expected, but admitted that it had at 
times been tedious. All reported that they had encountered a few records where 
there were themes not identifiable through the taxonomy. These were recorded 
in the notes section of the reading form. 
5.3.8 Hazard List Validation and Aggregation 
The hazard list constructed from the results of the observations and 
questionnaire was validated using a qualitative approach, where the taxonomy 
elements were linked to the hazard themes identified. An analysis was made 
using a comparison table and a partial ‘traffic light’ indication. Red was used to 
show that a theme was not identified through a particular method, while orange 
indicated partial identification. 
The notes made by the readers regarding hazards not identified through the 
taxonomy were qualitatively assessed and the emerging themes added to those 
from the taxonomy. The entire list was then made into one hazard analysis 
including, where possible, the results from the risk assessments. 
The result of the comparison of taxonomy elements to themes from the existing 
hazard analysis can be seen in Appendix D4, Table Appendix D4-1, which also 
includes the calculation of the final risk score for each hazard. It lists in each 
column, the hazards identified during the observational research alongside the 
hazard themes from the questionnaire study and the taxonomy elements, with 
those relating to each other in each row. A red cell indicates that no 
corresponding hazard, hazard theme or taxonomy element could be identified 
for that row and an orange cell indicates partial similarity. 
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The risk scores from the questionnaire and the incident report studies are 
summed to produce the ‘Risk Sum’ value in the last column. This final value 
was carried to the aggregated hazard analysis in Appendix D5, Table Appendix 
D.5-1. A risk score was calculated for 71% of the hazards using the results from 
the questionnaire and incident report studies. Most of the observed hazards 
were covered by the questionnaire and incident report studies. As expected 
however, both these studies identified additional hazards not seen during the 
observational research. 
The final aggregated hazard analysis is presented in Table Appendix D.5-1. A 
total of 188 hazards were identified through further distillation of the combined 
analyses. The table is arranged by alphabetical listing according to the system 
diagram of Figure 4-9. A colour coding was assigned to indicate risk categories 
according to the values in Table 5-12. These represent risk scores of above 1.5 
times the mean (High), 0.5 times either side of the mean (Moderate and Minor) 
and below 0.5 times the mean (Low). Fifty five hazards (29%) could not be risk 
assessed due to a lack of information regarding likelihood and harm. 
Table 5-12. Risk analysis summary 
Risk Category Value N % 
High > 0.2494 26 14% 
Moderate > 0.1663 < 0.2494 32 17% 
Minor > 0.0831 < 0.1663 34 18% 
Low < 0.0831 41 22% 
Un-Assessed   55 29% 
Total number of hazards:   188 100% 
 
5.4 Conclusions 
A taxonomy, developed through a design process which included two 
comprehensive trials, was applied to 5,755 incident reports in order to identify 
possible contributory hazardous elements within valid cases. The structure of 
the taxonomy (see Figure 5-7) was informed by a combination of the results 
from previous observational and questionnaire research along with the high 
level of experiential knowledge of the research group. The software for making 
use of the taxonomy was validated through the same trial process applied to the 
taxonomic structure.  
The results of the final categorization of the incident reports were tested for 
reliability using Krippendorff’s Alpha (Kα) and showed mixed results but were in 
general acceptable because a degree of diversity is advantageous in this 
context and was in fact the purpose of having a diverse research group. This 
was also used to calculate the probability of an elements’ contribution to an 
incident by way of an estimation of relevance based on frequency of occurrence 
and the reliability score. The relevance and an estimation of harm calculated 
using a weighted scoring method were applied together to produce a risk 
analysis for each hazardous element in the taxonomy (see Table 5-7. Risk 
analysis by taxonomy element).  
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The objective to create an aggregated hazard analysis was achieved with a 
high level of success. The previously constructed hazard list was verified to a 
large extent by the high degree of similarity of identified hazards (see Appendix 
D4). The hazard list was also amended and appended to, based on the 
additional identifications made from the incident reports and the knowledge 
gained on the nature of oxygen therapy and the related hazards.  
The final aggregated hazard analysis (see Appendix D5), was arranged 
according to the system diagram constructed from the knowledge gained during 
the observational and questionnaire research (Figure 4-9). The hazard analysis 
was later used to assess the validity of each of the formal hazard analysis 
methods applied in the next chapter. 
The risk assessment of hazard themes and the investigation into the 
combinations of hazardous elements creating an incident were used along with 
the results from the questionnaire study to produce a risk score for 71% of the 
identified hazards. Not all the hazards could be risk assessed as some of them 
were identified in addition to those defined through the taxonomy or from the 
questionnaire study. Knowledge on the nature of the hazards related to oxygen 
therapy was gained by looking closely at the contexts within which events 
occurred and how hazardous elements combined to create an incident.  
The efficiency and difficulty of this method for defining hazards was examined 
through a combination of time spent and opinions from the researchers. It was 
concluded that this method makes the analysis of a large number of incident 
reports possible in a relatively short period of time and was fairly easy to apply 
in most cases. 
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Chapter 6 Evaluating the Formal Hazard 
Analysis Methods. 
Abstract 
This chapter describes the second and third phases of the research as 
described in Chapter 1, section 1.2. The application of Failure Modes and 
Effects Analysis (FMEA), Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) and Hazard and Operability 
Analysis (HAZOP), using the common frame of reference consisting of the 
system diagram (Figure 4-9) and the Task analysis (Figure 4-10) is discussed. 
The hazard analysis methods were compared to each other in terms of process 
and presentation. Their results were compared to the combined hazard list 
described in the previous chapter in order to assess their applicability to ward 
based healthcare. This process is depicted in Figure 1-2 in Chapter 1. 
FMEA achieved 61% system coverage followed closely by FTA with 60%, while 
HAZOP only achieved approximately 44.6%. Although useful risk assessments 
could be attached to both the FMEA and the HAZOP results, FTA could not be 
used to its full potential when assessing probabilities of events. FTA did 
however provide clear indications of causality and event linkage which could not 
be achieved with the other two methods. 
It was generally found that these methods presented added value through the 
provision of: 
- Information for system modification. 
- Valid, accurate risk assessment. 
- Identification of hazard barriers and safeguards. 
- A formal method for the communication of results. 
- A vehicle for documented learning. 
The two most striking conclusions were that: 
1. The systems and processes definitions required by these methods 
provide a valuable opportunity for learning and the capture of tacit 
knowledge. 
2. An enduring means for the capture and dissemination of knowledge on 
hazards and risk is provided that can be continually updated and used for 
the formulation of strategies for safety and quality improvement. 
 
 115
6.1 Introduction 
The large number of existing Hazard Analysis methods makes the choice of 
which to use a daunting one. As outlined in Chapter 2, only Failure Modes and 
Effects Analysis (FMEA) appears to have been assessed (DeRosier et al., 
2002; Linkin et al., 2005) or, to a large extent, had any published account of its 
use in healthcare (Van Tilburg et al., 2006; Fechter and Barba, 2004).  
This evaluation was undertaken to assess the applicability of these methods to 
healthcare. This was accomplished by comparing the results from each method 
against those produced from the empirically based research. Judgements were 
also made about the usefulness of the information presented and whether some 
basic requirements for the identification of actions to prevent or mitigate 
incidents were met.  
6.1.1 Evaluation Aims 
The following aims were identified for this evaluation: 
- To select a small number of hazard analysis methods from the seven 
previously short-listed. 
- To conduct hazard analyses using each of the chosen methods in turn, 
all based on the system diagram of Figure 4-9 and the Task analysis flow 
chart of Figure 4-10. 
- To compare the results of each with the hazard analysis constructed 
previously from empirical research. 
- To asses the level of system coverage achieved by each method. 
- To discuss the presentation and usefulness of the information produced 
by the analyses. 
- To discuss the techniques for the assessment of risk or priority employed 
by each of the methods. 
- To discuss the overall ‘usability’ of each method. 
6.2 Hazard Analysis Methods  
6.2.1 Selecting the Methods for Evaluation  
The choice of methods to evaluate was dictated to a large extent by those 
which were accessible to the researcher. Seven had previously been 
shortlisted, as described in Chapter 2, based mainly on the fact that information 
about them and experience on their application was available within Cranfield 
University. These were: FMEA, FTA, ETA, HAZOP, SWIFT, HEART and 
THERP. 
Both HEART (Williams 1986) and THERP (Kirwan, 1996) are very numerical 
and require the assessor to make judgments on “Performance Shaping Factors” 
(PSFs) and ‘Error Producing Conditions’ (EPCs) which are built into the 
methods. It was felt that the specificity of these methods, the fact that they do 
not themselves identify hazards and their extremely quantitative nature made 
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them unsuitable for this research. This therefore left FMEA (including its two 
variants; Healthcare Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (HFMEA) and Failure 
Modes and Effects Criticality Analysis (FMECA)), FTA, ETA, HAZOP and 
SWIFT. A more detailed comparison of these methods was required to further 
refine the choice. Some basic criteria for their selection were defined as follows: 
1. The methods needed to be able to take into account a wide range of hazard 
domains, e.g.: 
- Equipment failure: There was a range of both permanent hardware 
and disposable accessories that had to be assessed. 
- Human factors: Therapies are not yet specified, ordered and 
administered by automated systems; there is always a human 
element in the process at some point. Mistakes and lapses are 
therefore inevitable and their assessment had to be included. 
Ergonomics and the equipment interface (Lin et al., 2001; Fries, 
2001), shift patterns affecting fatigue and distraction (Narumi et al., 
1999), stress and communication were just some of the issues 
expected to be encountered. 
- Systems factors: The robustness of a system can only be assessed if 
the inter-dependence of every sub system within it can be taken into 
account (Senders, 2006). This is especially the case with complex 
systems such as ward based healthcare. 
- Environmental factors: Variations in temperature, light levels or noise 
might affect not only the human elements in a system but also the 
equipment. The ward layout, bed arrangement and activities in 
neighbouring beds may also affect how therapies are administered 
and patients are monitored. 
- Organizational factors: Latent errors (Reason, 1999b) are mistakes or 
omissions within procedures or processes and are often permeated 
from decisions and actions taken at higher levels within organizations. 
These are often difficult to detect, but can have disastrous effects. 
2. At least one inductive and one deductive method were to be included so that 
there could be a comparison between the two methodologies.  
3. At least one graphically constructed and one tabular method was to be 
included so that the two general ways of presenting the results of an 
assessment could be compared.  
Table 6-1 was constructed from information gathered about the methods being 
considered. Their basic structure is described in the first four columns. A 
subjective judgment on their apparent complexity is included using a scale 
ranging from 1 (simple) to 5 (highly complex). Any special requirements in order 
to use them are listed and the final column contains notes referring to the 
criteria for selection and any other points deemed relevant. 
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Table 6-1 . The factors for the selection of hazard analysis methods. 
Method Focus Logic Style Complexity 1-5 
Special 
requirements Notes 
Multiple factors can be 
included. 
Some team 
input 
Used for evaluating 
technology and process. 
Can be used to complete 
a risk matrix.  
Previous use in healthcare 
Minimal training required 
Systems analysis possible 
Task analysis possible 
with functional FMEA 
Probabilistic analysis 
possible 
Can be used to inform 
FTA , ETA or HAZOP 
Cannot identify hazards 
from combination failures 
Might not identify hazards 
not resulting from failure 
FMEA, 
HFMEA, 
FMECA 
General 
Healthcare 
Systems 
Inductive Tabular 2 
 
Not recommended as sole 
analysis method 
Uses Boolean 
logic 
Multiple factors can be 
analyzed 
Basic drawing 
facility 
Used for systems analysis 
May need 
probabilistic data 
Used for task analysis 
Possible for single 
assessor  
Only fault or failure events 
considered 
Some training and practice 
required 
FTA General Deductive Graphical  3 
 
Probabilistic analysis 
possible 
Multiple factors Works best with 
correct software Used for systems analysis 
Used for task analysis 
Possible for single 
assessor  
All events considered 
Some training and practice 
required 
ETA General Deductive Graphical 
and 
tabular 
3 
 
Probabilistic analysis 
possible 
Team based Multiple factors 
Good leadership Used for evaluating 
technology and process. 
Conference 
facilities 
Can be used to complete 
a risk matrix.  
Co-operation 
from hospitals 
Used for systems analysis 
Used for task analysis 
HAZOP General Inductive 
and 
deductive 
Tabular 4 
Some training, 
but available on 
campus 
Can be linked to other 
analysis methods 
Multiple factors Instructional 
information 
scarce Used for systems analysis 
Not recommended as sole 
analysis method 
SWIFT General Inductive Tabular 3 
Some training 
and practice 
required Focuses on cause and effect 
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FMEA has previously been used in healthcare and seems to be growing in 
popularity. An evaluation was therefore felt to be timely. A decision had to be 
made between evaluating FMEA in its more original form, the FMEA modified 
for healthcare (HFMEA) described by DeRosier et al (DeRosier et al., 2002), or 
FMECA which includes a system criticality element. FMEA in its original form 
was chosen so that it could provide an inductive method with a formal tabular 
presentation and represent a technique with a growing following in healthcare. 
The result from this evaluation might be used as a benchmark for any future 
comparison applied to its various ‘offspring’. 
A difficult choice had to be made between FTA and ETA in order to provide a 
method which employs deductive logic with a graphical presentation of results. 
FTA was chosen over ETA because it is very prospectively focussed, has an 
almost purely graphical nature and concentrates mainly on failure events. It was 
further felt that a future study with an exploration of their combined use in a two 
way prospective and retrospective analysis of key events might be informed by 
this research and would be very useful. 
According to some reviewers, HAZOP has been used in healthcare (Redmill et 
al., 1999b)(Lyons et al., 2004), although no peer reviewed publications were 
found in a literature search in November 2005, which is when this decision was 
made. HAZOP was chosen over SWIFT as a creative method using both 
inductive and deductive logic with its own ‘built-in’ hazard identification method 
and tabular presentation. It has the added potential to link the results from a 
range of assessment methods into an ongoing hazard management system, 
which may have usefulness in the complex-systems environment of healthcare.  
6.3 Hazard identification 
Since the hazard list produced in the previous phase of the research was to be 
used as the comparative data for the evaluation, this could not be used to 
inform the formal hazard analyses. However, as neither FTA nor FMEA have 
their own explicit hazard identification processes, a separate method had to be 
employed for this purpose. The FMEA and the FTA were therefore both based 
on the same hazard identification map (Figure 6-8) constructed using a modified 
Delphi method (Robson, 2002e)(Hasson et al., 2000). In the normal Delphi 
method, participants contribute either individually or in small groups, providing 
their ideas on the subject under investigation by responding to a questionnaire. 
These are then analysed and a further set of questions devised. This process is 
repeated until ‘consensus’ is reached. The higher the number of iterations 
performed, the better the result.  
Instead of the usual questionnaire based process, the members were asked to 
brainstorm using a ‘spider diagram’ after being briefed on the subject of oxygen 
therapy and made familiar with the system diagram. The meetings were 
informal and conducted separately in order to reduce the disruption to normal 
duties. One full and one partial round were completed, giving most members 
the opportunity to comment on the full hazard identification. This was then used 
in conjunction with the system diagram for insertion into the structure of the 
FMEA and the FTA. The Delphi members included a Consultant Anaesthetist, a 
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Senior Nurse, a Clinical Risk Manager, an Engineering Design Consultant and a 
Clinical Technologist. 
HAZOP has its own hazard identification method making use of attributes and 
guidewords, which required a little customization for application to this research.  
Two full day HAZOP meetings were held with a similar group of members to the 
Delphi group; a Consultant Anaesthetist, three Senior Nurses, a Clinical Risk 
Manager, an Engineering Design Consultant and a Clinical Technologist. The 
hazard identification and analysis were done together in a continuous process 
in the normal way of HAZOP. 
6.4 The FMEA 
6.4.1 Description of FMEA 
FMEA(McDermott, 1996; Ericson II, 2005c) can be used for a wide variety of 
applications, including full systems analyses.  
The essence of FMEA is to answer four questions: 
1. What can fail? 
2. How can it fail? 
3. How likely is it to fail? 
4. What will happen if it does fail? 
The answers to these are entered into a table linking them all together such as 
shown in Table 6-2. In the following passage, text in italics indicates column 
headings. 
Table 6-2. An example of an FMEA table. 
System Sub-
system 
Com-
ponent 
Failure 
Mode 
Causes Detection 
Methods 
Effects Seve-
rity 
Likeli-
hood 
Detec-
tion 
RPN 
1.1.1a 
Therapy 
cannot be set 
up 
6 2 1 12 
1.1.1b Supply 
fails during 
use 
6 2 1 12 
1.1.1c Change 
to cylinders 
2 2 1 4 
Oxygen 
Therapy 
1. Supply 
Equipment 
1.1. 
Piped 
Supply 
1.1.1. 
No 
Supply 
No gas, 
Pipeline 
damaged, 
Maintenance 
Alarm 
panel 
1.1.1d 
Transfer to 
another ward 
2 2 1 4 
 
The first two questions above are answered qualitatively, with the answer to the 
first referring to items in a system diagram or process flow chart (‘System’, ‘Sub-
System’ and ‘Component’) and the second describing the manner of failure or 
‘Failure Mode’. Although FMEA does not have its own formal method of hazard 
identification, discussion of these questions with reference to the system 
diagrams can facilitate hazard identification. 
The third and fourth questions are answered both qualitatively and 
quantitatively. The ‘likelihood’ of any ‘Failure Mode’ is related to its ‘Causes’, 
which are described and discussed during an analysis. The ‘Effects’ of a failure 
are described and assessed quantitatively by the consideration of their 
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‘Severity’. This can often depend on whether or when a failure is detected and 
the ‘Detection’ methods are therefore also first described and then quantitatively 
assessed. 
The ‘Likelihood’ and ‘Severity’ are scored using scales defined by the assessor. 
These are often the values normally used in standard risk assessments. The 
‘Detection’ score is more accurately described as ‘the likelihood of failing to 
detect a hazard or failure mode’ and is usually a number from one to ten. All 
three need to be defined as precisely as possible before an assessment begins. 
The three scores are then multiplied to produce the ‘Risk Priority Number 
(RPN)’ 
The table can be extended to include identified preventative or mitigating 
apparatus, which could be physical barriers or less tangible safeguards such as 
process interlocks or amended protocols. Further numerical analysis might also 
be applied to the RPN, such as failure mode or sub-system risk. 
6.4.2 Conducting the FMEA 
The FMEA was conducted by the researcher at Cranfield University following 
the Delphi hazard identification performed at Bedford and Stoke Mandeville 
Hospitals. It took place from the beginning of August to the end of December 
2007.  
The first task was to transfer the hazards from the Delphi map to the FMEA 
table shown in Appendix E1, Table E.1-1, making direct reference to the system 
diagram (Figure 4-9). The column headings shown in Figure 6-1 were used in 
the FMEA with the results from the Delphi map contributing to the first two 
columns. Each subsystem component (‘System Element’) was taken in turn and 
the hazards associated with each of them listed as ‘Failure modes’. 
 
System 
Element 
Failure 
Mode 
Causes Detection 
Methods 
Effects Severity Likelihood Detection RPN Proportional 
Risk 
Failure 
Mode 
Proportional 
Risk 
Element 
Risk 
Subsystem 
Risk 
Figure 6-1. Column headings of FMEA table. 
Next to be considered were the possible ‘Causes’ and ‘Detection Methods’ of 
each ‘Failure mode’. These were first listed by the author and then discussed 
with members of the Delphi group. Where possible, all the feasible causes were 
included, many of which could occur in combination. A similar approach was 
used to identify the possible ‘Effects’ of each failure mode.  
Each ‘Effect’ was then risk assessed in three dimensions; ‘Severity’, ‘Likelihood’ 
and ‘Detection’. These were then multiplied to give the ‘Risk Priority Number’ 
(RPN). The ‘Severity’ and ‘Likelihood’ scores were assigned with reference to 
Table 6-3 and Table 6-4. The score assigned to ‘Detection’ indicates the 
increase to risk from failure to detect the hazard before an incident occurs and 
was selected by reference to Table 6-5. 
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Table 6-3. Severity Risk Scores 
Severity Score Definition 
Very Low 1 Distress or inconvenience 
Low 2 Minor harm, discomfort or delay
Medium 3 Severe, recoverable harm 
High 4 Severe, permanent harm 
Very High 5 One death 
Extreme 6 Multiple deaths 
 
Table 6-4. Likelihood Risk Scores 
Likelihood Score Definition 
Very Unlikely 1 <1% or < once in 2 years 
Unlikely 2 1% - 10% or once in 2 years 
Not Very Likely 3 10% - 30% or once a year 
Quite Likely 4 30 % - 50% or monthly (12 – 49 per year) 
Highly Likely 5 50% - 90% or Weekly (50 – 199 per year) 
Almost Certain 6 >90% or Daily (> 200 per year) 
  
Table 6-5. Detection Risk Scores 
Detection Score Definition 
Certain 1 Failure will always be detected 
High 2 Failure will be detected approximately 8/10 times 
Moderate 5 Failure will be detected approximately 5/10 times 
Unlikely 8 Failure will be detected approximately 2/10 times 
Impossible 10 Failure cannot be detected 
 
Additional calculations were made in order to assess whether extrapolation 
provides any added value compared to the RPN on its own. 
The RPN was divided by the highest possible score for each effect (360) to give 
a ‘proportional risk’ value. These values were added together to give the ‘Total 
System Risk’. The proportional risk values of each effect for a particular failure 
mode were added together and divided by the ‘Total System Risk’ to produce a 
‘Failure Mode Proportional Risk’ relative to the ‘Total System Risk’. These were 
further appropriately summed to give a ‘Subsystem Proportional Risk’ value.  
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6.5 The Fault Tree Analysis 
6.5.1 Description of FTA 
FTA (Ericson II, 2005c; Tetlow et al. 2005; Boult et al., 2006) is an event driven 
method in which causes are identified for a ‘Top Event’. These then become 
events themselves and their causes are identified. 
Figure 6-2 shows an example of a Fault Tree and the various symbols 
commonly used. Event 1 is the Top Event and can only take place if all three 
the events 2, 3 and 4 also occur. Event 2 has not yet been further explored 
while Event 4 is a normally occurring event and is not a failure or hazard. It 
does however have a condition attached which must be true for it to be 
considered as normal. Event 3 can happen if either 5 or 6 occur. Event 5 is a 
Basic Event, one where no further extrapolation is possible or warranted. It is 
also an End Event, which is where the analysis stops. Event 6 is a type of End 
Event known as a Transfer Event, which is part of a Fault Tree that is continued 
elsewhere (Usually the Top Event). There is always a reference indicating 
where to find this Transfer (or Sub) Tree. 
FTA, like FMEA, also does not have its own hazard identification method, other 
than the consideration made when the logic ‘AND’ or ‘OR’ gates are applied to 
each identified Event. The nature and propagation of events is considered both 
before and during the construction of the Fault Tree. This makes it a dynamic 
method that has to be kept in check to prevent obfuscation due to over analysis 
and the resultant inclusion of inconsequent information. 
 
Figure 6-2. An example of a Fault Tree. 
The analysis of a Fault Tree results in an expression in Boolean algebra 
containing the combinations of End Events that can produce the Top Event. 
These are called Cut Sets. An example using the tree of Figure 6-2 is: 
)642()542(1 EventEventEventEventEventEventEvent ⋅⋅+⋅⋅=  
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Where a dot ‘·’ represents an AND while a ‘+’ represents an OR function. 
When these expressions are minimised using normal Boolean logic rules, the 
result is a collection of the fewest End Events which, only when all present, can 
cause the Top Event. The two Minimised Cut Sets for the above example are 
therefore: 
6421
5421
EventEventEventEvent
EventEventEventEvent
⋅⋅=
⋅⋅=
 
Cut Sets containing only one event indicate that a single hazard can result in a 
failure or Top Event and these are almost always very bad news. 
Further analysis can be made if the probabilities of the End Events are known. 
Probability is expressed in values from 0 (impossible) to 1 (certain). Event 
probabilities combined with ANDs are multiplied and since the values are 
usually much less than 1, they result in a decreased probability for the event 
higher up the tree. ORs are added and result in an increased probability for the 
next event. This process is continued until the probability of the top event has 
been determined. 
6.5.2 Conducting the FTA 
The FTA was undertaken by the researcher at Cranfield University from the 
beginning of August to the end of December 2007, following the completion of 
the Delphi hazard identification conducted at Bedford and Stoke Mandeville 
Hospitals. 
As in the FMEA, transferring the hazards from the Delphi map to the FTA was 
the first task. This was slightly more complicated with the FTA because the 
result is not a listing of hazards, but an indication of causality. The Top Events 
(the eventual focal point of an incident) were taken as the failure of each of the 
system components and the various failure modes and contributory events 
leading up to this made up the rest of the fault tree. Considering the causal links 
therefore became the main challenge and most of these were done by a single 
assessor.  
Two versions of the ‘Top Tree’ leading to the generic event ‘Patient Harmed by 
Oxygen Therapy System Failure’ were constructed. One was based purely on 
the system diagram of Figure 4-9, the other on a combination of this and the 
task analysis of Figure 4-10. To keep the sizes of the trees to a minimum, 
‘transfer events’ were used to continue analysis in ‘sub trees’. The resulting fault 
trees are presented in Appendix E2, Figures E.2-1 to E.2-13. Each figure 
contains a list of minimum cut sets. 
Although probabilistic analysis is one of the strengths of FTA, too many of the 
probabilities were unknown and found to be impossible to estimate. The 
probabilistic analysis was therefore excluded from all the trees due to a lack of 
data. 
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6.6 The HAZOP 
6.6.1 Description of HAZOP 
HAZOP (Redmill et al., 1999b; Ericson II, 2005c) is best described as a very 
structured, mainly qualitative method with integrated hazard identification and 
analysis functions.  
The HAZOP process starts long before any meetings and the preparation 
involves a fair amount of work for the lead assessor. The system has to be 
defined and representations drawn. A team has to be assembled and prepared 
by training and system familiarization where necessary. The team members 
need to be focussed on the HAZOP and distraction kept to a minimum, making 
the choice of venue and meeting planning very important. 
The facilitation of a well structured HAZOP requires that the system be defined 
to the smallest element for inclusion. These elements have characteristic 
attributes which play a vital part in the analysis process. (Gas in storage for 
example, has volume, pressure, temperature and composition.) Relationships 
between elements can also be assessed. These might be defined separately in 
a system representation, which is the normal way, or as part of the attributes for 
related items.   
The single most important part of a HAZOP is the identification of reasons for 
‘Deviation from Operational Intent’, further referred to in this document as 
‘Deviation’. This is achieved by systematically applying Pre-defined adjective 
‘Guidewords’ such as ‘high’, ‘low’, ‘less’ or ‘more’ to each ‘Attribute’ of all the 
elements within a system. These combinations are then explored and any 
possible hazards or deviations noted. 
If possible, a HAZOP leader should make a first pass attempt at the HAZOP 
and produce a set of worksheets containing this assessment. Figure 6-3 
describes the process carried out at each HAZOP meeting. This will usually 
involve repeating the assessment made by the leader but includes 
consideration of all the attributes and guideword combinations.  
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Record team members present.
Review the HAZOP process.
Review and define the system under 
assessment including documentation to be 
used in the study.
Review the guidewords and attributes.
Define the recording style.
Select the part of the system for assessment.
Select and apply an attribute
Select and apply a guideword
Define possible deviations
Are deviations credible?
Have all interpretations and 
deviations been explored?
Have all guidewords been applied 
to that attribute?
Have all attributes for that system 
part been applied?
Investigate each credible deviation
Record the results of each exploration
Have all system parts been 
investigated?
End
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
No
 
Figure 6-3. The HAZOP Process flowchart. Adapted from (Redmill et al., 1999b) 
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The results are recorded in a table similar to the example shown in Figure 6-4, 
in which the first four columns contain the results of the hazard identification. 
The causes and consequences are then discussed and recorded, which may 
include a risk assessment. Recommendations for safeguards are then made, or 
those existing are listed. Any actions that might need to be taken to either install 
or maintain these safeguards are then noted and might include references to 
planning or design details. 
 
Figure 6-4. Example of a HAZOP worksheet. 
 
6.6.2 Preparing the HAZOP 
The system diagram and process flow chart had already been drawn, but the 
attributes attached to the system elements needed to be established and a 
series of guidewords defined.  
To aid in establishing the attributes, the system parameters listed and defined in 
Table 6-6 were devised. These were developed from the knowledge gained 
from the empirical research and by reference to standards (DH Estates and 
Facilities Directorate 2006) and previous research(Nicola Cooper, 2004; Small 
et al., 1992; Attia et al., 2004; Fulmer et al., 1984; Bazuaye et al., 1992). 
Various texts were referred to when considering the human elements of the 
system. Reason (Reason, 1999a) describes many human interface models and 
factors that affect cognition when performing tasks. Cacciabue (Cacciabue, 
2004) discusses the application and retrospective analysis of human factors 
theory to safety critical system design and Strauch (Strauch, 2006) expands on 
some of the human factors issues with specific relevance to complex systems. 
 
 127
Table 6-6. System Parameters and definitions. 
System Parameter Definition 
Generic General factors affecting all parts of the system. 
Task Mainly human factors affecting the way tasks are 
performed. 
Diagnosis Factors specific to the clinical diagnosis function of the 
‘Clinical Staff’ system component. 
Treatment Factors specific to the clinical treatment function of the 
‘Clinical Staff’ system component and the ‘Therapeutic 
Subsystem’. 
Equipment/Accessories Factors related to the availability of physical system 
components within the ‘Supply Equipment’ and 
‘Therapeutic’ subsystems.  
Assembly Factors affecting the specific task of assembling the 
physical components of the system. This is a function of 
the ‘Therapy set-up and monitoring’ component within the 
‘Clinical Subsystem’ and linked directly to the ‘Supply 
Equipment’ and ‘Therapeutic’ subsystems. 
Supply Factors influencing the physical characteristics of the 
oxygen supply components. 
Flow Control Factors influencing the physical flow of oxygen to and 
through the ‘Therapeutic Subsystem’ 
Information Factors influencing the formulation, storage, movement 
and use of information. 
Communication Factors affecting the general processes of 
communication within the system and those outside the 
system which manifest as external influences. 
Physical Environment Factors such as lighting, temperature or ward design 
which have an effect on system components and human 
factors. 
Contextual Environment Factors concerned mainly with the reasons for actions 
taken and the influence on choices made. E.g. Patient 
condition, internal politics or external influences 
Manual Handling Factors influencing the way physical components are 
moved, stored or used which may cause discomfort or 
injury to staff or patients. 
 
A list of guidewords and their definitions was compiled from some standard 
listings provided by Redmill (Redmill et al., 1999b) and Ericson (Ericson II, 
2005c). These standard examples are applicable to process and timing, but do 
not have much relevance to placement or position, which could be vital in a 
healthcare context. The standard list of guidewords was therefore added to so 
that these issues could be included in a consideration of ‘deviation from intent’, 
which is the basic purpose of a HAZOP. The guidewords and their generic 
definitions are presented in Table 6-7. 
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Table 6-7. Generic guidewords and definitions. 
No More Less As Well As Part of Other than 
No part of intent 
achieved 
Quantitative 
increase is 
achieved 
Quantitative 
decrease 
All design intent 
achieved with 
additional results 
Some of the 
intent is achieved 
Any result except 
the intended  
Reverse Early Late Before After Above 
The opposite 
result to the 
intent is achieved 
or movement 
backwards 
Result achieved 
sooner than 
required time 
Result achieved 
after required 
time 
Result achieved 
too soon in 
sequence 
Result achieved 
too late in 
sequence 
Position/ 
Importance 
relatively higher 
than 
Below Behind In Front Through Over Under 
Position/ 
Importance 
relatively lower 
than 
Positional 
posterior or 
movement  to the 
back 
Positional 
anterior or 
movement  to the 
front 
Positional or 
movement by 
way of, piercing 
or between 
Movement higher 
than. 
Toppling/falling. 
Starting again. 
Movement lower 
than or below 
 
6.6.3 HAZOP Trials 
The HAZOP was conducted at Bedford Hospital following trials at Cranfield 
University and took place during January 2008. 
Trials of the combinations of attributes and guidewords as well as the facilitation 
of the HAZOP were conducted at Cranfield University with the assistance of a 
small number of academic and research staff members. The first trial involved 
the use of a purely electronic method of recording the HAZOP. It soon became 
evident that this was not viable, as it was too slow to use and there were too 
many bugs in the software.  
Some lessons were learnt about the facilitation of the meeting, particularly that 
the system boundaries needed to be clearer and that no departure must be 
allowed from the defined system. 
There were further, more serious problems with the system attributes. An 
attempt had been made to use the system wide parameters as attributes 
applied directly to each of the system entities. This proved to be too vague and 
it was almost impossible to define any deviations from the combinations of 
these parameters and the guidewords. To solve this problem, more specific 
attributes derived from the system parameters were devised for each system 
element. 
Most attributes were fairly straight forward to identify, but it was slightly more 
complicated when considering the human factors. For these, the three types of 
human error identified by Reason (Reason, 1999a) were kept in mind. They are 
broadly: Skill based, Rule based and Knowledge based.  
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Cacciabue (Cacciabue, 2004) identifies two types of human factors for chemical 
plants. These are: 
- “Interfaces and Controls”, which includes factors of communication 
and operation  
- “Context and Environment”, which includes the physical environment 
and socio-technical factors.  
With some minor modification, these also appear suitable for ward based 
therapies. 
Linking these to Reason’s three types of human error, the three categories of 
human factors identified were ‘Operation’, ‘Environment’ and ‘Information’. 
Table 6-8 shows these categories and their corresponding human factor 
elements. 
Table 6-8. Human Factors (HF) Categories and Elements 
HF Category HF Elements 
Operation Diagnosis, Assembly, Monitoring, Adjustment, Patient Management 
Environment Physical, Knowledge, Skills, Policy, Defined Procedure, Institutional 
Structure, Management, Hierarchy, Culture, Communication 
Information Gauges, Dials, Indicators, Alarms, Written and Verbal Communication, 
Examination, Diagnostic Tests 
 
The various human factors attributes were then devised from these and 
together with the general attributes, assigned to each system component and 
added to the system diagram (Figure 4-9).  
The second HAZOP trial at Cranfield University involved the use of a paper 
based method, with each panel member having their own copy of a pre-printed 
worksheet, an example of which is given in Figure 6-5.  
The system wide attributes had also been replaced by the more specific 
attributes applied to each entity which were integrated into the system diagram.  
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HAZOP Worksheet 
Sheet ID   Date  
System   Subsystem  
 
Entity Attribute Guide
word 
Deviations Causes Consequences Safeguards Actions Likelihood 
(1 – 6) 
Severity 
(1 – 6) 
          
Figure 6-5. The HAZOP worksheet used in the second trial. 
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This trial was far more successful than the first, with the only real concerns 
being: 
1. The presentation of information during the training and introduction at the 
beginning of the meetings. 
2. The system definitions still needed to be clearer and better presented. 
3. The layout and content of the worksheet needed to be slightly amended. 
To address these issues: 
1. The pre-meeting presentation was amended to have clearer diagrams 
and the guidewords would be provided to panel members as well as 
discussed using a projected slide. 
2. A more detailed discussion and definition of the system would be 
provided. 
3. Worksheets similar to that shown in Figure 6-6 were constructed which 
listed each component and attribute along with any guidewords that 
might be appropriate to each combination. Some deviations were also 
listed and could be either rejected or ratified during the HAZOP. The 
‘Causes’ Column was removed and the ‘Consequences’ column widened 
to aid handwritten notes. The ‘Safeguards’ and ‘Actions’ columns were 
reduced by making them ‘Yes/No’ to indicate if safeguards existed or if 
actions were required. 
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Entity Attribute Guideword Deviation from intent Consequences Likelihood 
(1 – 6) 
Severity 
(1 – 6) 
Safeguards 
(Y / N) 
Actions 
(Y / N) 
As Well As 1. Correct gas mixed with 
another substance 
     
Part Of 2. Correct gas for some of 
the time, changing to 
wrong gas. 
     
1. Gas Type 
Other Than 3. Wrong Gas      
No 1. No pressure      
More 2. Too much pressure      
Less 3. Not enough pressure      
1. Piped 
Oxygen 
Supply 
2. Pressure / 
Supply 
Part Of 4. No gas for some time 
and then gas supply 
reinstated 
     
Figure 6-6. An example of the worksheet devised for the first 'live' HAZOP meeting. 
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6.6.4 Conducting the HAZOP 
The HAZOP was conducted at Bedford Hospital following the trials at Cranfield 
University and took place during January 2008. Two full day meetings were 
arranged and a venue within the participant hospital chosen that was as central 
and accessible as possible. The conference room chosen had video projection 
facilities and adequate seating around a circular table.  
Both meetings were carefully planned with a clearly laid out agenda. A set of 
HAZOP worksheets with pre-prepared Attribute/Guideword combinations, 
system diagrams and definition sheets were also supplied. A presentation to 
introduce the HAZOP method and define the system was followed by a system 
familiarisation session before each meeting. 
Panel members were asked to fill in their own worksheets and hand them back 
to the lead assessor at the end of each session. The meetings were video 
recorded to aid clarification of responses and deciphering handwriting during 
later transcription of the HAZOP results into a spreadsheet containing the 
analysis structure. 
After the first meeting it became clear that it might have been unwise to 
completely remove the ‘Causes’ column, as this was something that needed to 
be assessed along with the consequences of a hazard. An attempt was 
therefore made to generalise the worksheet slightly, as it was felt to be 
unfeasible to simply add a ‘Causes’ column. It was thought that a combined 
consideration of ‘Deviation’, ‘Cause’ and ‘Consequence’ could be made in one 
descriptive text field.  
It was also clear that almost every hazard could lead to death if the 
circumstances were right (or wrong). This is an issue reported by DeRosier et al 
during the development of HFMEA (DeRosier et al., 2002). The range of risk 
severities were therefore separately assessed for likelihood so that this 
confusion might be abated.  
The resultant new worksheet can be seen in Figure 6-7 and contains new titles 
for two of the columns. The ‘Deviation’ column was changed to an 
‘Interpretation’ of the combination of ‘Attribute’ and ‘Guideword’, while the 
‘Consequences’ column, although simply labelled ‘Possible Deviations’, became 
the combined assessment of ‘Deviation’, ‘Causes’ and ‘Consequences’. There 
was also the addition of nested rows for the assessment of likelihood attached 
to each ‘Severity’ rating. These changes were discussed with the panel 
members and the use of the columns carefully explained before the next 
meeting. 
Transcriptions were made from worksheets handed in by the panel members. 
Where entries did not agree or could not be deciphered, the video recordings 
were used to clarify the outcome. The resultant aggregated HAZOP 
assessments are available in Appendix E, Tables E.3-1 to E.3-4. 
After the final session, a short evaluation questionnaire was distributed which 
asked the following questions: 
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1. On a scale of 1 to 10, how difficult did you find the HAZOP? (Where 1 is 
‘very easy’ and 10 is ‘very difficult’). 
2. Would you do it again? 
3. Was the use of the printed worksheets helpful? 
4. Was it clear from the outset what was expected of you? 
5. Was it clear from the outset what was being assessed? 
6. Did you feel any progress was being made? 
7. Do you think you learnt anything from this exercise? 
8. Do you think it was a worthwhile use of your time? 
This was intended to assess perceived difficulty, willingness, the usefulness of 
the worksheets, clarity of expectation, clarity of purpose, progress, learning and 
value. Further comment was also invited in order to learn of any additional 
points of concern or useful advice. The results of this survey are discussed later 
in this chapter. 
This evaluation survey method could not be applied to the FMEA or the FTA as 
they were not conducted by a group; HAZOP is the only one of the methods 
that cannot be conducted by a single assessor. The survey was not applied to 
the Delphi process because it was not being assessed as a method in its own 
right. 
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Entity Attribute Guideword Interpretation Possible deviations. (May include direct harm to the patient or a 
cascade of events which may lead to harm.) 
Severity 
 
Likelihood 
 
Safeguards 
(Y / N) 
Actions 
(Y / N) 
Catastrophic  
Major  
Moderate  
Minor  
Above 1.1.1. Over a 
certain age 
 
Negligible  
  
Catastrophic  
Major  
Moderate  
Minor  
1.1. Age 
Below 1.1.2. Below a 
certain age 
 
Negligible  
  
Catastrophic  
Major  
Moderate  
Minor  
More 1.2.1. Condition 
worse than 
expected 
 
Negligible  
  
Catastrophic  
Major  
Moderate  
Minor  
1. 
Patient 
1.2. 
Condition 
As Well As 1.2.2. Combined 
Conditions 
 
Negligible  
  
Figure 6-7. Example of the worksheet used for the second 'live' HAZOP meeting. 
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6.7 Notes on the Evaluation 
6.7.1 Evaluation Metrics and Measures 
The hazards identified and assessed by each method were evaluated against 
the empirical hazard analysis by way of a comparison table (See Appendix E4 
Table E4-1). The level of coverage for each hazard was indicated by a symbol 
in the column representing the particular hazard analysis method, as shown in 
the key to the comparison table. The results were then examined using basic 
descriptive statistics and qualitative analysis. 
System coverage was qualitatively assessed by examining the subsystems in 
turn and considering how well they were addressed by each method. A 
quantitative assessment was made by comparison to the empirical data and 
assigned a percentage value. 
The type and quality of information conveyed and its usefulness to prevention or 
mitigation of adverse events was qualitatively assessed. Consideration was 
given to the knowledge gained and how the information related to the system 
diagram. Judgments were made on whether any use could be made of this 
information to help prevent the occurrence of incidents or to reduce their 
consequences. 
The difficulties of performing each analysis and the fit within healthcare were 
also considered and discussed in terms of assembly of teams, format of 
meetings, time spent out of normal duties and application of the information to 
practice. Informal discussions with participants regarding the process and 
presentation of the methods and a short questionnaire in the case of the 
HAZOP were used for this assessment. 
6.7.2 Limitations 
These analyses refer mainly to the system diagram (Figure 4-9). It would have 
been more useful to have applied these methods equally to this and the process 
task analysis diagram (Figure 4-10). Unfortunately, time constraints imposed 
through the limited availability of group members resulted in the research being 
more focused on the system diagram. Some specific task related human factors 
and external influences from institutional errors might therefore have been 
missed. The Delphi process could also only be completed once and re-
assessed by some of the group for the same reasons, providing less than 
optimal reliability.  
The HAZOP had to be completed in two full day meetings, making them long 
and tedious, increasing the possibility of error due to fading interest and 
concentration levels. All the methods were thus affected by similar factors, 
making it possible that they might, to some extent, cancel each other out.  
The evaluations were made on a ‘first pass’ analysis from these methods. (That 
is, only one attempt at an assessment was made). Normal practice would be to 
perform a number of iterations until all panel members were satisfied with the 
result or time ran out. 
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The identification of hazards for the FMEA and FTA is not a function of the 
analysis method, but more of a reflection on the modified Delphi method.  It is 
therefore not fair to place too much on this when assessing the validity of the 
hazard analysis method, except for its ability to process the hazards presented 
in the map. This does however present the opportunity to discuss the 
differences between a convened group and a dispersed group approach and 
provides some information on the validity of the method integrated within 
HAZOP.  
6.7.3 Expectations 
FMEA was expected to perform well in general, but there were some 
reservations about its inability to handle multiple cause failures (Marx and 
Slonim, 2003). 
It was thought that FTA would give a clear indication of hazard combinations 
and cascade failures (where one event triggers the next). An evaluation of its 
probabilistic analysis capability was felt to be impractical at this stage as such 
data could not be sourced. 
Neither of these methods have their own integral hazard identification 
technique, but it was expected that a modified version of the Delphi method 
could be used as a means of initial identification. The hazards identified in this 
way would then be fairly easily transferred to the analysis structures of each 
method. 
HAZOP was thought likely to provide a useful example of a method with its own 
hazard identification process. Its differences to FMEA and how it could be 
combined with other techniques were expected to become evident during the 
comparison of the three methods. 
6.8 Results and Discussion 
Much of the discussion on the comparison between the analysis methods refers 
to the table of Appendix E4, Table E.4-1. This table contains the hazard list 
resulting from the empirical studies, alongside symbols indicating the level of 
identification attained by each hazard analysis method against each of the 
hazards. A check mark (9) indicates complete identification, a tilde (~) indicates 
partial identification while a cross (X) indicates that the hazard was not 
identified. The summary of the comparison results is shown in Table 6-9 which 
is also referred to in the following section. 
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Table 6-9. Summary of Comparison Results 
  D
el
ph
i 
FM
E
A
 
FT
A
 
H
A
ZO
P
 
Fully identified 9 45 58 58 28 
    24% 31% 31% 15% 
Partly identified ~ 61 55 54 25 
    33% 30% 29% 13% 
Not identified X 80 73 74 133 
    43% 39% 40% 72% 
 Total Hazards   186 186 186 186 
 
6.8.1 Hazard Identification using the Delphi Method 
Figure 6-8 shows the hazard identification map resulting from the Delphi 
method process. The brainstorming approach to this method seems to have 
been effective and the participants engaged well with the process. However, the 
time that the participants could be available for this study had a limiting effect on 
the breadth and detail of the hazard identifications. This is evidenced by the fact 
that only 57% of the hazards in the empirical list were identified. (24% full, 33% 
partial). 
Very few external influences were included in the Delphi map and no 
environmental issues were identified. The few organizational hazards identified 
were quite general and no institutional factors were included. 
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Figure 6-8. Oxygen Therapy Hazard Identification. 
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6.8.2 FMEA 
The full FMEA is shown in Appendix E1, Table E.1-1. 
Transferring the hazards from the Delphi map took longer than expected, but 
was relatively straight forward. The most difficult part was relating the hazards 
to the system diagram and process flow chart. It was easier to map issues to 
the system diagram than to the process flow chart, although some hazards 
seemed to have a degree of commonality, especially within the ‘Clinical 
Subsystem’. There may be merit in the procedure adopted in most industries, 
where separate FMEAs are conducted for system and task or process 
assessments. These could then be compared and common causes would 
become evident. It may be that some hazard omissions were made because of 
the attempt to consider the two domains together. 
The comparison results in Table 6-9 indicate that 31% of the 186 empirically 
identified hazards were covered by the FMEA and that a further 30% were 
partially addressed. This suggests that approximately 61% of the system was 
covered to some degree. Organizational, external and environmental issues 
were not well addressed; possibly because they were not well identified in the 
Delphi map.  
The extended risk analysis attached to the FMEA was compared to the use of 
the Risk Priority Number (RPN) on its own. As shown in Table 6-10, there was 
no difference over the ranking of the first twenty failure modes. The risk analysis 
was based heavily on the expert opinions of the Delphi group members 
consulted. When compared to the risk analysis contained in the aggregated 
hazard list of table D.5-1 in Appendix D5, the general themes of ‘Staff 
Availability/Knowledge/Skill’ followed by ‘Communication/Information Errors’, 
‘Undetected Therapy Termination/Monitoring Errors’, ‘Patient Actions/Co-
operation’ and ‘Cylinder Management Errors’, correspond well with those listed 
in Table 6-10. 
The clear, compartmentalised nature of the tabular layout of FMEA creates a 
tendency towards unitary thinking, where only one failure mode and effect 
combination is considered at a time. Although this is a limitation in terms of 
common causes, it makes it easier to estimate severity, likelihood and detection 
scores. The highly structured layout also lends itself to the analysis of hazards 
per sub-system or system element and can be mapped directly to the system 
diagrams. It is easily constructed in any spreadsheet or even word processing 
software and fits in well with the use of ‘brainstorming’ for the identification of 
hazards. 
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Table 6-10. Extended Risk analysis Compared to Risk Priority Number. 
Failure Mode Proportional 
Risk Scores 
Failure Mode RPN per 
Failure 
Mode 
3.4.2. Over tasked 0.0676 3.4.2. Over tasked 720 
3.3.3. Therapy status not monitored 0.0451 3.3.3. Therapy status not monitored 480 
3.4.1. Staff not available 0.0399 3.4.1. Staff not available 425 
2.6.7. Moved into inappropriate Position / 
Placement 0.0338 
2.6.7. Moved into inappropriate Position / 
Placement 360 
3.4.3. Fail to communicate 0.0263 3.4.3. Fail to communicate 280 
1.3.5. Pressure gauge reading High 0.0188 1.3.5. Pressure gauge reading High 200 
3.1.2. Does not co-operate 0.0188 3.1.2. Does not co-operate 200 
3.4.4. Insufficient knowledge / Skill 0.0188 3.4.4. Insufficient knowledge / Skill 200 
3.4.6. Therapeutic requirement error 0.0188 3.4.6. Therapeutic requirement error 200 
2.1.5. Incorrect Information 0.0178 2.1.5. Incorrect Information 190 
1.2.2. Empty 0.0177 1.2.2. Empty 188 
1.4.7. Flow Reading Low 0.0169 1.4.7. Flow Reading Low 180 
2.3.3. Tubing too long 0.0169 2.3.3. Tubing too long 180 
2.1.4. No Information for Decision 0.0160 2.1.4. No Information for Decision 170 
1.3.6. Leaking 0.0150 1.3.6. Leaking 160 
3.1.4. Moves or removes mask 0.0150 3.1.4. Moves or removes mask 160 
3.2.2. Use error 0.0150 3.2.2. Use error 160 
2.3.6. Connections loose 0.0141 2.3.6. Connections loose 150 
3.2.4. Incorrect information 0.0141 3.2.4. Incorrect information 150 
 
6.8.3 FTA 
Translating hazards from the Delphi map to the FTA was found to be more 
difficult than for the FMEA. This was thought to be due to two factors:  
Firstly, the hazards contained in the Delphi map had to be translated into 
events. It became evident that many of the hazards could be linked to more 
than one type of event and that there were instances where hazards had to 
combine to form an event.  In some cases, non-hazardous events had to be 
included as conditional elements, such as ‘Non re-breathing mask used’ in the 
‘Applied Part Displaced’ tree. Secondly, consideration of the causal links had to 
be made carefully and took longer than expected. It did however allow for 
further exploration of hazardous events, expanding on the basic descriptions as 
the trees took shape.  
The comparison with the empirically derived hazard list shows that 31% of the 
186 hazards were addressed by the FTA while 29% were partially covered, 
resulting in a system coverage of approximately 60%. This compares very 
closely with the FMEA and the Delphi method, which might appear 
unremarkable.  
There were many startling omissions, even when compared against the Delphi 
map. This was very surprising when one considers that the Delphi map was 
used as the main hazard identification method. Some of these were due to the 
FTA being incomplete (tubing errors for example). Others such as Appendix D5, 
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Table D.5-1, hazard 14; ‘Administering or adjusting another therapy causes 
interference with this one’, would seem to have just ‘slipped through the net’. It 
may be that, as with the FMEA, an iterative process with more than one 
assessor would have corrected such omissions. 
There was a lack of temporal consideration in some areas, such as whether 
diagnoses were timely, or if the therapy was applied soon enough. These were 
issues not covered by the FTA even though it should be possible to do so. 
Risk analysis was not assessed as the probabilistic functions of FTA could not 
be used due to a lack of data. It may have been feasible to attach some 
standard likelihood assessments to the trees, but access to experts to carry this 
out was not possible. 
Hazards and causal links are easily identified from the trees and this aids in the 
identification of safeguards and barriers. A means of drawing the trees and a 
proficient assessor is required to both construct and explain them to someone 
seeing them for the first time.  
6.8.4 HAZOP 
Arranging the two full day meetings proved to be very difficult. Most healthcare 
professionals have very busy schedules and the HAZOP was only made 
possible through a key gatekeeper. These meetings were too long and this may 
have contributed to omissions due to tiredness. 
Facilitating the meetings was also a challenge, mostly due to the fact that 
HAZOP has a format that is quite alien to those who have experience in other 
less formal methods. This was compounded by the difficulties experienced in 
the risk assessment and the subsequent amendment of the worksheets. This 
was an ill advised change and damaged the validity of the study by causing 
confusion over the purpose and distinction of the ‘Interpretation’ and 
‘Deviations’ columns. The risk assessment was also substantially different in the 
second meeting and meant that this could not be meaningfully assessed by 
comparison to those made within the empirical list and the FMEA.  
Fewer hazards were identified than during the FMEA or the FTA. Only 15% of 
the 186 empirically identified hazards were covered by the HAZOP and 13% 
were additionally partly included. This makes for only 27% system coverage. 
This has to be taken somewhat in context as the HAZOP could not cover the 
whole system in the time available.  
It is evident that HAZOP has the potential to identify not only failures and 
hazards, but also exacerbating issues. During the second meeting, a long 
discussion resulted from an attempt to clarify how a lack of communication 
between a patient and a clinician might be hazardous to the patient’s safety. All 
the panel members felt that there had to be some identifiable hazard, but it was 
elusive. This would seem to be due to there being no direct hazard, but that 
such a situation might cause a normally simple problem (like a matter of comfort 
for example) to become far more likely to escalate into an incident. Most 
hazards of this sort require some kind of conditional state to exist and this is 
where HAZOP seems to struggle. 
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It was surprising how, even though certain general topics had been discussed, 
some hazards were hard to pin down. For example, patient and therapy 
monitoring was discussed as part of many of the hazards, yet it was not 
assessed in itself. It may be that it would have been covered later when the 
therapy set-up was assessed. It is also an element in the ‘Clinical Subsystem’ 
and as such would have been assessed had time permitted. There is also a 
suggestion of common causes produced from the repeated discussion of this 
subject at different times in the analysis, but this is an area where HAZOP 
struggles. 
The fact that it was not possible to perform a full system HAZOP was taken into 
account during the assessment by conducting a second analysis considering 
only those parts of the system included in the two HAZOP meetings. The 
identifications are summarised as percentages of the remaining 112 hazards as 
in Table 6-11. This indicates that the HAZOP still lagged behind the other 
methods slightly, with a 44.6% system coverage compared to 56.3% by the 
FTA, 61.6% by the FMEA and 63.4% by the Delphi method. 
Table 6-11 Percentage Hazard Identifications adjusted to HAZOP coverage 
 Delphi FMEA FTA HAZOP 
 Fully Identified 32.1% 29.5% 28.6% 24.1% 
 Partly Identified 31.3% 32.1% 27.7% 20.5% 
 Not Identified 35.7% 37.5% 42.9% 54.5% 
Using this same data, the correlation matrix of Table 6-12 suggests that HAZOP 
had a rather weak correlation with the other methods, although it did seem to 
agree slightly better with the FTA and FMEA than with the Delphi. 
Table 6-12. Correlation between HAZOP and the other methods 
  Delphi FMEA FTA 
FMEA 0.56     
FTA 0.54 0.71   
HAZOP 0.19 0.37 0.35 
The results of the evaluation questionnaire are summarised in Table 6-13below. 
Table 6-13. Results of the HAZOP Evaluation Questionnaire. 
  Totals 
Question Theme Ave y n 
1 Difficulty (1 to 10) 5.2     
2 Willingness  5 100% 0 0% 
3 Worksheets  5 100% 0 0% 
4 Expectation  4 80% 1 20% 
5 Subject  3 60% 1 20% 
6 Progress  5 100% 0 0% 
7 Learning  5 100% 0 0% 
8 Value   4 80% 0 0% 
 
Comments received were: “It has given me knowledge of HAZOP”, “Too long” 
and “Interesting and thought provoking”. 
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6.8.5 General Points 
A comparison of the hazard identification method within HAZOP and that of the 
Delphi method to the empirical research reveals that although some hazards 
identified in the empirical research were not explicitly identified by either the 
HAZOP or the Delphi method, there was some implicit inclusion. For example, 
‘Latent error in procedure causes mistakes’ identified in the empirical research 
may be a cause of ‘Wrong patient’, which was identified in the Delphi map. 
In 18 cases, even though the Delphi map did not contain a reference to a 
particular hazard, it was identified by either FMEA or FTA. The analysis 
presented in Table 6-14 shows the correlation coefficient between the Delphi 
map and the FMEA to be very similar to that of the Delphi map and FTA, but 
that between the FMEA and FTA it is slightly stronger.  
Table 6-14. Correlations between Delphi, FMEA and FTA. 
  Delphi FMEA 
FMEA 0.49   
FTA 0.45 0.66
 
Although the empirically derived hazard list was distilled twice, when the 
comparison with the hazard analysis methods was made, it was discovered that 
there were still two hazard descriptions that were essentially the same as 
another two. It should be pointed out however that the empirical list may have 
contained very similar hazards in more than one subsystem. This is something 
also evident in the FMEA as well as in the FTA where entire sub-trees are 
duplicated.  
There was no clearly identifiable pattern to the hazards identified in the 
empirical list but not in the formal hazard analyses, other than that many were 
task related. This was possibly due to the focus placed on the system diagram 
as the main source of reference. Some other issues missed were those that 
were indirect, such as ‘Incorrect actions at patient handover’. There were only 
38(20%) hazards missed by all three formal methods and these are listed in 
Table 6-15. This low number and their mainly task related nature suggests that 
a combinational approach is effective in capturing at least 80% of the hazards 
identified through empirical research. This would satisfy a Pareto analysis. 
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Table 6-15. Hazards missed by Delphi, FMEA, FTA and HAZOP. 
Subsystem Component Hazard ID Hazard Type 
Clinical Staff 8 Patient management errors when 
patients arrive after transfer 
Clinical Staff 21 Patient requests or needs unfulfilled 
Clinical External - Environment 27 Environmental factors such as 
noise masking calls for assistance 
Clinical External - Environment 33 Surplus equipment cluttering the 
ward area 
Clinical Therapy Setup 36 Equipment improperly checked 
All All 38 Technical or physical failures of the 
bed or associated equipment 
Clinical Therapy Monitoring 40 Failure to respond to an equipment 
alarm or warning 
Clinical Patient/Patient 
Monitoring 
47 Patient actions adversely affecting 
patient monitoring 
Clinical External - Environment 51 Environmental factor obscuring a 
clear view of the patient 
Clinical External - Environment 52 Environmental factor obstructing 
access to the patient 
Clinical Staff/Patient 55 Changing a patients posture or 
position interferes with the therapy 
Clinical Staff/Patient 57 Moving a patient between bed and 
chair causes interference with the 
therapy 
Clinical Staff 59 Incorrect actions at patient 
handover 
Clinical Therapy Setup 60 Incorrect actions during patient 
transfer 
Clinical Patient 64 Equipment delivering another 
therapy fails causing interference 
with this one 
Clinical Therapy Setup 105 A factor relating to design within the 
therapy or the environment causes 
setup error 
Clinical Therapy Setup 126 Wrong type of accessory used for a 
particular therapy setup 
Clinical Patient Monitoring 141 Sensitive alarms and persistent 
nurse calls from patients 
All External - Infrastructure 146 Lifts are shared with all building 
users  
Clinical Patient 153 Smoking 
Clinical Staff/Therapy Setup 154 Delayed Action from Staff 
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Subsystem Component Hazard ID Hazard Type 
Clinical External - Other 
Therapy 
159 CPAP/BIPAP Problems 
All External - Person 162 Actions of Paediatric Patient's 
Parents 
Supply Piped 166 Collision between patient and 
pipeline outlet hardware 
Clinical Staff 167 Communication/Structure - refusal 
to assess patient 
Clinical Staff/Therapy Setup 169 Contamination hazard - Used 
accessories not disposed of and 
replaced 
Clinical Staff/Cylinder 173 Cylinder management error - Not 
turned off after use 
Clinical Staff/Therapy Setup 176 Distraction of staff - Issue with this 
therapy puts other patients at risk 
Clinical Staff/Therapy Setup 183 Equipment not checked 
Clinical Patient/External - 
Person 
188 Inappropriate advice to patient from 
unauthorized person 
Therapeutic Tubing 189 Infection risk - Fungus in oxygen 
tubing 
Clinical External - Infrastructure 190 Infrastructure - Emergency buzzer 
inaccessible 
Clinical Patient Monitoring 194 Monitoring equipment - Physical 
harm from sensors 
Clinical Staff/Patient 200 Patient left unattended 
Clinical Staff/External - Person 203 Procedural error - Delegating 
clinical/nursing tasks to parents 
Clinical Staff/Cylinder 209 Staff knowledge/Skill - not able to 
identify an oxygen failure alarm 
Clinical Staff 211 Transferring without adequate 
escort 
Clinical Staff/Therapeutic 
Subsystem 
215 Unsuitable running repairs 
 
6.9 Conclusions 
In this chapter, the combined results from the empirical research studies in the 
form of a list containing 186 hazards was used to assess the applicability of 
Failure Modes and Affects Analysis, Fault Tree Analysis and HAZOP to ward 
based healthcare. The number and type of hazards, level of system coverage 
and presentation of results were considered and discussed, as were the 
techniques of risk assessment and the general ‘usability’ of the methods.  
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The following subsections contain a synopsis of the main points raised. 
6.9.1 FMEA 
Although transferring the hazards from the Delphi map to the FMEA was fairly 
uncomplicated, it was easier to relate the FMEA structure to the system 
diagram than the process flow chart. 
Table 6-9 indicates that approximately 61% system coverage was achieved. 
Organizational and environment issues were not well addressed, which might 
have been a legacy from the Delphi hazard identification. 
FMEA provides a useful opportunity for a very detailed risk analysis that has 
direct linkage with both hazards and system elements. This makes ranking of 
requirements for safeguards and barriers very much simplified. The comparison 
with the risk analysis based on the empirical research suggests that expert 
opinion is a valid source of information for the assessment of risks. It is helpful 
to be able to rank the system elements and sub-systems in terms of risk, but, as 
implied by the comparison with the extended analysis, this can be done through 
some simple arithmetic using the RPN. 
The firm, clear structure of FMEA aids in focusing attention on the risk 
assessments and the analysis of individual hazards. It also makes mapping of 
the hazards to the system diagram or process flow chart easier, each of which 
should rather be done separately than trying to combine them.  
The strongly formal, refined structure of both the HAZOP and Delphi methods 
makes duplication much less likely. Some duplication did still occur in both the 
FMEA and FTA. This shows common causality, something the HAZOP is not 
very good at, perhaps because of the highly rigid structure. 
6.9.2 FTA 
Some difficulty was encountered when translating hazards from the Delphi map 
into events. Therefore, although ‘brainstorming’ can be used for hazard 
identification, it is not necessarily straight forward to translate hazards or 
themes into events. FTA provides the vital causal linkage information that 
methods like FMEA are not capable of, as they focus on individual failures and 
hazards, rather than the interplay of events.  
A similar proportion of the system (60%) was covered by FTA compared with 
FMEA. A statistical analysis shows however that they only have a moderate 
correlation to each other (0.66) and even less to the Delphi map (0.45 with FTA, 
0.49 with FMEA). This suggests that they each went further than the Delphi 
map with some commonality, but also identified different hazards to each other. 
It is theoretically possible to produce a risk analysis based on probabilistic 
calculations, but this is an area where ward based healthcare has a lack of 
data. 
FTA works best with the use of software capable of drawing the logic diagrams. 
It also requires that the assessor has specific training in the method and is 
familiar with the use of logic symbols, Boolean algebra and probability. Although 
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these are not particularly difficult to learn, some time is likely required before an 
assessor can be considered proficient in this method. 
6.9.3 HAZOP 
The HAZOP required the most modification and preparation out of the three 
methods. It was also the only one that required that all members of the panel 
were present at the same time.  
A combination of the time constraints and the fact that the hazard identification 
and analysis tasks are done together meant that the HAZOP only achieved 
system coverage of approximately 44.6% even when a large part of the system 
is excluded from the consideration. Only 27% was achieved if the entire system 
is included. This is not necessarily an indication of failure, but of possible 
specificity. More time and further iterations combined with higher levels of 
familiarity with the process of HAZOP by the panel members would possibly 
have yielded better results. 
Complications caused mainly by the changes introduced after the first HAZOP 
meeting meant that the risk analysis part of the study could not be fully 
assessed. The only conclusion possible to draw is that the process of assessing 
the likelihood of all categories of consequence for every deviation is much 
easier to achieve than a single generalised assessment of each one. 
The evaluation questionnaire indicated that the participants were willing, 
thought the worksheets were helpful, that progress was clear and that they had 
learnt from the process. Most participants (80%) knew what was expected from 
them but fewer (60%) were clear about what was being assessed. Difficulty was 
rated as ‘moderate’ (5.2/10). General comments indicated that the meetings 
were too long but that the process produced learning in the subject under 
review, HAZOP itself and the concept of prospective analysis and action. 
6.9.4 General 
It was generally found that formal Prospective Hazard Analysis (PHA) 
presented added value through: 
- Detailed, relevant and reliable information for system modification for 
the purposes of safety and quality improvement. 
- Valid, accurate risk assessment, especially if based on a combination 
of expert opinion and empirical data. 
- The provision of a mechanism for evidence based identification of 
hazard barriers and safeguards. 
- The provision of a method for formal communication of results at any 
stage of an analysis. 
- The provision of a vehicle for documented learning through 
prospective analysis incorporating feedback from previous experience 
and adverse incidents. 
It would seem that each method had both merit and disadvantage in this 
context. FTA and FMEA both had better system coverage than the HAZOP and 
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identified more hazards than were contained in the Delphi map, which was used 
as the initial hazard identification method common to both techniques. FMEA 
and HAZOP needed some modification before use, with HAZOP requiring the 
most extensive adjustment. FTA was the only method capable of displaying 
causal linkage, but required that hazards be translated into events for analysis. 
It has a very useful graphical presentation which does however require a user to 
be familiar with logic symbols and Boolean algebra.  
Many errors of omission were made in transferring the hazards from the Delphi 
map to the FMEA and the FTA while simultaneously linking them to the system 
diagram and the process flow chart. Time pressure played a part in this, along 
with the fact that the transfer was made by a single assessor. It is possible that 
many of these omissions would be rectified by a more iterative process and at 
least one more assessor to provide verification. 
It was not possible to apply probabilistic analysis to the FTA due to a lack of 
data. This could be rectified in practice by constructing a fault tree based on an 
FMEA or a HAZOP. The latter methods would provide the probabilistic data and 
a solid structure, while the FTA makes it possible to examine causal linkages; 
something the tabular methods cannot accomplish. This is a practice advocated 
by Ericson (Ericson II, 2005c).  
There were many cases where it could be seen how each analysis method 
might have taken account of hazards identified in the empirical research when 
these were not included in the formal analyses. The formal methods in 
combination identified 80% of the hazards compared to the empirical list and 
many of those omitted may well have been identified through a task based 
analysis. It is not too much conjecture to believe that a more thorough hazard 
identification process and additional time may have aided in the inclusion of 
many of these for assessment. This also supports the idea of combining formal 
methods to ensure a reliable result. 
The two most striking conclusions are therefore that: 
1. The use of these methods requires that systems and processes are 
clearly defined and presented. This provides a valuable opportunity for 
learning and the capture of tacit knowledge in itself. 
2. These methods each have different advantages that can be combined as 
a structured means for the enduring capture and dissemination of 
knowledge on hazards and risk that can be continually updated and used 
for the formulation of strategies for safety and quality improvement. 
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Chapter 7 Conclusion and Discussion 
7.1 Introduction 
The objective of this research was to evaluate a small number of hazard 
analysis methods applied to a ward based therapy in order to assess the 
contribution they might make to patient safety. 
In the introduction to this thesis, a hypothesis was formed based on the 
research question:  
‘What is the contribution that formal hazard analysis can make to the 
assessment of patient safety within ward based therapies?’ 
It was hypothesized that a number of hazard analyses based on a common 
frame of reference, using formal methods, would produce comparable, value-
added results when tested against empirical research.  
The following aims were identified from this: 
1. To construct a comprehensive hazard list and risk assessment of a ward 
based therapy using empirical research. 
2. To conduct a small number of structured hazard analyses using different 
formal methods, each based on a common frame of reference built from 
empirical research. 
3. To evaluate the suitability, advantages and disadvantages of structured 
hazard analysis methods to the context of ward based care by comparing 
the formal hazard analyses to the results from empirical research. 
These aims were met through the application of a three phase research 
strategy that involved: 
1. The construction of a hazard list compiled from the results of three 
empirical studies was described in Chapters Four and Five and is 
available in Appendix D5. As well as this, the production of a system 
diagram (Figure 4-9) and process flow chart (Figure 4-10) were also 
achieved. 
2. Conducting formal hazard analyses using Failure Modes and Effects 
Analysis, Fault Tree Analysis and Hazard and Operability Analysis. 
3. Comparing these methods to each other and to the resulting hazard 
list produced from the empirical research in phase one. 
Each section of the thesis will now be discussed and conclusions drawn about 
whether these aims and objective have been met and how the chapters 
contributed to the research. 
7.2 Background 
Chapter one introduced the research and described the background to the 
project. The scope of the research was defined and the research and thesis 
structures were outlined. The two ways in which this research contributes to 
current knowledge were described as: 
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1. The apparent lack of techniques available for assessing hazards inherent 
in ward based therapies was addressed by testing three established 
methods by application to oxygen therapy. These formal hazard analysis 
methods were evaluated, taking account of the difficulty and value-added 
contribution of each by comparison to each other and to a specially 
constructed hazard list. 
2. The trials and comparisons further provided the first known 
comprehensive analysis of the hazards and risks associated with the 
administration of oxygen therapy. 
7.3 Literature Review 
The themes of; ‘Patient Safety’, ‘Hazard Analysis’, ‘Oxygen Therapy’ and 
‘Complexity’ were explored and discussed in chapter two. The history of patient 
safety, focusing mainly on the United Kingdom, was examined (Hoyle, 2005; 
Vincent, 2006b). It was concluded that although much has been achieved, there 
is still more to do in the area of ward based care, where many reported 
incidents have their origin (Nguyen et al., 2001b). 
The large number of hazard analysis methods used in many areas of 
endeavour creates something of a dilemma for those with a need to apply such 
techniques to healthcare (Lyons et al., 2004). Some work has been done to aid 
the choice for general task analysis and human factors, but little has been 
published concerning the validation or appraisal of these methods to ward 
based care (Kirwan, 1996). Seven methods; FMEA, FTA, ETA, HAZOP, 
SWIFT, HEART and THERP, were considered for evaluation in this research 
and generally described. 
Oxygen therapy has received some interest from a variety of angles, including 
the physiological effects (Benditt, 2000; Fisher, 1980) and some specific issues 
with methods of delivery or patient monitoring (Attia et al., 2004; Akbar and 
Campbell, 2006). Very little could be found in published literature regarding the 
overall consideration of the hazards of oxygen therapy and those that were 
found (Small et al., 1992; Fulmer et al., 1984; Martin, 1999) did not include the 
use of structured hazard analysis. 
Many ward based therapies are in themselves complex in nature and all are 
part of the wider system of healthcare, which is undoubtedly so. It was therefore 
felt relevant to include elements of the science of complexity in order to 
comment on and take consideration of this characteristic. It was discovered that 
six principles have been identified (Webb, 2006; Stacey, 2003) and these were 
applied to ward based healthcare to aid in describing the system and the 
process of oxygen therapy. 
Chapter three discussed the methodology, explaining the ‘Pragmatist’ 
philosophy and how it was adopted for this research. The various empirical 
methods available were considered and their selection for use in this research 
was discussed. The early expectations of results were also briefly discussed as 
were solutions to the initially anticipated problems. 
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7.4 The Empirical Research 
Three empirical studies were conducted with the common aim of producing a 
comprehensive, validated hazard list and associated risk analysis. First, 
following ethical approval and permission from the hospitals concerned, 
observational research was carried out at two sites. Immediately after these 
observations, questionnaires were distributed to a range of healthcare 
professionals asking about their experiences with oxygen therapy. Finally, after 
negotiating access to nationally reported incidents involving oxygen therapy, 
5,755 incident reports were examined and categorised using a specifically 
designed taxonomy. 
The observational research detailed in Chapter four identified 499 events over 
25 studies in which 178 subjects were included. 684 analyses were conducted 
on these events during which categories and sub-categories of hazards were 
identified and outcomes were considered. The range and variations of 
administration methods were examined and together with the outcomes 
analysis and national statistics on hospital episodes was used to gauge the size 
of the problem in the UK.  It was found that simple face masks and nasal 
cannulae together account for about 70% of the accessories used for oxygen 
therapy and that approximately 8% of admitted patients (about 1.3 million) 
receive oxygen each year. If 6% of these patients experience a problem with 
oxygen therapy, over 80,000 patients may be affected by an adverse incident 
each year. 
Also detailed in Chapter Four, the questionnaire study helped to support and 
augment the results from the observations. 293 statements were made in 
response to four open questions, resulting in the identification of 54 hazard 
themes. It was estimated that approximately six adverse events are 
experienced by individual professionals per year. By using a proportional risk 
score for hazard themes, it was shown that there is most concern about the 
management of patients with Chronic Obstructive Pulmonary Disease (COPD), 
the problem of cylinder depletions and incorrect dosage levels. Of least concern 
were the issues of equipment failures and problems with piped supplies. 
One question addressed the ranking of hazards by proportional frequency. The 
results closely agreed with the combined risk estimate from other questions, 
with the addition of general setup errors, which was also indicated as a 
prominent source of risk. 
The combination of responses to questions about guidelines and the 
demographic and involvement data indicated a general consensus over the 
issue of patient safety with oxygen therapy. No particular professional group 
showed more concern than the others and all were interested in aiding patient 
safety. Most agreed that guidelines are inadequate on their own and need to be 
supported through training and communication. 
The combined hazard list from these two pieces of research is presented in 
Appendix C1 Table C1-1. It contains 119 hazards, detailing their hazardous 
elements, triggering mechanisms and posed threat. A system diagram and 
process flow chart were also produced from the combined results of these two 
studies (Figure 4-9 and Figure 4-10). 
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The third empirical study was discussed in Chapter Five. This pivotal research 
study was designed partly as a feedback mechanism by which to validate the 
hazard list produced from the observations and questionnaire. It also had the 
purpose of identifying further hazards and applying a risk analysis to them from 
a slightly different perspective. It began by developing a taxonomic 
categorisation structure and method, which was developed from the results of 
the observations and the questionnaire and verified over two rigorous trials. 
Following the negotiation of a data sharing agreement with the National Patient 
Safety Agency (NPSA), 5,755 oxygen related incident reports covering England 
and Wales were made available for this research. Four Consultant 
Anaesthetists, a Research Associate from the NPSA and a Clinical 
Technologist reviewed and categorised these reports, listing all possible 
contributory factors and where possible, stating the context in which each valid 
incident may have occurred. 
The reliability of the resulting categorisation was tested using Krippendorff’s 
Alpha (Kα) and showed mixed results. A degree of disagreement is however 
advantageous in the context of hazard identification, as it indicates a variety of 
views, which was in fact the purpose of having a diverse research group. Kα 
was also used to calculate the probability of an elements’ contribution to an 
incident through an estimation of relevance based on frequency of occurrence 
and the reliability score. This and an estimate of harm calculated using a 
weighted scoring method were applied together to produce a risk analysis for 
each hazardous element in the taxonomy. 
The previously constructed hazard list was validated by the high degree of 
similarity of identified hazards (see Appendix D4). It was also amended, based 
on the additional identifications made from the incident reports. The final 
aggregated hazard analysis is presented in Appendix D5, Table D.5-1. A total of 
188 hazards were identified through distillation of the combined analyses (later 
further reduced to 186). The table is arranged by alphabetical listing according 
to the system diagram (Figure 4-9). 
7.5 The Evaluation 
The final stage of the research is presented in Chapter Six and is the 
confluence of the combined empirical research and the formal hazard analyses 
described in Chapter Six. The objective was to evaluate a small number of 
prospective hazard analysis methods to gauge their applicability to the analysis 
of ward based therapies and to assess the added value they might bring to 
learning for the benefit of patient safety. 
First of all, the hazard analysis methods to be evaluated had to be chosen from 
the large number in current use in industry. The selection process and the final 
choice of Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA), Fault Tree Analysis 
(FTA) and Hazard and Operability Analysis (HAZOP) was described. 
It was concluded that each method had both merit and disadvantage in this 
context. FTA and FMEA provided better system coverage than the HAZOP and 
identified more hazards than were contained in the Delphi map, which was used 
as the initial hazard identification method common to both techniques. FMEA 
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and HAZOP needed some modification before use, with HAZOP requiring the 
most extensive adjustment. FTA was the only method capable of displaying 
causal linkage, but required that hazards be translated into events for analysis. 
It has a very useful graphical presentation which does however require a user to 
be familiar with logic symbols and Boolean algebra. 
It was further concluded that formal Prospective Hazard Analysis (PHA) 
presented added value through: 
- Detailed, relevant and reliable information for system modification for the 
purposes of safety and quality improvement. 
- Valid, accurate risk assessment, especially if based on a combination of 
expert opinion and empirical data. 
- The provision of a mechanism for evidence based identification of hazard 
barriers and safeguards. 
- The provision of a method for formal communication of results at any stage 
of an analysis. 
- The provision of a vehicle for documented learning through prospective 
analysis incorporating feedback from previous experience and adverse 
incidents. 
Two further striking conclusions were that: 
1. The use of these methods required that systems and processes were 
clearly defined and presented. This provided a valuable opportunity for 
learning and the capture of tacit knowledge. 
2. These methods each have different advantages that might be combined 
as a structured means for the enduring capture and dissemination of 
knowledge on hazards and risk that can be continually updated and used 
for the formulation of strategies for safety and quality improvement. 
7.6 Suggested Application and Future Work 
Although empirical research can identify hazards and even be used to discover 
the probabilities and severity of some, a formal structure is still required so that 
the results can be usefully presented. The empirical research conducted during 
this project was as comprehensive as possible, but it may be that shorter 
studies, informed by a prospective preliminary analysis based on HAZOP or 
FMEA and Pareto analysis, could be used to examine specific issues. 
Figure 7-1 outlines a recommended process of hazard management based on 
the experience gained from this research. The first step would be to define the 
system under assessment by using system diagrams and process flow charts. 
A first stage assessment could then be carried out using HAZOP or FMEA, 
based on the system definition. Any gaps in knowledge should be corrected 
using empirical research methods such as observations, document review and 
staff and patient surveys. Once the system definition has been updated using 
this new knowledge, a second stage assessment can be carried out, with finer 
detail added (such as causality and probability) using Fault Trees or Event 
Trees linked to the main hazard analysis. Safeguards and hazard barriers are 
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identified and developed based on the second stage analysis and put in place. 
This changes the system and a new description has to be defined. The second 
stage analysis is then re-visited and the process continued through as much 
iteration as necessary until no further knowledge gaps exist and no new 
safeguards or barriers are feasible. The final step is to wait until either the 
system changes in some way or a time limit is reached, which would each 
trigger a new assessment. 
 
System Definition
First Stage 
Assessment
Directed 
Research/Audit
Second Stage 
Analysis
Barrier and 
Safeguard 
Identification
Implementation of 
Safeguards and 
Barriers
Await Trigger for 
review
System Definition 
Update
HAZOP or FMEA 
System Diagram and 
Process Map
Observations, 
Questionnaires and 
Document Review
Updated HAZOP or FMEA 
linked to Fault Trees or 
Event Trees
Updated System Diagram 
and Process Map
 
Figure 7-1. The Prospective Hazard Management Process 
 
The main benefit from the use of Prospective Hazard Analysis (PHA) is that it 
can be used to examine escalations in consequence. For example: If oxygen 
cylinder depletion is identified before a patient is harmed, the only consequence 
is a minor disruption in therapy. If detection occurs after a drop in the patient’s 
blood oxygen level, harm has already begun and any further delay could prove 
fatal. The system can then be modified to include a reliable means of identifying 
a state of near depletion with the requirement that urgent action is taken at this 
point rather than when it is already too late. 
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This research has confirmed what was expected and many commentators have 
said about the differences in the analysis of hazards and presentation of results 
obtained from each of these formal hazard analysis methods.(Lyons et al., 
2004; Redmill et al., 1999a; Bertolini et al., 2007) FMEA and HAZOP are both 
very useful for formal hazard identification and analysis of causes. They both 
therefore lend themselves for use as prospective frameworks for application as 
a predictive mechanism pre-event as shown in the green section of Figure 7-2. 
Fault Tree Analysis is also useful as a prospective method and can provide an 
event driven analysis showing causal linkages such as common causes and 
cascade events.   
 
 
Figure 7-2. The Bow Tie methodology. 
 
Although not covered in this research, Root Cause Analysis (RCA) is a method 
advocated by the NPSA and commonly employed in the NHS(National Patient 
Safety Agency, 2006). Although the learning from RCA’s is valuable, they tend 
to be repeated for each investigation carried out following a serious untoward 
event. Event Trees are ideal for capturing this post-event knowledge as in the 
red section of Figure 7-2. The further knowledge gained from the combined 
results form a number of RCA’s can then be used to feed back to the 
prospective analysis in order to make improvements to the system and hazard 
barriers. Now that the methods themselves have been shown to be applicable 
to healthcare, this combined methodology can be tested and validated. 
The NPSA have published a set of events that are described as ‘Never Events’ 
(NPSA, 2009). As the name suggests, these are things that should never 
happen. There are eight of these (see Figure 7-3) and trusts are expected to 
carry out a formal investigation including a root cause analysis whenever such 
an event occurs. It would seem logical that these should be the first to benefit 
from a structured, formal approach to hazard analysis that makes use of these 
RCAs to update knowledge and contribute to identifying hazard barriers. Since 
the NPSA is already collecting these RCA’s and they have been tasked with 
learning from the NHS and sharing such knowledge, it would seem they are 
best placed to take ownership of this approach and administer it centrally for the 
benefit of the whole NHS.  
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Figure 7-3. List of Never Events. 
Although Never Events are important and there would be clear benefit to 
patients if they were prevented, they are still very specific and may be the result 
of common systemic failures. In order to take these into consideration, at least 
one level of abstraction needs to be observed. These abstract levels or 
‘subsystems’ would contain many of the Never Events as hazards, allowing 
common causes and systemic barriers to be addressed. 
From a literature review, the informal views of two nurses and a consultant 
anaesthetist combined with the author’s experience in healthcare, six categories 
of therapies that may be considered to form some of these subsystems were 
identified: Drugs, Fluids, Gases, Nutrition, Physical and Resuscitation. These 
were then further divided into types as follows: 
Drugs; oral 
These are usually medications given in either tablet or liquid form, taken 
orally and swallowed on their own or with water. There are numerous 
types and almost every patient will have some form of oral medication 
during a stay on a ward.  
A number of fairly obvious hazards exist and some complex issues such 
as allergies or interactions between medications as well as human 
factors need to be considered in the management of these therapies. 
Drugs; single bolus (Crompton, 2003) 
These are usually administered by needle injection and are numerous in 
type. There are many similarities to oral medications with some added 
issues such as infection due to piercing the skin, air embolism and the 
danger of sharps injuries to staff (Vincent, 2006b; Jacobson and Murray, 
2007b; Cheng, 2004). 
Drugs; Continuous infusion (Jacobson and Murray, 2007b) 
Some medications are delivered intravenously via slow continuous 
infusion. This requires the use of an infusion device (Jacobson and 
Murray, 2007b; Khandpur, 2005a) such as a syringe driver or volumetric 
 Wrong site surgery  
 Retained instrument post-operation  
 Wrong route administration of chemotherapy  
 Misplaced naso or orogastric tube not deteced prior to use  
 Inpatient suicide using non-collapsible rails  
 Escape from within the secure perimeter of medium or high 
secure mental health services by patients who are transferred 
prisoners  
 In-hospital maternal death from post-partum haemorrhage 
after elective caesarean section  
 Intravenous administration of mis-selected concentrated 
potassium chloride  
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pump. There are all the hazards of injected medications as well as those 
associated with the use of infusion devices and venous cannula 
placement. The medications also often carry high risk; being critical to 
the patient’s treatment, potentially harmful or a controlled narcotic 
substance. 
Fluids; ‘Uncontrolled’ infusion (Jacobson and Murray, 2007b) 
Fluids are different from Drugs in this classification in that they are not 
manufactured pharmaceuticals, but naturally occurring substances such 
as water or blood (sometimes with additives). ‘Uncontrolled’ infusions are 
those driven by gravity and regulated by a simple roller clamp. The rate 
of infusion is estimated by counting the number of drops per minute 
through a sight glass.  
Fluids; ‘Controlled’ infusion (Jacobson and Murray, 2007b; Khandpur, 2005a) 
These are similar to those administered by ‘uncontrolled’ infusion except 
that use is made of an infusion device, usually a volumetric pump, to 
deliver a more precise volume. The infusion pumps also monitor the 
therapy and provide alarms to alert ward staff of occlusions or fluid bag 
depletions. If blood is being infused, the device must be specifically 
designed for this use as blood cells are easily damaged by the 
mechanical action of some types of pump. 
Gases; Nitrous Oxide (N2O) (BOC Medical, 2008) 
This is a mild narcotic with analgesic properties, normally mixed with 
oxygen. Other than its use when combined with other substances in 
anaesthesia during surgery, it is most often used during labour, pre-
mixed in the form of ‘Entonox’ (50% N2O, 50% O2). The hazards pose 
relatively low risks, but prolonged use is to be avoided (BOC Medical, 
2008). It is not often used on other wards. 
Nutrition; Nasogastric feeding 
Not very often used on general wards, nasogastric feeding is 
administered to patients who cannot eat or drink in the normal way, but 
have a functional gastric system. A tube is passed via the nasal 
passages into the oesophagus and specially formulated feed is pumped 
directly into the stomach. The most serious hazard is probably that of 
placement of the tube to prevent feed being passed into the lungs via the 
trachea (National Patient Safety Agency 2005; Gharib et al., 1996).  
Physical; Physiotherapy 
Many patients benefit from physiotherapy as part of a rehabilitation 
regime after surgery, serious injury or prolonged inactivity. There is a 
wide range of treatments ranging from massage to laser therapy. The 
treatments are often personally tailored to a patient and practitioners 
have to be highly skilled. 
Resuscitation; Suction 
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During resuscitation, sputum and other fluids often have to be suctioned 
away. Suction is either provided through the use of a piped vacuum 
supply, a free standing machine or by means of a venturi device on an 
air or oxygen cylinder. Fluids are collected in a jar or fluid bag and need 
to be disposed of as biological waste. Care must be taken when 
suctioning the mouth and throat not to harm the patient or cause hypoxia 
by sucking oxygenated air from the lungs. 
Resuscitation; Defibrillation (Jacobson and Murray, 2007a) 
Defibrillation is used to bring a heart in ventricular fibrillation (Van 
Wynsberghe et al., 1995a) back into normal sinus rhythm (Clark et al., 
1998). This is an expert procedure that involves the discharge of up to 
360 Joules across a patient’s chest and into the heart muscle from as 
much as 4000 Volts and 50 Ampere over a few milliseconds (Jacobson 
and Murray, 2007a; Khandpur, 2005b). 
To the author’s knowledge, none of these therapeutic subsystems have been 
the subject of published structured, systematic hazard analysis. 
7.7 Final Word 
There is a marked distinction between healthcare and many other endeavour 
models. Most industrial and business processes are carefully designed with a 
more or less predictable pattern of events. Healthcare, in a similar way to 
military practice, or even photography, has evolved in a more artful manner. 
Pockets of highly defined tasks reside in a complex system with a chaotic 
character, resulting in a structure with many vagaries and outcomes that would 
be difficult to predict. It is highly dynamic and those practicing their professions 
within it cannot therefore be constrained within an artificially rigid framework. 
If someone were to try to re-design healthcare in order to make it more 
mechanistic, it may well become more predictable and perhaps even 
statistically more reliable. It would seem however that in doing so, those that 
make it work in its current form may become alienated and those needing care 
might become distrustful of a system that is more focused on process than 
people. 
This however does not preclude the use of checklists (Gawande, 2007) and the 
mapping and definition of many of the processes within healthcare. Much of the 
autonomy of doctors and the humanitarian focus of professional nursing can be 
maintained by ensuring their inclusion as ‘intelligent autonomous agents’ within 
a complex systems analysis framework (Nilsson and Darley, 2006; Nowak and 
Lamont, 2008). 
This thesis has demonstrated, by way of a thorough empirically based 
evaluation, that prospective hazard analysis methods such as FMEA, FTA and 
HAZOP can be effectively applied to ward based therapies. It has also shown 
that the systems definitions used to make sense of the complexity of the 
healthcare context can be used together with the formal structures of these 
hazard analyses to capture some of the tacit knowledge held by the 
professionals working in the system. This research has paved the way for the 
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use of these methods to shift the emphasis away from the current ‘rearward’ 
view employed for learning from mistakes in healthcare, to a more ‘forward’ one 
where hazards are anticipated through a prospective viewpoint. This new 
methodology, in which both viewpoints have merit and function, should reduce 
both the frequency and severity of many untoward incidents through the 
structured dissemination of this captured knowledge. This would promote a 
culture in which lessons learnt are shared and preventative and mitigatory 
barriers can be designed and maintained by reference to objective analysis. 
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A.1 Information sheet. 
A survey is being conducted on the use and administration of Oxygen on 
hospital wards. 
Title of the research: 
 The evaluation of risk to patients on Oxygen Therapy in hospital wards. 
How will it affect patients? 
This work will not adversely affect the treatment or care of patients, and 
will not interfere with the normal operation of the department.  
No personally identifiable information will be collected. 
A researcher will be observing the performance of the Oxygen delivery 
equipment and the actions of people on the ward. The researcher may 
on occasion take readings from the Oxygen delivery equipment in use. 
Discretion will be used in order to protect patient privacy and dignity. 
Patients will not be asked any questions about themselves. No 
participation is required from the patient. 
How will it affect staff? 
The normal operation of the department or ward will not be affected. A 
researcher will be observing the performance of the Oxygen delivery 
equipment and the actions of people on the ward. The researcher may 
on occasion ask questions about what activities have been carried out in 
relation to a patient receiving Oxygen. No personally identifiable 
information about the patient or staff will be collected. The researcher will 
not become involved in any clinical activity. If a potentially harmful or 
dangerous situation is observed, the researcher will discreetly advise a 
member of staff. 
Who is conducting the research? 
The research is being conducted through collaboration between the 
Hospital Trust and Cranfield University. The same researcher will be 
present on all occasions, and will be wearing identification. 
What is the purpose of the research? 
Information is being gathered on how oxygen is used in hospitals in order 
to assess the potential risks to patients receiving oxygen. This research 
will be used, along with other research, to help make oxygen therapy 
even safer than at present.  
If you have any concerns or questions, please do not hesitate to ask the 
researcher. If you would prefer, you may contact the Trust research office for 
further information.  
If you have any complaints, the normal hospitals complaints procedure is 
available to you. Please ask a member of staff.  
Thank you for your interest in this research. 
 177
A.2 Notice of Research Activity 
 
 
 
 
Notice of research activity. 
 
 
 
Please note that observational research activity is 
taking place on this ward. 
 
This will in no way adversely affect your treatment or 
care. 
 
For further information please ask a member of staff. 
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A.3 Observational Study Tables  
 
Table Appendix A.3-1 List of Category - Subcategory pairs and their frequency. 
Event Categories Event Subcategories Count 
Nursing Tasks Patient Monitoring 27 
Patient Transfer Patient Arrival 26 
Nursing Tasks Other Therapy 24 
Therapy Adjustment Supply Change 23 
Patient Actions Accessory Displacement 19 
Patient Actions Patient Sleeping 16 
Nurse Actions Failure To Act 16 
Therapy Adjustment Accessory Change 16 
Therapy 
Administration/Monitoring Accessory Displacement 15 
Patient Actions Patient Talking 14 
Accessory Displacement   14 
Therapy Adjustment Therapy Discontinued 11 
Nurse Actions Accessory Adjustment 11 
Patient Actions Patient Eating/Drinking 11 
Patient Arrival Supply Change 10 
Therapy Adjustment Therapy Flow Rate 9 
Therapy 
Administration/Monitoring Failure To Act 9 
Nurse Actions Accessory Displacement 8 
Doctor Actions Examination 8 
Nurse Actions Patient Posture/Position 8 
Nurse Actions Patient Monitoring 8 
Nursing Tasks Patient Transfer 7 
Therapy 
Administration/Monitoring Supply Change 7 
Patient Condition Nausea or Vomiting 6 
Nurse Actions Nursing Tasks 6 
Patient Actions Patient Posture/Position 6 
Nurse Actions Remedial Action 6 
Therapy 
Administration/Monitoring Tubing Disconnect 5 
Therapist Actions Other Therapy 5 
Nursing Tasks Patient Bed/Chair Transfer 5 
Nurse Actions Therapy Discontinued 5 
Patient Monitoring Monitoring Error 5 
Nursing Tasks Patient Posture/Position 5 
Clinical Actions Examination 5 
Nursing Tasks Patient Hand-Over 4 
Patient Transfer Supply Change 4 
Patient Actions Call For Assistance 4 
Other Therapy Medication 4 
First Contact Accessory Displacement 4 
Patient Actions Accessory Adjustment 4 
Therapy 
Administration/Monitoring Therapy Started 4 
Visitor Actions Patient Talking 4 
Nursing Tasks Patient Care 4 
Clinical Actions Other Therapy 4 
Nurse Actions Environmental Factor 4 
Therapy Adjustment Accessory Adjustment 4 
Nurse Actions Communication Issues 3 
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Event Categories Event Subcategories Count 
Patient Actions Patient Monitoring 3 
Therapy 
Administration/Monitoring Therapy Stopped 3 
Doctor Actions Clinical Actions 3 
Human Factors Distraction 3 
First Contact Normal Function 3 
Therapy 
Administration/Monitoring Cylinder Depletion 3 
Therapy 
Administration/Monitoring Accessory Adjustment 3 
Nurse Actions Medication 3 
Researcher Actions First Contact 3 
Patient Comfort Nature Calls 3 
Visitor Actions Patient Comfort 3 
Doctor Actions Patient Monitoring 3 
Doctor Actions Other Therapy 3 
Doctor Actions Failure To Act 3 
Failure To Act Accessory Displacement 3 
Communication Issues Patient Hand-Over 3 
Nurse Actions Therapy Started 2 
Nurse Actions Patient Care 2 
Nurse Actions Setup Error 2 
Nurse Actions Patient Safety 2 
Patient Actions Patient Co-operation 2 
Patient Actions Patient Comfort 2 
Patient Actions Other Therapy 2 
Patient Actions Medication 2 
Medication Normal Function 2 
Nursing Tasks Accessory Displacement 2 
Nursing Tasks Bed sheets changed 2 
Nursing Tasks Examination 2 
Nursing Tasks Medication 2 
Normal Function First Contact 2 
Nurse Actions Examination 2 
Nursing Tasks 
Therapy 
Administration/Monitoring 2 
Nursing Tasks Patient Talking 2 
Nurse Actions Equipment check 2 
Normal Function   2 
Equipment Disconnect Patient Monitoring 2 
Environmental Factor Surplus Equipment 2 
Patient Transfer Bed space Move 2 
Therapy 
Administration/Monitoring Normal Function 2 
Porter Actions Inappropriate Action 2 
Therapy Adjustment Therapy Stopped 2 
Clinical Actions Patient Care 2 
Therapy 
Administration/Monitoring Therapy Flow Rate 2 
Therapy 
Administration/Monitoring Obscured View 2 
Procedural Prescription 2 
Patient Talking   2 
Therapist Actions Therapy Adjustment 2 
Patient Monitoring Failure To Act 2 
Patient Eating/Drinking Accessory Displacement 2 
Communication Issues Patient Notes 2 
Patient Disconnection 
Therapy 
Administration/Monitoring 2 
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Event Categories Event Subcategories Count 
Setup Error 
Therapy 
Administration/Monitoring 2 
External Contractor Actions Patient Talking 2 
Patient Co-operation Failure To Act 2 
Communication Issues Failure To Act 1 
Communication Issues Patient Condition 1 
Communication Issues Call For Assistance 1 
Nurse Actions Cylinder Exchange 1 
Communication Issues Impared Speech 1 
Nurse Actions Lack of Staff 1 
Consultant Actions Examination 1 
Clinical Actions Patient Posture/Position 1 
Nurse Actions Bed space Move 1 
Clinical Actions Patient Monitoring 1 
Clinical Actions Patient Bed/Chair Transfer 1 
Nurse Actions Organisational Factor 1 
Nurse Actions Other Therapy 1 
Clinical Actions Accessory Change 1 
Accessory Poor Fit Physical Obstruction 1 
Accessory Displacement Patient Talking 1 
Accessory Displacement Patient Actions 1 
Accessory Displacement Failure To Act 1 
Clinical Actions Supply Change 1 
Human Factors Surplus Equipment 1 
Examination Communication Issues 1 
Equipment Failure Other Therapy 1 
First Contact Patient Actions 1 
Human Factors Communication Issues 1 
Equipment Failure Accessory Failure 1 
Human Factors Other Therapy 1 
Equipment check Normal Function 1 
Human Factors Patient Comfort 1 
Equipment Change-over Patient Monitoring 1 
Environmental Factor Tubing Pinched 1 
Domestic Staff Actions Patient Eating/Drinking 1 
Environmental Factor Technician Actions 1 
Doctor Actions Communication Issues 1 
Environmental Factor Remedial Action 1 
Environmental Factor Patient Access 1 
Environmental Factor Obstructed by Cylinder 1 
Environmental Factor Inappropriate Action 1 
Environmental Factor Human Factors 1 
Environmental Factor Equipment Missing/Unavailable 1 
Failure To Act 
Therapy 
Administration/Monitoring 1 
Environmental Factor Call For Assistance 1 
Equipment Failure Bed Fault 1 
Doctor Actions Therapy Discontinued 1 
Doctor Actions Remedial Action 1 
Human Factors Setup Error 1 
Researcher Actions   1 
Nursing Tasks (Another Patient) Patient Transfer 1 
Technician Actions Mobile X-ray 1 
Technician Actions Failure To Act 1 
Technician Actions Environmental Factor 1 
Setup Error Therapy Humidification 1 
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Event Categories Event Subcategories Count 
Setup Error Bubble Tubing 1 
Setup Error Accessory Displacement 1 
Therapist Actions Examination 1 
Researcher Actions 
Therapy 
Administration/Monitoring 1 
Therapist Actions Failure To Act 1 
Procedural Patient Transfer 1 
Procedural Patient Arrival 1 
Porter Actions Remedial Action 1 
Patient Transfer Patient Bed/Chair Transfer 1 
Patient Transfer Nursing Tasks 1 
Patient Transfer Normal Function 1 
Patient Transfer Communication Issues 1 
Setup Error Accessory Choice Error 1 
Therapy 
Administration/Monitoring Setup Error 1 
Visitor Actions Patient Safety 1 
Visitor Actions Environmental Factor 1 
Visitor Actions   1 
Therapy Started Other Therapy 1 
Therapy Discontinued Nursing Tasks 1 
Therapy Discontinued Nurse Actions 1 
Therapy Discontinued Normal Function 1 
Therapist Actions Communication Issues 1 
Therapy 
Administration/Monitoring Therapy Adjustment 1 
Patient Safety Procedural 1 
Therapy 
Administration/Monitoring Remedial Action 1 
Therapy 
Administration/Monitoring Patient Monitoring 1 
Therapy 
Administration/Monitoring Accessory Disconnect 1 
Therapy Adjustment Therapy Started 1 
Therapist Actions 
Therapy 
Administration/Monitoring 1 
Therapist Actions Patient Talking 1 
Therapist Actions Normal Function 1 
Therapy 
Administration/Monitoring Therapy Humidification 1 
Nursing Tasks Patient Admission 1 
Patient Actions Confused Thrashing 1 
Other Therapy Remedial Action 1 
Visitor Actions Tampering 1 
Organisational Factor Lack of Staff 1 
Nursing Tasks Therapy Started 1 
Nursing Tasks Therapy Discontinued 1 
Nursing Tasks Patient Eating/Drinking 1 
Patient Sleeping Normal Function 1 
Nursing Tasks Patient Comfort 1 
Patient Actions Patient Condition 1 
Nursing Tasks Nature Calls 1 
Nursing Tasks Bed space Move 1 
Nursing Tasks   1 
Nurse Actions Tubing Disconnect 1 
Nurse Actions 
Therapy 
Administration/Monitoring 1 
Nurse Actions Supply Fail 1 
Nurse Actions Patient Transfer 1 
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Event Categories Event Subcategories Count 
Nursing Tasks Patient Condition 1 
Patient Condition Patient Confusion 1 
Nurse Actions Patient Comfort 1 
Patient Safety Patient Condition 1 
Patient Posture/Position Accessory Displacement 1 
Patient Posture/Position   1 
Patient Monitoring Patient Entanglement 1 
Patient Disconnection Accessory Displacement 1 
Patient Co-operation Nursing Tasks 1 
Patient Actions Inappropriate Action 1 
Patient Co-operation Accessory Displacement 1 
Patient Actions Nature Calls 1 
Patient Condition   1 
Patient Arrival Patient Transfer 1 
Patient Arrival Patient Monitoring 1 
Patient Admission Supply Change 1 
Patient Actions Tampering 1 
Patient Actions Patient Safety 1 
Patient Actions Patient Entanglement 1 
Patient Sleeping   1 
Patient Co-operation Nurse Actions 1 
 
Table Appendix A.3-2 Categorical combinations and outcomes analysis. 
Category Sub-Category Focus Event Type Possible Outcome Count 
Patient Transfer Patient Arrival Nursing Task Benign Neutral 23 
Therapy Adjustment Supply Change Therapy Setup 
Remedial 
Proactive 
Decreased Probability 
of Failure 15 
Accessory Displacement . Therapy Setup Adverse Major
Increased Probability of 
Failure 11 
Patient Actions Patient Sleeping Patient Action Benign Neutral 11 
Nursing Tasks Patient Monitoring Monitoring Benign 
Decreased Probability 
of Failure 10 
Patient Actions Accessory Displacement Patient Action Adverse Minor
Increased Probability of 
Failure 10 
Patient Actions Patient Talking Patient Action Benign Neutral 10 
Patient Arrival Supply Change Therapy Setup Benign 
Decreased Probability 
of Failure 10 
Therapy Adjustment Accessory Change Therapy Setup Benign Neutral 10 
Therapy 
Administration/Monitoring Accessory Displacement Therapy Setup Adverse Minor
Increased Probability of 
Failure 8 
Nursing Tasks Patient Monitoring Nursing Task Benign Neutral 7 
Therapy 
Administration/Monitoring Failure To Act Therapy Setup Adverse Major
Increased Probability of 
Failure 7 
Nursing Tasks Other Therapy Other Therapy Benign Neutral 6 
Patient Actions Patient Eating/Drinking Patient Action Benign Neutral 6 
Patient Actions Patient Posture/Position Patient Action Adverse Minor
Increased Probability of 
Failure 6 
Audit Only Normal Function Therapy Setup Benign Neutral 5 
Doctor Actions Examination Clinical Benign 
Decreased Probability 
of Failure 5 
Nursing Tasks Other Therapy Other Therapy Benign Undetermined 5 
Therapy Adjustment Therapy Discontinued Therapy Setup Benign Neutral 5 
Audit Only Normal Function Therapy Setup Benign Undetermined 4 
Nurse Actions Failure To Act Therapy Setup Adverse Major
Increased Probability of 
Failure 4 
Patient Transfer Supply Change Therapy Setup Benign 
Increased Probability of 
Failure 4 
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Category Sub-Category Focus Event Type Possible Outcome Count 
Therapy Adjustment Therapy Discontinued Therapy Setup Undetermined Undetermined 4 
Therapy 
Administration/Monitoring Supply Change Therapy Setup Benign 
Increased Probability of 
Failure 4 
Accessory Displacement . Therapy Setup Adverse Minor
Increased Probability of 
Failure 3 
Clinical Actions Examination Clinical Benign 
Decreased Probability 
of Failure 3 
Failure To Act Accessory Displacement Therapy Setup Adverse Major
Increased Probability of 
Failure 3 
Nurse Actions Accessory Adjustment Therapy Setup 
Remedial 
Reactive Improvement 3 
Nurse Actions Accessory Displacement Nursing Task Adverse Minor
Increased Probability of 
Failure 3 
Nurse Actions Environmental Factor Equipment Adverse Minor
Increased Probability of 
Failure 3 
Nurse Actions Failure To Act Monitoring Adverse Major
Increased Probability of 
Failure 3 
Nurse Actions Failure To Act Therapy Setup Adverse Major Undetermined 3 
Nurse Actions Patient Monitoring Monitoring 
Remedial 
Reactive 
Decreased Probability 
of Failure 3 
Nurse Actions Patient Posture/Position Patient Safety 
Remedial 
Reactive Improvement 3 
Nursing Tasks Other Therapy Nursing Task Undetermined Undetermined 3 
Other Therapy Medication Other Therapy Adverse Minor Discomfort 3 
Patient Actions Patient Eating/Drinking Patient Action Benign 
Increased Probability of 
Failure 3 
Patient Actions Patient Sleeping Patient Action Benign 
Increased Probability of 
Failure 3 
Patient Actions Patient Talking Patient Action Benign 
Increased Probability of 
Failure 3 
Patient Condition Nausea or Vomiting 
Patient 
Condition Adverse Minor
Increased Probability of 
Failure 3 
Patient Monitoring Monitoring Error Monitoring Adverse Major
Increased Probability of 
Failure 3 
Researcher Actions First Contact 
Actions by 
Others Benign Neutral 3 
Therapy Adjustment Supply Change Therapy Setup Benign 
Decreased Probability 
of Failure 3 
Therapy Adjustment Therapy Flow Rate Therapy Setup Benign Undetermined 3 
Therapy 
Administration/Monitoring Accessory Displacement Therapy Setup Adverse Major Undetermined 3 
Audit Only Patient Sleeping Patient Action Benign Undetermined 2 
Communication Issues Patient Hand-Over Communication Adverse Major
Increased Probability of 
Failure 2 
Environmental Factor Surplus Equipment Equipment Adverse Minor
Increased Probability of 
Failure 2 
External Contractor 
Actions Patient Talking 
Actions by 
Others Benign Neutral 2 
First Contact Accessory Displacement Therapy Setup Adverse Major
Increased Probability of 
Failure 2 
First Contact Normal Function Therapy Setup Benign Undetermined 2 
Medication Normal Function Therapy Setup Benign Neutral 2 
Normal Function   
Actions by 
Others Benign Neutral 2 
Normal Function First Contact Patient Safety Benign Neutral 2 
Nurse Actions Failure To Act Therapy Setup Adverse Minor
Increased Probability of 
Failure 2 
Nurse Actions Nursing Tasks Nursing Task Benign Neutral 2 
Nurse Actions Nursing Tasks Nursing Task Benign Undetermined 2 
Nurse Actions Patient Posture/Position Nursing Task Benign Undetermined 2 
Nurse Actions Remedial Action Patient Action 
Remedial 
Reactive Improvement 2 
Nurse Actions Setup Error Therapy Setup Adverse Minor
Increased Probability of 
Failure 2 
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Category Sub-Category Focus Event Type Possible Outcome Count 
Nurse Actions Therapy Discontinued Therapy Setup Benign Neutral 2 
Nursing Tasks 
Patient Bed/Chair 
Transfer Nursing Task Benign Neutral 2 
Nursing Tasks Patient Hand-Over Communication Benign 
Decreased Probability 
of Failure 2 
Nursing Tasks Patient Monitoring Monitoring 
Remedial 
Proactive 
Decreased Probability 
of Failure 2 
Nursing Tasks Patient Monitoring Nursing Task Benign 
Decreased Probability 
of Failure 2 
Nursing Tasks Patient Transfer Nursing Task Benign 
Increased Probability of 
Failure 2 
Nursing Tasks Patient Transfer Nursing Task Benign Undetermined 2 
Nursing Tasks Patient Transfer Nursing Task Undetermined Undetermined 2 
Patient Actions Accessory Adjustment Patient Action 
Remedial 
Other Improvement 2 
Patient Actions Accessory Displacement Patient Action Adverse Major
Increased Probability of 
Failure 2 
Patient Actions Accessory Displacement Patient Action Adverse Minor Discomfort 2 
Patient Actions Patient Sleeping Patient Action Benign Undetermined 2 
Patient Comfort Nature Calls Patient Comfort Adverse Minor Next Event Trigger 2 
Patient Condition Nausea or Vomiting 
Patient 
Condition Adverse Minor Discomfort 2 
Patient Eating/Drinking Accessory Displacement Patient Action Adverse Minor
Increased Probability of 
Failure 2 
Patient Monitoring Failure To Act Monitoring Adverse Minor
Increased Probability of 
Failure 2 
Patient Monitoring Monitoring Error Monitoring Adverse Minor
Increased Probability of 
Failure 2 
Patient Talking   Patient Action Benign Neutral 2 
Patient Transfer Patient Arrival Nursing Task Benign Undetermined 2 
Setup Error 
Therapy 
Administration/Monitoring Therapy Setup Adverse Minor Undetermined 2 
Therapist Actions Other Therapy Other Therapy Benign Undetermined 2 
Therapist Actions Therapy Adjustment Therapy Setup Undetermined Undetermined 2 
Therapy Adjustment Accessory Adjustment Therapy Setup Benign Neutral 2 
Therapy Adjustment Accessory Change Therapy Setup Benign Undetermined 2 
Therapy Adjustment Supply Change Therapy Setup Benign 
Increased Probability of 
Failure 2 
Therapy Adjustment Therapy Flow Rate Therapy Setup 
Remedial 
Reactive Undetermined 2 
Therapy 
Administration/Monitoring Accessory Displacement Therapy Setup Adverse Major
Increased Probability of 
Failure 2 
Therapy 
Administration/Monitoring Cylinder Depletion Therapy Setup Adverse Major Undetermined 2 
Therapy 
Administration/Monitoring Normal Function Therapy Setup Benign Neutral 2 
Therapy 
Administration/Monitoring Obscured View Monitoring Adverse Minor
Increased Probability of 
Failure 2 
Therapy 
Administration/Monitoring Supply Change Therapy Setup Benign 
Decreased Probability 
of Failure 2 
Therapy 
Administration/Monitoring Tubing Disconnect Therapy Setup Adverse Minor
Increased Probability of 
Failure 2 
Visitor Actions Patient Talking 
Actions by 
Others Benign Neutral 2 
Accessory Displacement Failure To Act Therapy Setup Adverse Major
Increased Probability of 
Failure 1 
Accessory Displacement Patient Actions Patient Action Adverse Minor Undetermined 1 
Accessory Displacement Patient Talking Therapy Setup Adverse Minor Undetermined 1 
Accessory Poor Fit Physical Obstruction Equipment Adverse Minor
Increased Probability of 
Failure 1 
Clinical Actions Accessory Change Clinical 
Remedial 
Reactive Improvement 1 
Clinical Actions Examination 
Actions by 
Others Benign 
Decreased Probability 
of Failure 1 
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Category Sub-Category Focus Event Type Possible Outcome Count 
Clinical Actions Examination Clinical Benign Neutral 1 
Clinical Actions Other Therapy Clinical 
Remedial 
Reactive Improvement 1 
Clinical Actions Other Therapy Other Therapy Adverse Minor Discomfort 1 
Clinical Actions Other Therapy Other Therapy Adverse Minor Undetermined 1 
Clinical Actions Other Therapy Other Therapy 
Remedial 
Reactive Improvement 1 
Clinical Actions 
Patient Bed/Chair 
Transfer 
Actions by 
Others Benign Neutral 1 
Clinical Actions Patient Care Clinical 
Remedial 
Other Undetermined 1 
Clinical Actions Patient Care Clinical Undetermined Undetermined 1 
Clinical Actions Patient Monitoring Clinical Benign 
Decreased Probability 
of Failure 1 
Clinical Actions Patient Posture/Position Clinical Benign Neutral 1 
Clinical Actions Supply Change 
Actions by 
Others Benign Neutral 1 
Communication Issues Call For Assistance Communication Adverse Minor Discomfort 1 
Communication Issues Failure To Act Communication Adverse Minor
Increased Probability of 
Failure 1 
Communication Issues Impaired Speech Communication Adverse Minor
Increased Probability of 
Failure 1 
Communication Issues Patient Condition 
Patient 
Condition Adverse Minor
Increased Probability of 
Failure 1 
Communication Issues Patient Hand-Over Communication Benign 
Decreased Probability 
of Failure 1 
Communication Issues Patient Notes Communication Adverse Major Delay 1 
Communication Issues Patient Notes Communication Adverse Minor
Increased Probability of 
Failure 1 
Consultant Actions Examination Clinical Benign 
Decreased Probability 
of Failure 1 
Doctor Actions Clinical Actions 
Actions by 
Others Undetermined Undetermined 1 
Doctor Actions Clinical Actions Clinical Benign Neutral 1 
Doctor Actions Clinical Actions Clinical 
Remedial 
Proactive 
Decreased Probability 
of Failure 1 
Doctor Actions Communication Issues Communication Adverse Minor Next Event Trigger 1 
Doctor Actions Examination Clinical Benign Neutral 1 
Doctor Actions Examination Clinical Benign Undetermined 1 
Doctor Actions Examination Clinical Undetermined 
Decreased Probability 
of Failure 1 
Doctor Actions Failure To Act 
Actions by 
Others Adverse Major
Increased Probability of 
Failure 1 
Doctor Actions Failure To Act Therapy Setup Adverse Major
Increased Probability of 
Failure 1 
Doctor Actions Failure To Act Therapy Setup Adverse Minor
Increased Probability of 
Failure 1 
Doctor Actions Other Therapy Clinical Benign Neutral 1 
Doctor Actions Other Therapy Clinical Benign Undetermined 1 
Doctor Actions Other Therapy Other Therapy Benign Neutral 1 
Doctor Actions Patient Monitoring Monitoring Adverse Major
Increased Probability of 
Failure 1 
Doctor Actions Patient Monitoring Monitoring 
Remedial 
Proactive 
Decreased Probability 
of Failure 1 
Doctor Actions Patient Monitoring Monitoring 
Remedial 
Reactive Improvement 1 
Doctor Actions Remedial Action Patient Safety 
Remedial 
Reactive Improvement 1 
Doctor Actions Therapy Discontinued Therapy Setup Undetermined Undetermined 1 
Domestic Staff Actions Patient Eating/Drinking 
Actions by 
Others Benign Undetermined 1 
Environmental Factor Call For Assistance Communication Adverse Major
Increased Probability of 
Failure 1 
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Category Sub-Category Focus Event Type Possible Outcome Count 
Environmental Factor 
Equipment 
Missing/Unavailable Resources Adverse Major
Increased Probability of 
Failure 1 
Environmental Factor Human Factors Patient Safety Adverse Minor Near Miss 1 
Environmental Factor Inappropriate Action 
Actions by 
Others Undetermined Undetermined 1 
Environmental Factor Obstructed by Cylinder Equipment Adverse Minor
Increased Probability of 
Failure 1 
Environmental Factor Patient Access Nursing Task Adverse Minor
Increased Probability of 
Failure 1 
Environmental Factor Remedial Action Equipment 
Remedial 
Reactive Improvement 1 
Environmental Factor Technician Actions 
Actions by 
Others Undetermined 
Increased Probability of 
Failure 1 
Environmental Factor Tubing Pinched Equipment Adverse Major
Increased Probability of 
Failure 1 
Equipment Change-over Patient Monitoring Equipment Benign 
Increased Probability of 
Failure 1 
Equipment check Normal Function Equipment Adverse Minor
Increased Probability of 
Failure 1 
Equipment Disconnect Patient Monitoring Monitoring Adverse Major
Increased Probability of 
Failure 1 
Equipment Disconnect Patient Monitoring Monitoring Adverse Minor
Increased Probability of 
Failure 1 
Equipment Failure Accessory Failure Equipment Adverse Minor
Increased Probability of 
Failure 1 
Equipment Failure Bed Fault Equipment Adverse Major Near Miss 1 
Equipment Failure Other Therapy Other Therapy Adverse Major Discomfort 1 
Examination Communication Issues Communication Benign 
Increased Probability of 
Failure 1 
Failure To Act 
Therapy 
Administration/Monitoring Monitoring Adverse Major Near Miss 1 
First Contact Accessory Displacement Therapy Setup Adverse Major Undetermined 1 
First Contact Accessory Displacement Therapy Setup Adverse Minor
Increased Probability of 
Failure 1 
First Contact Normal Function Therapy Setup Benign Neutral 1 
First Contact Patient Actions Patient Action Adverse Minor
Increased Probability of 
Failure 1 
Human Factors Communication Issues Communication Adverse Major
Increased Probability of 
Failure 1 
Human Factors Distraction 
Actions by 
Others Adverse Minor
Increased Probability of 
Failure 1 
Human Factors Distraction Other Therapy Adverse Minor
Increased Probability of 
Failure 1 
Human Factors Distraction Patient Safety Adverse Minor
Increased Probability of 
Failure 1 
Human Factors Other Therapy Other Therapy Adverse Minor Neutral 1 
Human Factors Patient Comfort Patient Comfort Adverse Minor Discomfort 1 
Human Factors Setup Error Therapy Setup Adverse Major Near Miss 1 
Human Factors Surplus Equipment Equipment Adverse Minor
Increased Probability of 
Failure 1 
Nurse Actions Accessory Adjustment Equipment 
Remedial 
Reactive Improvement 1 
Nurse Actions Accessory Adjustment Nursing Task 
Remedial 
Reactive 
Decreased Probability 
of Failure 1 
Nurse Actions Accessory Adjustment Patient Action 
Remedial 
Reactive Improvement 1 
Nurse Actions Accessory Adjustment Therapy Setup Benign 
Decreased Probability 
of Failure 1 
Nurse Actions Accessory Adjustment Therapy Setup 
Remedial 
Other 
Decreased Probability 
of Failure 1 
Nurse Actions Accessory Adjustment Therapy Setup 
Remedial 
Proactive Undetermined 1 
Nurse Actions Accessory Adjustment Therapy Setup 
Remedial 
Reactive Aversion 1 
Nurse Actions Accessory Adjustment Therapy Setup 
Remedial 
Reactive 
Increased Probability of 
Failure 1 
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Category Sub-Category Focus Event Type Possible Outcome Count 
Nurse Actions Accessory Displacement Nursing Task Adverse Minor
Minor Injury/Slight 
Worsening 1 
Nurse Actions Accessory Displacement Nursing Task Benign 
Increased Probability of 
Failure 1 
Nurse Actions Accessory Displacement 
Patient 
Condition 
Remedial 
Reactive Aversion 1 
Nurse Actions Accessory Displacement Therapy Setup Adverse Minor
Increased Probability of 
Failure 1 
Nurse Actions Accessory Displacement Therapy Setup Benign 
Decreased Probability 
of Failure 1 
Nurse Actions Bed space Move Nursing Task Benign Neutral 1 
Nurse Actions Communication Issues Communication Benign 
Decreased Probability 
of Failure 1 
Nurse Actions Communication Issues Communication Benign Neutral 1 
Nurse Actions Communication Issues Therapy Setup Adverse Major Undetermined 1 
Nurse Actions Cylinder Exchange Therapy Setup 
Remedial 
Reactive Improvement 1 
Nurse Actions Environmental Factor Equipment Benign 
Increased Probability of 
Failure 1 
Nurse Actions Equipment check Equipment 
Remedial 
Proactive 
Decreased Probability 
of Failure 1 
Nurse Actions Equipment check Monitoring 
Remedial 
Proactive 
Decreased Probability 
of Failure 1 
Nurse Actions Examination Clinical Undetermined Undetermined 1 
Nurse Actions Examination Nursing Task Benign 
Decreased Probability 
of Failure 1 
Nurse Actions Failure To Act   Adverse Major Undetermined 1 
Nurse Actions Failure To Act Communication Adverse Major
Increased Probability of 
Failure 1 
Nurse Actions Failure To Act Equipment Adverse Major
Increased Probability of 
Failure 1 
Nurse Actions Failure To Act Therapy Setup Adverse Minor Undetermined 1 
Nurse Actions Lack of Staff Monitoring Adverse Minor
Increased Probability of 
Failure 1 
Nurse Actions Medication Nursing Task Benign Neutral 1 
Nurse Actions Medication Other Therapy Benign Neutral 1 
Nurse Actions Medication Other Therapy Benign Undetermined 1 
Nurse Actions Nursing Tasks Monitoring 
Remedial 
Proactive 
Decreased Probability 
of Failure 1 
Nurse Actions Nursing Tasks Nursing Task Adverse Minor Discomfort 1 
Nurse Actions Organisational Factor 
Actions by 
Others Benign Next Event Trigger 1 
Nurse Actions Other Therapy Nursing Task 
Remedial 
Other Improvement 1 
Nurse Actions Patient Care Nursing Task Benign Neutral 1 
Nurse Actions Patient Care Nursing Task Benign Undetermined 1 
Nurse Actions Patient Comfort Nursing Task Benign Neutral 1 
Nurse Actions Patient Monitoring Monitoring Adverse Minor
Increased Probability of 
Failure 1 
Nurse Actions Patient Monitoring Monitoring Adverse Minor Neutral 1 
Nurse Actions Patient Monitoring Monitoring Adverse Minor Undetermined 1 
Nurse Actions Patient Monitoring Monitoring 
Remedial 
Proactive Aversion 1 
Nurse Actions Patient Monitoring Nursing Task Benign Neutral 1 
Nurse Actions Patient Posture/Position Nursing Task Benign Neutral 1 
Nurse Actions Patient Posture/Position Patient Comfort Benign Neutral 1 
Nurse Actions Patient Posture/Position Patient Safety 
Remedial 
Proactive Aversion 1 
Nurse Actions Patient Safety Patient Safety 
Remedial 
Proactive 
Decreased Probability 
of Failure 1 
Nurse Actions Patient Safety Patient Safety 
Remedial 
Proactive Improvement 1 
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Nurse Actions Patient Transfer Nursing Task Benign Undetermined 1 
Nurse Actions Remedial Action Monitoring 
Remedial 
Reactive Improvement 1 
Nurse Actions Remedial Action Patient Action 
Remedial 
Reactive 
Decreased Probability 
of Failure 1 
Nurse Actions Remedial Action Patient Comfort
Remedial 
Reactive Improvement 1 
Nurse Actions Remedial Action Therapy Setup 
Remedial 
Reactive Improvement 1 
Nurse Actions Supply Fail Therapy Setup Adverse Minor
Increased Probability of 
Failure 1 
Nurse Actions 
Therapy 
Administration/Monitoring Therapy Setup 
Remedial 
Reactive Aversion 1 
Nurse Actions Therapy Discontinued Therapy Setup Adverse Major
Minor Injury/Slight 
Worsening 1 
Nurse Actions Therapy Discontinued Therapy Setup Benign Undetermined 1 
Nurse Actions Therapy Discontinued Therapy Setup Undetermined Undetermined 1 
Nurse Actions Therapy Started 
Patient 
Condition 
Remedial 
Reactive Aversion 1 
Nurse Actions Therapy Started Therapy Setup 
Remedial 
Reactive Improvement 1 
Nurse Actions Tubing Disconnect Therapy Setup Adverse Minor Discomfort 1 
Nursing Tasks   Nursing Task Benign Neutral 1 
Nursing Tasks Accessory Displacement Nursing Task Adverse Minor
Increased Probability of 
Failure 1 
Nursing Tasks Accessory Displacement Therapy Setup Undetermined 
Increased Probability of 
Failure 1 
Nursing Tasks Bed sheets changed Nursing Task Benign Next Event Trigger 1 
Nursing Tasks Bed sheets changed Nursing Task 
Remedial 
Other Neutral 1 
Nursing Tasks Bed space Move Nursing Task Benign Neutral 1 
Nursing Tasks Examination Monitoring Benign 
Decreased Probability 
of Failure 1 
Nursing Tasks Examination Nursing Task Benign Neutral 1 
Nursing Tasks Medication Other Therapy Benign Neutral 1 
Nursing Tasks Medication Therapy Setup Adverse Minor Discomfort 1 
Nursing Tasks Nature Calls Nursing Task Benign Discomfort 1 
Nursing Tasks Other Therapy   Benign Neutral 1 
Nursing Tasks Other Therapy Clinical Benign Neutral 1 
Nursing Tasks Other Therapy Clinical 
Remedial 
Reactive Undetermined 1 
Nursing Tasks Other Therapy Nursing Task Adverse Minor Discomfort 1 
Nursing Tasks Other Therapy Nursing Task Benign Undetermined 1 
Nursing Tasks Other Therapy Nursing Task 
Remedial 
Reactive Undetermined 1 
Nursing Tasks Other Therapy Nursing Task Undetermined Neutral 1 
Nursing Tasks Other Therapy Other Therapy 
Remedial 
Other Neutral 1 
Nursing Tasks Other Therapy Other Therapy 
Remedial 
Reactive Neutral 1 
Nursing Tasks Other Therapy Other Therapy Undetermined Undetermined 1 
Nursing Tasks Patient Admission Nursing Task Benign Improvement 1 
Nursing Tasks 
Patient Bed/Chair 
Transfer Nursing Task Benign Improvement 1 
Nursing Tasks 
Patient Bed/Chair 
Transfer Nursing Task Benign 
Increased Probability of 
Failure 1 
Nursing Tasks 
Patient Bed/Chair 
Transfer Nursing Task Undetermined Undetermined 1 
Nursing Tasks Patient Care Clinical Benign Undetermined 1 
Nursing Tasks Patient Care Nursing Task Benign Neutral 1 
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Nursing Tasks Patient Care 
Patient 
Condition Benign Neutral 1 
Nursing Tasks Patient Care 
Patient 
Condition 
Remedial 
Reactive Undetermined 1 
Nursing Tasks Patient Comfort Nursing Task Benign Improvement 1 
Nursing Tasks Patient Condition Nursing Task Undetermined Undetermined 1 
Nursing Tasks Patient Eating/Drinking Nursing Task Benign Neutral 1 
Nursing Tasks Patient Hand-Over Communication Benign Neutral 1 
Nursing Tasks Patient Hand-Over Nursing Task Benign Undetermined 1 
Nursing Tasks Patient Monitoring Monitoring Benign 
Increased Probability of 
Failure 1 
Nursing Tasks Patient Monitoring Monitoring Benign Neutral 1 
Nursing Tasks Patient Monitoring Monitoring 
Remedial 
Other 
Decreased Probability 
of Failure 1 
Nursing Tasks Patient Monitoring Monitoring 
Remedial 
Proactive Undetermined 1 
Nursing Tasks Patient Monitoring Nursing Task 
Remedial 
Proactive 
Decreased Probability 
of Failure 1 
Nursing Tasks Patient Monitoring Nursing Task 
Remedial 
Proactive Improvement 1 
Nursing Tasks Patient Posture/Position Nursing Task Benign Improvement 1 
Nursing Tasks Patient Posture/Position Nursing Task Benign 
Increased Probability of 
Failure 1 
Nursing Tasks Patient Posture/Position Nursing Task Benign Neutral 1 
Nursing Tasks Patient Posture/Position Patient Comfort
Remedial 
Other Undetermined 1 
Nursing Tasks Patient Posture/Position 
Patient 
Condition 
Remedial 
Reactive Improvement 1 
Nursing Tasks Patient Talking Communication Benign Neutral 1 
Nursing Tasks Patient Talking Nursing Task Benign 
Decreased Probability 
of Failure 1 
Nursing Tasks Patient Transfer Nursing Task Benign Neutral 1 
Nursing Tasks 
Therapy 
Administration/Monitoring Therapy Setup 
Remedial 
Other Improvement 1 
Nursing Tasks 
Therapy 
Administration/Monitoring Therapy Setup 
Remedial 
Proactive Undetermined 1 
Nursing Tasks Therapy Discontinued Nursing Task Benign Neutral 1 
Nursing Tasks Therapy Started Nursing Task Benign Neutral 1 
Nursing Tasks (Another 
Patient) Patient Transfer Nursing Task Undetermined Neutral 1 
Organisational Factor Lack of Staff Resources Adverse Major
Increased Probability of 
Failure 1 
Other Therapy Medication Clinical Benign Undetermined 1 
Other Therapy Remedial Action 
Patient 
Condition 
Remedial 
Reactive Improvement 1 
Patient Actions Accessory Adjustment Patient Action 
Remedial 
Other 
Decreased Probability 
of Failure 1 
Patient Actions Accessory Adjustment Therapy Setup 
Remedial 
Other Improvement 1 
Patient Actions Accessory Displacement   Adverse Minor Neutral 1 
Patient Actions Accessory Displacement Patient Action Adverse Major Next Event Trigger 1 
Patient Actions Accessory Displacement Patient Action Adverse Major Undetermined 1 
Patient Actions Accessory Displacement Patient Action Adverse Minor Undetermined 1 
Patient Actions Accessory Displacement Patient Comfort Adverse Minor
Increased Probability of 
Failure 1 
Patient Actions Call For Assistance Communication Benign Neutral 1 
Patient Actions Call For Assistance Patient Action Benign 
Decreased Probability 
of Failure 1 
Patient Actions Call For Assistance Patient Action 
Remedial 
Reactive 
Decreased Probability 
of Failure 1 
Patient Actions Call For Assistance Patient Action 
Remedial 
Reactive Improvement 1 
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Patient Actions Confused Thrashing Patient Action Adverse Minor
Increased Probability of 
Failure 1 
Patient Actions Inappropriate Action Patient Action Adverse Major Undetermined 1 
Patient Actions Medication Patient Action Adverse Minor Discomfort 1 
Patient Actions Medication Patient Action Benign Neutral 1 
Patient Actions Nature Calls Patient Action Adverse Minor
Increased Probability of 
Failure 1 
Patient Actions Other Therapy Other Therapy Adverse Major Near Miss 1 
Patient Actions Other Therapy Patient Safety Adverse Minor Undetermined 1 
Patient Actions Patient Comfort Patient Action Adverse Minor Discomfort 1 
Patient Actions Patient Comfort Patient Action Benign Next Event Trigger 1 
Patient Actions Patient Condition 
Patient 
Condition Adverse Minor
Increased Probability of 
Failure 1 
Patient Actions Patient Co-operation Patient Action Adverse Major
Increased Probability of 
Failure 1 
Patient Actions Patient Co-operation Patient Action Adverse Minor Undetermined 1 
Patient Actions Patient Eating/Drinking Patient Action Adverse Major Neutral 1 
Patient Actions Patient Eating/Drinking Patient Action Benign Undetermined 1 
Patient Actions Patient Entanglement Patient Action Adverse Minor
Increased Probability of 
Failure 1 
Patient Actions Patient Monitoring Monitoring Adverse Minor
Increased Probability of 
Failure 1 
Patient Actions Patient Monitoring Monitoring 
Remedial 
Other Improvement 1 
Patient Actions Patient Monitoring Patient Action Adverse Minor
Increased Probability of 
Failure 1 
Patient Actions Patient Safety Patient Action Adverse Minor
Increased Probability of 
Failure 1 
Patient Actions Patient Talking Patient Action Benign Undetermined 1 
Patient Actions Tampering Patient Action Adverse Minor
Increased Probability of 
Failure 1 
Patient Admission Supply Change Therapy Setup Benign 
Decreased Probability 
of Failure 1 
Patient Arrival Patient Monitoring Monitoring Benign Neutral 1 
Patient Arrival Patient Transfer 
Actions by 
Others Benign Undetermined 1 
Patient Comfort Nature Calls Patient Comfort Benign Neutral 1 
Patient Condition   
Patient 
Condition Adverse Major Undetermined 1 
Patient Condition Nausea or Vomiting 
Patient 
Condition Adverse Minor Undetermined 1 
Patient Condition Patient Confusion 
Patient 
Condition Adverse Minor
Increased Probability of 
Failure 1 
Patient Co-operation Accessory Displacement Patient Action Adverse Minor
Increased Probability of 
Failure 1 
Patient Co-operation Failure To Act Patient Action Adverse Minor
Increased Probability of 
Failure 1 
Patient Co-operation Failure To Act Therapy Setup Adverse Minor
Increased Probability of 
Failure 1 
Patient Co-operation Nurse Actions Nursing Task 
Remedial 
Other Improvement 1 
Patient Co-operation Nursing Tasks Patient Comfort Adverse Minor Discomfort 1 
Patient Disconnection Accessory Displacement Monitoring Adverse Major Aversion 1 
Patient Disconnection 
Therapy 
Administration/Monitoring Therapy Setup Adverse Major Near Miss 1 
Patient Disconnection 
Therapy 
Administration/Monitoring Therapy Setup Adverse Major Undetermined 1 
Patient Monitoring Patient Entanglement Monitoring Adverse Minor
Increased Probability of 
Failure 1 
Patient Posture/Position   Patient Comfort Benign Neutral 1 
Patient Posture/Position Accessory Displacement Therapy Setup Adverse Minor
Increased Probability of 
Failure 1 
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Patient Safety Patient Condition 
Patient 
Condition Adverse Major
Increased Probability of 
Failure 1 
Patient Safety Procedural Patient Safety Adverse Minor Undetermined 1 
Patient Sleeping   Patient Action Benign Neutral 1 
Patient Sleeping Normal Function Patient Action Benign Neutral 1 
Patient Transfer Bed space Move Clinical Benign Undetermined 1 
Patient Transfer Bed space Move Nursing Task Undetermined 
Increased Probability of 
Failure 1 
Patient Transfer Communication Issues Equipment Adverse Major
Increased Probability of 
Failure 1 
Patient Transfer Normal Function Nursing Task Undetermined Undetermined 1 
Patient Transfer Nursing Tasks Nursing Task Benign Neutral 1 
Patient Transfer Patient Arrival 
Actions by 
Others Benign Neutral 1 
Patient Transfer 
Patient Bed/Chair 
Transfer Patient Comfort Benign Undetermined 1 
Porter Actions Inappropriate Action 
Actions by 
Others Adverse Major
Increased Probability of 
Failure 1 
Porter Actions Inappropriate Action 
Actions by 
Others Adverse Major Undetermined 1 
Porter Actions Remedial Action Therapy Setup 
Remedial 
Reactive Improvement 1 
Procedural Patient Arrival 
Actions by 
Others Benign Neutral 1 
Procedural Patient Transfer 
Actions by 
Others Benign Neutral 1 
Procedural Prescription Communication Adverse Minor
Increased Probability of 
Failure 1 
Procedural Prescription Patient Safety Adverse Minor
Increased Probability of 
Failure 1 
Researcher Actions   Patient Safety 
Remedial 
Reactive Undetermined 1 
Researcher Actions 
Therapy 
Administration/Monitoring Therapy Setup 
Remedial 
Reactive Improvement 1 
Setup Error Accessory Choice Error Therapy Setup Adverse Major
Increased Probability of 
Failure 1 
Setup Error Accessory Displacement Therapy Setup Adverse Minor Neutral 1 
Setup Error Bubble Tubing Therapy Setup Adverse Minor Undetermined 1 
Setup Error Therapy Humidification Therapy Setup Adverse Major
Increased Probability of 
Failure 1 
Technician Actions Environmental Factor 
Actions by 
Others 
Remedial 
Other Improvement 1 
Technician Actions Failure To Act 
Actions by 
Others Adverse Minor
Increased Probability of 
Failure 1 
Technician Actions Mobile X-ray 
Actions by 
Others Benign Neutral 1 
Therapist Actions Communication Issues 
Patient 
Condition Benign Neutral 1 
Therapist Actions Examination Clinical Undetermined Undetermined 1 
Therapist Actions Failure To Act Therapy Setup Adverse Major
Increased Probability of 
Failure 1 
Therapist Actions Normal Function 
Actions by 
Others Benign Neutral 1 
Therapist Actions Other Therapy 
Actions by 
Others Benign Neutral 1 
Therapist Actions Other Therapy Other Therapy Benign Discomfort 1 
Therapist Actions Other Therapy Other Therapy Benign Neutral 1 
Therapist Actions Patient Talking Monitoring Benign Neutral 1 
Therapist Actions 
Therapy 
Administration/Monitoring Monitoring 
Remedial 
Proactive Aversion 1 
Therapy Adjustment Accessory Adjustment Nursing Task 
Remedial 
Proactive Improvement 1 
Therapy Adjustment Accessory Adjustment Therapy Setup 
Remedial 
Reactive Undetermined 1 
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Therapy Adjustment Accessory Change Patient Comfort
Remedial 
Reactive Aversion 1 
Therapy Adjustment Accessory Change Therapy Setup Adverse Major Next Event Trigger 1 
Therapy Adjustment Accessory Change Therapy Setup Benign Improvement 1 
Therapy Adjustment Accessory Change Therapy Setup 
Remedial 
Reactive Improvement 1 
Therapy Adjustment Supply Change Therapy Setup Benign Neutral 1 
Therapy Adjustment Supply Change Therapy Setup 
Remedial 
Reactive Aversion 1 
Therapy Adjustment Supply Change Therapy Setup Undetermined 
Increased Probability of 
Failure 1 
Therapy Adjustment Therapy Discontinued Therapy Setup Benign Undetermined 1 
Therapy Adjustment Therapy Discontinued Therapy Setup 
Remedial 
Reactive Undetermined 1 
Therapy Adjustment Therapy Flow Rate Therapy Setup Benign Discomfort 1 
Therapy Adjustment Therapy Flow Rate Therapy Setup Benign Neutral 1 
Therapy Adjustment Therapy Flow Rate Therapy Setup 
Remedial 
Other Undetermined 1 
Therapy Adjustment Therapy Flow Rate Therapy Setup 
Remedial 
Reactive Improvement 1 
Therapy Adjustment Therapy Started 
Patient 
Condition 
Remedial 
Reactive Improvement 1 
Therapy Adjustment Therapy Stopped Therapy Setup Adverse Major
Minor Injury/Slight 
Worsening 1 
Therapy Adjustment Therapy Stopped Therapy Setup Adverse Minor
Increased Probability of 
Failure 1 
Therapy 
Administration/Monitoring Accessory Adjustment Therapy Setup 
Remedial 
Other 
Decreased Probability 
of Failure 1 
Therapy 
Administration/Monitoring Accessory Adjustment Therapy Setup 
Remedial 
Reactive Aversion 1 
Therapy 
Administration/Monitoring Accessory Adjustment Therapy Setup 
Remedial 
Reactive Improvement 1 
Therapy 
Administration/Monitoring Accessory Disconnect Therapy Setup Adverse Minor
Increased Probability of 
Failure 1 
Therapy 
Administration/Monitoring Accessory Displacement 
Patient 
Condition Adverse Minor Improvement 1 
Therapy 
Administration/Monitoring Accessory Displacement Therapy Setup Undetermined Undetermined 1 
Therapy 
Administration/Monitoring Cylinder Depletion Monitoring Adverse Major Near Miss 1 
Therapy 
Administration/Monitoring Failure To Act Nursing Task Adverse Major
Increased Probability of 
Failure 1 
Therapy 
Administration/Monitoring Failure To Act Therapy Setup Adverse Minor
Increased Probability of 
Failure 1 
Therapy 
Administration/Monitoring Patient Monitoring Monitoring Benign 
Decreased Probability 
of Failure 1 
Therapy 
Administration/Monitoring Remedial Action Therapy Setup 
Remedial 
Reactive Aversion 1 
Therapy 
Administration/Monitoring Setup Error Therapy Setup Adverse Minor Undetermined 1 
Therapy 
Administration/Monitoring Supply Change Therapy Setup 
Remedial 
Proactive 
Decreased Probability 
of Failure 1 
Therapy 
Administration/Monitoring Therapy Adjustment Therapy Setup 
Remedial 
Reactive Improvement 1 
Therapy 
Administration/Monitoring Therapy Flow Rate Therapy Setup Adverse Minor
Increased Probability of 
Failure 1 
Therapy 
Administration/Monitoring Therapy Flow Rate Therapy Setup Undetermined Undetermined 1 
Therapy 
Administration/Monitoring Therapy Humidification Therapy Setup Adverse Minor Undetermined 1 
Therapy 
Administration/Monitoring Therapy Started Nursing Task Benign 
Decreased Probability 
of Failure 1 
Therapy 
Administration/Monitoring Therapy Started Nursing Task Benign Improvement 1 
Therapy 
Administration/Monitoring Therapy Started Therapy Setup Benign Neutral 1 
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Therapy 
Administration/Monitoring Therapy Started Therapy Setup 
Remedial 
Reactive Aversion 1 
Therapy 
Administration/Monitoring Therapy Stopped Nursing Task Adverse Minor
Increased Probability of 
Failure 1 
Therapy 
Administration/Monitoring Therapy Stopped Nursing Task Benign 
Increased Probability of 
Failure 1 
Therapy 
Administration/Monitoring Therapy Stopped Therapy Setup Undetermined Undetermined 1 
Therapy 
Administration/Monitoring Tubing Disconnect Therapy Setup Adverse Major
Increased Probability of 
Failure 1 
Therapy 
Administration/Monitoring Tubing Disconnect Therapy Setup Adverse Minor Discomfort 1 
Therapy 
Administration/Monitoring Tubing Disconnect Therapy Setup Undetermined Undetermined 1 
Therapy Discontinued Normal Function Therapy Setup Benign Undetermined 1 
Therapy Discontinued Nurse Actions Therapy Setup Benign Neutral 1 
Therapy Discontinued Nursing Tasks Therapy Setup Benign Undetermined 1 
Therapy Started Other Therapy Other Therapy 
Remedial 
Other Undetermined 1 
Visitor Actions   
Actions by 
Others Benign Neutral 1 
Visitor Actions Environmental Factor Equipment Adverse Minor Near Miss 1 
Visitor Actions Patient Comfort 
Actions by 
Others Benign 
Increased Probability of 
Failure 1 
Visitor Actions Patient Comfort 
Actions by 
Others Benign Neutral 1 
Visitor Actions Patient Comfort Patient Comfort Benign Improvement 1 
Visitor Actions Patient Safety 
Actions by 
Others Benign 
Decreased Probability 
of Failure 1 
Visitor Actions Patient Talking 
Actions by 
Others Benign 
Increased Probability of 
Failure 1 
Visitor Actions Patient Talking Patient Action Benign Neutral 1 
Visitor Actions Tampering 
Actions by 
Others Adverse Major Near Miss 1 
 
Table Appendix A.3-3 Hazard Identification from Observed Events. 
Type(Focus) Category Sub-Category Event Class Consequence Hazardous Element 
Actions by 
Others Doctor Actions Clinical Actions Undetermined Undetermined 
Incorrect 
clinical decision 
or action 
Actions by 
Others Doctor Actions Failure To Act 
Adverse 
Major 
Increased 
Probability of 
Failure 
Failure to 
recognize and 
act on an 
imminent 
therapy failure 
Actions by 
Others Nurse Actions Failure To Act 
Adverse 
Major Undetermined 
Failure to 
recognize and 
act on an 
imminent 
therapy failure 
Actions by 
Others Technician Actions Failure To Act 
Adverse 
Minor 
Increased 
Probability of 
Failure 
Failure to 
recognize and 
act on an 
imminent 
therapy failure 
Actions by 
Others Domestic Staff Actions Patient Eating/Drinking Benign Undetermined 
Unauthorized 
or 
inappropriate 
action by 
others 
Actions by 
Others Porter Actions Inappropriate Action 
Adverse 
Major 
Increased 
Probability of 
Failure 
Unauthorized 
or 
inappropriate 
action by 
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others 
Actions by 
Others Porter Actions Inappropriate Action 
Adverse 
Major Undetermined 
Unauthorized 
or 
inappropriate 
action by 
others 
Actions by 
Others Environmental Factor Inappropriate Action Undetermined Undetermined 
An 
environmental 
factor promotes 
inappropriate 
action 
Actions by 
Others Environmental Factor Technician Actions Undetermined 
Increased 
Probability of 
Failure 
Non clinical 
staff rectifying 
an 
environmental 
fault 
Actions by 
Others Human Factors Distraction 
Adverse 
Minor 
Increased 
Probability of 
Failure 
Distraction 
caused by 
activity on the 
ward 
Actions by 
Others Nurse Actions Organisational Factor Benign 
Next Event 
Trigger 
Latent error 
causes a 
failure in 
communication 
or process 
Actions by 
Others Patient Arrival Patient Transfer Benign Undetermined 
Patient 
management 
errors when 
patients arrive 
after transfer 
Actions by 
Others Visitor Actions Patient Comfort Benign 
Increased 
Probability of 
Failure 
Innocent action 
by visitor to aid 
patient comfort 
compromises 
this therapy 
Actions by 
Others Visitor Actions Patient Talking Benign 
Increased 
Probability of 
Failure 
Patients talking 
to visitors  
Actions by 
Others Visitor Actions Tampering 
Adverse 
Major Near Miss 
Visitors 
tampering with 
therapies 
Clinical Clinical Actions Patient Care Remedial Other Undetermined 
Clinical activity 
interfering with 
the therapy 
Clinical Clinical Actions Patient Care Undetermined Undetermined 
Clinical activity 
interfering with 
the therapy 
Clinical Therapist Actions Examination Undetermined Undetermined 
Clinical activity 
interfering with 
the therapy 
Clinical Nursing Tasks Other Therapy Remedial Reactive Undetermined 
Administering 
or adjusting 
another 
therapy causes 
interference 
with this one 
Clinical Doctor Actions Other Therapy Benign Undetermined 
Administering 
or adjusting 
another 
therapy causes 
interference 
with this one 
Clinical Nursing Tasks Patient Care Benign Undetermined 
Administering 
or adjusting 
another 
therapy causes 
interference 
with this one 
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Type(Focus) Category Sub-Category Event Class Consequence Hazardous Element 
Clinical Patient Transfer Bed space Move Benign Undetermined 
Process or 
patient 
management 
errors moving 
patients from 
one bed to 
another 
Clinical Doctor Actions Examination Benign Undetermined 
Patient 
requirement 
incorrectly 
assessed 
Clinical Nurse Actions Examination Undetermined Undetermined 
General 
nursing tasks 
interfering with 
the therapy 
Clinical Other Therapy Medication Benign Undetermined 
Other 
medication 
interfering with 
this therapy 
Communication Human Factors Communication Issues Adverse Major 
Increased 
Probability of 
Failure 
Inadequacy of 
pro forma or 
another 
communication 
tool 
Communication Communication Issues Call For Assistance Adverse Minor Discomfort 
Calls for 
assistance 
unanswered 
Communication Communication Issues Failure To Act Adverse Minor 
Increased 
Probability of 
Failure 
Patient 
requests or 
needs 
unfulfilled 
Communication Communication Issues Impaired Speech Adverse Minor 
Increased 
Probability of 
Failure 
Impaired 
speech due to 
the face mask 
or other aspect 
of the therapy 
making 
communication 
difficult 
Communication Communication Issues Patient Hand-Over Adverse Major 
Increased 
Probability of 
Failure 
Communication 
failures at 
patient hand-
over  
Communication Communication Issues Patient Notes Adverse Major Delay 
Missing or 
incomplete 
patient notes 
Communication Communication Issues Patient Notes Adverse Minor 
Increased 
Probability of 
Failure 
Incorrect 
information in 
patient notes 
Communication Doctor Actions Communication Issues Adverse Minor 
Next Event 
Trigger 
Poor 
communication 
from doctors to 
nursing staff 
Communication Environmental Factor Call For Assistance Adverse Major 
Increased 
Probability of 
Failure 
Environmental 
factors such as 
noise masking 
calls for 
assistance 
Communication Examination Communication Issues Benign 
Increased 
Probability of 
Failure 
Communication 
failures 
between 
clinician and 
patient during 
an examination 
Communication Nurse Actions Failure To Act Adverse Major 
Increased 
Probability of 
Failure 
Nursing staff 
not responding 
to requests or 
orders from 
doctors 
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Communication Procedural Prescription Adverse Minor 
Increased 
Probability of 
Failure 
Prescriptions or 
treatment 
orders incorrect 
or not made 
Equipment Accessory Poor Fit Physical Obstruction Adverse Minor 
Increased 
Probability of 
Failure 
Spectacles or 
other 
obstructions on 
the face 
Equipment Environmental Factor Obstructed by Cylinder Adverse Minor 
Increased 
Probability of 
Failure 
Position of 
cylinders at the 
bed side 
Equipment Environmental Factor Surplus Equipment Adverse Minor 
Increased 
Probability of 
Failure 
Surplus 
equipment 
cluttering the 
ward area 
Equipment Human Factors Surplus Equipment Adverse Minor 
Increased 
Probability of 
Failure 
Surplus 
equipment 
cluttering the 
ward area 
Equipment Environmental Factor Tubing Pinched Adverse Major 
Increased 
Probability of 
Failure 
Tubing pinched 
in furniture or 
other 
equipment at 
the bed side 
Equipment Equipment Change-over Patient Monitoring Benign 
Increased 
Probability of 
Failure 
Mistakes or 
equipment 
failures when 
changing from 
portable to 
installed 
monitoring or 
vice-versa 
Equipment Equipment check Normal Function Adverse Minor 
Increased 
Probability of 
Failure 
Equipment 
improperly 
checked 
Equipment Equipment Failure Accessory Failure Adverse Minor 
Increased 
Probability of 
Failure 
Physical failure 
of a patient 
connected 
accessory 
Equipment Equipment Failure Bed Fault Adverse Major Near Miss 
Technical or 
physical 
failures of the 
bed or 
associated 
equipment 
Equipment Nurse Actions Environmental Factor Adverse Minor 
Increased 
Probability of 
Failure 
Interference 
from an 
environmental 
factor affecting 
a nurses 
actions in the 
use of 
equipment 
Equipment Nurse Actions Environmental Factor Benign 
Increased 
Probability of 
Failure 
Interference 
from an 
environmental 
factor affecting 
a nurses 
actions in the 
use of 
equipment 
Equipment Nurse Actions Failure To Act Adverse Major 
Increased 
Probability of 
Failure 
Failure to 
respond to an 
alarm or some 
other 
equipment 
issue 
Equipment Patient Transfer Communication Issues Adverse Major 
Increased 
Probability of 
Failure 
Failure of staff 
to 
communicate 
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regarding 
equipment 
required in 
patient transfer 
Equipment Visitor Actions Environmental Factor Adverse Minor Near Miss 
Environmental 
issues like 
noise or 
cramped space 
cause visitors 
actions to 
interfere with 
the therapy 
Monitoring Doctor Actions Patient Monitoring Adverse Major 
Increased 
Probability of 
Failure 
Human error by 
clinical staff 
when 
monitoring 
patients 
Monitoring Equipment Disconnect Patient Monitoring Adverse Major 
Increased 
Probability of 
Failure 
Undetected 
disconnection 
of patient 
monitoring 
equipment  
Monitoring Equipment Disconnect Patient Monitoring Adverse Minor 
Increased 
Probability of 
Failure 
Undetected 
disconnection 
of patient 
monitoring 
equipment  
Monitoring Nurse Actions Failure To Act Adverse Major 
Increased 
Probability of 
Failure 
Failure to 
respond to or 
implement 
patient 
monitoring 
Monitoring Nurse Actions Patient Monitoring Adverse Minor 
Increased 
Probability of 
Failure 
Failure to 
respond to or 
implement 
patient 
monitoring 
Monitoring Patient Monitoring Failure To Act Adverse Minor 
Increased 
Probability of 
Failure 
Failure to 
respond to or 
implement 
patient 
monitoring 
Monitoring Nurse Actions Patient Monitoring Adverse Minor Undetermined 
Failure to 
respond to or 
implement 
patient 
monitoring 
Monitoring Nurse Actions Lack of Staff Adverse Minor 
Increased 
Probability of 
Failure 
Failure to 
respond to 
patient or 
therapy 
monitoring 
alerts due to a 
lack of staff 
Monitoring Patient Actions Patient Monitoring Adverse Minor 
Increased 
Probability of 
Failure 
Patient actions 
adversely 
affecting 
patient 
monitoring 
Monitoring Patient Disconnection Accessory Displacement Adverse Major Aversion 
Failure of 
patient or 
therapy 
monitoring to 
detect a patient 
disconnection 
Monitoring Patient Monitoring Patient Entanglement Adverse Minor 
Increased 
Probability of 
Failure 
Failure to 
detect patient 
entanglement 
in oxygen 
tubing  
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Monitoring Therapy Administration/Monitoring Cylinder Depletion 
Adverse 
Major Near Miss 
Failure to 
detect cylinder 
depletion when 
in use 
Monitoring Therapy Administration/Monitoring Obscured View 
Adverse 
Minor 
Increased 
Probability of 
Failure 
Environmental 
factor 
obscuring a 
clear view of 
the patient 
Monitoring Therapist Actions Therapy Administration/Monitoring 
Remedial 
Proactive Aversion 
Failure to 
adequately 
monitor a 
patient during 
treatment with 
another 
therapy 
Monitoring Failure To Act Therapy Administration/Monitoring 
Adverse 
Major Near Miss 
Failure to 
respond to or 
implement 
therapy 
monitoring 
Monitoring Nurse Actions Patient Monitoring Remedial Proactive Aversion 
Incorrect action 
when 
responding to 
or 
implementing 
patient 
monitoring 
Monitoring Nursing Tasks Patient Monitoring Benign 
Increased 
Probability of 
Failure 
Incorrect action 
when 
responding to 
or 
implementing 
patient 
monitoring 
Monitoring Nursing Tasks Patient Monitoring Remedial Proactive Undetermined 
Incorrect action 
when 
responding to 
or 
implementing 
patient 
monitoring 
Monitoring Patient Monitoring Monitoring Error Adverse Major 
Increased 
Probability of 
Failure 
Incorrect action 
when 
responding to 
or 
implementing 
patient 
monitoring 
Monitoring Patient Monitoring Monitoring Error Adverse Minor 
Increased 
Probability of 
Failure 
Incorrect action 
when 
responding to 
or 
implementing 
patient 
monitoring 
Nursing Task Patient Transfer Patient Arrival Benign Undetermined 
Process errors 
when patients 
arrive after 
transfer 
Nursing Task Nursing Tasks Other Therapy Adverse Minor Discomfort 
Administering 
or adjusting 
another 
therapy causes 
interference 
with this one 
Nursing Task Nursing Tasks Other Therapy Benign Undetermined 
Administering 
or adjusting 
another 
therapy causes 
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interference 
with this one 
Nursing Task Nursing Tasks Other Therapy Remedial Reactive Undetermined 
Administering 
or adjusting 
another 
therapy causes 
interference 
with this one 
Nursing Task Nursing Tasks Other Therapy Undetermined Undetermined 
Administering 
or adjusting 
another 
therapy causes 
interference 
with this one 
Nursing Task Patient Transfer Bed space Move Undetermined 
Increased 
Probability of 
Failure 
Process errors 
moving 
patients from 
one bed to 
another 
Nursing Task Environmental Factor Patient Access Adverse Minor 
Increased 
Probability of 
Failure 
Environmental 
factor 
obstructing 
access to the 
patient 
Nursing Task Nurse Actions Accessory Displacement Adverse Minor 
Increased 
Probability of 
Failure 
Accessory 
incorrectly 
administered or 
moved into an 
incorrect 
position by 
clinical staff 
Nursing Task Nurse Actions Accessory Displacement Adverse Minor 
Minor 
Injury/Slight 
Worsening 
Accessory 
incorrectly 
administered or 
moved into an 
incorrect 
position by 
clinical staff 
Nursing Task Nursing Tasks Accessory Displacement Adverse Minor 
Increased 
Probability of 
Failure 
Accessory 
incorrectly 
administered or 
moved into an 
incorrect 
position by 
clinical staff 
Nursing Task Nurse Actions Accessory Displacement Benign 
Increased 
Probability of 
Failure 
Failure to 
notice an 
incorrectly 
positioned 
accessory 
Nursing Task Nurse Actions Patient Posture/Position Benign Undetermined 
Changing a 
patients 
posture or 
position 
interferes with 
the therapy 
Nursing Task Nursing Tasks Patient Posture/Position Benign 
Increased 
Probability of 
Failure 
Changing a 
patients 
posture or 
position 
interferes with 
the therapy 
Nursing Task Nurse Actions Patient Transfer Benign Undetermined 
Preparing a 
patient for 
transfer 
interferes with 
the therapy 
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Nursing Task Nursing Tasks Patient Bed/Chair Transfer Benign 
Increased 
Probability of 
Failure 
Moving a 
patient 
between bed 
and chair 
causes 
interference 
with the 
therapy 
Nursing Task Nursing Tasks Patient Bed/Chair Transfer Undetermined Undetermined 
Moving a 
patient 
between bed 
and chair 
causes 
interference 
with the 
therapy 
Nursing Task Nursing Tasks Patient Condition Undetermined Undetermined 
Incorrect action 
when 
responding to a 
change in a 
patients 
condition 
Nursing Task Nursing Tasks Patient Hand-Over Benign Undetermined 
Incorrect 
actions at 
patient 
handover 
Nursing Task Nursing Tasks Patient Transfer Benign 
Increased 
Probability of 
Failure 
Incorrect 
actions during 
patient transfer 
Nursing Task Nursing Tasks Patient Transfer Benign Undetermined 
Incorrect 
actions during 
patient transfer 
Nursing Task Nursing Tasks Patient Transfer Undetermined Undetermined 
Incorrect 
actions during 
patient transfer 
Nursing Task Patient Transfer Normal Function Undetermined Undetermined 
Incorrect 
actions during 
patient transfer 
Nursing Task Therapy Administration/Monitoring Failure To Act 
Adverse 
Major 
Increased 
Probability of 
Failure 
Failure to act 
on a detected 
therapy 
administration 
error 
Nursing Task Therapy Administration/Monitoring Therapy Stopped 
Adverse 
Minor 
Increased 
Probability of 
Failure 
Failure to 
detect that the 
therapy has 
terminated 
early 
Nursing Task Therapy Administration/Monitoring Therapy Stopped Benign 
Increased 
Probability of 
Failure 
Failure to act 
on a detected 
early therapy 
termination 
Nursing Task Nurse Actions Nursing Tasks Adverse Minor Discomfort 
General 
nursing tasks 
interfering with 
the therapy 
Nursing Task Nurse Actions Nursing Tasks Benign Undetermined 
General 
nursing tasks 
interfering with 
the therapy 
Nursing Task Nurse Actions Patient Care Benign Undetermined 
General 
nursing tasks 
interfering with 
the therapy 
Nursing Task Nursing Tasks Bed sheets changed Benign Next Event Trigger 
General 
nursing tasks 
interfering with 
the therapy 
Nursing Task Nursing Tasks Nature Calls Benign Discomfort General nursing tasks 
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interfering with 
the therapy 
Other Therapy Clinical Actions Other Therapy Adverse Minor Discomfort 
Administering 
or adjusting 
another 
therapy causes 
interference 
with this one 
Other Therapy Clinical Actions Other Therapy Adverse Minor Undetermined 
Administering 
or adjusting 
another 
therapy causes 
interference 
with this one 
Other Therapy Nurse Actions Medication Benign Undetermined 
Administering 
or adjusting 
another 
therapy causes 
interference 
with this one 
Other Therapy Nursing Tasks Other Therapy Benign Undetermined 
Administering 
or adjusting 
another 
therapy causes 
interference 
with this one 
Other Therapy Nursing Tasks Other Therapy Undetermined Undetermined 
Administering 
or adjusting 
another 
therapy causes 
interference 
with this one 
Other Therapy Other Therapy Medication Adverse Minor Discomfort 
Administering 
or adjusting 
another 
therapy causes 
interference 
with this one 
Other Therapy Therapist Actions Other Therapy Benign Discomfort 
Administering 
or adjusting 
another 
therapy causes 
interference 
with this one 
Other Therapy Therapist Actions Other Therapy Benign Undetermined 
Administering 
or adjusting 
another 
therapy causes 
interference 
with this one 
Other Therapy Therapy Started Other Therapy Remedial Other Undetermined 
Administering 
or adjusting 
another 
therapy causes 
interference 
with this one 
Other Therapy Equipment Failure Other Therapy Adverse Major Discomfort 
Equipment 
delivering 
another 
therapy fails 
causing 
interference 
with this one 
Other Therapy Human Factors Distraction Adverse Minor 
Increased 
Probability of 
Failure 
A required 
action related 
to another 
therapy causes 
a distraction 
which 
compromises 
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this therapy 
Other Therapy Patient Actions Other Therapy Adverse Major Near Miss 
A patient takes 
action related 
to another 
therapy, which 
compromises 
this one 
Patient Action Patient Actions Medication Adverse Minor Discomfort 
A patient takes 
action related 
to another 
therapy, which 
compromises 
this one 
Patient Action Accessory Displacement Patient Actions Adverse Minor Undetermined 
Accessory 
moved into an 
incorrect 
position by 
Patient 
Patient Action Patient Actions Accessory Displacement Adverse Major 
Increased 
Probability of 
Failure 
Accessory 
moved into an 
incorrect 
position by 
Patient 
Patient Action Patient Actions Accessory Displacement Adverse Major 
Next Event 
Trigger 
Accessory 
moved into an 
incorrect 
position by 
Patient 
Patient Action Patient Actions Accessory Displacement Adverse Major Undetermined 
Accessory 
moved into an 
incorrect 
position by 
Patient 
Patient Action Patient Actions Accessory Displacement Adverse Minor Discomfort 
Accessory 
moved into an 
incorrect 
position by 
Patient 
Patient Action Patient Actions Accessory Displacement Adverse Minor 
Increased 
Probability of 
Failure 
Accessory 
moved into an 
incorrect 
position by 
Patient 
Patient Action Patient Actions Accessory Displacement Adverse Minor Undetermined 
Accessory 
moved into an 
incorrect 
position by 
Patient 
Patient Action Patient Actions Confused Thrashing Adverse Minor 
Increased 
Probability of 
Failure 
Unintentional 
action by 
patient 
interferes with 
the therapy 
Patient Action Patient Actions Inappropriate Action Adverse Major Undetermined 
Unauthorized 
or 
inappropriate 
action by the 
patient 
Patient Action Patient Actions Nature Calls Adverse Minor 
Increased 
Probability of 
Failure 
Action taken by 
a patient 
related to 
natural relief 
compromises 
the therapy 
Patient Action Patient Actions Patient Comfort Adverse Minor Discomfort 
Action taken by 
a patient to 
relieve 
discomfort 
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compromises 
the therapy 
Patient Action Patient Actions Patient Comfort Benign Next Event Trigger 
Action taken by 
a patient to 
relieve 
discomfort 
compromises 
the therapy 
Patient Action Patient Actions Patient Co-operation Adverse Major 
Increased 
Probability of 
Failure 
Patient refuses 
to co-operate 
with clinical 
staff regarding 
the therapy 
Patient Action Patient Actions Patient Co-operation Adverse Minor Undetermined 
Patient refuses 
to co-operate 
with clinical 
staff regarding 
the therapy 
Patient Action Patient Co-operation Failure To Act Adverse Minor 
Increased 
Probability of 
Failure 
Patient refuses 
to co-operate 
with clinical 
staff regarding 
the therapy 
Patient Action Patient Actions Patient Eating/Drinking Benign 
Increased 
Probability of 
Failure 
Patient has to 
take action to 
enable them to 
eat or drink 
which 
compromises 
the therapy 
Patient Action Patient Actions Patient Eating/Drinking Benign Undetermined 
Patient has to 
take action to 
enable them to 
eat or drink 
which 
compromises 
the therapy 
Patient Action Patient Actions Patient Entanglement Adverse Minor 
Increased 
Probability of 
Failure 
Actions by 
patient causes 
them to 
become 
entangled in 
the oxygen 
tubing 
Patient Action Patient Actions Patient Monitoring Adverse Minor 
Increased 
Probability of 
Failure 
Actions by the 
patient interfere 
with the patient 
monitoring 
Patient Action Patient Actions Patient Posture/Position Adverse Minor 
Increased 
Probability of 
Failure 
Actions by the 
patient to 
change 
position or 
posture 
interfere with 
the therapy 
Patient Action Patient Actions Patient Sleeping Benign 
Increased 
Probability of 
Failure 
Movements or 
actions during 
sleep 
compromise 
the therapy 
Patient Action Patient Actions Patient Sleeping Benign Undetermined 
Movements or 
actions during 
sleep 
compromise 
the therapy 
Patient Action Patient Actions Patient Talking Benign 
Increased 
Probability of 
Failure 
Actions taken 
by patient to 
allow them to 
talk 
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compromises 
the therapy 
Patient Action Patient Actions Patient Talking Benign Undetermined 
Actions taken 
by patient to 
allow them to 
talk 
compromises 
the therapy 
Patient Action First Contact Patient Actions Adverse Minor 
Increased 
Probability of 
Failure 
Innocent action 
by patient 
compromises 
the therapy 
Patient Action Patient Actions Tampering Adverse Minor 
Increased 
Probability of 
Failure 
A patient 
tampers with 
their therapy 
Patient Action Patient Co-operation Accessory Displacement Adverse Minor 
Increased 
Probability of 
Failure 
Patient refuses 
to co-operate 
with the 
therapy by 
removing the 
accessory 
Patient Action Patient Eating/Drinking Accessory Displacement Adverse Minor 
Increased 
Probability of 
Failure 
Patient has to 
take action to 
enable them to 
eat or drink 
which 
compromises 
the therapy 
Patient Action Patient Actions Patient Safety Adverse Minor 
Increased 
Probability of 
Failure 
Purposeful 
action by 
patient 
compromises 
the therapy 
Patient Comfort Nursing Tasks Patient Posture/Position Remedial Other Undetermined 
Changing a 
patients 
posture or 
position 
interferes with 
the therapy 
Patient Comfort Human Factors Patient Comfort Adverse Minor Discomfort 
Some aspect of 
the therapy 
causes 
discomfort 
Patient Comfort Patient Actions Accessory Displacement Adverse Minor 
Increased 
Probability of 
Failure 
Patient 
displaces 
accessory 
because it is 
causing 
discomfort 
Patient Comfort Patient Comfort Nature Calls Adverse Minor 
Next Event 
Trigger 
Action taken by 
nursing staff to 
aid a patient to 
obtain natural 
relief 
compromises 
the therapy 
Patient Comfort Therapy Adjustment Accessory Change Remedial Reactive Aversion 
The accessory 
has to be 
changed to 
relieve patient 
discomfort 
Patient Comfort Patient Co-operation Nursing Tasks Adverse Minor Discomfort 
Lack of co-
operation by 
patient 
regarding a 
nursing task 
causes therapy 
to become 
uncomfortable 
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Patient Comfort Patient Transfer Patient Bed/Chair Transfer Benign Undetermined 
Moving patient 
between bed 
and chair 
causes the 
therapy to 
become 
uncomfortable 
Patient 
Condition Nurse Actions Accessory Displacement 
Remedial 
Reactive Aversion 
Failure to 
notice an 
incorrectly 
positioned 
accessory 
Patient 
Condition Nursing Tasks Patient Care 
Remedial 
Reactive Undetermined 
Incorrect action 
when 
responding to a 
change in a 
patients 
condition 
Patient 
Condition Patient Actions Patient Condition 
Adverse 
Minor 
Increased 
Probability of 
Failure 
Incorrect action 
when 
responding to a 
change in a 
patients 
condition 
Patient 
Condition Patient Condition   
Adverse 
Major Undetermined 
Incorrect action 
when 
responding to a 
change in a 
patients 
condition 
Patient 
Condition Communication Issues Patient Condition 
Adverse 
Minor 
Increased 
Probability of 
Failure 
The patients 
condition 
minimises 
communication 
Patient 
Condition Nurse Actions Therapy Started 
Remedial 
Reactive Aversion 
Undetected 
change in 
patient 
condition 
Patient 
Condition Patient Safety Patient Condition 
Adverse 
Major 
Increased 
Probability of 
Failure 
Undetected 
change in 
patient 
condition 
Patient 
Condition Patient Condition Nausea or Vomiting 
Adverse 
Minor Discomfort 
Patient 
vomiting while 
an accessory is 
in position 
Patient 
Condition Patient Condition Nausea or Vomiting 
Adverse 
Minor 
Increased 
Probability of 
Failure 
Patient 
vomiting while 
an accessory is 
in position 
Patient 
Condition Patient Condition Nausea or Vomiting 
Adverse 
Minor Undetermined 
Patient 
vomiting while 
an accessory is 
in position 
Patient 
Condition Patient Condition Patient Confusion 
Adverse 
Minor 
Increased 
Probability of 
Failure 
Inability for 
patient to co-
operate 
interferes with 
the therapy 
Patient Safety Researcher Actions   Remedial Reactive Undetermined 
Failure to 
recognize and 
act on an 
imminent 
therapy failure 
Patient Safety Procedural Prescription Adverse Minor 
Increased 
Probability of 
Failure 
Prescriptions or 
treatment 
orders incorrect 
or not made 
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Patient Safety Nurse Actions Patient Posture/Position Remedial Proactive Aversion 
Changing a 
patients 
posture or 
position 
interferes with 
the therapy 
Patient Safety Patient Actions Other Therapy Adverse Minor Undetermined 
A patient takes 
action related 
to another 
therapy, which 
compromises 
this one 
Patient Safety Environmental Factor Human Factors Adverse Minor Near Miss 
Environmental 
factor masks 
information 
relating to a 
change in 
patient 
condition 
Patient Safety Human Factors Distraction Adverse Minor 
Increased 
Probability of 
Failure 
A factor 
relating to 
design within 
the therapy or 
the 
environment 
causes staff to 
be distracted 
Patient Safety Patient Safety Procedural Adverse Minor Undetermined 
A latent error in 
a defined 
procedure 
causes 
mistakes 
Resources Environmental Factor Equipment Missing/Unavailable 
Adverse 
Major 
Increased 
Probability of 
Failure 
A lack of 
available 
equipment for 
therapy 
administration 
or monitoring 
Resources Organisational Factor Lack of Staff Adverse Major 
Increased 
Probability of 
Failure 
Insufficient staff 
numbers to 
effectively 
manage 
patients 
receiving 
therapy 
Therapy Setup First Contact Normal Function Benign Undetermined Patients talking to visitors  
Therapy Setup Nursing Tasks Medication Adverse Minor Discomfort 
Administering 
or adjusting 
another 
therapy causes 
interference 
with this one 
Therapy Setup Therapy Administration/Monitoring Cylinder Depletion 
Adverse 
Major Undetermined 
Failure to 
detect cylinder 
depletion when 
in use 
Therapy Setup Accessory Displacement   Adverse Major 
Increased 
Probability of 
Failure 
Accessory 
incorrectly 
administered or 
moved into an 
incorrect 
position by 
clinical staff 
Therapy Setup Accessory Displacement   Adverse Minor 
Increased 
Probability of 
Failure 
Accessory 
incorrectly 
administered or 
moved into an 
incorrect 
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position by 
clinical staff 
Therapy Setup Nurse Actions Accessory Adjustment Remedial Proactive Undetermined 
Accessory 
incorrectly 
administered or 
moved into an 
incorrect 
position by 
clinical staff 
Therapy Setup Nurse Actions Accessory Adjustment Remedial Reactive Aversion 
Accessory 
incorrectly 
administered or 
moved into an 
incorrect 
position by 
clinical staff 
Therapy Setup Nurse Actions Accessory Adjustment Remedial Reactive 
Increased 
Probability of 
Failure 
Accessory 
incorrectly 
administered or 
moved into an 
incorrect 
position by 
clinical staff 
Therapy Setup Nurse Actions Accessory Displacement Adverse Minor 
Increased 
Probability of 
Failure 
Accessory 
incorrectly 
administered or 
moved into an 
incorrect 
position by 
clinical staff 
Therapy Setup Therapy Administration/Monitoring Accessory Adjustment 
Remedial 
Reactive Aversion 
Accessory 
incorrectly 
administered or 
moved into an 
incorrect 
position by 
clinical staff 
Therapy Setup Therapy Administration/Monitoring Accessory Displacement 
Adverse 
Major 
Increased 
Probability of 
Failure 
Accessory 
incorrectly 
administered or 
moved into an 
incorrect 
position by 
clinical staff 
Therapy Setup Therapy Administration/Monitoring Accessory Displacement 
Adverse 
Major Undetermined 
Accessory 
incorrectly 
administered or 
moved into an 
incorrect 
position by 
clinical staff 
Therapy Setup Therapy Administration/Monitoring Accessory Displacement 
Adverse 
Minor 
Increased 
Probability of 
Failure 
Accessory 
incorrectly 
administered or 
moved into an 
incorrect 
position by 
clinical staff 
Therapy Setup Therapy Administration/Monitoring Accessory Displacement Undetermined Undetermined 
Accessory 
incorrectly 
administered or 
moved into an 
incorrect 
position by 
clinical staff 
Therapy Setup Doctor Actions Failure To Act Adverse Major 
Increased 
Probability of 
Failure 
Failure to act 
on a detected 
therapy 
administration 
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error 
Therapy Setup Doctor Actions Failure To Act Adverse Minor 
Increased 
Probability of 
Failure 
Failure to act 
on a detected 
therapy 
administration 
error 
Therapy Setup Nurse Actions Failure To Act Adverse Major 
Increased 
Probability of 
Failure 
Failure to act 
on a detected 
therapy 
administration 
error 
Therapy Setup Nurse Actions Failure To Act Adverse Major Undetermined 
Failure to act 
on a detected 
therapy 
administration 
error 
Therapy Setup Nurse Actions Failure To Act Adverse Minor 
Increased 
Probability of 
Failure 
Failure to act 
on a detected 
therapy 
administration 
error 
Therapy Setup Nurse Actions Failure To Act Adverse Minor Undetermined 
Failure to act 
on a detected 
therapy 
administration 
error 
Therapy Setup Therapist Actions Failure To Act Adverse Major 
Increased 
Probability of 
Failure 
Failure to act 
on a detected 
therapy 
administration 
error 
Therapy Setup Therapy Administration/Monitoring Failure To Act 
Adverse 
Major 
Increased 
Probability of 
Failure 
Failure to act 
on a detected 
therapy 
administration 
error 
Therapy Setup Therapy Administration/Monitoring Failure To Act 
Adverse 
Minor 
Increased 
Probability of 
Failure 
Failure to act 
on a detected 
therapy 
administration 
error 
Therapy Setup Accessory Displacement Patient Talking Adverse Minor Undetermined 
Actions taken 
by patient to 
allow them to 
talk 
compromises 
the therapy 
Therapy Setup Setup Error Therapy Humidification Adverse Major 
Increased 
Probability of 
Failure 
Humidifier 
incorrectly set 
up, used 
inappropriately 
or not used 
when it should 
Therapy Setup Accessory Displacement Failure To Act Adverse Major 
Increased 
Probability of 
Failure 
Failure to 
correct a 
displaced 
accessory 
Therapy Setup Failure To Act Accessory Displacement Adverse Major 
Increased 
Probability of 
Failure 
Failure to 
correct a 
displaced 
accessory 
Therapy Setup Doctor Actions Therapy Discontinued Undetermined Undetermined 
Therapy 
terminated 
early in error 
Therapy Setup Nurse Actions Therapy Discontinued Adverse Major 
Minor 
Injury/Slight 
Worsening 
Therapy 
terminated 
early in error 
Therapy Setup Nurse Actions Therapy Discontinued Benign Undetermined Therapy terminated 
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early in error 
Therapy Setup Nurse Actions Therapy Discontinued Undetermined Undetermined 
Therapy 
terminated 
early in error 
Therapy Setup Therapy Adjustment Therapy Discontinued Benign Undetermined 
Therapy 
terminated 
early in error 
Therapy Setup Therapy Adjustment Therapy Discontinued Remedial Reactive Undetermined 
Therapy 
terminated 
early in error 
Therapy Setup Therapy Adjustment Therapy Discontinued Undetermined Undetermined 
Therapy 
terminated 
early in error 
Therapy Setup Therapy Adjustment Therapy Stopped Adverse Major 
Minor 
Injury/Slight 
Worsening 
Therapy 
terminated 
early in error 
Therapy Setup Therapy Adjustment Therapy Stopped Adverse Minor 
Increased 
Probability of 
Failure 
Therapy 
terminated 
early in error 
Therapy Setup Therapy Administration/Monitoring Therapy Stopped Undetermined Undetermined 
Therapy 
terminated 
early in error 
Therapy Setup Therapy Discontinued Normal Function Benign Undetermined 
Therapy 
terminated 
early in error 
Therapy Setup Therapy Discontinued Nursing Tasks Benign Undetermined 
Therapy 
terminated 
early in error 
Therapy Setup First Contact Accessory Displacement Adverse Major 
Increased 
Probability of 
Failure 
failure to detect 
a displaced 
accessory 
Therapy Setup First Contact Accessory Displacement Adverse Major Undetermined 
failure to detect 
a displaced 
accessory 
Therapy Setup First Contact Accessory Displacement Adverse Minor 
Increased 
Probability of 
Failure 
failure to detect 
a displaced 
accessory 
Therapy Setup Human Factors Setup Error Adverse Major Near Miss 
A factor 
relating to 
design within 
the therapy or 
the 
environment 
causes setup 
error 
Therapy Setup Nurse Actions Communication Issues Adverse Major Undetermined 
Nursing staff 
failing to 
communicate 
effectively 
regarding a 
patient's 
therapy 
Therapy Setup Nurse Actions Setup Error Adverse Minor 
Increased 
Probability of 
Failure 
Mistakes in 
setting up the 
therapy 
Therapy Setup Nurse Actions Supply Fail Adverse Minor 
Increased 
Probability of 
Failure 
Failure to 
detect a failed 
oxygen supply 
Therapy Setup Nurse Actions Therapy Administration/Monitoring 
Remedial 
Reactive Aversion 
Incorrect action 
taken when 
attempting to 
rectify a setup 
error 
Therapy Setup Therapy Administration/Monitoring Remedial Action 
Remedial 
Reactive Aversion 
Incorrect action 
taken when 
attempting to 
rectify a setup 
error 
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Therapy Setup Nurse Actions Tubing Disconnect Adverse Minor Discomfort 
Therapy tubing 
disconnected in 
error 
Therapy Setup Nursing Tasks Accessory Displacement Undetermined 
Increased 
Probability of 
Failure 
Accessory is 
displaced as a 
result of a 
general nursing 
task 
Therapy Setup Therapy Adjustment Accessory Change Adverse Major 
Next Event 
Trigger 
A change of 
accessory is 
incorrectly 
implemented 
Therapy Setup Therapy Adjustment Accessory Change Benign Undetermined 
A change of 
accessory is 
incorrectly 
implemented 
Therapy Setup Patient Co-operation Failure To Act Adverse Minor 
Increased 
Probability of 
Failure 
A patient 
compromises 
the therapy 
setup by not 
co-operating 
with staff 
Therapy Setup Patient Posture/Position Accessory Displacement Adverse Minor 
Increased 
Probability of 
Failure 
An accessory 
is displaced 
when a 
patient's 
position or 
posture is 
changed 
Therapy Setup Therapy Administration/Monitoring Accessory Disconnect 
Adverse 
Minor 
Increased 
Probability of 
Failure 
An accessory 
is incorrectly or 
inappropriately 
disconnected 
by clinical staff 
Therapy Setup Nursing Tasks Therapy Administration/Monitoring 
Remedial 
Proactive Undetermined 
An incorrect 
adjustment is 
made to the 
therapy 
Therapy Setup Therapist Actions Therapy Adjustment Undetermined Undetermined 
An incorrect 
adjustment is 
made to the 
therapy 
Therapy Setup Therapy Adjustment Accessory Adjustment Remedial Reactive Undetermined 
An incorrect 
adjustment is 
made to the 
therapy 
Therapy Setup Setup Error Bubble Tubing Adverse Minor Undetermined 
Bubble tubing 
incorrectly cut 
Therapy Setup Patient Transfer Supply Change Benign 
Increased 
Probability of 
Failure 
Change either 
way between 
piped supply 
and cylinder 
incorrectly 
implemented 
Therapy Setup Therapy Adjustment Supply Change Benign 
Increased 
Probability of 
Failure 
Change either 
way between 
piped supply 
and cylinder 
incorrectly 
implemented 
Therapy Setup Therapy Adjustment Supply Change Remedial Reactive Aversion 
Change either 
way between 
piped supply 
and cylinder 
incorrectly 
implemented 
Therapy Setup Therapy Adjustment Supply Change Undetermined 
Increased 
Probability of 
Failure 
Change either 
way between 
piped supply 
and cylinder 
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incorrectly 
implemented 
Therapy Setup Therapy Administration/Monitoring Supply Change Benign 
Increased 
Probability of 
Failure 
Change either 
way between 
piped supply 
and cylinder 
incorrectly 
implemented 
Therapy Setup Patient Disconnection Therapy Administration/Monitoring 
Adverse 
Major Near Miss 
Failure by 
clinical staff to 
detect a patient 
disconnection 
Therapy Setup Patient Disconnection Therapy Administration/Monitoring 
Adverse 
Major Undetermined 
Failure by 
clinical staff to 
detect a patient 
disconnection 
Therapy Setup Setup Error Therapy Administration/Monitoring 
Adverse 
Minor Undetermined 
Failure to 
detect a setup 
error 
Therapy Setup Therapy Adjustment Therapy Flow Rate Benign Discomfort 
Flow rate 
incorrectly or 
inappropriately 
adjusted 
Therapy Setup Therapy Adjustment Therapy Flow Rate Benign Undetermined 
Flow rate 
incorrectly or 
inappropriately 
adjusted 
Therapy Setup Therapy Adjustment Therapy Flow Rate Remedial Other Undetermined 
Flow rate 
incorrectly or 
inappropriately 
adjusted 
Therapy Setup Therapy Adjustment Therapy Flow Rate Remedial Reactive Undetermined 
Flow rate 
incorrectly or 
inappropriately 
adjusted 
Therapy Setup Therapy Administration/Monitoring Therapy Flow Rate 
Adverse 
Minor 
Increased 
Probability of 
Failure 
Flow rate 
incorrectly or 
inappropriately 
adjusted 
Therapy Setup Therapy Administration/Monitoring Therapy Flow Rate Undetermined Undetermined 
Flow rate 
incorrectly or 
inappropriately 
adjusted 
Therapy Setup Therapy Administration/Monitoring Therapy Started 
Remedial 
Reactive Aversion 
Therapy 
incorrectly or 
inappropriately 
set up when re-
administered 
after a previous 
termination 
Therapy Setup Therapy Administration/Monitoring Tubing Disconnect 
Adverse 
Major 
Increased 
Probability of 
Failure 
Undetected 
accidental or 
erroneous 
tubing 
disconnection 
Therapy Setup Therapy Administration/Monitoring Tubing Disconnect 
Adverse 
Minor Discomfort 
Undetected 
accidental or 
erroneous 
tubing 
disconnection 
Therapy Setup Therapy Administration/Monitoring Tubing Disconnect 
Adverse 
Minor 
Increased 
Probability of 
Failure 
Undetected 
accidental or 
erroneous 
tubing 
disconnection 
Therapy Setup Therapy Administration/Monitoring Tubing Disconnect Undetermined Undetermined 
Undetected 
accidental or 
erroneous 
tubing 
 212
Type(Focus) Category Sub-Category Event Class Consequence Hazardous Element 
disconnection 
Therapy Setup Therapy Administration/Monitoring Therapy Humidification 
Adverse 
Minor Undetermined 
Undetected 
humidifier 
water depletion 
Therapy Setup Setup Error Accessory Choice Error Adverse Major 
Increased 
Probability of 
Failure 
Wrong type of 
accessory used 
for a particular 
therapy setup 
Therapy Setup Therapy Administration/Monitoring Setup Error 
Adverse 
Minor Undetermined 
Therapy not set 
up according to 
prescription or 
treatment order 
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Appendix B : The Questionnaire 
B.1 The Questionnaire Layout 
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Questionnaire to assess the risk to patients on 
Oxygen Therapy 
 
Introduction 
This short questionnaire is an attempt to get an idea of how often clinical staff 
encounter problems with oxygen therapy, and what the main causes of the 
problems might be. 
A problem is defined as any instance where oxygen therapy is the main cause 
of harm or “near miss” to a patient or anyone else. There may be clinical 
reasons, or it may be the result of therapy being interrupted, stopped or 
changed in some way that was unexpected or as a result of some failure or 
error. There may be instances where oxygen was not administered to the 
patient when it should have. Instances of falling cylinders or people becoming 
entangled in tubing and other physical problems should also be included. 
Your involvement is entirely voluntary.  
You will remain entirely anonymous; you cannot be identified from any of the 
information on this form. In order to further preserve your identity it is suggested 
that you refrain from discussing the questionnaire with your colleagues. 
Please answer each question in turn, try not to read ahead or answer the 
questions out of sequence. 
Please make use of the extra space provided for further information, even if it 
seems trivial. It is up to you to decide how involved your answers are; but the 
more information that can be gathered, the better the chances that the outcome 
of the research will benefit patient and staff safety. 
Although the risks to some patients in the use of oxygen are known, there is 
very little data available on how often problems occur, or what all the hazards 
are. The information gathered from this questionnaire will be used along with 
other research to catalogue and quantify the risks in order to improve patient 
safety. 
The research is conducted in collaboration between The Trust and Cranfield 
University. Please ask the researcher for further information if required. 
Please return your completed questionnaire via internal mail to:  
Marcus Durand 
[Internal mail address for hospital site] 
Thank you for your help in improving patient safety. 
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1. Which professional group best describes you? 
Not listed? Please specify. 
Student 
Nurse 
Qualified 
Nurse 
Trainee 
Doctor 
SAS 
Doctor Consultant Therapist Technologist CSW 
 
     
 
 
 
2. How many times have you ever seen patients harmed or badly affected in some way as a result 
of Oxygen Therapy? 
Please write an approximate number here. 
 It doesn’t have to be exact your best estimate will do  
If you would like to give some details please do so here. Continue on a separate sheet if needed. 
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3. In those instances where there have been problems with Oxygen Therapy, even if no-one 
has been harmed, what proportions were from the following causes? 
None Very few Many Most All Few 
A. Empty Cylinders 
B. Patient actions e.g. removing mask or pulling tubing off flow meter. 
None Very few Many Most All Few 
C. Faults with tubing, masks or nasal specs 
None Very few Many Most All Few 
D. Incorrect or unreadable notes or prescriptions 
None Very few Many Most All Few 
E. Faulty wall supply 
None Very few Many Most All Few 
J. Other causes.  Please describe the cause: 
None Very few Many Most All Few 
F. Actions of others, (e.g. Visitors, Therapists, Cleaners, etc.) 
None Very few Many Most All Few 
G. Set-up errors 
None Very few Many Most All Few 
H. Faulty regulator or flow meter 
None Very few Many Most All Few 
I. Incorrect prescription 
None Very few Many Most All Few 
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4. Approximately how many instances, even where no-one was harmed, have you seen in the last 
12 months where there have been problems with Oxygen Therapy? 
Please write an approximate number here. 
 
If you would like to give some details please do so here. Continue on a separate sheet if needed. 
 
     
 
 
 
5. Do you think current guidelines are adequate in ensuring patient safety during Oxygen Therapy? 
 Not at all Poorly Partly Adequately Mainly Completely 
If you would like to give some further comments please do so here. Continue on a separate sheet if needed. 
 
    
 
 
6. When did you start working in healthcare? Please include your time as a trainee. 
Day / Month / Year 
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B.2 The proportional frequency ranking of causes 
from question 3 
In Table Appendix B.2-1, the themes are listed on the left with the frequency 
choices along the top. The choices per frequency are shown in the resulting 
matrix. 1656 choices were made in total. 
 
Table Appendix B.2-1 Responses to Question three. 
  All Most Many Few V Few None 
Patient Actions 4 18 58 56 24 24 
Other 2 3 3 9 5 0 
Prescription 1 4 9 22 37 105 
Empty Cylinders 0 5 14 38 44 78 
Accessories 0 0 3 25 57 98 
Notes 0 1 17 29 40 95 
Wall Supply 0 0 1 25 31 125 
Other's Actions 0 2 0 25 45 111 
Set-Up 0 1 7 34 52 88 
Reg or Flow 0 0 4 26 57 94 
 
The proportion of choices was calculated by dividing the value in each cell by 
the total number of choices, resulting in the matrix of Table Appendix B.2-2.  
 
Table Appendix B.2-2 Choices Proportional to Total. 
  All Most Many Few V Few None 
Patient Actions 0.0024 0.0109 0.0350 0.0338 0.0145 0.0145 
Other 0.0012 0.0018 0.0018 0.0054 0.0030 0.0000 
Prescription 0.0006 0.0024 0.0054 0.0133 0.0223 0.0634 
Empty Cylinders 0.0000 0.0030 0.0085 0.0229 0.0266 0.0471 
Accessories 0.0000 0.0000 0.0018 0.0151 0.0344 0.0592 
Notes 0.0000 0.0006 0.0103 0.0175 0.0242 0.0574 
Wall Supply 0.0000 0.0000 0.0006 0.0151 0.0187 0.0755 
Other's Actions 0.0000 0.0012 0.0000 0.0151 0.0272 0.0670 
Set-Up 0.0000 0.0006 0.0042 0.0205 0.0314 0.0531 
Reg or Flow 0.0000 0.0000 0.0024 0.0157 0.0344 0.0568 
 
The value in each cell of Table Appendix B.2-2 was multiplied by the weighting 
score for each choice, as in the final matrix of Table Appendix B.2-3. 
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Table Appendix B.2-3 Proportional Scores for Each Theme and Frequency Choice. 
Weighting Scores 5 4 3 2 1 0 
  All Most Many Few V Few None 
Patient Actions 0.0121 0.0435 0.1051 0.0676 0.0145 0.0000 
Other 0.0060 0.0072 0.0054 0.0109 0.0030 0.0000 
Prescription 0.0030 0.0097 0.0163 0.0266 0.0223 0.0000 
Empty Cylinders 0.0000 0.0121 0.0254 0.0459 0.0266 0.0000 
Accessories 0.0000 0.0000 0.0054 0.0302 0.0344 0.0000 
Notes 0.0000 0.0024 0.0308 0.0350 0.0242 0.0000 
Wall Supply 0.0000 0.0000 0.0018 0.0302 0.0187 0.0000 
Other's Actions 0.0000 0.0048 0.0000 0.0302 0.0272 0.0000 
Set-Up 0.0000 0.0024 0.0127 0.0411 0.0314 0.0000 
Reg or Flow 0.0000 0.0000 0.0072 0.0314 0.0344 0.0000 
 
The scores for each theme were added together and then sorted to provide the 
ranked list in Table Appendix B.2-4. 
 
Table Appendix B.2-4 Final Ranked Scores. 
Themes Total Scores 
Patient Actions 0.2428 
Empty Cylinders 0.1099 
Notes 0.0924 
Set-Up 0.0876 
Prescription 0.0779 
Reg or Flow 0.0731 
Accessories 0.0700 
Other's Actions 0.0622 
Wall Supply 0.0507 
Other 0.0326 
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Appendix C The Observations and 
Questionnaire Hazard Analysis 
 
 221
C.1 The Observations and Questionnaire 
Combined Hazard Analysis 
 
Table Appendix C.1-1 The Observations and Questionnaire Combined Hazard Analysis. 
Hazard 
ID Hazard Type Hazardous Element Initiating Mechanisms Threat/Effect 
1 Incorrect clinical decision or action 
Undetected incorrect 
clinical decision or 
action 
Incorrect information, 
lack of knowledge or 
skill, human error 
Incorrect, Inadequate 
or No Therapy 
2 
Failure to recognize 
and act on an 
imminent therapy 
failure 
Undetected therapy 
failure 
Lack of vigilance, 
knowledge or Skill 
Incorrect, Inadequate 
or No Therapy 
3 
Unauthorized or 
inappropriate action 
by others 
Incorrect action by an 
unauthorized person 
Unrestricted access to 
the therapy 
Incorrect, Inadequate 
or No Therapy, 
discomfort, physical 
harm 
4 
An environmental 
factor promotes 
inappropriate action 
Undertaking tasks in an 
environment of 
excessive Noise, Light, 
Darkness or discomfort 
An environment of 
excessive Noise, Light, 
Darkness or discomfort 
Incorrect, Inadequate 
or No Therapy, 
discomfort, physical 
harm 
5 
Non clinical staff 
rectifying an 
environmental fault 
Unexpected events due 
to non clinical 
maintenance work 
Failure of an 
environmental control 
mechanism 
Unexpected and 
unpredictable influence 
on therapy 
6 Distraction caused by activity on the ward 
Distraction of clinical 
staff 
Unusual or intrusive 
activity on the ward 
Impaired vigilance, 
Increased possibility of 
human error 
7 
Latent error causes a 
failure in 
communication or 
process 
Latent error in 
communication or 
process methods 
Communication or 
process failure 
Following the usual 
process leads to error 
8 
Patient management 
errors when patients 
arrive after transfer 
Patient Management 
error 
Patient arrival on the 
ward 
Patient placed in an 
incorrect ward or bed 
space resulting in 
inadequate, unreliable 
or no therapy 
9 
Inadequacy of pro 
forma or another 
communication tool 
Missing or incorrect 
information 
An inadequate 
communication tool 
Delays or incorrect 
decisions based on 
poor information 
10 
Innocent action by 
visitor to aid patient 
comfort compromises 
this therapy 
Incorrect action by an 
unauthorized person 
Therapy parameters 
are changed by 
uninformed action by 
visitor when patient or 
equipment is moved  
Reduced or interrupted 
therapy or no therapy if 
undetected. Distracted 
staff. 
11 Patients talking to visitors  Suspension of therapy 
Patients need to talk, 
eat or leave the bed 
Increased possibility of 
therapy not being 
resumed 
12 Visitors tampering with therapies 
Incorrect action by an 
unauthorized person 
Inappropriate 
adjustment or 
termination of therapy 
by visitors. 
Reduced or interrupted 
therapy or no therapy if 
undetected, distracted 
staff 
13 
Clinical activity 
interfering with the 
therapy 
Poorly considered 
clinical interventions to 
patient receiving 
oxygen therapy 
Nursing or clinical 
tasks 
Unexpected influence 
on therapy by routine 
tasks. Change induces 
ineffective therapy. 
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Hazard 
ID Hazard Type Hazardous Element Initiating Mechanisms Threat/Effect 
14 
Administering or 
adjusting another 
therapy causes 
interference with this 
one 
Undetected 
interference with 
oxygen therapy 
Administration or 
changes in another 
therapy 
Physical interference 
causing inadequate 
therapy 
15 
Wrong type of 
accessory used for a 
particular therapy 
setup 
Wrong accessory for 
purpose 
Human error, lack of 
knowledge/skill 
Incorrect or inadequate 
therapy, discomfort, 
physical harm 
18 
Process or patient 
management errors 
moving patients from 
one bed to another 
Patient placed in an 
inadequate bed space 
Moving patients 
between bed spaces 
Inadequate, incorrect 
or no therapy applied 
20 Calls for assistance unanswered 
Unanswered calls for 
assistance Lack of vigilance 
Incorrect, Inadequate 
or No Therapy, 
discomfort, physical 
harm 
21 Patient requests or needs unfulfilled Unfulfilled patient need Failure to act 
Incorrect, Inadequate 
or No Therapy, 
discomfort, physical 
harm 
22 
Impaired speech due 
to the face mask or 
other aspect of the 
therapy making 
communication 
difficult 
Lack of communication 
through impaired 
speech 
A face mask or other 
aspect of the therapy 
causing impairment 
Limited communication 
23 
Communication 
failures at patient 
hand-over  
Communication failure Poor communication at patient handover 
Incorrect action or 
failure to act 
24 Missing or incomplete patient notes Lack of information 
Missing or incomplete 
patient notes 
Delays or incorrect 
decisions based on 
poor information 
25 Incorrect information in patient notes Incorrect information 
Incorrect information 
entered into patient 
notes 
Incorrect action or 
failure to act 
26 
Poor communication 
between doctors and 
nursing staff 
Communication failure 
between clinical staff 
Poor communication 
between doctors and 
nursing staff 
No therapy or incorrect 
therapy 
27 
Environmental factors 
such as noise 
masking calls for 
assistance 
Unanswered calls for 
assistance 
High levels of ambient 
noise 
Impaired vigilance, No 
response to alarms 
from monitoring 
equipment and nurse 
calls 
28 
Communication 
failures between 
clinician and patient 
during an examination 
Incorrect or incomplete 
information or diagnosis 
Misunderstanding 
between doctor and 
patient 
Incorrect or inadequate 
therapy, discomfort, 
physical harm 
29 
Nursing staff not 
responding to 
requests or orders 
from doctors 
Communication failure 
between clinical staff 
Communication or 
protocol failure 
Incorrect action or 
failure to act 
30 
Prescriptions or 
treatment orders 
incorrect or not made 
Incorrect action Protocol or procedure failure 
No therapy or incorrect 
therapy 
31 
Spectacles or other 
obstructions on the 
face 
Poorly fitting patient 
accessory 
Spectacles or other 
obstructions on the 
face 
Incorrect or inadequate 
therapy, discomfort, 
physical harm 
32 
Position of cylinder at 
the bed side causes 
Physical obstruction 
Physical obstruction at 
the bed side 
Badly positioned 
Cylinder 
Delayed or impaired 
access to patient, 
physical harm 
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Hazard 
ID Hazard Type Hazardous Element Initiating Mechanisms Threat/Effect 
32.1 
Position of cylinder at 
the bed side causes 
unknown cylinder 
contents 
Unknown cylinder 
contents 
Obscured view of 
cylinder 
Unreliable therapy, 
undetected cylinder 
depletion 
32.2 
Position of cylinders 
at the bed side 
causes patients 
movements to be 
restricted by tubing 
position 
Patients movements 
restricted by tubing 
position 
Cylinder too far from 
patient 
Displaced accessory, 
discomfort 
33 
Surplus equipment 
cluttering the ward 
area 
Obstructed access or 
confusion Cluttered ward area 
Ineffective equipment 
management, Physical 
obstructions, Reduced 
access, Confusion 
between used and full 
cylinders 
34 
Tubing pinched in 
furniture or other 
equipment at the bed 
side 
Damaged or occluded 
tubing Poor tubing position 
Possible undetected 
tubing disconnection, 
occlusion or cutting 
causing a loss or 
reduction of therapy or 
an oxygen leak. 
35 
Mistakes or 
equipment failures 
when changing from 
portable to installed 
monitoring or vice-
versa 
Ineffective patient 
monitoring 
Human error or 
equipment failure 
when changing 
between monitoring 
devices 
delayed or ineffective 
monitoring 
36 Equipment improperly checked Unreliable equipment 
Human error: 
Equipment checks 
Unreliable therapy or 
monitoring 
37 
Physical failure of a 
patient connected 
accessory 
Undetected accessory 
failure 
Any physical or 
functional failure of any 
accessory 
Limited or complete 
lack of therapy 
38 
Technical or physical 
failures of the bed or 
associated equipment 
Malfunctioning bed or 
associated equipment Equipment failure 
Disturbance of therapy, 
distracted staff 
39 
Interference from an 
environmental factor 
affecting a nurses 
actions in the use of 
equipment 
Equipment use error Interference from an environmental factor 
Therapy set up or 
monitoring errors 
40 
Failure to respond to 
an equipment alarm 
or warning 
Undetected therapy 
failure 
Lack of vigilance 
through unattended 
alarms or equipment 
notifications 
Incorrect or inadequate 
therapy, discomfort, 
physical harm 
41 
Failure of staff to 
communicate 
regarding equipment 
required in patient 
transfer 
Unavailable equipment 
Failure to 
communicate a 
requirement 
Incorrect or inadequate 
therapy, discomfort, 
physical harm 
42 
Environmental issues 
like noise or cramped 
space cause visitors 
actions to interfere 
with the therapy 
Interference/tampering 
with the therapy 
Visitors actions when 
reacting to the 
environment 
Incorrect or inadequate 
therapy, discomfort, 
physical harm, 
distraction of staff 
43 
Human error by 
clinical staff when 
monitoring patients 
Undetected therapy 
failure 
Lack of vigilance 
through patient 
monitoring error 
Incorrect or inadequate 
therapy, discomfort, 
physical harm 
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Hazard 
ID Hazard Type Hazardous Element Initiating Mechanisms Threat/Effect 
44 
Undetected 
disconnection of 
patient monitoring 
equipment  
Undetected monitoring 
failure 
Monitoring equipment 
disconnection 
Patient monitoring 
error, Incorrect or 
inadequate therapy, 
discomfort, physical 
harm 
45 
Failure to respond to 
or implement patient 
monitoring 
Undetected therapy 
failure 
Patient monitoring 
error through failure to 
act 
Incorrect or inadequate 
therapy, discomfort, 
physical harm 
46 
Failure to respond to 
patient or therapy 
monitoring alerts due 
to a lack of staff 
No response to 
monitoring alerts lack of staff 
Incorrect or inadequate 
therapy, discomfort, 
physical harm 
47 
Patient actions 
adversely affecting 
patient monitoring 
Interference with 
patient monitoring Patients actions 
Ineffective patient 
monitoring 
48 
Failure of patient or 
therapy monitoring to 
detect a therapy 
disconnection 
Undetected therapy 
disconnection 
Ineffective patient 
monitoring No therapy 
49 
Failure to detect 
patient entanglement 
in oxygen tubing  
Undetected patient 
entanglement Lack of vigilance 
Impaired therapy, 
physical harm 
50 
Failure to detect 
cylinder depletion 
when in use 
Undetected cylinder 
depletion 
Lack of vigilance or 
information No therapy 
51 
Environmental factor 
obscuring a clear view 
of the patient 
Obscured view of 
patient Environmental factor 
Reduced patient 
monitoring, Impaired 
vigilance 
52 
Environmental factor 
obstructing access to 
the patient 
Obstructed access to 
patient Environmental factor 
Delays, Reduced task 
capabilities, Physical 
harm 
53 
Accessory incorrectly 
administered or 
moved into an 
incorrect position by 
clinical staff 
Misplaced accessory Staff actions 
Incorrect or inadequate 
therapy, discomfort, 
physical harm 
54 
Failure to notice an 
incorrectly positioned 
accessory 
Misplaced accessory Lack of vigilance 
Incorrect or inadequate 
therapy, discomfort, 
physical harm 
55 
Changing a patients 
posture or position 
interferes with the 
therapy 
Interference with the 
therapy 
Change in patients 
posture or position 
Incorrect or inadequate 
therapy, discomfort, 
physical harm 
56 
Preparing a patient for 
transfer interferes with 
the therapy 
Interference with the 
therapy Preparation for transfer 
Incorrect or inadequate 
therapy, discomfort, 
physical harm 
57 
Moving a patient 
between bed and 
chair causes 
interference with the 
therapy 
Interference with the 
therapy 
Transferring a patient 
between bed and chair 
Incorrect or inadequate 
therapy, discomfort, 
physical harm 
58 
Incorrect action when 
responding to a 
change in a patients 
condition 
Clinical error: incorrect 
action 
Change in patients 
condition 
Incorrect or inadequate 
therapy, discomfort, 
physical harm 
59 Incorrect actions at patient handover 
Protocol/procedure 
error: Incorrect action 
Handing over care 
from one team to 
another 
Incorrect or inadequate 
therapy, discomfort, 
physical harm 
60 Incorrect actions during patient transfer 
Protocol/procedure 
error: Incorrect action 
Transferring a patient 
between 
wards/departments 
Incorrect or inadequate 
therapy, discomfort, 
physical harm 
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Hazard 
ID Hazard Type Hazardous Element Initiating Mechanisms Threat/Effect 
61 
Failure to act on a 
detected therapy 
administration error 
Failure to act on a 
Therapy administration 
error 
Human error 
Incorrect or inadequate 
therapy, discomfort, 
physical harm 
62 
Failure to detect that 
the therapy has 
terminated early 
Undetected therapy 
termination Therapy monitoring 
No therapy, discomfort, 
physical harm 
63 
Failure to act on a 
detected early therapy 
termination 
Failure to act on an 
early therapy 
termination 
Human error No therapy, discomfort, physical harm 
64 
Equipment delivering 
another therapy fails 
causing interference 
with this one 
Interference with the 
therapy 
Equipment Failure for 
another therapy 
Incorrect or inadequate 
therapy, discomfort, 
physical harm 
65 
A required action 
related to another 
therapy causes a 
distraction which 
compromises this 
therapy 
Staff distraction 
Action required for the 
administration of 
another therapy 
lack of vigilance, 
incomplete, Incorrect or 
inadequate therapy, 
discomfort, physical 
harm 
66 
A patient takes action 
related to another 
therapy, which 
compromises this one 
Undetected therapy 
failure 
Patients actions 
related to another 
therapy 
Incorrect or inadequate 
therapy, discomfort, 
physical harm 
67 
Accessory moved into 
an incorrect position 
by Patient 
Misplaced accessory Patients actions 
Incorrect or inadequate 
therapy, discomfort, 
physical harm 
68 
Unintentional action 
by patient interferes 
with the therapy 
Undetected therapy 
failure Patients actions 
Incorrect or inadequate 
therapy, discomfort, 
physical harm 
69 
Unauthorized or 
inappropriate action 
by the patient 
Undetected therapy 
failure 
Unauthorized or 
inappropriate action by 
the patient 
Incorrect or inadequate 
therapy, discomfort, 
physical harm 
70 
Action taken by a 
patient related to 
natural relief 
compromises the 
therapy 
Suspension of therapy Patient leaves the bed to go to the toilet 
Increased possibility of 
therapy not being 
resumed, Reduced or 
interrupted therapy or 
no therapy if 
undetected, distracted 
staff 
71 
Action taken by a 
patient to relieve 
discomfort 
compromises the 
therapy 
Suspension of therapy 
Patient changes 
position or moves 
between bed and chair 
Increased possibility of 
therapy not being 
resumed, Reduced or 
interrupted therapy or 
no therapy if 
undetected, distracted 
staff 
72 
Patient refuses to co-
operate with clinical 
staff regarding the 
therapy 
Suspension of therapy Lack of patient co-operation 
Increased possibility of 
therapy not being 
resumed, Reduced or 
interrupted therapy or 
no therapy if 
undetected, distracted 
staff 
73 
Patient has to take 
action to enable them 
to talk, eat or drink 
Suspension of therapy 
or food/drink not 
consumed 
Patient has to suspend 
the therapy to enable 
them to talk, eat or 
drink 
Increased possibility of 
therapy not being 
resumed, Reduced or 
interrupted therapy or 
no therapy if 
undetected, Food / 
drink not consumed, 
distracted staff 
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Hazard 
ID Hazard Type Hazardous Element Initiating Mechanisms Threat/Effect 
73.1 
Patient has to take 
action to enable them 
to take oral meds 
Suspension of therapy 
or oral meds not taken 
Patient has to suspend 
the therapy to enable 
them to take oral meds 
Increased possibility of 
therapy not being 
resumed, Reduced or 
interrupted therapy or 
no therapy if 
undetected, Oral meds 
not taken, distracted 
staff 
74 
Actions by patient 
causes them to 
become entangled in 
the oxygen tubing 
Patient entanglement Patient movements 
Incorrect or inadequate 
therapy, discomfort, 
physical harm 
75 
Actions by the patient 
interfere with the 
patient monitoring 
Patient monitoring 
interference 
Patients actions or 
movements 
Reduced patient 
monitoring, Impaired 
vigilance, staff 
distraction 
77 
Movements or actions 
during sleep 
compromise the 
therapy 
Undetected therapy 
failure 
Unintentional patient 
actions or movements 
Interrupted therapy 
resulting in no therapy 
if this remains 
undetected 
80 
Innocent action by 
patient compromises 
the therapy 
Undetected therapy 
failure Unintentional 
Interrupted therapy 
resulting in no therapy 
if this remains 
undetected 
82 
Patient refuses to co-
operate with the 
therapy by removing 
and ignoring requests 
to replace the 
accessory 
Misplaced accessory Patient co-operation Limited or no therapy and distracted staff 
90 
The accessory has to 
be changed to relieve 
patient discomfort 
Misplaced accessory Accessory causes discomfort 
Patient removes 
accessory to relieve 
discomfort 
91 
The patients condition 
minimises 
communication and 
involvement 
Limited information, 
patient involvement and 
feedback 
Lack of communication 
Patient cannot report 
changes in condition or 
requirement leading to 
the possibility for sub-
optimal therapy 
92 Undetected change in patient condition 
Undetected change in 
patient condition 
Lack of vigilance, 
ineffective patient 
monitoring, 
interference from an 
environmental factor 
Incorrect or inadequate 
therapy, discomfort, 
physical harm 
93 
Patient vomiting while 
an accessory is in 
position 
Choking Vomiting into a face mask 
If the patient is wearing 
a face mask, there is a 
strong possibility of 
choking. The mask has 
to be removed while 
the patient is vomiting, 
resulting in reduced or 
no therapy. 
96 
A factor relating to 
design within the 
therapy or the 
environment causes 
staff to be distracted 
Distracted or inattentive 
staff 
Human factors: 
Difficulty in 
administering therapy 
Incorrect or inadequate 
therapy, discomfort, 
physical harm 
97 
A latent error in a 
defined procedure 
causes mistakes 
Latent error in a 
procedure 
Incorrectly defined 
procedure 
Incorrect or inadequate 
therapy, discomfort, 
physical harm 
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Hazard 
ID Hazard Type Hazardous Element Initiating Mechanisms Threat/Effect 
98 
Humidifier incorrectly 
set up, used 
inappropriately or not 
used when it should 
Humidification error 
Lack of 
procedure/protocol, 
Lack of 
knowledge/skill, 
Human factors, Lack of 
equipment 
Incorrect or inadequate 
therapy, discomfort, 
physical harm 
99 
A lack of available 
equipment for therapy 
administration or 
monitoring 
Lack of Equipment 
Management error, 
Purchasing/stores 
error 
Sub-optimal or 
ineffective therapy, No 
therapy 
100 
Insufficient staff 
numbers to effectively 
manage patients 
receiving therapy 
Lack of staff Management error, Institutional issue 
Sub-optimal patient 
care, Reduced patient 
monitoring, Impaired 
vigilance, Inconsistent 
patient care, 
Inappropriate action, 
inadequate or no 
therapy 
101 Failure to correct a displaced accessory Misplaced accessory Failure to act 
Incorrect or inadequate 
therapy, discomfort, 
physical harm 
105 
A factor relating to 
design within the 
therapy or the 
environment causes 
setup error 
Undetected setup error  
Human factors: 
Difficulty in 
administering therapy 
Incorrect or inadequate 
therapy, discomfort, 
physical harm 
107 Mistakes in setting up the therapy Undetected setup error  Human error 
Incorrect or inadequate 
therapy, discomfort, 
physical harm 
108 Undetected failed oxygen supply 
Undetected supply 
failure 
Lack of vigilance and 
Wall port failure, 
flowmeter fault, 
Pipeline and alarm 
system failure or 
cylinder depletion 
Incorrect or inadequate 
therapy, discomfort, 
physical harm 
109 
Incorrect action taken 
when attempting to 
rectify a setup error 
Incorrect action Setup error and human error 
Incorrect or inadequate 
therapy, discomfort, 
physical harm 
110 Therapy tubing disconnected in error 
Undetected tubing 
disconnection 
Inappropriate or 
inadvertent action No therapy 
113 
A change of 
accessory is 
incorrectly 
implemented 
Undetected setup error  Human error 
Incorrect or inadequate 
therapy, discomfort, 
physical harm 
115 
An accessory is 
displaced when a 
patient's position or 
posture is changed 
Accessory 
displacement 
Changing a patients 
posture or position 
Incorrect or inadequate 
therapy, discomfort, 
physical harm 
116 
An accessory is 
incorrectly or 
inappropriately 
disconnected by 
clinical staff 
Undetected accessory 
disconnection 
Human error, Lack of 
Knowledge or Skill 
Incorrect or inadequate 
therapy, discomfort, 
physical harm 
117 
An incorrect 
adjustment is made to 
the therapy 
Undetected setup error  Human error 
Incorrect or inadequate 
therapy, discomfort, 
physical harm 
118 Bubble tubing incorrectly cut Undetected setup error  Human error 
Incorrect or inadequate 
therapy, discomfort, 
physical harm 
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Hazard 
ID Hazard Type Hazardous Element Initiating Mechanisms Threat/Effect 
119 
Change either way 
between piped supply 
and cylinder 
incorrectly 
implemented 
Undetected setup error  Human error 
Incorrect or inadequate 
therapy, discomfort, 
physical harm 
120 
Failure by clinical staff 
to notice a patient 
disconnection 
Undetected therapy 
disconnection Lack of vigilance No therapy 
121 Failure to detect a setup error Undetected setup error  Lack of vigilance 
Incorrect or inadequate 
therapy, discomfort, 
physical harm 
122 
Flow rate incorrectly 
or inappropriately 
adjusted 
Dosage error Human error, Lack of Knowledge / Skill 
Incorrect or inadequate 
therapy, discomfort, 
physical harm 
123 
Therapy incorrectly or 
inappropriately set up 
when re-administered 
after a previous 
termination 
Undetected incorrect or 
inappropriate therapy 
re-administration 
Re-administering the 
therapy after a 
previous termination 
Incorrect or inadequate 
therapy, discomfort, 
physical harm 
125 Undetected humidifier water depletion 
Undetected humidifier 
water depletion Lack of vigilance 
Inadequate, unreliable 
or no therapy 
126 
Wrong type of 
accessory used for a 
particular therapy 
setup 
Use error  Lack of Knowledge or Skill 
Limited, interrupted, 
Incorrect or No 
Therapy 
127 
Failure to adequately 
monitor a patient 
during treatment with 
another therapy 
Undetected change in 
patient condition Lack of vigilance 
Incorrect or inadequate 
therapy, discomfort, 
physical harm 
128 Patient requirement incorrectly assessed 
clinical error: 
diagnosis/assessment 
Human error, Lack of 
Knowledge / Skill 
Incorrect or inadequate 
therapy, discomfort, 
physical harm 
129 
Failure to respond to 
or implement therapy 
monitoring 
Undetected therapy 
failure 
Human error, Lack of 
Knowledge / Skill 
Incorrect or inadequate 
therapy, discomfort, 
physical harm 
131 
Incorrect action when 
responding to or 
implementing patient 
monitoring 
Incorrect action Human error, Lack of Knowledge / Skill 
Reduced patient 
monitoring, Impaired 
vigilance, Incorrect or 
inadequate therapy, 
discomfort, physical 
harm 
134 
Other medication 
interfering with this 
therapy 
Undetected drug 
interference 
Communication error, 
Human error, Lack of 
Knowledge / Skill 
Incorrect or inadequate 
therapy, discomfort, 
physical harm 
136 
Therapy not set up 
according to 
prescription or 
treatment order 
Undetected setup error  
Communication error, 
Human error, Lack of 
Knowledge / Skill 
Incorrect or inadequate 
therapy, discomfort, 
physical harm 
137 
A human factors issue 
with any equipment 
causes a functional 
failure because 
Equipment is applied 
differently to its 
intended use 
Incorrect application of 
equipment Equipment use error 
Limited, interrupted, 
Incorrect or No 
Therapy 
139 Bed spaces are in close proximity 
Confusion with 
therapies common to 
two patients in close 
proximity 
Proximity of bed 
spaces, Poor ward 
layout, Patient 
management error, 
Ward management 
error, Central bed 
Reduced access, 
Increased possibility of 
wrong patient incidents 
(e.g. wrong patients 
flow rate adjusted) 
 229
Hazard 
ID Hazard Type Hazardous Element Initiating Mechanisms Threat/Effect 
management error 
140 
Two or more patients 
sharing a wall port or 
cylinder 
Confusion with 
therapies common to 
two patients in close 
proximity 
Shared resources, 
Human error, Ward 
layout error, Patient 
management error 
Increased possibility of 
wrong patient incidents 
(e.g. wrong patients 
flow rate adjusted), 
Faster cylinder 
depletion, Possible 
common failure (same 
failure affecting two 
patients) 
141 
Sensitive alarms and 
persistent nurse calls 
from patients 
Undetected therapy 
failure 
Frequently occurring 
alarms 
Desensitization to 
alarms resulting in 
Impaired vigilance, No 
response to alarms 
from monitoring 
equipment and nurse 
calls 
143 
Staff are allowed to 
undertake tasks 
without adequate or 
relevant skills or 
knowledge  
No method available to 
prevent unauthorized 
staff attempting clinical 
or nursing tasks 
Lack of 
skill/knowledge, 
protocol / procedure 
error 
Sub-optimal patient 
care, Inconsistent 
patient care, 
Inappropriate action, 
inadequate or no 
therapy 
145 
No provision for the 
safe and organized 
storage of oxygen 
cylinders 
The chaotic storage of 
used and full cylinders 
together 
Inadequate Storage 
Full and used cylinders 
stored together on the 
wards leading to the 
increased possibility of 
selecting one without 
adequate content 
146 Lifts are shared with all building users  
Extended and 
unpredictable transfer 
times 
No dedicated lift 
Access for patient 
transfers 
Prolonged patient 
transfers leading to an 
increased possibility of 
cylinder depletion, 
increased possibility of 
lifts failing and of 
physical harm to other 
lift users 
147 
Not enough oxygen 
outlets for the number 
of patients requiring 
therapy 
Unavailability of piped 
oxygen outlets 
Insufficient number of 
oxygen outlets 
Cylinders have to be 
used, reducing the 
reliability of the 
therapy, or patients 
must be moved to other 
wards. Major threats 
are: Inadequate, 
unreliable or no therapy 
due to insufficient 
capacity. 
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Appendix D The Review of Incident Reports 
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D.1 Summary report from the NPSA   
          
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Risks to patients on oxygen therapy 
Review of data from the National Reporting and 
Learning System (NRLS) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Author: Dagmar Luettel    Date: 30th March 2006 
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NRLS Reports Disclaimer Statement 
The incidents summarised in this report have been drawn from the NPSA National 
Reporting and Learning System (NRLS). The NRLS supports the goal of the NPSA 
to make patient care safer. These incidents have been reported to the NRLS by 
NHS organisations across England and Wales. The NRLS is a confidential 
reporting system. The incidents are reported through a variety of routes, by 
individual NHS staff, including through local trust risk management systems and 
web based e-forms (including an open access e-form). The individual reports are 
not investigated or verified by the NPSA. Since these incidents are self-reported 
they are not necessarily representative of the NHS across England and Wales and 
therefore need interpreting with care.  
 
For internal use only: 
Permission must be obtained from the NPSA before the information contained 
within the report it is published or passed on to a third party outside the NPSA. For 
help with interpretation please contact the statistics team on 
DataRequestTeam@npsa.nhs.uk 
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1. Background & Purpose 
This note summarises the review on incidents from the NRLS, which are related to 
oxygen therapy. The review has been undertaken following an external request. 
The objective of the analysis is to get a better understanding of what types of 
incidents are reported to the National Reporting and Learning System (NRLS) 
relating to oxygen therapy in acute/general hospitals.  
 
2. Overview of analysis 
A search of the NRLS database was carried out using the following search criteria:  
• The search was performed for the time 24th November 2003 to 24th March 
2006 
• The search was limited to incidents, which occurred in acute/general 
hospitals 
• A SAS autonomy search was performed in the NRLS database using the 
keywords ‘oxygen’ and ‘O2’ 
 
3. Results 
A total of 4288 incidents was found and due to the large number a random, 
weighted sample of 200 incidents was reviewed. The sample was screened to 
identify those which are not “cases” and it was found that 119 incident reports did 
not meet the selection criteria. In these reports it was mentioned that the patient 
required oxygen therapy or had poor oxygenation levels but there was no problem 
identified involving the oxygen therapy itself (e.g. baby delivered by emergency 
caesarean section, required O2; found patient lying on the floor, oxygen sats and 
BP was low). 
81 reports did meet the selection criteria and they were analyzed. From the free 
text description it was possible to identify some common themes and these are 
illustrated in the following table: 
 
Themes Numbers Total 
Administration 
of oxygen 
therapy  
No oxygen administered 
Delay or wrong dose/gas  
Communications problems 
Saturations not monitored 
11 
10 
 7 
 7 
 
 
 
35 
Equipment  
 
Lack of equipment 
Empty oxygen cylinder 
User error 
Faulty equipment 
14 
14 
 3 
 2 
 
 
 
33 
Other 13 
Total 81 
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From the sample reviewed, 35 incident reports relate to the administration of 
oxygen therapy.  
• In 11 reports the patient did not receive oxygen although it was prescribed. 
Most of the cases occurred during a transfer, for example 
‘Patient on full ventilation was transferred from bed space one to 
bed space three with no oxygen’. 
‘The patient had not received oxygen therapy during transfer 
despite her PO2 being 5.45 in A&E’. 
‘Patient transferred from A+E to the unit with BIPAP mask on and 
tubing connected to BIPAP machine. Patient looked to be 
struggling to breathe and catch breath… The machine was found 
to be off, patient transferred without battery pack from AE’.  
• In four reports it was described that a wrong dose has been administered, 
for example the patient was prescribed 2l/min and received 8l/min; patient 
was connected to oxygen cylinder but the flow rate was set to zero 
• In four reports it was described that the wrong gas has been administered; 
in all cases air had been given instead of oxygen 
• In two reports it was described that there was a delay of the administration 
of oxygen; the delay was due to  
‘Wall oxygen was not functional, and when the O2 cylinder was 
fetched there was a delay in opening the valve’ 
‘Patient without oxygen cylinder for extended period due to delay 
in porters changing cylinder’      
• Seven reports describe communication problems; these are mainly related 
to staff not being informed that the patient requires oxygen. Examples 
are 
'Patient arrived to the ward on oxygen. In the nurse handover to 
 the ward it was not stated that patient required oxygen’. 
‘As patient on continuous oxygen, transport home should have 
been ordered to accommodate continuous oxygen. Ambulance 
arrived and would not accept patient as she required continuous 
oxygen’.   
• In seven incident reports it was described that saturation levels were not 
recorded or monitored. Examples are: 
‘Observations recorded - SPO2 84% on air - No sats recorded 
during post procedure recovery although the Staff Nurse had 
given intermittent oxygen therapy’. 
‘Patient had no saturation monitor attached. Saturations found to 
be 47  when monitor attached’. 
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From the sample reviewed, 33 reports relate to oxygen equipment.  
• 14 reports describe a lack of equipment and the items missing on the ward 
were saturation monitors, oxygen cylinder, oxygen ports, flow meter and 
CPAP equipment.  
• 14 reports describe that the oxygen cylinder was found empty; examples 
from the free text description are:  
 ‘Patient needed transfer - portable oxygen cylinder on ward empty’ 
 ‘Patient had been left with portable oxygen on and this had run out’ 
• Three reports relate to a user error; it was described that the suction was 
connected to the oxygen outlet; the water circuit had been set up incorrectly, 
the BIPAP machine was not set up correctly and the nasal BIPAP mask was 
applied upside down 
• Two reports describe faulty equipment and these incidents relate to the 
oxygen tubing and the wall outlet. 
 
13 other incidents were reported and these relate to a variety of issues. 
• 5 incident reports describe a collision with oxygen equipment; these are:  
 - Flow meter fell of the wall into the cot and hit the patient’s head 
 - Cylinder rolled off the bed and hit the patient’s leg 
 - Patient fell to floor and hit his head on oxygen cylinder next to bed 
 - Oxygen cylinder placed in bathroom with patient, patient accidentally   
   knocked over the cylinder which fell onto his foot   
 - Patient tripped over an oxygen line 
• Two reports describe the risk of smoking and receiving oxygen therapy at 
the same time; patients tried to light a cigarette while on oxygen and 
suffered burns to face, hands and chest 
• Two reports relate to the audible alarm of ventilators; the reports describe 
that the sound was turned off/ on level one so that staff could not hear the 
alarm and were not immediately notified that there was a problem 
• One report describe the risk of receiving morphine and oxygen therapy; a 
patient had been given 10mg morphine iv and was administered oxygen 
(dose unknown), the patient developed type 2 respiratory failure 
• One incident occurred where the crash buzzer wasn't clearly audible due to 
the noise of the oxygen system 
• One report described that the oxygen humidification system was set up to 
high and the water chamber and tubing coming from water chamber were 
untouchable hot (system was set for 35', the chamber temperature was 55') 
• One incident was reported in which a patient pulled the O2 sats probe apart 
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Specialty and degree of harm 
The following table shows the degree of harm by specialty. 
 Degree of Harm 
Specialty Death Low Moderate No Harm Severe Total 
Accident and Emergency  1    1 
Anaesthetics    3  3 
Diagnostic services   2 2  4 
Medical specialties 1 8 5 25 1 40 
Not applicable    1  1 
Obstetrics and gynaecology  2  6  8 
Other  3 2 1  6 
Other specialties   1 2  3 
Surgical specialties  4 2 9  15 
Unknown  1  1  2 
Total 1 19 12 50 1 83 
 
The table shows that the majority of incidents reviewed occurred within the medical 
specialty.  
The table also shows that the majority of incidents did result in no harm or low 
harm to the patient. One incident was reported, where the degree of harm was 
severe; however, from the free text description the incident does not seem to have 
resulted in permanent harm.  
Patient was taken for a home assessment by OT/PT. Ambulance with O2 
was organised for 12.00 for return. A full O2 cylinder was taken for visit. 
Ambulance didn't arrive till 13.30 ... We phoned that we were running out 
of O2 ... , phoned again at that O2 was now empty. However, ambulance 
arrived 20 minutes later. Patient was not in respiratory distress this time. 
O2 given by ambulance crew.      
One incident was reported where the degree of harm was death; in this reports it 
was described that a patient was being transferred with 100% high flow oxygen in 
situ. On arrival to the ward the oxygen ran out and immediate action was taken to 
connect the patient to the main oxygen supply. The patient was transferred to her 
bed and had a respiratory arrest followed by cardiac arrest; resuscitation began 
immediately but was unsuccessful and the patient died.  
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4. Conclusions 
The NRLS database has been searched for incidents, which relate to oxygen 
therapy in acute/general hospitals. A total of 4288 incidents were found and due to 
the large number a random, weighted sample of 200 incidents was reviewed. It 
was found that 83 incidents from the sample met the selection criteria.  
From the free text description it was possible to identify a range of risk factors for 
patients requiring oxygen therapy. These are related to the administration of 
oxygen and range from not receiving oxygen although required, to receiving the 
wrong dose or the wrong gas. It was also found that problems occur when 
saturation levels are not monitored or patient’s oxygen requirements are not 
communicated among staff.  
Further incidents were reported, which related to the oxygen equipment. It was 
found that there is a shortage of equipment on some wards and that in several 
cases the oxygen cylinder was found empty. Incidents also occurred because the 
equipment was faulty or was not used correctly. 
A variety of other issues were reported relating to oxygen therapy and these are 
injuries due to unrestrained equipment, burns because of smoking, respiratory 
depression due to morphine and oxygen and harm due to hot water from the 
oxygen humidification system. 
Although only 40% of the sample reviewed did meet the selection criteria, it was 
possible to identify some common themes and risk factors for patient receiving 
oxygen therapy and to get a better understanding of what types of incidents are 
reported to the NRLS relating to oxygen therapy in acute/general hospitals.  
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D.2 Using the Oxygen Incident Categorization 
Program 
The Reading Form 
The layout of the reading form is in two parts: 
On the top, left side are the record navigation buttons and the drop-down 
choice boxes for the Case status and the Context. Below this are the 
collection of fields from the incident reports and the reader’s notes field is at 
the bottom. 
On the right are the categorization tree and the readers help buttons for the 
category headings. 
Definitions 
An accessory:  
An accessory is anything beyond the flow meter that is used for passive 
oxygen therapy. E.g. Humidifier, tubing, nebuliser, mask, nasal cannula 
(specs), headboxes, tracheostomy connections. 
Other Equipment: 
Equipment attached to an oxygen supply instead of a flow meter, or anything 
used for assisted breathing. E.g. Ventilators, CPAP, NIPPV or bag-and-valve 
are ‘Other Equipment’. Heated humidifiers and oxygen concentration monitors 
used with headboxes are also ‘Other Equipment’.  
A case:  
Any incident where oxygen therapy was not administered when it should 
have, failed during therapy or was in some way implicated in the incident. 
External factors such as other therapies or medications that cause the 
patient’s condition to change and thus affect the therapy should be included. 
Instances where oxygen therapy was correctly administered as a result of 
some other incident should not be included.  
Context: 
The context is the situation or place of the incident. They deal mainly with 
“place”, but there are some “situation” contexts too. Some assumptions may 
need to be made here. If the event moved to another area, select the area it 
started in. Situation takes precedence over place. E.g. If it was a Crash Call, 
choose 'Internal Emergency' regardless of where the patient was. You may 
have to make your best guess with this, but don’t be shy to select “don’t 
know”.  
The list should be self explanatory, but if in doubt call or email Marcus. 
Rules 
The following rules must be applied when considering any record. 
1. Always assume the worst case when details are not specified. 
2. Even if there appears to have been no harm, each report must be 
considered an incident. 
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3. Hyperbaric oxygen therapy is excluded. 
4. Incidents in operating theatres are to be excluded. If this is not 
stated in the report, assume the incident took place in a ward 
setting. Theatre recovery, ITU, HDU and Critical care are however 
to be included.  
5. Home oxygen therapy is to be excluded. 
6. Clinical Error can be either stated or inferred. If it is obvious to you 
that there was a clinical error then make this choice. 
 
Categorizing Incident Records:  
Please note that the following list is not exhaustive and that there may be 
cases where the cause is unspecified in the category tree but still fits into a 
category group. For example; there may be equipment failures where the 
equipment is not listed here, like CPAP or NIPPV devices.  
It is permissible to choose more than one category. Many incidents are a 
result of multiple causes or are cascaded failures, where one failure leads to 
another.  
If there is any doubt, choose the “For Discussion” check box. You can still 
categorize the incident as you think fit as well as ticking this box. Please 
remember to add a comment in reader’s notes to indicate why you want to 
discuss this incident. 
Help is available by clicking the “?” button next to each category heading in 
the tree. 
1. Equipment:  
Any incident where the problem was caused or exacerbated by some 
problem with the equipment. This may include equipment not operating 
correctly, not operating at all, or use error. 
a. Piped Supply:  
These are cases where the piped supply has either stopped, produced 
a low output or is unavailable. Examples include; leaking, jammed or 
worn outlets that expel flow meters or other equipment or will not allow 
equipment to be connected. Wrong gas is also included here, and is 
linked to ‘Human error. Please note; ‘Not enough outlets’ is a lack of 
resources. 
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b. Cylinder Supply:  
Empty cylinders, Jammed or leaking cylinder valves or regulators, 
Faulty pressure gauges, Regulators that will not go on or come off 
when cylinders are replaced, Wrong gas (linked with human error).  
c. Flow meter:  
Leaking or blocked flow meters, incorrect flow indication or physical 
damage. 
d. Accessory Error:  
Blocked humidifiers or tubing. Cut or crushed tubing. Poorly fitting 
connections or broken mask elastic straps. Use error is also included 
here. 
e. Monitoring Equipment: 
Faulty or incorrect use of patient monitoring equipment that could affect 
the therapy; like pulse oximeters or blood gas analysers. 
f. Other Equipment: 
Faults or incorrect use of any other equipment delivering or monitoring 
oxygen therapy. E.g. Ventilators, CPAP or NIPPV. 
 
2. Human Error:  
Any instance where people act incorrectly or fail to act correctly. 
a. Communication Error:  
Cases where people are not informed or are misinformed. Bad or 
missing patient’s notes, Therapy not properly specified, nursing staff not 
keeping other staff informed. 
b. Setup and Administration:  
Wrongly assembled therapy, Humidifiers incorrectly used or not used 
when high flow rates are set, masks left on when the supply is turned 
off, badly positioned nasal cannulae or masks, wrong gas, wrongly cut 
bubble tubing, inadequately monitored therapy. 
c. Clinical Error:  
If the incident report states that there was a diagnostic, treatment or 
other clinical decision error, or if you are certain that there was an error 
of clinical judgement or decision. 
d. Patient Monitoring:  
Failure to monitor the patient. Failure to monitor the therapy (e.g. empty 
humidifiers or depleted cylinders) are setup and administration errors. 
e. Other Human Error: 
If a human error incident does not fit any of the above please describe it 
in the notes box. 
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External:  
Any influence that is not under the direct control of the clinical staff. 
Management issues, security issues or environmental issues for 
example. 
f. Lack of Resources (Things):  
Cases where equipment or any required item is not available, not 
enough cylinders, wall ports, accessories or beds. Also consider 
incidents caused by faulty equipment left unattended to and so 
unavailable. 
g. Ward Management:  
Lack of staff, wrong grade or speciality of staff, poor knowledge causing 
delay or cascading to setup error, negligence or poor patient 
management.  
h. Tampering:  
Visitors or non clinical staff interfering with the therapy or causing a 
cascading incident by, for example, changing the setup of monitoring 
equipment. 
i. Patient’s Actions:  
Misplacement of masks and cannulae, failure to co-operate, 
entanglement during sleep, disconnection from source due to 
movement. If the patient has tampered with the therapy, then choose 
intentional patient actions.  
j. Institutional: 
External factors that originate beyond the ward or department. 
Examples of communication issues are; porters not told about empty 
cylinders, or porters sent to the wrong place with a patient (especially if 
this leads to cylinder depletion). Procurement and stores problems are 
linked with lack of resources. Maintenance issues could be jammed 
doors or broken lifts. Environmental/infrastructure problems include lack 
of space, poor light, narrow doorways or excessive noise. 
k. Other External: 
If an external factor is not listed, please describe it in the notes box. 
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D.3 Combinations of Hazards – Selective Sorting 
Table Appendix D.3-1 Selective sorting of records and elements. 
 Harm Count IPP CEPM WMSK CET PMPC PMPO ISC IMT OHE CCE CPT SAM CPN LRC LRA CE AOP SAA LRB LRWP PACI IEI OEUF IPS OE IMC PAU PMBG AUE SAF MEF OEF PWG CED SAH WMSS WMSN CFC AF CRP FF PS CWG TV 
 Severe 11 TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE FALSE FALSE TRUE TRUE FALSE TRUE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE
 Severe 10 TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE FALSE FALSE TRUE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE
 Death 9 TRUE TRUE TRUE FALSE TRUE FALSE TRUE TRUE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE
 Severe 9 TRUE TRUE TRUE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE
 Severe 9 FALSE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE TRUE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE
 Severe 8 TRUE TRUE TRUE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE
 Severe 8 TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE
 Severe 8 TRUE TRUE TRUE FALSE TRUE TRUE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE
 Severe 7 TRUE TRUE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE TRUE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE 
 Severe 7 TRUE TRUE TRUE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE
 Severe 7 FALSE TRUE TRUE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE
 Severe 7 TRUE FALSE TRUE FALSE TRUE FALSE TRUE FALSE TRUE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE
 Severe 7 TRUE TRUE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE TRUE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE
 Severe 7 TRUE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE TRUE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE
 Severe 7 TRUE TRUE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE TRUE TRUE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE
 Severe 7 TRUE TRUE FALSE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE
 Severe 7 FALSE TRUE FALSE TRUE TRUE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE
 Severe 7 FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE
 Death 6 TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE
 Death 6 TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE
 Death 6 FALSE TRUE TRUE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE
 Death 6 FALSE TRUE TRUE TRUE FALSE TRUE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE
 Death 6 TRUE TRUE FALSE TRUE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE
 Severe 6 TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE
 Severe 6 TRUE TRUE TRUE FALSE TRUE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE
 Severe 6 TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE
 Severe 6 FALSE TRUE TRUE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE
 Severe 6 TRUE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE
 Severe 6 TRUE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE
 Severe 6 FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE
 Severe 6 FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE
 Severe 6 TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE
 Severe 6 TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE
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 Severe 6 TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE
 Severe 6 FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE TRUE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE
 Death 5 TRUE TRUE TRUE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE
 Death 5 TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE
 Death 5 FALSE TRUE TRUE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE
 Death 5 FALSE FALSE TRUE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE
 Death 5 TRUE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE
 Death 5 TRUE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE
 Death 5 TRUE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE TRUE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE
 Severe 5 TRUE TRUE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE
 Severe 5 TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE
 Severe 5 TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE
 Severe 5 TRUE FALSE TRUE FALSE TRUE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE
 Severe 5 TRUE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE
 Severe 5 TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE TRUE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE
 Severe 5 TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE TRUE FALSE TRUE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE
 Severe 5 TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE
 Severe 5 FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE
 Severe 5 FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE TRUE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE
 Death 4 TRUE TRUE TRUE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE
 Death 4 TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE
 Death 4 TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE
 Death 4 TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE
 Death 4 FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE
 Severe 4 TRUE TRUE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE
 Severe 4 TRUE TRUE TRUE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE
 Severe 4 FALSE TRUE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE
 Severe 4 FALSE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE
 Severe 4 TRUE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE
 Severe 4 FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE
 Severe 4 FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE
 Severe 4 FALSE FALSE TRUE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE
 Severe 4 FALSE FALSE TRUE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE
 Severe 4 FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE
 Severe 4 FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE TRUE TRUE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE
 Severe 4 FALSE FALSE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE
 Severe 4 TRUE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE
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 Severe 4 TRUE TRUE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE
 Severe 4 TRUE TRUE FALSE TRUE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE
 Severe 4 FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE TRUE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE
 Severe 4 TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE
 Severe 4 TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE TRUE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE
 Severe 4 FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE
 Severe 4 FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE TRUE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE
 Severe 4 FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE TRUE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE
 Death 3 FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE
 Death 3 TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE
 Death 3 FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE
 Death 3 FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE TRUE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE
 Severe 3 FALSE TRUE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE
 Severe 3 TRUE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE
 Severe 3 TRUE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE
 Severe 3 TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE
 Severe 3 TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE
 Severe 3 FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE
 Severe 3 FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE
 Severe 3 FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE
 Severe 3 FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE
 Severe 3 FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE
 Severe 3 FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE TRUE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE
 Severe 3 FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE
 Severe 3 FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE
 Severe 3 FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE
 Death 2 FALSE FALSE TRUE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE
 Death 2 TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE
 Death 2 TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE
 Death 2 FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE
 Death 2 FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE
 Severe 2 FALSE FALSE TRUE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE
 Severe 2 FALSE FALSE TRUE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE
 Severe 2 FALSE FALSE TRUE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE
 Severe 2 FALSE TRUE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE
 Severe 2 TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE
 Severe 2 TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE
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 Severe 2 FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE
 Severe 2 FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE
 Severe 2 FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE
 Severe 2 FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE
 Severe 2 FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE
 Severe 2 FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE
 Severe 2 FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE
 Severe 2 FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE
 Severe 2 FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE
 Severe 2 FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE
 Severe 2 FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE
 Severe 2 FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE
 Severe 2 FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE
 Severe 2 FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE
 Death 1 FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE
 Death 1 FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE
 Severe 1 FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE
 Severe 1 FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE
 Severe 1 FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE
 Severe 1 FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE
 Severe 1 FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE
 Severe 1 FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE
 Severe 1 FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE
 Severe 1 FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE
 Severe 1 FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE
 Severe 1 FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE
 Death 0 FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE
 Severe 0 FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE
                                               
Severe 105 420 57 48 47 35 28 23 24 19 19 15 12 12 12 10 10 8 9 10 6 6 6 8 8 6 6 7 4 6 6 6 2 3 4 4 2 3 3 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 
Death 30 118 2 3 0 6 1 3 2 0 0 3 2 2 0 1 1 2 1 0 3 2 2 0 0 1 1 0 2 0 0 0 2 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
Total 135 538 59 51 47 41 29 26 26 19 19 18 14 14 12 11 11 10 10 10 9 8 8 8 8 7 7 7 6 6 6 6 4 4 4 4 3 3 3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
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D.4 Hazard list comparison and Risk Analysis. 
The following table lists in each column, the hazards identified during the 
observational research alongside the hazard themes from the questionnaire 
study and the taxonomy elements, with those relating to each other in each 
row. A red cell indicates that no corresponding hazard, hazard theme or 
taxonomy element could be identified for that row and an orange cell indicates 
partial similarity. 
The risk scores from the questionnaire and the incident report studies are 
summed to produce the ‘Risk Sum’ value in the last column. This final value 
was carried to the aggregated hazard analysis in Appendix D.5, Table 
Appendix D.5-1 
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Table Appendix D.4-1 Hazard Identification comparison and Risk Analysis. 
Hazard 
ID 
Observed Hazard Types Questionnaire Themes Reported Incident Categories Hazard Themes not in the 
Taxonomy 
Quest 
Risk 
Inc Risk Risk 
sum 
Clinical Error - Diagnosis   0.007 0.00058 0.17491 
Clinical Error - Treatment     0.10602   
1 Incorrect clinical decision or action Clinical Error 
Clinical Error - Patient Management     0.06097   
2 Failure to recognize and act on an 
imminent therapy failure 
Lack of Therapy Monitoring Setup and Admin - Monitoring the 
therapy 
  0.024 0.00160 0.02535 
3 Unauthorized or inappropriate 
action by others 
Tampering Tampering - Unauthorised staff   0.002 0.00009 0.00180 
4 An environmental factor promotes 
inappropriate action 
  Institutional - 
Environment/Infrastructure 
    0.00577 0.00577 
5 Non clinical staff rectifying an 
environmental fault 
  Institutional - Maintenance     0.00410 0.00410 
6 Distraction caused by activity on 
the ward 
  Institutional - 
Environment/Infrastructure 
Interruption/distraction during 
setting up 
  0.00577 0.00577 
Guidelines Institutional - Procedure/Protocol   0.024 0.10304 0.17295 7 Latent error causes a failure in 
communication or process Communication Institutional - Structure/Communication   0.014 0.03237   
Inadequate Patient Care Clinical Error - Patient Management   0.012 0.06097 0.09037 8 Patient management errors when 
patients arrive after transfer 
Patient Transfer Problem     0.017     
Prescription Communication - 
Prescription/Treatment order 
  0.058 0.02209 0.14186 
Communication Institutional - Structure/Communication   0.014 0.03237   
9 Inadequacy of pro forma or 
another communication tool 
Patient's Notes Communication - Patient Notes   0.003 0.01258   
10 Innocent action by visitor to aid 
patient comfort compromises this 
therapy 
Patient Comfort     0.042   0.04187 
12 Visitors tampering with therapies Tampering Tampering - Visitor   0.002 0.00033 0.00204 
13 Clinical activity interfering with the 
therapy 
Training Ward Management - Staff knowledge 
and skills 
  0.026 0.30900 0.46153 
    Guidelines Institutional - Procedure/Protocol   0.024 0.10304   
14 Administering or adjusting another 
therapy causes interference with 
this one 
  Clinical Error - Treatment     0.10602 0.10602 
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Hazard 
ID 
Observed Hazard Types Questionnaire Themes Reported Incident Categories Hazard Themes not in the 
Taxonomy 
Quest 
Risk 
Inc Risk Risk 
sum 
Training Ward Management - Staff knowledge 
and skills 
  0.026 0.30900 0.42865 
Guidelines Setup and Admin - Assembly  0.024 0.02213   
Setup Error    0.042     
15 Wrong type of accessory used for 
a particular therapy setup 
Wrong Type Of Accessory     0.006     
Training Clinical Error - Patient Management   0.026 0.06097 0.21900 18 Process or patient management 
errors moving patients from one 
bed to another 
Inadequate Patient Care Institutional - Procedure/Protocol   0.012 0.10304   
    Patient Transfer Problem     0.017     
20 Calls for assistance unanswered Training   0.026 0.01974 0.05781 
    Inadequate Patient Care 
Communication - Clinical 
Assistance/Examination   0.012     
21 Patient requests or needs 
unfulfilled 
Inadequate Patient Care Communication - Clinical 
Assistance/Examination 
  0.012 0.01974 0.03221 
22 Impaired speech due to the face 
mask or other aspect of the 
therapy making communication 
difficult 
Communication     0.014   0.01365 
23 Communication failures at patient 
hand-over  
Training Institutional - Procedure/Protocol 0.026 0.10304 0.16618 
    Guidelines   
Communication problems at 
handover 
0.024     
    Communication     0.014     
24 Missing or incomplete patient 
notes 
Training Communication - Patient Notes   0.026 0.01258 0.05524 
    Communication     0.014     
    Patient's Notes     0.003     
25 Incorrect information in patient 
notes 
Training Communication - Patient Notes   0.026 0.01258 0.05524 
    Communication     0.014     
    Patient's Notes     0.003     
26 Poor communication between 
doctors and nursing staff 
Training Communication - 
Prescription/Treatment order 
  0.026 0.02209 0.06134 
    Communication     0.014     
27 Environmental factors such as 
noise masking calls for assistance 
Patient Comfort Institutional - 
Environment/Infrastructure 
Noisy environment masked low 
saturation alarm 
0.042 0.00577 0.07376 
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Hazard 
ID 
Observed Hazard Types Questionnaire Themes Reported Incident Categories Hazard Themes not in the 
Taxonomy 
Quest 
Risk 
Inc Risk Risk 
sum 
  Communication   0.014     
    Inadequate Patient Care     0.012     
28 Training   0.026 0.01974 0.05899 
  
Communication failures between 
clinician and patient during an 
examination Communication 
Communication - Clinical 
Assistance/Examination   0.014     
29 Prescription Communication - 
Prescription/Treatment order 
  0.058 0.02209 0.20493 
  
Nursing staff not responding to 
requests or orders from doctors 
Dosage Error     0.086     
    Training     0.026     
    Communication     0.014     
30 Prescriptions or treatment orders 
incorrect or not made 
Prescription Communication - 
Prescription/Treatment order 
  0.058 0.02209 0.24732 
    Dosage Error     0.086     
    Training     0.026     
    Setup Error     0.042     
    Communication     0.014     
31 Spectacles or other obstructions 
on the face 
Training     0.026   0.15869 
    Guidelines     0.024     
    Patient Comfort     0.042     
    Setup Error     0.042     
    Cylinder Fall     0.014     
    Accessory Fit Problem     0.011     
32 Training   0.026   0.06708 
  
Position of cylinder at the bed side 
causes Physical obstruction Guidelines   
Cylinder placement - dangerous 
position 0.024     
    Cylinder Fall     0.014     
    Cylinder Placement     0.002     
    Patient Access     0.002     
32.1 Empty Cylinder Setup and Admin - Monitoring the 
therapy 
  0.099 0.00160 0.24087 
  
Position of cylinder at the bed side 
causes unknown cylinder contents 
Training     0.026     
    Guidelines     0.024     
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Hazard 
ID 
Observed Hazard Types Questionnaire Themes Reported Incident Categories Hazard Themes not in the 
Taxonomy 
Quest 
Risk 
Inc Risk Risk 
sum 
    Lack of Oxygen (Hypoxia)     0.065     
    Lack of Therapy Monitoring     0.024     
    Cylinder Placement     0.002     
32.2 Training Setup and Admin - Assembly   0.026 0.02213 0.17176 
  
Position of cylinders at the bed 
side causes patients movements 
to be restricted by tubing position Guidelines     0.024     
    Patient Comfort     0.042     
    Setup Error     0.042     
    Cylinder Fall     0.014     
    Cylinder Placement     0.002     
33 Surplus equipment cluttering the 
ward area 
  Institutional - 
Environment/Infrastructure 
    0.00577 0.00577 
34 
Lack of Oxygen (Hypoxia) 
Setup and Admin - Monitoring the 
therapy 
Tubing occluded - 
Kinked/Knotted 
0.065 0.00160 0.09085 
  
Tubing pinched in furniture or 
other equipment at the bed side 
Lack of Therapy Monitoring     0.024     
Training Monitoring Equipment - Fault   0.026 0.00255 0.05255 35 Mistakes or equipment failures 
when changing from portable to 
installed monitoring or vice-versa Guidelines Monitoring Equipment - Use Error   0.024 0.00051   
36 Equipment improperly checked Training Institutional - Procedure/Protocol   0.026 0.10304 0.15252 
    Guidelines     0.024     
37 Physical failure of a patient 
connected accessory Lack of Oxygen (Hypoxia) 
Accessory - Faulty   0.065 0.00147 0.13259 
    Patient Comfort     0.042     
    Lack of Therapy Monitoring     0.024     
38 Technical or physical failures of 
the bed or associated equipment 
Patient Comfort Other Equipment - Faulty   0.042 0.00753 0.04940 
39 Interference from an 
environmental factor affecting a 
nurses actions in the use of 
equipment 
Setup Error Institutional - 
Environment/Infrastructure 
  0.042 0.00577 0.04816 
40 Failure to respond to an 
equipment alarm or warning 
Training Setup and Admin - Monitoring the 
therapy 
  0.026 0.00160 0.11644 
    Lack of Oxygen (Hypoxia)     0.065     
    Lack of Therapy Monitoring     0.024     
251 
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Quest 
Risk 
Inc Risk Risk 
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41 Training Institutional - Procedure/Protocol   0.026 0.10304 0.19387 
  
Failure of staff to communicate 
regarding equipment required in 
patient transfer Guidelines     0.024     
    Communication     0.014     
    Lack Of Equipment     0.011     
    Patient Transfer Problem     0.017     
42 Environmental issues like noise or 
cramped space cause visitors 
actions to interfere with the 
therapy 
Cylinder Fall Institutional - 
Environment/Infrastructure 
  0.014 0.00577 0.01994 
43 Human error by clinical staff when 
monitoring patients 
Training Patient Monitoring - Patient Condition   0.026 0.05019 0.12330 
    Patient Condition     0.016     
    Inadequate Patient Care     0.012     
    Lack of Patient Monitoring     0.019     
44 Training Monitoring Equipment - Use Error   0.026 0.00051 0.04475 
  
Undetected disconnection of 
patient monitoring equipment  Lack of Patient Monitoring     0.019     
45 Failure to respond to or implement 
patient monitoring 
Training Patient Monitoring - Patient Condition   0.026 0.05019 0.14719 
    Guidelines     0.024     
    Patient Condition     0.016     
    Inadequate Patient Care     0.012     
    Lack of Patient Monitoring     0.019     
46 Lack of Oxygen (Hypoxia) Ward Management - Staff numbers   0.065 0.00385 0.14403 
  Lack of Therapy Monitoring     0.024     
  Patient Condition     0.016     
  Inadequate Patient Care     0.012     
  Lack of Patient Monitoring     0.019     
  
Failure to respond to patient or 
therapy monitoring alerts due to a 
lack of staff 
Lack Of Staff     0.003     
47 Patient actions adversely affecting 
patient monitoring 
Patient Compliance Patient Actions - Unintentional   0.079 0.00269 0.10060 
    Lack of Patient Monitoring     0.019     
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48 
Lack of Oxygen (Hypoxia) 
Setup and Admin - Monitoring the 
therapy 
  0.065 0.00160 0.12248 
  
Failure of patient or therapy 
monitoring to detect a therapy 
disconnection Lack of Therapy Monitoring     0.024     
    Lack of Patient Monitoring     0.019     
    Accessory Not Connected     0.007     
    Mask Related Suffocation     0.006     
49 Failure to detect patient 
entanglement in oxygen tubing  
Training Setup and Admin - Monitoring the 
therapy 
Tubing entanglement 0.026 0.00160 0.19506 
    Lack of Oxygen (Hypoxia)     0.065     
    Patient Comfort     0.042     
    Lack of Therapy Monitoring     0.024     
    Inadequate Patient Care     0.012     
    Lack of Patient Monitoring     0.019     
    Entanglement - Tubing     0.006     
50 Failure to detect cylinder depletion 
when in use 
Empty Cylinder Cylinder - Empty   0.099 0.02749 0.26506 
    Training     0.026     
    Guidelines     0.024     
    Lack of Oxygen (Hypoxia)     0.065     
    Lack of Therapy Monitoring     0.024     
51 Inadequate Patient Care Institutional - 
Environment/Infrastructure 
  0.012 0.00577 0.03687 
  
Environmental factor obscuring a 
clear view of the patient 
Lack of Patient Monitoring     0.019     
52 Environmental factor obstructing 
access to the patient 
Patient Access Institutional - 
Environment/Infrastructure 
  0.002 0.00577 0.00747 
53 Training Accessory - Out of Place   0.026 0.00526 0.22091 
  
Accessory incorrectly 
administered or moved into an 
incorrect position by clinical staff Guidelines     0.024     
    Lack of Oxygen (Hypoxia)     0.065     
    Patient Comfort     0.042     
    Setup Error     0.042     
    Accessory Fit Problem     0.011     
    Mask Related Suffocation     0.006     
253 
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54 Failure to notice an incorrectly 
positioned accessory 
Training Accessory - Out of Place   0.026 0.00526 0.21513 
    Lack of Oxygen (Hypoxia)     0.065     
    Patient Comfort     0.042     
    Setup Error     0.042     
    Lack of Therapy Monitoring     0.024     
    Accessory Fit Problem     0.011     
55 Training     0.026   0.20095 
  
Changing a patients posture or 
position interferes with the therapy Guidelines     0.024     
    Lack of Oxygen (Hypoxia)     0.065     
    Patient Comfort     0.042     
    Setup Error     0.042     
    Posture/Positioning     0.002     
56 Training Clinical Error - Patient Management   0.026 0.06097 0.23527 
  
Preparing a patient for transfer 
interferes with the therapy Guidelines     0.024     
    Lack of Oxygen (Hypoxia)     0.065     
    Setup Error     0.042     
    Patient Transfer Problem     0.017     
57 Training Clinical Error - Patient Management   0.026 0.06097 0.26585 
  
Moving a patient between bed and 
chair causes interference with the 
therapy Guidelines     0.024     
    Lack of Oxygen (Hypoxia)     0.065     
    Patient Comfort     0.042     
    Setup Error     0.042     
    Mask Related Suffocation     0.006     
58 COPD Management Ward Management - Staff knowledge 
and skills 
  0.112 0.30900 0.65051 
  
Incorrect action when responding 
to a change in a patients condition 
Dosage Error     0.086     
    Training     0.026     
    Guidelines     0.024     
    Lack of Oxygen (Hypoxia)     0.065     
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    Patient Condition     0.016     
    Inadequate Patient Care     0.012     
59 Incorrect actions at patient 
handover 
Training Institutional - Procedure/Protocol   0.026 0.10304 0.23167 
    Guidelines     0.024     
    Lack of Oxygen (Hypoxia)     0.065     
    Communication     0.014     
60 Incorrect actions during patient 
transfer 
Training Ward Management - Staff knowledge 
and skills 
  0.026 0.30900 0.45509 
    Guidelines     0.024     
    Lack of Oxygen (Hypoxia)     0.065     
    Inadequate Patient Care     0.012     
    Patient Transfer Problem     0.017     
    Communication With Porters     0.002     
61 Failure to act on a detected 
therapy administration error 
Dosage Error Ward Management - Staff knowledge 
and skills 
  0.086 0.30900 0.54079 
    Training     0.026     
    Lack of Oxygen (Hypoxia)     0.065     
    Setup Error     0.042     
    Inadequate Patient Care     0.012     
62 Failure to detect that the therapy 
has terminated early 
Empty Cylinder Setup and Admin - Monitoring the 
therapy 
  0.099 0.00160 0.30111 
    Dosage Error     0.086     
    Training     0.026     
    Lack of Oxygen (Hypoxia)     0.065     
    Lack of Therapy Monitoring     0.024     
63 Failure to act on a detected early 
therapy termination 
Empty Cylinder Ward Management - Staff knowledge 
and skills 
  0.099 0.30900 0.60457 
    Dosage Error     0.086     
    Training     0.026     
    Lack of Oxygen (Hypoxia)     0.065     
    Inadequate Patient Care     0.012     
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    Cylinder Replacement/Refilling     0.007     
64 Dosage Error Other Equipment - Faulty   0.086 0.00753 0.18275 
  
Equipment delivering another 
therapy fails causing interference 
with this one Guidelines     0.024     
    Lack of Oxygen (Hypoxia)     0.065     
65 Lack of Oxygen (Hypoxia)     0.065   0.10788 
  
A required action related to 
another therapy causes a 
distraction which compromises 
this therapy 
Setup Error     0.042     
66 Patient Compliance Patient Actions - Unintentional   0.079 0.00269 0.18985 
  
A patient takes action related to 
another therapy, which 
compromises this one Lack of Oxygen (Hypoxia) 
    0.065     
    Setup Error     0.042     
67 Accessory moved into an incorrect 
position by Patient 
Patient Compliance Accessory - Out of Place   0.079 0.00526 0.26881 
    Lack of Oxygen (Hypoxia)     0.065     
    Patient Comfort     0.042     
    Setup Error     0.042     
    Lack of Therapy Monitoring     0.024     
    Accessory Fit Problem     0.011     
68 Lack of Oxygen (Hypoxia) Patient Actions - Unintentional 0.065 0.00269 0.13433 
  
Unintentional action by patient 
interferes with the therapy Setup Error   
Confused/agitated movements 
by patient 0.042     
    Lack of Therapy Monitoring     0.024     
69 Unauthorized or inappropriate 
action by the patient 
Patient Compliance Patient Actions - 
Compliance/Intentional 
  0.079 0.01515 0.20402 
    Lack of Oxygen (Hypoxia)     0.065     
    Setup Error     0.042     
    Tampering     0.002     
70 
Lack of Oxygen (Hypoxia) 
Setup and Admin - Monitoring the 
therapy 
  0.065 0.00160 0.13271 
  
Action taken by a patient related to 
natural relief compromises the 
therapy Patient Comfort     0.042     
    Lack of Therapy Monitoring     0.024     
71 Action taken by a patient to relieve 
discomfort compromises the Lack of Oxygen (Hypoxia) 
Setup and Admin - Monitoring the 
therapy 
  0.065 0.00160 0.17511 
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  therapy Patient Comfort     0.042     
    Setup Error     0.042     
    Lack of Therapy Monitoring     0.024     
72 Patient Compliance Patient Actions - 
Compliance/Intentional 
  0.079 0.01515 0.15992 
  
Patient refuses to co-operate with 
clinical staff regarding the therapy 
Lack of Oxygen (Hypoxia)     0.065     
73 Lack of Oxygen (Hypoxia) Patient Actions - Unintentional   0.065 0.00269 0.13433 
  
Patient has to take action to 
enable them to talk, eat or drink Setup Error     0.042     
    Lack of Therapy Monitoring     0.024     
73.1 Lack of Oxygen (Hypoxia) Patient Actions - Unintentional   0.065 0.00269 0.13433 
  
Patient has to take action to 
enable them to take oral meds Setup Error     0.042     
    Lack of Therapy Monitoring     0.024     
74 Lack of Oxygen (Hypoxia) Patient Actions - Unintentional Tubing entanglement 0.065 0.00269 0.18748 
  
Actions by patient causes them to 
become entangled in the oxygen 
tubing Patient Comfort     0.042     
    Setup Error     0.042     
    Lack of Therapy Monitoring     0.024     
    Entanglement - Tubing     0.006     
    Deliberate Self Harm - Tubing     0.006     
75 Patient Compliance Patient Actions - Unintentional   0.079 0.00269 0.10060 
  
Actions by the patient interfere 
with the patient monitoring Lack of Patient Monitoring     0.019     
77 Lack of Oxygen (Hypoxia) Patient Actions - Unintentional   0.065 0.00269 0.17121 
  
Movements or actions during 
sleep compromise the therapy 
Patient Compliance     0.079     
    Lack of Therapy Monitoring     0.024     
80 Innocent action by patient 
compromises the therapy Lack of Oxygen (Hypoxia) 
Patient Actions - Unintentional   0.065 0.00269 0.17121 
    Lack of Therapy Monitoring     0.024     
    Patient Compliance     0.079     
82 Patient Compliance Patient Actions - 
Compliance/Intentional 
  0.079 0.01515 0.15992 
  
Patient refuses to co-operate with 
the therapy by removing and 
ignoring requests to replace the 
accessory Lack of Oxygen (Hypoxia) 
    0.065     
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90 Training     0.026   0.12062 
  
The accessory has to be changed 
to relieve patient discomfort Patient Comfort     0.042     
    Setup Error     0.042     
    Accessory Fit Problem     0.011     
91 Communication     0.014   0.03006 
  
The patients condition minimises 
communication and involvement Patient Condition     0.016     
92 Undetected change in patient 
condition 
COPD Management Patient Monitoring - Patient Condition   0.112 0.05019 0.38645 
    Dosage Error     0.086     
    Training     0.026     
    Lack of Oxygen (Hypoxia)     0.065     
    Patient Condition     0.016     
    Inadequate Patient Care     0.012     
    Lack of Patient Monitoring     0.019     
93 Patient vomiting while an 
accessory is in position 
Training     0.026   0.13139 
    Guidelines     0.024     
    Lack of Oxygen (Hypoxia)     0.065     
    Patient Condition     0.016     
96 Training   0.026   0.09109 
  
A factor relating to design within 
the therapy or the environment 
causes staff to be distracted Lack of Oxygen (Hypoxia)   
Interruption/distraction during 
setting up 0.065     
97 A latent error in a defined 
procedure causes mistakes 
Dosage Error Institutional - Procedure/Protocol   0.086 0.10304 0.30385 
    Training     0.026     
    Guidelines     0.024     
    Lack of Oxygen (Hypoxia)     0.065     
98 Training Setup and Admin - Humidification   0.026 0.00080 0.21081 
  
Humidifier incorrectly set up, used 
inappropriately or not used when it 
should Guidelines     0.024     
    Lack of Oxygen (Hypoxia)     0.065     
    Patient Comfort     0.042     
258 
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    Setup Error     0.042     
    Humidifier Set Up     0.011     
99 Lack of Oxygen (Hypoxia) Lack of resources - Accessories   0.065 0.01765 0.16517 
  
A lack of available equipment for 
therapy administration or 
monitoring Setup Error     0.042     
    Lack of Therapy Monitoring     0.024     
    Lack Of Equipment     0.011     
    Lack Of Cylinders     0.005     
100 Lack of Oxygen (Hypoxia) Ward Management - Staff numbers   0.065 0.00385 0.12421 
  
Insufficient staff numbers to 
effectively manage patients 
receiving therapy Lack of Therapy Monitoring     0.024     
    Inadequate Patient Care     0.012     
    Lack of Patient Monitoring     0.019     
101 Failure to correct a displaced 
accessory 
Training Accessory - Out of Place   0.026 0.00526 0.20385 
    Lack of Oxygen (Hypoxia)     0.065     
    Patient Comfort     0.042     
    Setup Error     0.042     
    Inadequate Patient Care     0.012     
    Accessory Fit Problem     0.011     
105 Lack of Oxygen (Hypoxia) Setup and Admin - Assembly   0.065 0.02213 0.13001 
  
A factor relating to design within 
the therapy or the environment 
causes setup error Setup Error     0.042     
107 Mistakes in setting up the therapy Dosage Error Setup and Admin - Assembly   0.086 0.02213 0.27662 
    Training     0.026     
    Guidelines     0.024     
    Lack of Oxygen (Hypoxia)     0.065     
    Setup Error     0.042     
    Mask Related Suffocation     0.006     
    Flow Meter Not Turned On     0.006     
108 Undetected failed oxygen supply Empty Cylinder Pipeline - Supply Fail   0.099 0.00018 0.23367 
    Training     0.026     
259 
Hazard 
ID 
Observed Hazard Types Questionnaire Themes Reported Incident Categories Hazard Themes not in the 
Taxonomy 
Quest 
Risk 
Inc Risk Risk 
sum 
    Lack of Oxygen (Hypoxia)     0.065     
    Lack of Therapy Monitoring     0.024     
    Inadequate Patient Care     0.012     
    Wall Supply Fault     0.002     
    Mask Related Suffocation     0.006     
109 Dosage Error Ward Management - Staff knowledge 
and skills 
  0.086 0.30900 0.53961 
  
Incorrect action taken when 
attempting to rectify a setup error 
Training     0.026     
    Lack of Oxygen (Hypoxia)     0.065     
    Setup Error     0.042     
    Mask Related Suffocation     0.006     
    Flow Meter Not Turned On     0.006     
110 Therapy tubing disconnected in 
error 
Training Ward Management - Staff knowledge 
and skills 
Tubing disconnect 0.026 0.30900 0.45548 
    Lack of Oxygen (Hypoxia)     0.065     
    Setup Error     0.042     
    Accessory Not Connected     0.007     
    Mask Related Suffocation     0.006     
113 A change of accessory is 
incorrectly implemented 
Training Ward Management - Staff knowledge 
and skills 
  0.026 0.30900 0.45377 
    Lack of Oxygen (Hypoxia)     0.065     
    Setup Error     0.042     
    Wrong Type Of Accessory     0.006     
    Mask Related Suffocation     0.006     
115 Training Accessory - Out of Place   0.026 0.00526 0.21684 
  
An accessory is displaced when a 
patient's position or posture is 
changed Lack of Oxygen (Hypoxia)     0.065     
    Patient Comfort     0.042     
    Setup Error     0.042     
    Lack of Therapy Monitoring     0.024     
    Accessory Fit Problem     0.011     
    Posture/Positioning     0.002     
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116 Training Ward Management - Staff knowledge 
and skills 
  0.026 0.30900 0.49184 
  
An accessory is incorrectly or 
inappropriately disconnected by 
clinical staff Guidelines     0.024     
    Lack of Oxygen (Hypoxia)     0.065     
    Setup Error     0.042     
    Inadequate Patient Care     0.012     
    Accessory Not Connected     0.007     
    Mask Related Suffocation     0.006     
117 An incorrect adjustment is made to 
the therapy 
Dosage Error Setup and Admin - Flowrate   0.086 0.00729 0.20810 
    Training     0.026     
    Guidelines     0.024     
    Lack of Oxygen (Hypoxia)     0.065     
118 Bubble tubing incorrectly cut Training Setup and Admin - Assembly   0.026 0.02213 0.09012 
    Setup Error     0.042     
119 Training Setup and Admin - Assembly   0.026 0.02213 0.16125 
  
Change either way between piped 
supply and cylinder incorrectly 
implemented Lack of Oxygen (Hypoxia)     0.065     
    Setup Error     0.042     
    Mask Related Suffocation     0.006     
120 Failure by clinical staff to notice a 
patient disconnection 
Training Setup and Admin - Monitoring the 
therapy 
  0.026 0.00160 0.13626 
    Lack of Oxygen (Hypoxia)     0.065     
    Lack of Therapy Monitoring     0.024     
    Inadequate Patient Care     0.012     
    Accessory Not Connected     0.007     
121 Failure to detect a setup error Dosage Error Setup and Admin - Monitoring the 
therapy 
  0.086 0.00160 0.25031 
    Training     0.026     
    Lack of Oxygen (Hypoxia)     0.065     
    Setup Error     0.042     
    Lack of Therapy Monitoring     0.024     
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    Flow Meter Not Turned On     0.006     
122 Flow rate incorrectly or 
inappropriately adjusted 
COPD Management Setup and Admin - Flowrate   0.112 0.00729 0.37360 
    Dosage Error     0.086     
    Training     0.026     
    Guidelines     0.024     
    Lack of Oxygen (Hypoxia)     0.065     
    Setup Error     0.042     
    Mask Related Suffocation     0.006     
    Flow Meter Not Turned On     0.006     
123 Dosage Error Setup and Admin - Assembly   0.086 0.02213 0.26533 
  
Therapy incorrectly or 
inappropriately set up when re-
administered after a previous 
termination 
Training     0.026     
    Guidelines     0.024     
    Lack of Oxygen (Hypoxia)     0.065     
    Setup Error     0.042     
125 Undetected humidifier water 
depletion 
Training Setup and Admin - Monitoring the 
therapy 
  0.026 0.00160 0.14598 
    Patient Comfort     0.042     
    Setup Error     0.042     
    Lack of Therapy Monitoring     0.024     
    Humidifier Set Up     0.011     
126 Training Setup and Admin - Assembly   0.026 0.02213 0.17228 
  
Wrong type of accessory used for 
a particular therapy setup Guidelines     0.024     
    Patient Comfort     0.042     
    Setup Error     0.042     
    Accessory Fit Problem     0.011     
    Wrong Type Of Accessory     0.006     
127 Training Patient Monitoring - Patient Condition   0.026 0.05019 0.21268 
  
Failure to adequately monitor a 
patient during treatment with 
another therapy Guidelines     0.024     
262 
Hazard 
ID 
Observed Hazard Types Questionnaire Themes Reported Incident Categories Hazard Themes not in the 
Taxonomy 
Quest 
Risk 
Inc Risk Risk 
sum 
    Lack of Oxygen (Hypoxia)     0.065     
    Patient Condition     0.016     
    Inadequate Patient Care     0.012     
    Lack of Patient Monitoring     0.019     
128 Patient requirement incorrectly 
assessed 
COPD Management Clinical Error - Diagnosis   0.112 0.00058 0.37884 
    Dosage Error     0.086     
    Training     0.026     
    Guidelines     0.024     
    Lack of Oxygen (Hypoxia)     0.065     
    Patient Comfort     0.042     
    Patient Condition     0.016     
    Clinical Error     0.007     
129 Failure to respond to or implement 
therapy monitoring 
Empty Cylinder Setup and Admin - Monitoring the 
therapy 
  0.099 0.00160 0.28156 
    Training     0.026     
    Guidelines     0.024     
    Lack of Oxygen (Hypoxia)     0.065     
    Setup Error     0.042     
    Lack of Therapy Monitoring     0.024     
131 Dosage Error Patient Monitoring - Patient Condition   0.086 0.05019 0.25822 
  
Incorrect action when responding 
to or implementing patient 
monitoring Training     0.026     
    Lack of Oxygen (Hypoxia)     0.065     
    Inadequate Patient Care     0.012     
    Lack of Patient Monitoring     0.019     
134 Other medication interfering with 
this therapy 
Prescription Clinical Error - Treatment   0.058 0.10602 0.38441 
    Dosage Error     0.086     
    Training     0.026     
    Guidelines     0.024     
    Lack of Oxygen (Hypoxia)     0.065     
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    Inadequate Patient Care     0.012     
    Clinical Error     0.007     
136 Prescription Communication - 
Prescription/Treatment order 
0.058 0.02209 0.34406 
  
Therapy not set up according to 
prescription or treatment order 
Dosage Error   
Communication - Prescribed 
therapy not administered 
0.086     
    Training     0.026     
    Guidelines     0.024     
    Lack of Oxygen (Hypoxia)     0.065     
    Setup Error     0.042     
    Communication     0.014     
    Clinical Error     0.007     
137 Training Other Equipment - Use Error   0.026 0.00904 0.20933 
  Lack of Oxygen (Hypoxia)     0.065     
  
A human factors issue with any 
equipment causes a functional 
failure because Equipment is 
applied differently to its intended 
use 
Patient Comfort     0.042     
    Setup Error     0.042     
    Cylinder Fall     0.014     
    Accessory Fit Problem     0.011     
139 Bed spaces are in close proximity Training Institutional - 
Environment/Infrastructure 
  0.026 0.00577 0.12075 
    Guidelines     0.024     
    Lack of Oxygen (Hypoxia)     0.065     
Two or more patients sharing a 
wall port or cylinder 
Training Lack of Resources - Cylinders   0.026 0.02896 0.21574 140 
  Guidelines Lack of resources - Wall ports   0.024 0.00670   
    Lack of Oxygen (Hypoxia)     0.065     
    Setup Error     0.042     
    Lack Of Equipment     0.011     
    Lack Of Wall Ports     0.007     
    Lack Of Cylinders     0.005     
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141 Sensitive alarms and persistent 
nurse calls from patients 
Inadequate Patient Care     0.012   0.03111 
    Lack of Patient Monitoring     0.019     
143 Training Ward Management - Staff knowledge 
and skills 
  0.026 0.30900 0.37096 
  
Staff are allowed to undertake 
tasks without adequate or relevant 
skills or knowledge  Guidelines     0.024     
    Inadequate Patient Care     0.012     
145 Empty Cylinder Institutional - Management   0.099 0.00030 0.22829 
  
No provision for the safe and 
organized storage of oxygen 
cylinders Training     0.026     
    Guidelines     0.024     
    Lack of Oxygen (Hypoxia)     0.065     
    Cylinder Fall     0.014     
146 Lifts are shared with all building 
users  
  Institutional - 
Environment/Infrastructure 
Infrastructure - Lifts unavailable   0.00577 0.00577 
147 Guidelines Lack of resources - Wall ports   0.024 0.00670 0.11538 
  
Not enough oxygen outlets for the 
number of patients requiring 
therapy Lack of Oxygen (Hypoxia)     0.065     
    Inadequate Patient Care     0.012     
    Lack Of Wall Ports     0.007     
148   
Inadequate Patient Care 
Clinical Error - Patient Management Nursing staff afraid of treating 
patient with oxygen because of 
COPD  
0.012 0.06097 0.18526 
    COPD Management     0.112     
149   Guidelines Institutional - Procedure/Protocol   0.024 0.10304 0.12693 
150   Cylinder Fall Cylinder - Falling Cylinder   0.014 0.00177 0.01595 
151   Manual Handling - Cylinders   Awkward handling of cylinders 
during transfer 
0.007   0.00683 
152   Wrong Gas Pipeline - Wrong Gas   0.017 0.00237 0.01930 
152.1   Wrong gas Cylinder - Wrong Gas   0.017 0.00067 0.01760 
153   Smoking   Smoking while on oxygen 0.013   0.01299 
154   Delayed Action     0.007   0.00735 
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155   Patient Transfer Problem   0.017   0.03058 
    Communication   
Communication problems with 
porters when arranging for 
patient transfer 0.014     
156   Excessive Work Load Ward Management - Staff numbers   0.003 0.00385 0.00727 
157   Flow Meter Fault Flow meter - Faulty   0.003 0.00026 0.00367 
158   Retrolental Fibroplasia     0.011   0.01129 
159   CPAP/BIPAP Problems     0.007   0.00735 
160   Tracheostomy   Tracheostomy dislodged 0.011   0.01129 
161   Cylinder Identification     0.002   0.00171 
162   Actions of Patient's Parents     0.006   0.00564 
163   Regulator Faulty Cylinder - Regulator/Pressure Gauge   0.002 0.00104 0.00275 
164       Bedspaces not prepared       
165       Clinical Error - Making decisions 
without reference to diagnostic 
results 
      
166       Collision between patient and 
pipeline outlet hardware 
      
167       Communication/Structure - 
refusal to assess patient 
      
168       Contaminated pipeline       
169       Contamination hazard - Used 
accessories not disposed of and 
replaced 
      
170       Cylinder damage - Incorect 
positioning on trolley 
      
171       Cylinder Faulty - Cannot turn on 
gas 
      
172       cylinder faulty - leaking        
173       Cylinder management - 
Unsecured/Unrestrained 
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174       Cylinder management error - 
Not turned off after use 
      
175       Cylinder Quality - New cylinder 
empty 
      
176       Deviations from accepted 
procedure 
      
177       Distraction of staff - Issue with 
this therapy puts other patients 
at risk 
      
178       Endo-Tracheal tube blocked       
179       Equipment design issue       
180       Equipment missing - Cylinder       
181       Equipment missing - Cylinder 
key 
      
182       Equipment missing - Flowmeter       
183       Equipment missing - Regulator       
184       Equipment not checked       
185       Faulty humidifier       
186       Faulty Schrader valve on 
cylinder jamming and 
preventing change of supply 
      
187       Fire hazard - Faulty nearby 
electrical equipment 
      
188       Flowmeter not properly 
attached to wall port 
      
189       Humidifier use error - Refilled 
with saline 
      
190       Inappropriate advice from 
unauthorized person 
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191       Infection risk - Fungus in 
oxygen tubing (Can be caused 
by using non-sterile water in 
humidifier) 
      
192       Infrastructure - Emergency 
buzzer inaccessible 
      
193       Insufficient cylinder contents for 
transfer 
      
194       Interference from nursing tasks 
- Accidental therapy 
disconnection 
      
195       Lack of resources; sterile water 
for humidifiers 
      
196       Monitoring equipment - Physical 
harm from sensors 
      
197       Non-Standard equipment fitting 
sizes 
      
198       Oil used on oxygen outlet       
199       Other therapies - Unauthorized 
medications 
      
200       Oxygen flow impeded - 
Accessory blocked 
      
201       Oxygen Regulator Fire       
202       Patient left unattended       
203       Patient monitoring - Equipment 
unavailable 
      
204       Pressure/Abrasion sores from 
accessories 
      
205       Procedural error - Deligating 
clinical/nursing tasks to parents 
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206       Procedureal delay - Cylinder 
restocking 
      
207       Procedureal delay - 
Examination 
      
208       Self Harm - Strangulation with 
oxygen tubing 
      
209       Setup - Oxygen not turned on       
210       Setup error - Venturi mask       
211       Staff knowledge/Skill - not able 
to identify an oxygen failure 
alarm 
      
212       staff unavailable - too busy       
213       Transfering without adequate 
escort 
      
214       Transport without oxygen       
215       Tubing damaged - Melted due 
to contact with hot surface 
      
216       Unauthorized administration of 
oxygen 
      
217       Unsuitable running repairs       
218       Use Error - Cylinder not 
switched on 
      
219       Ward management - Empty and 
full cylinders stored together 
      
220       Wrong wall port - Suction 
instead of oxygen 
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D.5 Aggregated Hazard Analysis 
Table Appendix D.5-1 Hazard analysis combining all results. 
Subsystem Component 
Hazard 
ID Hazard Type Hazardous Element Initiating Mechanisms Threats/Effects Risk 
All All 38 Technical or physical failures of 
the bed or associated equipment 
Malfunctioning bed or associated 
equipment 
Equipment failure Disturbance of therapy, distracted 
staff 0.0494 
All All 5 Non clinical staff rectifying an 
environmental fault 
Unexpected events due to non 
clinical maintenance work 
Environmental control mechanism 
failure, Lack of vigilance 
Unexpected and unpredictable 
influence on therapy 0.0041 
All External - 
Environment 
185 Fire hazard - Faulty nearby 
electrical equipment 
Fire in an oxygen enriched 
environment 
Faulty electrical equipment at or 
near an oxygen enriched 
bedspace 
Fire to bed linen, equipment or 
oxygen delivery accessories   
All External - 
Infrastructure 
146 Lifts are shared with all building 
users  
Extended and unpredictable 
transfer times 
No dedicated lift Access for patient 
transfers 
Prolonged patient transfers leading to 
an increased possibility of cylinder 
depletion, increased possibility of lifts 
failing and of physical harm to other 
lift users 
0.0058 
All External - 
Manufacturer 
195 Non-Standard equipment fitting 
sizes 
Non-Standard equipment fitting 
sizes 
Manufacturing error, inappropriate 
modification 
Setup cannot be completed 
  
All External - Person 162 Actions of Paediatric Patient's 
Parents 
Inapropriate actions by parents of 
paediatric patients 
Poor communication and 
involvment with parents 
Sub-optimal patient care, 
Inconsistent patient care, 
Inappropriate action, inadequate or 
no therapy 
0.0056 
Clinical External - 
Environment 
52 Environmental factor obstructing 
access to the patient 
Obstructed access to patient Environmental factor Delays, Reduced task capabilities, 
Physical harm 0.0075 
Clinical External - 
Environment 
33 Surplus equipment cluttering the 
ward area 
Obstructed access or confusion Cluttered ward area Ineffective equipment management, 
Physical obstructions, Reduced 
access, Confusion between used and 
full cylinders 
0.0058 
Clinical External - 
Environment 
39 Interference from an 
environmental factor affecting a 
nurses actions in the use of 
equipment 
Equipment use error Interference from an 
environmental factor 
Therapy set up or monitoring errors 
0.0482 
Clinical External - 
Environment 
51 Environmental factor obscuring a 
clear view of the patient 
Obscured view of patient Environmental factor Reduced patient monitoring, 
Impaired vigilance 0.0369 
Clinical External - 
Environment 
27 Environmental factors such as 
noise masking calls for assistance 
Unanswered calls for assistance High levels of ambient noise Impaired vigilance, No response to 
alarms from monitoring equipment 
and nurse calls 
0.0738 
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Hazard 
ID Hazard Type Hazardous Element Initiating Mechanisms Threats/Effects Risk 
Clinical External - 
Environment 
96 A factor relating to design within 
the therapy or the environment 
causes staff to be distracted 
Distracted or inattentive staff Human factors: Difficulty in 
administering therapy 
Incorrect or inadequate therapy, 
discomfort, physical harm 0.0911 
Clinical External - 
Infrastructure 
190 Infrastructure - Emergency buzzer 
inaccessible 
Emergency buzzer is out of reach 
or faulty 
Poor room layout, equipment fault Staff cannot call for assistance in an 
emergency in a side room   
Clinical External - 
Institutional 
149 Lack of or poorly constructed 
guidelines 
Poor guidelines Assessing requirement or applying 
therapy 
Incorrect treatment 0.1269 
Clinical External - 
Institutional 
97 A latent error in a defined 
procedure causes mistakes 
Latent error in a procedure Incorrectly defined procedure Incorrect or inadequate therapy, 
discomfort, physical harm 0.3039 
Clinical External - 
Institutional 
156 Excessive Work Load for Staff Lack of staff or busy environment Task overload, ward management 
failure, organizational failure 
Sub-optimal patient care, 
Inconsistent patient care, 
Inappropriate action, inadequate or 
no therapy 
0.0073 
Clinical External - Other 
Therapy 
159 CPAP/BIPAP Problems Incorrect oxygen concentration 
during CPAP or BIPAP 
Setup error, oxygen supply failure, 
equipment failure/use error 
Hypoxia, distress, discomfort 
0.0073 
Clinical External - Other 
Therapy 
197 Other therapies - Unauthorized 
medications 
Unauthorised medications Patient administered or  
unprescribed medication 
Therapy interference 
  
Clinical External - Person 214 Unauthorized administration of 
oxygen 
Oxygen administered by 
unauthorized person or without 
clinical authorization 
Human error, Lack of staff, Task 
overload, ward management 
failure, organizational failure, 
procedure/process error 
Inappropriate therapy 
  
Clinical Patient 64 Equipment delivering another 
therapy fails causing interference 
with this one 
Interference with the therapy Equipment Failure for another 
therapy 
Incorrect or inadequate therapy, 
discomfort, physical harm 0.1827 
Clinical Patient 68 Unintentional action by patient 
interferes with the therapy 
Undetected therapy failure Patients actions Incorrect or inadequate therapy, 
discomfort, physical harm 0.1343 
Clinical Patient 70 Action taken by a patient related to 
natural relief compromises the 
therapy 
Suspension of therapy Patient leaves the bed to go to the 
toilet 
Increased possibility of therapy not 
being resumed, Reduced or 
interrupted therapy or no therapy if 
undetected, distracted staff 
0.1327 
Clinical Patient 71 Action taken by a patient to relieve 
discomfort compromises the 
therapy 
Suspension of therapy Patient changes position or moves 
between bed and chair 
Increased possibility of therapy not 
being resumed, Reduced or 
interrupted therapy or no therapy if 
undetected, distracted staff 
0.1751 
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Subsystem Component 
Hazard 
ID Hazard Type Hazardous Element Initiating Mechanisms Threats/Effects Risk 
Clinical Patient 73 Patient has to take action to 
enable them to talk, eat or drink 
Suspension of therapy or 
food/drink not consumed 
Patient has to suspend the therapy 
to enable them to talk, eat or drink 
Increased possibility of therapy not 
being resumed, Reduced or 
interrupted therapy or no therapy if 
undetected, Food / drink not 
consumed, distracted staff 
0.1343 
Clinical Patient 73.1 Patient has to take action to 
enable them to take oral meds 
Suspension of therapy or oral 
meds not taken 
Patient has to suspend the therapy 
to enable them to take oral meds 
Increased possibility of therapy not 
being resumed, Reduced or 
interrupted therapy or no therapy if 
undetected, Oral meds not taken, 
distracted staff 
0.1343 
Clinical Patient 74 Actions by patient causes them to 
become entangled in the oxygen 
tubing 
Patient entanglement Patient movements Incorrect or inadequate therapy, 
discomfort, physical harm 0.1875 
Clinical Patient 77 Movements or actions during 
sleep compromise the therapy 
Undetected therapy failure Unintentional patient actions or 
movements 
Interrupted therapy resulting in no 
therapy if this remains undetected 0.1712 
Clinical Patient 80 Innocent action by patient 
compromises the therapy 
Undetected therapy failure Unintentional Interrupted therapy resulting in no 
therapy if this remains undetected 0.1712 
Clinical Patient 91 The patients condition minimises 
communication and involvement 
Limited information, patient 
involvement and feedback 
Lack of communication Patient cannot report changes in 
condition or requirement leading to 
the possibility for sub-optimal therapy 
0.0301 
Clinical Patient 66 A patient takes action related to 
another therapy, which 
compromises this one 
Undetected therapy failure Patients actions related to another 
therapy 
Incorrect or inadequate therapy, 
discomfort, physical harm 0.1898 
Clinical Patient 93 Patient vomiting while an 
accessory is in position 
Vomiting into a face mask Lack of vigilance, ineffective 
patient monitoring 
If the patient is wearing a face mask, 
there is a strong possibility of 
choking. The mask has to be 
removed while the patient is 
vomiting, resulting in reduced or no 
therapy. 
0.1314 
Clinical Patient 153 Smoking Fire Smoking in an oxygen rich 
environment 
Fire to bed linen or oxygen delivery 
accessories 0.0130 
Clinical Patient 82 Patient refuses to co-operate with 
the therapy by removing an 
accessory and ignoring requests 
to replace it 
Misplaced accessory Patient co-operation Limited or no therapy and distracted 
staff 0.1599 
Clinical Patient 69 Unauthorized or inappropriate 
action by the patient 
Undetected therapy failure Unauthorized or inappropriate 
action by the patient 
Incorrect or inadequate therapy, 
discomfort, physical harm 0.2040 
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Hazard 
ID Hazard Type Hazardous Element Initiating Mechanisms Threats/Effects Risk 
Clinical Patient 22 Impaired speech due to the face 
mask or other aspect of the 
therapy making communication 
difficult 
Lack of communication through 
impaired speech 
A face mask or other aspect of the 
therapy causing impairment 
Limited communication 
0.0137 
Clinical Patient Monitoring 92 Undetected change in patient 
condition 
Undetected change in patient 
condition 
Lack of vigilance, ineffective 
patient monitoring, interference 
from an environmental factor 
Incorrect or inadequate therapy, 
discomfort, physical harm 0.3864 
Clinical Patient Monitoring 127 Failure to adequately monitor a 
patient during treatment with 
another therapy 
Undetected change in patient 
condition 
Lack of vigilance Incorrect or inadequate therapy, 
discomfort, physical harm 0.2127 
Clinical Patient Monitoring 194 Monitoring equipment - Physical 
harm from sensors 
Sensors left in the same position 
for too long 
Human error, lack of 
knowledge/skill 
Burns or pressure sores from sensor 
placements   
Clinical Patient Monitoring 201 Patient monitoring - Equipment 
unavailable 
No patient monitoring equipment 
available 
Equipment management error, 
Patient management error 
Patient cannot be monitored 
effectively, possibility of undetected 
condition changes 
  
Clinical Patient Monitoring 44 Undetected disconnection of 
patient monitoring equipment  
Undetected monitoring failure Monitoring equipment 
disconnection 
Patient monitoring error, Incorrect or 
inadequate therapy, discomfort, 
physical harm 
0.0447 
Clinical Patient Monitoring 141 Sensitive alarms and persistent 
nurse calls from patients 
Undetected therapy failure Frequently occurring alarms Desensitization to alarms resulting in 
Impaired vigilance, No response to 
alarms from monitoring equipment 
and nurse calls 
0.0311 
Clinical Patient/External - 
Person 
188 Inappropriate advice to patient 
from unauthorized person 
Incorrect or inappropriate advice Untrained staff, visitors giving 
advice 
Inapropriate or incorrect action   
Clinical Patient/Patient 
Monitoring 
47 Patient actions adversely affecting 
patient monitoring 
Interference with patient 
monitoring 
Patients actions Ineffective patient monitoring 
0.1006 
Clinical Patient/Staff 72 Patient refuses to co-operate with 
clinical staff regarding the therapy 
Suspension of therapy Lack of patient co-operation Increased possibility of therapy not 
being resumed, Reduced or 
interrupted therapy or no therapy if 
undetected, distracted staff 
0.1599 
Clinical Patient/Therapeutic 
Subsystem 
206 Self Harm - Strangulation with 
oxygen tubing 
Self Harm - Strangulation with 
oxygen tubing 
Patient not assessed as "At-risk",  
Lack of vigilance 
Serious physical harm, Death, 
Traumatized staff and patients   
Clinical Staff 175 Deviations from accepted 
procedure 
Inappropriate deviation from 
accepted procedure 
human error, lack of  
knowledge/skill, insufficient 
process checks 
Sub-optimal patient care, 
Inconsistent patient care, 
Inappropriate action, inadequate or 
no therapy 
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ID Hazard Type Hazardous Element Initiating Mechanisms Threats/Effects Risk 
Clinical Staff 14 Administering or adjusting another 
therapy causes interference with 
this one 
Interference from adjustment of 
another therapy 
Human error, lack of 
knowledge/skill, Lack of vigilance 
Physical interference causing 
inadequate therapy 0.1060 
Clinical Staff 65 A required action related to 
another therapy causes a 
distraction which compromises this 
therapy 
Staff distraction Action required for the 
administration of another therapy 
lack of vigilance, incomplete, 
Incorrect or inadequate therapy, 
discomfort, physical harm 0.1079 
Clinical Staff 9 Inadequacy of pro forma or 
another communication tool 
Information missing or incorrect An inadequate communication tool Delays or incorrect decisions based 
on poor information 0.1419 
Clinical Staff 20 Calls for assistance unanswered Unanswered calls for assistance Lack of vigilance Incorrect, Inadequate or No Therapy, 
discomfort, physical harm 0.0578 
Clinical Staff 100 Insufficient staff numbers to 
effectively manage patients 
receiving therapy 
Lack of staff Management error, Institutional 
issue 
Sub-optimal patient care, Reduced 
patient monitoring, Impaired 
vigilance, Inconsistent patient care, 
Inappropriate action, inadequate or 
no therapy 
0.1242 
Clinical Staff 109 Incorrect action taken when 
attempting to rectify a setup error 
Incorrect action Setup error and human error Incorrect or inadequate therapy, 
discomfort, physical harm 0.5396 
Clinical Staff 18 Process or patient management 
errors moving patients from one 
bed to another 
Patient placed in an inadequate 
bed space 
Moving patients between bed 
spaces 
Inadequate, incorrect or no therapy 
applied 0.2190 
Clinical Staff 128 Patient requirement incorrectly 
assessed 
clinical error: 
diagnosis/assessment 
Human error, Lack of Knowledge / 
Skill 
Incorrect or inadequate therapy, 
discomfort, physical harm 0.3788 
Clinical Staff 13 Clinical activity interfering with the 
therapy 
Unexpected influence on therapy 
by routine tasks. 
Interference from clinical 
interventions to patient receiving 
oxygen therapy 
Change induces ineffective therapy. 
0.4615 
Clinical Staff 167 Communication/Structure - refusal 
to assess patient 
Clinician cannot or will not assess 
patient 
Institutional communication or 
structure errors 
Sub-optimal patient care, 
Inconsistent patient care, 
Inappropriate action, inadequate or 
no therapy 
  
Clinical Staff 7 Latent error causes a failure in 
communication or process 
Latent error in communication or 
process methods 
Human error - mistakes in process 
definitions 
Following the defined process leads 
to error 0.1730 
Clinical Staff 164 Bed spaces not prepared Bed spaces not adequately 
prepared for patients requiring 
therapy 
Lack of staff, Task overload, ward 
management failure, 
organizational failure 
Delayed or no therapy 
  
Clinical Staff 6 Distraction caused by activity on 
the ward 
Distraction of clinical staff Unusual or intrusive activity on the 
ward 
Impaired vigilance, Increased 
possibility of human error 0.0058 
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Hazard 
ID Hazard Type Hazardous Element Initiating Mechanisms Threats/Effects Risk 
Clinical Staff 4 An environmental factor promotes 
inappropriate action 
Inappropriate or incorrect action - 
Staff 
Human factors - An environment 
of excessive Noise, Light, 
Darkness or discomfort 
Incorrect, Inadequate or No Therapy, 
discomfort, physical harm 0.0058 
Clinical Staff 143 Staff are allowed to undertake 
tasks without adequate or relevant 
skills or knowledge  
No method available to prevent 
unauthorized staff attempting 
clinical or nursing tasks 
Lack of skill/knowledge, protocol / 
procedure error 
Sub-optimal patient care, 
Inconsistent patient care, 
Inappropriate action, inadequate or 
no therapy 
0.3710 
Clinical Staff 1 Incorrect clinical decision or action Clinical Error - Undetected 
incorrect clinical decision or action 
Incorrect information, lack of 
knowledge or skill, human error 
Incorrect, Inadequate or No Therapy 0.1749 
Clinical Staff 8 Patient management errors when 
patients arrive after transfer 
Patient placed in an incorrect ward 
or bed space. 
Patient Management error Inadequate, unreliable or no therapy 0.0904 
Clinical Staff 24 Missing or incomplete patient 
notes 
Missing or incomplete patient 
notes 
Human error - Notes mislayed or 
misfiled  
Delays or incorrect decisions based 
on poor information 0.0552 
Clinical Staff 61 Failure to act on a detected 
therapy administration error 
Failure to act on a Therapy 
administration error 
Human error Incorrect or inadequate therapy, 
discomfort, physical harm 0.5408 
Clinical Staff 41 Failure of staff to communicate 
regarding equipment required in 
patient transfer 
Unavailable equipment Failure to communicate a 
requirement 
Incorrect or inadequate therapy, 
discomfort, physical harm 0.1939 
Clinical Staff 30 Prescriptions or treatment orders 
incorrect or not made 
Incorrect action Communication, protocol or 
procedure failure 
No therapy or incorrect therapy 0.2473 
Clinical Staff 29 Nursing staff not responding to 
requests or orders from doctors 
Failure to act Communication or protocol failure No therapy or incorrect therapy 0.2049 
Clinical Staff 211 Transferring without adequate 
escort 
Patients on oxygen therapy 
transferred without escort 
Human error, Lack of staff, Task 
overload, ward management 
failure, organizational failure, 
procedure/process error 
Sub-optimal patient care, 
Inconsistent patient care, 
Inappropriate action, inadequate or 
no therapy 
  
Clinical Staff 46 Failure to respond to patient or 
therapy monitoring alerts due to a 
lack of staff 
No response to monitoring alerts lack of staff Incorrect or inadequate therapy, 
discomfort, physical harm 0.1440 
Clinical Staff 21 Patient requests or needs 
unfulfilled 
Unfulfilled patient need Failure to act Incorrect, Inadequate or No Therapy, 
discomfort, physical harm 0.0322 
Clinical Staff 63 Failure to act on a detected early 
therapy termination 
Failure to act on an early therapy 
termination 
Human error No therapy, discomfort, physical 
harm 0.6046 
Clinical Staff 23 Communication failures at patient 
hand-over  
Poor communication at patient 
handover 
Poorly defined process, not 
following procedure, complacency 
Incorrect action or failure to act 0.1662 
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ID Hazard Type Hazardous Element Initiating Mechanisms Threats/Effects Risk 
Clinical Staff 26 Poor communication between 
doctors and nursing staff regarding 
setup or adjustment 
Incorrect action or no action Communication failure between 
clinical staff 
No therapy or incorrect therapy 
0.0613 
Clinical Staff 59 Incorrect actions at patient 
handover 
Protocol/procedure error: Incorrect 
action 
Handing over care from one team 
to another 
Incorrect or inadequate therapy, 
discomfort, physical harm 0.2317 
Clinical Staff 25 Incorrect information in patient 
notes 
Incorrect information entered into 
patient notes 
Human error - Mistakes when 
writing notes, wrong patients notes 
written in 
Incorrect action or failure to act 
0.0552 
Clinical Staff/Cylinder 155 Delays or failures with Cylinder 
Replacement/Refilling 
Lack of available cylinders Request for replacement not 
made, request not received or 
handled by porters, insufficient 
central stock 
Delayed or no therapy 
0.0306 
Clinical Staff/Cylinder 161 Cylinder Identification Staff unable to identify cylinder 
contents 
Staff knowledge, improper/ unclear 
or missing content label/colour 
code 
Wrong gas applied 
0.0017 
Clinical Staff/Cylinder 216 Use Error - Cylinder not switched 
on 
Cylinder not turned on at setup Human error, lack of 
knowledge/skill, Communication 
error 
No therapy 
  
Clinical Staff/Cylinder 209 Staff knowledge/Skill - not able to 
identify an oxygen failure alarm 
Staff unable to identify oxygen 
cylinders 
Unmarked/labelled/coded 
cylinders, lack of knowledge/skill 
Wrong gas, no therapy, delayed 
therapy   
Clinical Staff/Cylinder 173 Cylinder management error - Not 
turned off after use 
Cylinders placed in storage 
without being turned off 
Human error Depleted cylinders in storage, 
oxygen enriched storage area   
Clinical Staff/External - 
institutional 
210 staff unavailable - too busy Staff unavailable Lack of staff, Task overload, ward 
management failure, 
organizational failure 
Sub-optimal patient care, 
Inconsistent patient care, 
Inappropriate action, inadequate or 
no therapy 
  
Clinical Staff/External - 
Person 
203 Procedural error - Delegating 
clinical/nursing tasks to parents 
Clinical tasks inappropriately 
delegated to parents 
lack of knowledge/skill, Human 
error, procedure/protocol error, 
lack of staff 
Sub-optimal patient care, 
Inconsistent patient care, 
Inappropriate action, inadequate or 
no therapy 
  
Clinical Staff/Patient 58 Incorrect action when responding 
to a change in a patients condition 
Clinical error: incorrect action Change in patients condition Incorrect or inadequate therapy, 
discomfort, physical harm 0.6505 
Clinical Staff/Patient 134 Other medication interfering with 
this therapy 
Undetected drug interference Communication error, Human 
error, Lack of Knowledge / Skill 
Incorrect or inadequate therapy, 
discomfort, physical harm 0.3844 
Clinical Staff/Patient 55 Changing a patients posture or 
position interferes with the therapy 
Interference with the therapy Change in patients posture or 
position 
Incorrect or inadequate therapy, 
discomfort, physical harm 0.2009 
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ID Hazard Type Hazardous Element Initiating Mechanisms Threats/Effects Risk 
Clinical Staff/Patient 28 Communication failures between 
clinician and patient during an 
examination 
Incorrect or incomplete information 
or diagnosis 
Misunderstanding between doctor 
and patient 
Incorrect or inadequate therapy, 
discomfort, physical harm 0.0590 
Clinical Staff/Patient 56 Preparing a patient for transfer 
interferes with the therapy 
Interference with the therapy Preparation for transfer Incorrect or inadequate therapy, 
discomfort, physical harm 0.2353 
Clinical Staff/Patient 57 Moving a patient between bed and 
chair causes interference with the 
therapy 
Interference with the therapy Transferring a patient between 
bed and chair 
Incorrect or inadequate therapy, 
discomfort, physical harm 0.2659 
Clinical Staff/Patient 139 Bed spaces are in close proximity Confusion with therapies common 
to two patients in close proximity 
Proximity of bed spaces, Poor 
ward layout, Patient management 
error, Ward management error, 
Central bed management error 
Reduced access, Increased 
possibility of wrong patient incidents 
(e.g. wrong patients flow rate 
adjusted) 
0.1207 
Clinical Staff/Patient 49 Failure to detect patient 
entanglement in oxygen tubing  
Undetected patient entanglement Lack of vigilance Impaired therapy, physical harm 0.1951 
Clinical Staff/Patient 200 Patient left unattended Unattended patient on an oxygen 
cylinder 
Human error, Organizational error, 
Process/protocol error 
Undetected cylinder depletion, 
physical harm from 
accessories/tubing 
  
Clinical Staff/Patient 158 Retrolental Fibroplasia Oxygen overdose to neonate Human error, Clinical error Retrolental Fibroplasia, Permanent 
blindness 0.0113 
Clinical Staff/Patient 165 Clinical Error - Making decisions 
without reference to diagnostic 
results 
Decisions made without reference 
to diagnostic results 
Urgency, human error, delayed 
results 
Sub-optimal patient care, 
Inconsistent patient care, 
Inappropriate action, inadequate or 
no therapy 
  
Clinical Staff/Patient 205 Procedural delay - Examination Delay in conducting an 
examination 
Human error, lack of staff, Task 
overload, ward management 
failure, organizational failure 
Delayed clinical decision or action 
  
Clinical Staff/Patient 148 Incorrect management of patients 
with COPD 
COPD Incorrect therapy or wrong dose CO2 retention, respiratory failure, 
Lack of oxygen if dose too low 0.1853 
Clinical Staff/Patient 
Monitoring 
45 Failure to respond to or implement 
patient monitoring 
Undetected therapy failure Patient monitoring error through 
failure to act 
Incorrect or inadequate therapy, 
discomfort, physical harm 0.1472 
Clinical Staff/Patient 
Monitoring 
35 Mistakes or equipment failures 
when changing from portable to 
installed monitoring or vice-versa 
Ineffective patient monitoring Human error or equipment failure 
when changing between 
monitoring devices 
delayed or ineffective monitoring 
0.0525 
Clinical Staff/Patient 
Monitoring 
43 Human error by clinical staff when 
monitoring patients 
Undetected therapy failure Lack of vigilance through patient 
monitoring error 
Incorrect or inadequate therapy, 
discomfort, physical harm 0.1233 
Clinical Staff/Therapeutic 
Subsystem 
215 Unsuitable running repairs Inappropriate running repairs done 
to therpay system 
Equipment fault, Lack of available 
replacements, procedure/process 
error, lack of knowledge/skill 
Unreliable therapy, physical harm 
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Clinical Staff/Therapeutic 
Subsystem 
192 Interference from nursing tasks - 
Accidental therapy disconnection 
Accidental disconnection at any 
point in the therapy system 
Human error, loose connections Sudden loss of therapy 
  
Clinical Staff/Therapy 
Monitoring 
131 Incorrect action when responding 
to or implementing patient 
monitoring 
Incorrect action Human error, Lack of Knowledge / 
Skill 
Reduced patient monitoring, 
Impaired vigilance, Incorrect or 
inadequate therapy, discomfort, 
physical harm 
0.2582 
Clinical Staff/Therapy 
Setup 
191 Insufficient cylinder contents for 
transfer 
Insufficient cylinder contents for 
transfer 
Contents not checked before 
transfer, replacement cylinder not 
ordered in time 
Cylinder depletion during transfer 
  
Clinical Staff/Therapy 
Setup 
176 Distraction of staff - Issue with this 
therapy puts other patients at risk 
Staff are distracted by dealing with 
a problem with oxygen therapy 
Human error, lack of staff, Task 
overload, ward management 
failure, organizational failure 
Sub-optimal patient care, 
Inconsistent patient care, 
Inappropriate action, inadequate or 
no therapy 
  
Clinical Staff/Therapy 
Setup 
169 Contamination hazard - Used 
accessories not disposed of and 
replaced 
Accessories used by a previous 
patient left at the bed space 
Human error, lack of staff, Task 
overload, ward management 
failure, organizational failure 
Cross-infection 
  
Clinical Staff/Therapy 
Setup 
136 Therapy not set up according to 
prescription or treatment order 
Undetected setup error  Communication error, Human 
error, Lack of Knowledge / Skill 
Incorrect or inadequate therapy, 
discomfort, physical harm 0.3441 
Clinical Staff/Therapy 
Setup 
154 Delayed Action from Staff Delay in specifying, applying or 
adjusting therapy 
Lack of staff or busy environment Hypoxia, distress, discomfort 0.0073 
Clinical Staff/Therapy 
Setup 
183 Equipment not checked Equipment placed into storage for 
re-use or taken for use without 
being checked 
Human error, lack of staff, Task 
overload, ward management 
failure, organizational failure 
Unreliable, malfunctioning or 
contaminated equipment used on a 
patient 
  
Clinical Therapy Monitoring 40 Failure to respond to an 
equipment alarm or warning 
Undetected therapy failure Lack of vigilance through 
unattended alarms or equipment 
notifications 
Incorrect or inadequate therapy, 
discomfort, physical harm 0.1164 
Clinical Therapy Monitoring 48 Failure of therapy monitoring to 
detect a therapy disconnection 
Undetected therapy disconnection Ineffective patient monitoring No therapy 0.1225 
Clinical Therapy Monitoring 50 Failure to detect cylinder depletion 
when in use 
Undetected cylinder depletion Lack of vigilance or information No therapy 0.2651 
Clinical Therapy Monitoring 62 Failure to detect that the therapy 
has terminated early 
Undetected therapy termination Therapy monitoring No therapy, discomfort, physical 
harm 0.3011 
Clinical Therapy Monitoring 54 Failure to notice an incorrectly 
positioned accessory 
Misplaced accessory Lack of vigilance Incorrect or inadequate therapy, 
discomfort, physical harm 0.2151 
Clinical Therapy Monitoring 120 Failure by clinical staff to notice a 
patient disconnection 
Undetected therapy disconnection Lack of vigilance No therapy 0.1363 
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Hazard 
ID Hazard Type Hazardous Element Initiating Mechanisms Threats/Effects Risk 
Clinical Therapy Monitoring 129 Failure to respond to or implement 
therapy monitoring 
Undetected therapy failure Human error, Lack of Knowledge / 
Skill 
Incorrect or inadequate therapy, 
discomfort, physical harm 0.2816 
Clinical Therapy Monitoring 2 Failure to recognize and act on an 
imminent therapy failure 
Therapy failure (Undetected) Lack of vigilance, knowledge or 
Skill 
Incorrect, Inadequate or No Therapy 0.0254 
Clinical Therapy Setup 15 Wrong type of accessory used for 
a particular therapy setup 
Wrong accessory for purpose Human error, lack of 
knowledge/skill, Correct accessory 
not available 
Incorrect or inadequate therapy, 
discomfort, physical harm 0.4287 
Clinical Therapy Setup 36 Equipment improperly checked Unreliable equipment Human error: Equipment checks Unreliable therapy or monitoring 0.1525 
Clinical Therapy Setup 60 Incorrect actions during patient 
transfer 
Protocol/procedure error: Incorrect 
action 
Transferring a patient between 
wards/departments 
Incorrect or inadequate therapy, 
discomfort, physical harm 0.4551 
Clinical Therapy Setup 53 Accessory incorrectly administered 
or moved into an incorrect position 
by clinical staff 
Misplaced accessory Staff actions Incorrect or inadequate therapy, 
discomfort, physical harm 0.2209 
Clinical Therapy Setup 113 A change of accessory is 
incorrectly implemented 
Undetected setup error  Human error Incorrect or inadequate therapy, 
discomfort, physical harm 0.4538 
Clinical Therapy Setup 126 Wrong type of accessory used for 
a particular therapy setup 
Use error  Lack of Knowledge or Skill Limited, interrupted, Incorrect or No 
Therapy 0.1723 
Clinical Therapy Setup 123 Therapy incorrectly or 
inappropriately set up when re-
administered after a previous 
termination 
Undetected incorrect or 
inappropriate therapy re-
administration 
Re-administering the therapy after 
a previous termination 
Incorrect or inadequate therapy, 
discomfort, physical harm 0.2653 
Clinical Therapy Setup 122 Flow rate incorrectly or 
inappropriately adjusted 
Dosage error Human error, Lack of Knowledge / 
Skill 
Incorrect or inadequate therapy, 
discomfort, physical harm 0.3736 
Clinical Therapy Setup 121 Failure to detect a setup error Undetected setup error  Lack of vigilance Incorrect or inadequate therapy, 
discomfort, physical harm 0.2503 
Clinical Therapy Setup 119 Change either way between piped 
supply and cylinder incorrectly 
implemented 
Undetected setup error  Human error Incorrect or inadequate therapy, 
discomfort, physical harm 0.1613 
Clinical Therapy Setup 207 Setup - Oxygen not turned on Oxygen supply not turned on at 
setup 
Human error, lack of 
knowledge/skill, Communication 
error 
No therapy 
  
Clinical Therapy Setup 117 An incorrect adjustment is made to 
the therapy 
Undetected setup error  Human error Incorrect or inadequate therapy, 
discomfort, physical harm 0.2081 
Clinical Therapy Setup 107 Mistakes in setting up the therapy Undetected setup error  Human error Incorrect or inadequate therapy, 
discomfort, physical harm 0.2766 
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ID Hazard Type Hazardous Element Initiating Mechanisms Threats/Effects Risk 
Clinical Therapy Setup 105 A factor relating to design within 
the therapy or the environment 
causes setup error 
Undetected setup error  Human factors: Difficulty in 
administering therapy 
Incorrect or inadequate therapy, 
discomfort, physical harm 0.1300 
Clinical Therapy Setup 202 Pressure/Abrasion sores from 
accessories 
Poorly fitting accessories left in 
place too long 
Human error, setup error, Therapy 
management error 
Pressure sores or abraisions   
Clinical Therapy Setup 137 A human factors issue with any 
equipment causes a functional 
failure because Equipment is 
applied differently to its intended 
use 
Incorrect application of equipment Equipment use error Limited, interrupted, Incorrect or No 
Therapy 
0.2093 
Clinical Therapy Setup 208 Setup error - Venturi mask Flow rate does not match venturi 
specification 
Human error, lack of 
knowledge/skill 
Inadequate therapy   
Clinical Therapy 
Setup/Supply 
212 Transport without oxygen Patients who require oxygen 
therapy are 
transported/transferred without 
Human error, lack of 
knowledge/skill, Lack of staff, Task 
overload, ward management 
failure, organizational failure, 
procedure/process error 
Hypoxia, distress, discomfort 
  
Clinical Therapy 
Setup/Supply 
218 Wrong wall port - Suction instead 
of oxygen 
Patient connected to suction port 
instead of oxygen 
lack of knowledge/skill, Human 
error, procedure/protocol error 
Hypoxia, physical harm, distress   
Supply All 108 Undetected failed oxygen supply Undetected supply failure Lack of vigilance and Wall port 
failure, flow meter fault, Pipeline 
and alarm system failure or 
cylinder depletion 
Incorrect or inadequate therapy, 
discomfort, physical harm 0.2337 
Supply Cylinder 170 Cylinder damage - Incorrect 
positioning on trolley 
Aluminium cylinder crushed or 
punctured by bed or trolley height 
adjustment 
Cylinder incorrectly positioned Explosion/high pressure discharge, 
leak, unexpected depletion   
Supply Cylinder 179 Equipment missing - Cylinder Cylinder not in expected position human error, theft, lack of 
cylinders 
Delayed or no therapy   
Supply Cylinder 174 Cylinder Quality - New cylinder 
empty 
Unused, sealed new cylinder is 
empty 
Manufacturing error, leaking 
cylinder 
Delayed or no therapy   
Supply Cylinder 172 cylinder faulty - leaking  Leaking cylinder Faulty valve, faulty regulator, 
cracked /punctured cylinder 
Unexpected depletion   
Supply Cylinder 180 Equipment missing - Cylinder key No cylinder key available to turn 
on gas supply 
human error, theft, lack of cylinder 
keys 
Delayed or no therapy   
Supply Cylinder 32.1 Position of cylinder at the bed side 
causes unknown cylinder contents 
Unknown cylinder contents Obscured view of cylinder Unreliable therapy, undetected 
cylinder depletion 0.2409 
Supply Cylinder 32 Position of cylinder at the bed side 
causes Physical obstruction 
Physical obstruction at the bed 
side 
Badly positioned Cylinder Delayed or impaired access to 
patient, physical harm 0.0671 
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Supply Cylinder 171 Cylinder Faulty - Cannot turn on 
gas 
Cylinder valve cannot be opened Dabaged nut or faulty valve Delayed or no therapy   
Supply Cylinder 152.1 Wrong cylinder used Wrong gas Human error when applying 
therapy, Different cylinders stored 
together 
Hypoxia, poisoning 
0.0176 
Supply Cylinder 32.2 Position of cylinders at the bed 
side causes patients movements 
to be restricted by tubing position 
Patients movements restricted by 
tubing position 
Cylinder too far from patient Displaced accessory, discomfort 
0.1718 
Supply Cylinder 151 Manual Handling - Cylinders Heavy, awkward cylinders Moving or lifting cylinders Falling cylinders or injury to staff 0.0068 
Supply Cylinder 150 Cylinder management - 
Unsecured/Unrestrained 
Unrestrained cylinders Moving or bumping into the 
cylinder 
Falling cylinder harming people, 
damaging equipment or the cylinder, 
sudden loss of therapy to patient 
0.0160 
Supply Cylinder/External - 
Institutional 
204 Procedural delay - Cylinder 
restocking 
Delay in replacement of empty 
cylinders 
Ward management error, 
procedure/process error, 
communication error, human error 
Cylinders not available for use 
  
Supply External - 
Infrastructure 
147 Not enough oxygen outlets for the 
number of patients requiring 
therapy 
Unavailability of piped oxygen 
outlets 
Insufficient number of oxygen 
outlets 
Cylinders have to be used, reducing 
the reliability of the therapy or 
patients must be moved to other 
wards. Major threats are: Inadequate, 
unreliable or no therapy due to 
insufficient capacity,  
0.1154 
Supply External - 
Infrastructure 
145 No provision for the safe and 
organized storage of oxygen 
cylinders 
The chaotic storage of used and 
full cylinders together 
Inadequate Storage Full and used cylinders stored 
together on the wards leading to the 
increased possibility of selecting one 
without adequate content 
0.2283 
Supply External - 
Infrastructure 
140 Two or more patients sharing a 
wall port or cylinder 
Confusion with therapies common 
to two patients in close proximity 
Shared resources, Human error, 
Ward layout error, Patient 
management error 
Increased possibility of wrong patient 
incidents (e.g. wrong patients flow 
rate adjusted), Faster cylinder 
depletion, Possible common failure 
(same failure affecting two patients) 
0.2157 
Supply External - 
institutional 
217 Ward management - Empty and 
full cylinders stored together 
Empty and full cylinders stored 
together 
Ward management error, 
procedure/process error, 
communication error, human error 
Unexpected cylinder depletion, 
delayed therapy, no therapy   
Supply External - 
Maintenance 
196 Oil used on oxygen outlet Oil used on the oxygen outlet or 
regulator components 
Lack of Knowledge or Skill, 
maintenance tasks carried out by 
untrained staff 
Fire or explosion 
  
Supply Flow Regulation 186 Flow meter not properly attached 
to wall port 
Improperly attached flow meter 
falling or being expelled out of wall 
port 
Human error, faulty shraeder valve Falling equipment hitting patients or 
staff, sudden loss of therapy   
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Supply Flow Regulation 157 Flow Meter Fault Incorrect indication of flow rate Mechanical fault Incorrect therapy 0.0037 
Supply Flow Regulation 181 Equipment missing - Flow meter Flow meter missing from wall 
outlet or cylinder 
human error, theft, lack of flow 
meters 
Delayed or no therapy   
Supply Piped 152 Wrong Gas port used Wrong gas Human error when applying 
therapy 
Hypoxia, poisoning 0.0193 
Supply Piped 166 Collision between patient and 
pipeline outlet hardware 
Patients colliding with therapy 
outlet hardware 
Patient movements, 
posture/position changes, patient 
transfers 
Physical harm 
  
Supply Piped 168 Contaminated pipeline Contaminants in oxygen pipeline Ingress at a puncture, particles or 
chemicals from maintenance tasks 
Hypoxia, poisoning   
Supply Pressure 
Regulation 
163 Regulator Faults Faulty pressure reducing regulator 
on a cylinder 
Mechanical fault Low pressure, High pressure, 
Incorrect or inadequate therapy, 
discomfort, physical harm 
0.0027 
Supply Pressure 
Regulation 
182 Equipment missing - Regulator Regulator missing from cylinder human error, theft, lack of 
regulators, not swapped over on 
cylinder replacement 
Delayed or no therapy 
  
Supply Pressure 
Regulation 
199 Oxygen Regulator Fire Fire or explosion of oxygen 
regulator 
Manufacturing error, Maintenance 
error, Oil/debris ingress 
Fire, High speed projectiles, 
percussive bang, damaged 
equipment, physical harm to people 
in proximity, sudden loss of therapy 
  
Therapeutic All 178 Equipment design issue Confusing or difficult to use 
equipment 
Design error or insuficient 
attention to human factors 
Setup or use error, Sub-optimal 
patient care, Inconsistent patient 
care, Inappropriate, inadequate or no 
therapy 
  
Therapeutic All 198 Oxygen flow impeded - Accessory 
blocked 
Occluded accessory Debris or deposits, Manufacturing 
error, setup error 
No oxygen flow   
Therapeutic External - 
Environment 
42 Environmental issues like noise or 
cramped space cause visitors 
actions to interfere with the 
therapy 
Interference/tampering with the 
therapy 
Visitors actions when reacting to 
the environment 
Incorrect or inadequate therapy, 
discomfort, physical harm, distraction 
of staff 0.0199 
Therapeutic External - 
Institutional 
99 A lack of available equipment for 
therapy administration or 
monitoring 
Lack of Equipment Management error, 
Purchasing/stores error 
Sub-optimal or ineffective therapy, 
No therapy 0.1652 
Therapeutic External - 
Institutional, 
Humidifier 
193 Lack of resources; sterile water for 
humidifiers 
No sterile water available for 
humidifiers 
Resource management error, 
Central stores stock error 
No humidification, non sterile water 
used resulting in an infection hazard   
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Therapeutic External - Person 3 Unauthorized or inappropriate 
action by others 
Inappropriate or incorrect action - 
unauthorized person 
Lack of vigilance, Visitor 
management failure, unrestricted 
access 
Incorrect, Inadequate or No Therapy, 
discomfort, physical harm, distracted 
staff 
0.0018 
Therapeutic External - Person 10 Innocent action by visitor to aid 
patient comfort compromises this 
therapy 
Incorrect action by an 
unauthorized person 
Therapy parameters are changed 
by uninformed action by visitor 
when patient or equipment is 
moved 
Reduced or interrupted therapy or no 
therapy if undetected. Distracted 
staff. 0.0419 
Therapeutic Humidifier 187 Humidifier use error - Refilled with 
saline 
Humidifier refilled with saline Human error, lack of 
knowledge/skill 
Salt deposits blocking humidifier   
Therapeutic Humidifier 98 Humidifier incorrectly set up, used 
inappropriately or not used when it 
should 
Humidification error Lack of procedure/protocol, Lack 
of knowledge/skill, Human factors, 
Lack of equipment 
Incorrect or inadequate therapy, 
discomfort, physical harm 0.2108 
Therapeutic Humidifier 184 Faulty humidifier Humidifier does not provide the 
correct level of humidification or 
dispenses an incorrect oxygen 
concentration 
Mechanical fault Incorrect therapy 
  
Therapeutic Humidifier 125 Undetected humidifier water 
depletion 
Undetected humidifier water 
depletion 
Lack of vigilance Inadequate, unreliable or no therapy 0.1460 
Therapeutic Patient Connection 31 Spectacles or other obstructions 
on the face 
Poorly fitting patient accessory Spectacles or other obstructions 
on the face 
Incorrect or inadequate therapy, 
discomfort, physical harm 0.1587 
Therapeutic Patient Connection 177 Endotracheal tube blocked Blocked endotracheal tube Setup error, debris Hypoxia, distress, discomfort   
Therapeutic Patient Connection 160 Tracheostomy Complications Loose or blocked tracheostomy Setup error, patient movement, 
debris 
Hypoxia, distress, discomfort 0.0113 
Therapeutic Patient Connection 116 An accessory is incorrectly or 
inappropriately disconnected by 
clinical staff 
Undetected accessory 
disconnection 
Human error, Lack of Knowledge 
or Skill 
Incorrect or inadequate therapy, 
discomfort, physical harm 0.4918 
Therapeutic Patient Connection 115 An accessory is displaced when a 
patient's position or posture is 
changed 
Accessory displacement Changing a patients posture or 
position 
Incorrect or inadequate therapy, 
discomfort, physical harm 0.2168 
Therapeutic Patient Connection 101 Failure to correct a displaced 
accessory 
Misplaced accessory Failure to act Incorrect or inadequate therapy, 
discomfort, physical harm 0.2038 
Therapeutic Patient Connection 90 The accessory has to be changed 
to relieve patient discomfort 
Unsuitable accessory Accessory causes discomfort Patient removes accessory to relieve 
discomfort 0.1206 
Therapeutic Patient Connection 67 Accessory moved into an incorrect 
position by Patient 
Misplaced accessory Patients actions Incorrect or inadequate therapy, 
discomfort, physical harm 0.2688 
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Therapeutic Patient Connection 37 Physical failure of a patient 
connected accessory 
Undetected accessory failure Any physical or functional failure of 
any accessory 
Limited or complete lack of therapy 0.1326 
Therapeutic Tubing 118 Bubble tubing incorrectly cut Undetected setup error  Human error Incorrect or inadequate therapy, 
discomfort, physical harm 0.0901 
Therapeutic Tubing 213 Tubing damaged - Melted due to 
contact with hot surface 
Contact between tubing and hot 
surfaces 
Tubing routing error, Patient 
movements or actions 
Fire, oxygen leak, ineffective therapy, 
inhalation of smoke/vapour   
Therapeutic Tubing 110 Therapy tubing disconnected in 
error 
Undetected tubing disconnection Inappropriate or inadvertent action No therapy 0.4555 
Therapeutic Tubing 189 Infection risk - Fungus in oxygen 
tubing 
Fungal growth in oxygen tubing Non-sterile water in humidifier, 
tubing in use for too long 
Respiratory infection   
Therapeutic Tubing 34 Tubing pinched in furniture or 
other equipment at the bed side 
Damaged or occluded tubing Poor tubing position Possible undetected tubing 
disconnection, occlusion or cutting 
causing a loss or reduction of therapy 
or an oxygen leak. 
0.0908 
      Mean 0.1663 
      1.5 times the Mean 0.2494 
      0.5 times the Mean 0.0831 
     Risk Key: High > 0.2494 
      Moderate > 0.1663 < 0.2494 
      Minor > 0.0831 < 0.1663 
      Low < 0.0831 
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Appendix E The Formal Hazard Analyses. 
E.1 Failure Modes and Effects Analysis. 
Table Appendix E.1-1 The Failure Modes and Effects Analysis of ward based Oxygen Therapy. 
System 
Element 
Failure Mode Causes Detection 
Methods 
Effects Severity Likelihood Detection RPN Proportional 
Risk 
Failure Mode 
Proportional Risk 
Element 
Risk 
Subsystem 
Risk 
1.1.1a Therapy cannot be 
set up 
6 2 1 12 0.033 0.003 0.030 0.193 
1.1.1b Supply fails during 
use 
6 2 1 12 0.033       
1.1.1c Change to 
cylinders 
2 2 1 4 0.011       
1.1.1. No Supply No gas, Pipeline 
damaged, 
Maintenance 
Alarm panel 
1.1.1d Transfer to another 
ward 
2 2 1 4 0.011       
1.1.2a Poisoning 6 2 10 120 0.333 0.012     
1.1.2b Change to 
cylinders 
2 2 1 4 0.011       
1.1.2. Contamination Residue from 
maintenance, 
Substance 
ingress due to 
damage, 
Backflow from 
devices 
None 
1.1.2c Transfer to another 
ward 
2 2 1 4 0.011       
1.1.3a Therapy cannot be 
set up 
6 4 2 48 0.133 0.006     
1.1.3b Change to 
cylinders 
2 4 1 8 0.022       
1.1.3. No Ports 
Available 
Insufficient 
capacity, 
Overpopulated 
ward 
Planning 
1.1.3c Transfer to another 
ward 
2 4 1 8 0.022       
1.1.4a Hypoxia 5 2 8 80 0.222 0.008     1.1.4. Wrong Gas 
Administered 
Human error Visual 
1.1.4b Delayed therapy 2 2 1 4 0.011       
1.1.5a Flow meter will not 
attach 
2 2 1 4 0.011 0.001     
1.1. Piped 
Supply 
1.1.5. Port Connector 
Failure 
Wear, Damage Visual 
1.1.5b Flow meter is 
expelled during use 
2 1 2 4 0.011       
1.2.1a Hypoxia 5 3 8 120 0.333 0.012 0.049   1.2.1. Wrong Gas Human error None 
1.2.1b Delayed therapy 2 3 1 6 0.017       
1.2. 
Cylinder 
Supply 
1.2.2. Empty Leaking, 
Incorrect 
Pressure 
gauge 
1.2.2a Therapy cannot be 
set up 
5 4 1 20 0.056 0.018     
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Risk 
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Risk 
1.2.2b Therapy fails 
during use 
5 4 8 160 0.444       Pressure 
Indication 
1.2.2c Delayed therapy 2 4 1 8 0.022       
1.2.3a Therapy cannot be 
set up 
5 2 2 20 0.056 0.002     1.2.3. No cylinders 
Available 
No Central 
Stock, Ward 
management 
error 
Ward 
management 
1.2.3b Delayed therapy 2 3 1 6 0.017       
1.2.4a Therapy cannot be 
set up 
5 2 8 80 0.222 0.008     1.2.4. Cylinder Valve 
Shut 
Human error, No 
Key 
Ward 
management 
1.2.4b Delayed therapy 2 4 1 8 0.022       
1.2.5a Cylinder falls when 
moved 
3 3 5 45 0.125 0.008     1.2.5. Falling Cylinder Unsecured Visual 
1.2.5b Cylinder falls when 
bumped 
3 3 5 45 0.125       
1.3.1a Fire due to 
contaminants 
5 1 8 40 0.111 0.009 0.053   
1.3.1b Will not fit on 
cylinder 
2 2 2 8 0.022       
1.3.1. Incorrect Gas 
Type 
Human error None 
1.3.1c Incorrect pressure 
output 
3 2 8 48 0.133       
1.3.2. Incorrect 
Connector Type 
Human error Visual 1.3.2a Accessories will not 
fit 
2 4 5 40 0.111 0.004     
1.3.3a Therapy cannot be 
set up 
5 2 2 20 0.056 0.003     1.3.3. No Regulators 
Available 
Equipment 
Management 
Error 
Ward 
management 
1.3.3b Delayed therapy 2 3 2 12 0.033       
1.3.4. Pressure gauge 
reading Low 
Mechanical 
Fault 
None 1.3.4a Cylinder replaced 
early 
1 4 10 40 0.111 0.004     
1.3.5. Pressure gauge 
reading High 
Mechanical 
Fault 
None 1.3.5a Unexpected 
depletion 
5 4 10 200 0.556 0.019     
1.3. 
Pressure 
Regulator 
1.3.6. Leaking Mechanical 
Fault 
Audible/Visible 1.3.6a Cylinder depletes 
before expected 
5 4 8 160 0.444 0.015     
1.4.1a Fire due to 
contaminants 
4 1 2 8 0.022 0.001 0.062   1.4.1. Incorrect Gas 
Type 
Human Error Visual 
1.4.1b Incorrect flow 
reading 
2 1 2 4 0.011       
1.4.2a Therapy cannot be 
set up 
5 2 2 20 0.056 0.003     1.4.2. No Flow meters 
Available 
Equipment 
Management 
Error 
Ward 
management 
1.4.2b Delayed therapy 2 4 2 16 0.044       
1.4. Flow 
Regulator 
1.4.3. Wrong flow range Human Error, Visual 1.4.3a Flow rate too high 4 3 2 24 0.067 0.006     
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1.4.3b Flow rate too low 4 3 2 24 0.067       Not obviously 
distinctive, All 
stored together 1.4.3c Delayed therapy 2 4 2 16 0.044       
1.4.4a Therapy cannot be 
set up 
5 3 5 75 0.208 0.011     1.4.4. Incorrect Outlet 
Connector 
Human Error Visual 
1.4.4b Delayed therapy 2 4 5 40 0.111       
1.4.5a Flow rate unknown 3 4 5 60 0.167 0.010     1.4.5. Inaccessible while 
in use 
Environmental 
factor, Human 
Error 
Visual 
1.4.5b Flow rate cannot 
be changed 
3 3 5 45 0.125       
1.4.6. Leaking When 
Turned Off 
Mechanical 
Fault 
Audible 1.4.6a Cylinder depletes 
in storage 
2 4 8 64 0.178 0.006     
1.4.7a Too much oxygen 4 2 10 80 0.222 0.017     1.4.7. Flow Reading 
Low 
Mechanical 
Fault 
None 
1.4.7b Cylinder depletes 
before expected 
5 2 10 100 0.278       
1.4.8. Flow Reading 
High 
Mechanical 
Fault 
None 1.4.8a Too little oxygen 4 2 10 80 0.222 0.008     
2.1.1a Humidifier used 
when not required 
2 3 5 30 0.083 0.011 0.089 0.448 2.1.1. No Protocol Institutional 
Error 
Ward 
management 
2.1.1b Humidifier not used 
when required 
3 6 5 90 0.250       
2.1.2a Humidifier used 
when not required 
2 3 8 48 0.133 0.011     2.1.2. Incorrect Protocol Human error Review 
2.1.2b Humidifier not used 
when required 
3 3 8 72 0.200       
2.1.3a Humidifier used 
when not required 
2 3 8 48 0.133 0.014     2.1.3. Protocol not 
Applied 
Human Error, 
Complacency 
Visual 
2.1.3b Humidifier not used 
when required 
3 4 8 96 0.267       
2.1.4a Therapy set up with 
low flow so that humidifier 
is not required 
4 4 5 80 0.222 0.016     
2.1.4b Therapy set up with 
high flow, humidified 
3 2 5 30 0.083       
2.1.4c Therapy set up with 
low flow and humidifier 
applied 
4 1 5 20 0.056       
2.1. Choice 
(Humidifier) 
2.1.4. No Information for 
Decision 
Human Error, 
Missing Notes 
Procedural 
2.1.4d Therapy set up with 
high flow, not humidified 
2 4 5 40 0.111       
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2.1.5a Humidifier used 
when not required 
2 2 10 40 0.111 0.018     2.1.5. Incorrect 
Information 
Human Error None 
2.1.5b Humidifier not used 
when required 
3 5 10 150 0.417       
2.1.6a Humidifier used 
when not required 
2 2 8 32 0.089 0.010     2.1.6. Decision by 
untrained person 
Institutional 
Error 
Review of 
notes 
2.1.6b Humidifier not used 
when required 
3 3 8 72 0.200       
2.1.7a Humidifier used 
when not required 
2 2 8 32 0.089 0.010     2.1.7. Incorrect decision Human Error Re-
examination 
2.1.7b Humidifier not used 
when required 
3 3 8 72 0.200       
2.2.1a Therapy not 
applied 
5 2 2 20 0.056 0.009 0.054   
2.2.1b Delayed therapy 4 3 2 24 0.067       
2.2.1c Therapy set up with 
low flow so that humidifier 
is not required 
4 4 2 32 0.089       
2.2.1. No Humidifiers 
Available 
Central Supplies 
failure, Ward 
Management 
Error 
Ward 
management 
2.2.1d Therapy set up with 
specified flow, not 
humidified 
3 4 2 24 0.067       
2.2.2. Connections 
loose 
Equipment 
Failure, Human 
Error 
None 2.2.2a Undetected 
disconnection 
5 2 10 100 0.278 0.009     
2.2.3. Connections 
leaking 
Equipment 
Failure, Human 
Error 
None 2.2.3a Incorrect delivered 
flow  
4 3 10 120 0.333 0.011     
2.2.4. Water level low Human Error Visual 2.2.4a Unhumidified 
therapy 
2 4 2 16 0.044 0.002     
2.2.5. Flow too high for 
Concentration setting 
Human Error, 
Use Error 
Visual 2.2.5a Oxygen 
concentration higher than 
set value 
2 4 5 40 0.111 0.004     
2.2.6. Flow too low for 
concentration setting 
Human Error, 
Use Error 
Visual 2.2.6a Lower than set 
concentration 
4 4 5 80 0.222 0.008     
2.2.7a Adjustments 
cannot be made 
4 3 5 60 0.167 0.008     
2.2. 
Humidifier 
2.2.7. Humidifier 
inaccessible 
Environmental 
factor, Human 
Error 
Visual 
2.2.7b Maintenance 
cannot be carried out 
2 3 5 30 0.083       
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2.2.8. Humidifier not 
visible 
Environmental 
factor, Human 
Error 
Visual 2.2.8a Status cannot be 
monitored 
2 3 5 30 0.083 0.003     
2.3.1a Therapy not 
applied 
5 2 2 20 0.056 0.007 0.115   
2.3.1b Delayed therapy 4 3 2 24 0.067       
2.3.1. Correct tubing not 
available 
Central Supplies 
failure, Ward 
Management 
Error 
Ward 
management 
2.3.1c Incorrect type used 5 3 2 30 0.083       
2.3.2a Insufficient flow 
rate 
4 3 5 60 0.167 0.013     2.3.2. Incorrect type / 
Diameter used 
Human Error Visual 
2.3.2b Water from 
humidifier trapped 
5 3 5 75 0.208       
2.3.3a Excess tubing 
snagging 
2 3 5 30 0.083 0.017     
2.3.3b Patient 
entanglement 
3 3 5 45 0.125       
2.3.3c Untidy bed space 2 3 5 30 0.083       
2.3.3. Tubing too long Human Error, 
Stock Error 
Visual 
2.3.3d Unsafe routing 5 3 5 75 0.208       
2.3.4a Patient discomfort 2 3 5 30 0.083 0.010     2.3.4. Tubing too short Human Error, 
Stock Error 
Visual 
2.3.4b Unsafe routing 5 3 5 75 0.208       
2.3.5. Unsafe routing Human Error Visual 2.3.5a Tubing damage 5 3 8 120 0.333 0.011     
2.3.6. Connections 
loose 
Human Error None 2.3.6a Undetected 
disconnection 
5 3 10 150 0.417 0.014     
2.3.7. Connections 
leaking 
Human Error None 2.3.7a Incorrect delivered 
flow  
4 3 10 120 0.333 0.011     
2.3.8. Tubing ruptured Human Error audible 2.3.8a Incorrect delivered 
flow  
4 3 8 96 0.267 0.009     
2.3.9. Tubing squashed 
/ pinched 
Human Error Visual 2.3.9a Reduced flow 5 3 8 120 0.333 0.011     
2.3. Tubing 
2.3.10. Tubing occluded Human Error Visual 2.3.10a Reduced flow 5 3 8 120 0.333 0.011     
2.4.1. No Protocol Institutional 
Error 
None 2.4.1a Nebulizer used 
incorrectly 
3 2 5 30 0.083 0.003 0.047   
2.4.2. Incorrect Protocol Human error Review 2.4.2a Nebulizer used 
incorrectly 
3 2 8 48 0.133 0.005     
2.4.3. Protocol not 
Applied 
Human error, 
Complacency 
Visual 2.4.3a Nebulizer used 
incorrectly 
3 2 8 48 0.133 0.005     
2.4. Choice 
(Nebuliser) 
2.4.4. No Information for 
Decision 
Procedural 
Error, Human 
Error 
None 2.4.4a Nebulised 
medication not 
administered 
3 3 5 45 0.125 0.007     
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2.4.4b Nebulised 
medication wrongly 
administered 
2 3 5 30 0.083       
2.4.5a Nebulised 
medication not 
administered 
3 3 8 72 0.200 0.011     2.4.5. Incorrect 
Information 
Procedural 
Error, Human 
Error 
None 
2.4.5b Nebulised 
medication wrongly 
administered 
2 3 8 48 0.133       
2.4.6a Nebulised 
medication not 
administered 
3 2 8 48 0.133 0.008     2.4.6. Decision by 
untrained person 
Institutional 
Error, Ward 
Management 
Error 
Review 
2.4.6b Nebulised 
medication wrongly 
administered 
2 2 8 32 0.089       
2.4.7a Nebulised 
medication not 
administered 
3 2 5 30 0.083 0.005     2.4.7. Incorrect decision Human Error Re-
examination 
2.4.7b Nebulised 
medication wrongly 
administered 
2 2 5 20 0.056       
2.4.8a Nebulised 
medication not 
administered 
3 2 5 30 0.083 0.005     2.4.8. Patient 
requirement incorrectly 
assessed 
Human Error Re-
examination 
2.4.8b Nebulised 
medication wrongly 
administered 
2 2 5 20 0.056       
2.5.1. Flow rate too low Human Error Visual 2.5.1a Inefficient 
nebulisation 
2 4 8 64 0.178 0.006 0.031   
2.5.2a Patient discomfort 2 5 5 50 0.139 0.009     2.5.2. Flow rate too high Human Error Visual 
2.5.2b Wasted medication 2 5 5 50 0.139       
2.5.3a Patient harm 5 2 2 20 0.056 0.004     2.5.3. Incorrect 
medication type 
Human Error Dispensing 
Checks 2.5.3b Nebuliser occlusion 5 2 2 20 0.056       
2.5.4. Nebulizer not 
available 
Central Supplies 
failure, Ward 
Management 
Error 
Ward 
management 
2.5.4a Medication cannot 
be administered 
2 3 2 12 0.033 0.001     
2.5.5a No medication 
nebulised 
2 3 5 30 0.083 0.008     
2.5. 
Nebulizer 
2.5.5. Incorrectly 
attached 
Human Error Visual 
2.5.5b No oxygen flow 5 2 5 50 0.139       
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2.5.6a No medication 
nebulised 
2 3 2 12 0.033 0.003     
2.5.6b Too much 
medication administered 
2 3 2 12 0.033       
2.5.6. Medication 
incorrectly applied 
Human Error Dispensing 
Checks 
2.5.6c Too little 
medication administered 
2 3 2 12 0.033       
2.6.1a Patient discomfort 2 2 2 8 0.022 0.002 0.112   2.6.1. Wrong size face 
mask 
Human Error, 
Stock Error 
Visual 
2.6.1b Inefficient therapy 3 2 2 12 0.033       
2.6.2a Patient discomfort 2 3 5 30 0.083 0.007     2.6.2. Specs used on 
high flow 
Human error Visual 
2.6.2b Nasal sinus 
damage 
3 3 5 45 0.125       
2.6.3. Face mask used 
on flow lower than 
recommended 
Human Error, 
Use Error 
Visual 2.6.3a CO2 from 
exhallation not expelled 
before next breath 
3 5 8 120 0.333 0.011     
2.6.4. Non-rebreathe 
mask with flow too low 
Human Error, 
Use Error 
Visual 2.6.4a Resevoire not fully 
replenished between 
breaths 
3 4 5 60 0.167 0.006     
2.6.5a Increased effort of 
breathing 
2 4 2 16 0.044 0.002     2.6.5. Non-rebreathe 
bag with no flow 
Human Error, 
Use Error 
Visual 
2.6.5b Suffocation 5 1 2 10 0.028       
2.6.6a Patient discomfort 2 2 5 20 0.056 0.009     
2.6.6b Inefficient therapy 3 2 5 30 0.083       
2.6.6. Inappropriate 
Position / Placement at 
setup 
Human error,  Visual 
2.6.6c No therapy 5 2 5 50 0.139       
2.6.7a Patient discomfort 2 6 8 96 0.267 0.034     
2.6.7b Inefficient therapy 3 6 8 144 0.400       
2.6.7. Moved into 
inappropriate Position / 
Placement 
Patient actions, 
Human error 
Visual 
2.6.7c No therapy 5 3 8 120 0.333       
2.6.8a Therapy not 
applied 
5 2 2 20 0.056 0.005     
2.6.8b Delayed therapy 2 4 2 16 0.044       
2.6.8. Correct 
Accessory not Available 
Central Supplies 
failure, Ward 
Management 
Error 
None 
2.6.8c Incorrect Acessory 
Used 
2 4 2 16 0.044       
2.6.9a Patient discomfort 2 2 5 20 0.056 0.005     2.6.9. Mask Split Mechanical 
Fault, 
Mishandling 
Visual 
2.6.9b Inefficient therapy 3 2 5 30 0.083       
2.6.10a Mask cannot be 
fitted 
2 4 5 40 0.111 0.009     
2.6. Patient 
Connection 
2.6.10. Mask strap 
broken 
Mechanical 
Fault, 
Mishandling 
Visual 
2.6.10b Mask falls off 4 3 5 60 0.167       
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2.6.11. Specs Occluded Nasal deposits, 
manufacturing 
fault, Twisted / 
Kinked 
Visual 2.6.11a Therapy not 
applied 
4 3 5 60 0.167 0.006     
2.6.12. Mask Blocked Deposits, 
manufacturing 
fault 
None 2.6.12a Therapy not 
applied 
5 2 5 50 0.139 0.005     
2.6.13. Tracheostomy 
loose 
Human Error, 
Manufacturing 
fault 
Visual 2.6.13a Inefficient therapy 4 4 5 80 0.222 0.008     
2.6.14. Tracheostomy 
Blocked 
Deposits, 
manufacturing 
fault 
Routine 
checks 
2.6.14a Therapy not 
applied 
5 4 2 40 0.111 0.004     
3.1.1. Condition 
changes 
Multiple Patient 
monitoring, 
Clinical 
examination, 
Patient report 
3.1.1a Therapy becomes 
unsuitable 
5 5 2 50 0.139 0.005 0.062 0.368 
3.1.2. Does not co-
operate 
Multiple Visual 3.1.2a Therapy not 
possible  
4 5 10 200 0.556 0.019     
3.1.3. Cannot 
communicate 
Multiple Interview 3.1.3a Delayed therapy 4 4 2 32 0.089 0.003     
3.1.4. Moves or 
removes mask 
Multiple Patient 
monitoring 
3.1.4a Compromised 
therapy 
5 4 8 160 0.444 0.015     
3.1.5. Tampers with 
therapy settings 
Boredom, 
Curiosity, 
attempt to 
relieve 
discomfort 
Patient 
monitoring 
3.1.5a Compromised 
therapy 
5 3 8 120 0.333 0.011     
3.1. Patient 
3.1.6. Experiences 
discomfort 
Multiple Patient 
monitoring 
3.1.6a Action taken 
compromises therapy 
4 3 8 96 0.267 0.009     
3.2.1. Equipment total 
failure 
Multiple Visual 3.2.1a No warnings of 
change to patient 
condition 
5 4 5 100 0.278 0.009 0.046   
3.2.2. Use error Human error, 
Equipment 
design factor 
None 3.2.2a No warnings of 
change to patient 
condition 
5 4 8 160 0.444 0.015     
3.2.3. Equipment not 
available 
Multiple Ward 
management 
3.2.3a No patient 
monitoring 
5 3 5 75 0.208 0.007     
3.2. Patient 
Monitoring 
3.2.4. Incorrect 
information 
Equipment error, 
Setup error 
None 3.2.4a ineffective patient 
monitoring 
5 3 10 150 0.417 0.014     
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3.3.1. Not set up 
according to 
specification 
Human error, 
Parts 
unavailable 
Visual 3.3.1a Unsuitable therapy 5 3 8 120 0.333 0.011 0.059   
3.3.2. Therapy not 
applied 
Human error, 
Communication 
error 
Clinical review 3.3.2a No therapy 5 3 2 30 0.083 0.003     
3.3.3a Unsuitable therapy 5 6 8 240 0.667 0.045     
3.3. Setup 
and 
Monitoring 
3.3.3. Therapy status 
not monitored 
Human error, 
Procedural error 
None 
3.3.3b Undetected therapy 
failure 
5 6 8 240 0.667       
3.4.1a Delayed therapy 5 5 5 125 0.347 0.040 0.201   
3.4.1b ineffective patient 
monitoring 
5 6 5 150 0.417       
3.4.1. Staff not available Institutional and 
ward 
management 
Management 
process 
3.4.1c Ineffective therapy 
management 
5 6 5 150 0.417       
3.4.2a Delayed therapy 5 6 8 240 0.667 0.068     
3.4.2b ineffective patient 
monitoring 
5 6 8 240 0.667       
3.4.2. Over tasked Institutional and 
ward 
management 
Management 
process 
3.4.2c Ineffective therapy 
management 
5 6 8 240 0.667       
3.4.3a No therapy 5 4 8 160 0.444 0.026     3.4.3. Fail to 
communicate 
process and 
procedural error, 
attitude 
None 
3.4.3b clinical error 5 3 8 120 0.333       
3.4.4a Unsuitable therapy 5 4 5 100 0.278 0.019     3.4.4. Insufficient 
knowledge / Skill 
Lack of effective 
training, attitude 
Ward 
management 3.4.4b compromised 
therapy 
5 4 5 100 0.278       
3.4.5. Diagnosis error Multiple Clinical review 3.4.5a Clinical error 5 3 2 30 0.083 0.012     
3.4.6a No therapy 5 4 5 100 0.278 0.019     3.4.6. Therapeutic 
requirement error 
Multiple Clinical review 
3.4.6b Unsuitable therapy 5 4 5 100 0.278       
3.4.7. Therapy 
specification error 
Human error Review at 
setup 
3.4.7a Unsuitable therapy 5 5 5 125 0.347 0.012     
3.4. Clinical 
Staff 
3.4.8. Therapy not 
specified 
Human error, 
Procedural error 
Clinical review 3.4.8a Therapy not 
applied, Unsuitable 
therapy 
5 6 2 60 0.167 0.006     
 98    Total Risk 10645 29.569 1.009 1.009 1.009 
     Average Risk 61.89 0.172 0.010 0.072 0.336 
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Figure Appendix E-1 Top Tree 1 
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Figure Appendix E-2 Top Tree 2 
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Figure Appendix E-3 Piped Supply Error 
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Figure Appendix E-4 Cylinder Error 
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Figure Appendix E-5 Cylinder Regulator Error. 
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Figure Appendix E-6 Flow Regulator Error. 
 
300 
Cut Sets
A,T1,B
A,T1,C
A,T1,D
A,T1,E
A,T1,F
A,T1,G
A,T1,H
A,T1,I
A,T1,K
A,T1,L
A,T1,N1,M
A,T1,N1,T2
A,T1,N1,T3
A,T1,N2,J
 
Figure Appendix E-7 Applied Part Displacement. 
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Figure Appendix E-8 Setup Error. 
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Figure Appendix E-9 Cylinder Attached to Patient. 
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Figure Appendix E-10 Not Replaced in Time. 
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Figure Appendix E-11 Inadequate Monitoring of Therapy. 
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Figure Appendix E-12 Humidifier Error. 
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Figure Appendix E-13 Equipment Failure. 
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Table Appendix E.3-1 HAZOP of 15 January 2008. 
Likelhd Sevrty Safegrds Actns Entity Attribute Guideword Deviation from intent Consequences 
(1 – 6) (1 – 
6) 
(Y / N) (Y / 
N) 
Risk Notes 
Harm to one patient 1 5 y y 5   As Well As 1. Correct gas mixed 
with another substance Harm to multiple patients 1 6 y y 6   
Harm to one patient 1 5 y   5   Part Of 2. Correct gas for some 
of the time, changing to 
wrong gas. 
Harm to many patients 1 6 y   6   
1. Gas 
Type 
Other 
Than 
3. Wrong Gas Hypoxic gas like helium  
would cause miltiple harm 
1 6 y   6   
Single outlet, single 
patient no therapy(Would 
require there to be no 
cylinders available 
simultaneously) 
1 5 y   5   
Single outlet, single 
patient reguiring cylinder. 
1 2 y   2   
Multiple outlets, 
insuficient cylinders 
1 6 y   6   
No 1. No pressure 
Multiple outlets, Multiplr 
patients requiring 
cylinders 
1 2     2   
Higher than set flow rate 1 2     2   More 2. Too much pressure 
Equipment damage, harm 
to multiple patients 
1 6     6   
Less 3. Not enough pressure Muliple patients affected. 
Possible lower than 
required therapy 
2 3     6   
2. 
Pressure / 
Supply 
Part Of 4. No gas for some time 
and then gas supply 
reinstated 
Fluctuating supply; 
difficult to detect 
2 3     6   
If detected: Patient placed 
on less reliable cylinder 
supply 
6 1 y y 6   
1. Piped 
Oxygen 
Supply 
3. 
Availability 
of Ports 
No 1. No ports available 
If detected: Patient 
moved to another ward 
4 2 y   8   
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Likelhd Sevrty Safegrds Actns Entity Attribute Guideword Deviation from intent Consequences 
(1 – 6) (1 – 
6) 
(Y / N) (Y / 
N) 
Risk Notes 
(Gender specific bays or 
no cylinders available) 
If undetected: Similar to 
no pressure, but more 
hazardous due to 
unawareness 
6 5 n y 30   
Move patients around 
within the ward giving 
priority to those with high 
flow rate requirement 
6 1 n y 6   
Patient connected to a 
port that is not turned on 
2 2 n y 4   
Patient plugged into outlet 
of wrong gas 
2 5     10   
Wrong flow meter 
adjusted giving two 
patients wrong therapy 
2 4     8   
More 2. More than one port in 
close proximity 
Many patients on medium 
to high flow rates causing 
a drop in supply pressure 
to that area. 
1 6     6   
As well as 4. Gasses of different 
types in close proximity 
Harm to one patient 
possible in Critical care 
areas. 
1 3     3 This cannot happen on 
general wards as there is 
only one gas outlet. On 
critical care, patients are 
carefully monitored, so 
consequences would be 
detected and mitigated 
No therapy, possible 
death 
5 5 y y 25   No 1. No gas 
Delay while  cylinder is 
replaced 
5 1     5   
Less 3. Too little gas (failure in 
use) 
No therapy, possible 
death 
5 5 y y 25   
2. Cylinder 
Oxygen 
Supply 
1. 
Contents 
As well as 4. Correct gas mixed Contaminated supply, 1 5 n n 5   
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Likelhd Sevrty Safegrds Actns Entity Attribute Guideword Deviation from intent Consequences 
(1 – 6) (1 – 
6) 
(Y / N) (Y / 
N) 
Risk Notes 
patient poisoned with another substance 
Substance in cylinder 
valve causes regulator to 
fail 
1 5 y n 5   
Other than 7. Wrong gas Severe harm or death if 
undetected. Possibility of 
the same cylinder being 
used again. 
1 5 n y 5   
No Therapy. 1 5 y y 5   No 1. No cylinders available 
Delay while  cylinder is 
replaced 
4 3 y y 12   
More 2. Too many cylinders 
available 
Problems with storage 
and physical hazards 
from manual handling. 
1 2 y n 2   
Less 4. Too few cylinders 
available 
Posibility of running out. 
Most serious patients will 
be on wall supply. 
Possibility of problems for 
transfers. 
2 6 ? y 12   
5. Cylinders of different 
gas types stored 
together 
Possibility of taking 
cylinder of wrong gas 
? ? ? y     As well as 
6. Empty, part used and 
full cylinders in same 
storeage area 
Difficult to manage stock 
and possibility of delays 
or therapy failures. 
6 5 n y 30   
Other than 7. Only cylinders of 
different gas types 
available 
No therapy 1 5     5   
2. 
Availability 
of 
Cylinders 
Late 8. Cylinder made 
available too late 
Delayed therapy 2 5 ? n 10 Stock control issue 
Physical hazard.  6 2     12   As well as 1. Cylinder or trolley 
protruding into next bed 
space 
Tubing not able to reach 
patient 
6 2     12   
3. Position 
/ 
Placement 
Other than 2. Cylinder in another Physical hazard.  2 2     4   
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Likelhd Sevrty Safegrds Actns Entity Attribute Guideword Deviation from intent Consequences 
(1 – 6) (1 – 
6) 
(Y / N) (Y / 
N) 
Risk Notes 
bay/bed space Tubing not able to reach 
patient 
2 2     4   
Below 4. Cylinder too low Tubing not able to reach 
patient 
5 1 n y 5   
Physical hazard.  5 1 n y 5   Behind 5. Cylinder obscured or 
obstructed Problems moving the 
patient 
6 2 n y 12   
In front 6. Cylinder obscuring or 
obstructing something 
Physical hazard.  6 2 n ? 12   
Through 7. Cylinder being moved 
through an area 
Collision hazard 2 2 ? ? 4   
Over 8. Cylinder placed on top 
of something 
Physical hazard.  2 1 n n 2 Cylinders are sometimes 
placed on beds 
Under 9. Something on top of 
cylinder 
Cylinder becomes 
obstructed 
2 1 n n 2 linked hazard with 
'Obscured cylinder' 
No 1. Not secured Falling cylinder 6 2 n y 12   
Less 2. Inadequately secured Falling cylinder 3 2 y y 6   
4. Properly 
secured 
Part of 3. Secured but not 
according to proper 
procedure or regulations 
Falling cylinder 5 2 ? y 10   
1. Cylinders do not fit 
into emergency trolleys 
Cylinders have to be 
brought to an emergency 
seperately, causing delay 
? ? ? y     5. Cylinder 
Type/ Size 
Other 
Than 
2. Cylinders do not have 
sufficient contents. 
Possibility of undetected 
depletion. 
? ?         
3. 
Pressure 
Regulation 
3. 
Pressure 
Information 
More 2. Pressure indicated as 
higher than true value 
(over reading) 
Strong posibility of 
undetected depletion 
because pressure 
indicates more content 
than is the case  
? 5 ? y     
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Table Appendix E.3-2 HAZOP of 22 January 2008, Worksheet 1. 
Entity Attribute Guideword Interpretation Possible deviations. (May include direct harm 
to the patient or a cascade of events which 
may lead to harm.) 
Severity Likelihood Safeguards Actions 
              (Y / N) (Y / N) 
1. 
Patient 
Age Above Over a certain age No Hazard Catastrophic       
          Major       
          Moderate       
          Minor       
          Negligible       
    Below Below a certain age Possibility of Retinopathy in premature babies Catastrophic   y  Y:  
          Major 1   
          Moderate     
          Minor     
          Negligible   
Monitoring, 
Training, BGA, 
TCM 
  
  Condition More Condition worse than 
expected 
1. Patients recovering from surgery on wards Catastrophic 3 y  Y 
        2. Any medical patient can get worse Major 4 Mandatory Minimal 
          Moderate       
          Minor       
          Negligible       
    Less Condition improves Patient could get better and no longer require 
oxygen therapy 
Minor 1 y n 
          Negligible       
    As Well As Combined Conditions 1. Confusion due to dementure or mental health 
may result in patient removing therapy 
Catastrophic 1 y y 
        2. Tracheostomies - Special equipment required Major       
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Entity Attribute Guideword Interpretation Possible deviations. (May include direct harm 
to the patient or a cascade of events which 
may lead to harm.) 
Severity Likelihood Safeguards Actions 
        3. COPD; Retainer with M.I. Moderate       
        4. Drug abuse Minor       
        5. Unnoticed secondary condition (see also 1.2.1) Negligible 5     
1. 
Patient 
Condition Other Than Conditions that cannot be 
treated with plain Oxygen 
Therapy. (Not mechanically 
assisted) 
See condition worse than expected Catastrophic 3     
          Major 4     
          Moderate       
          Minor       
          Negligible       
  Actions Other than Patient takes action that 
interferes with oxygen 
therapy 
See co-operation and combined conditions 
 
      
                 
      Tampering Patient fiddles with therapy due to Catastrophic   y y 
         boredom, Attention seeking, percieved need Major       
        Moderate       
         Minor 3     
          Negligible       
      Self harm Suicide using oxygen tubing Catastrophic 2 y y 
              Policies Needs 
Review 
              training   
  Co-
operation 
No Patient will not co-operate 
with staff 
Patient wants to die Catastrophic       
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Entity Attribute Guideword Interpretation Possible deviations. (May include direct harm 
to the patient or a cascade of events which 
may lead to harm.) 
Severity Likelihood Safeguards Actions 
        Wants to do something off the ward Major       
        Patient does not like the therapy Moderate       
          Minor 2     
          Negligible 5     
    Part Of Patient complies with part 
of instruction 
May be result of negotiation Catastrophic   y y 
        May result in sub optimal care Major   Monitoring Review 
          Moderate   Assessment   
          Minor   Documentation   
          Negligible 1     
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Table Appendix E.3-3 HAZOP of 22 January 2008, Worksheet 2. 
Safeguards Actions Entity Attribute Guideword Interpretation Possible deviations. (May include direct 
harm to the patient or a cascade of 
events which may lead to harm.) 
Severity Likelihood 
(Y / N) (Y / N) 
Catastrophic 1 1. Staff to patient. Patient cannot receive 
due to stroke or coma. No direct hazard 
except that problems cannot be made 
known and there is an 'increased likelihood 
of exacerbation of an issue 
Major   
2. patient to staff only: May cause anxiety 
and frustration, but it is hard to identify a 
hazard 
Moderate   
  Minor   
Direction Part Of Communication is 
one way 
  Negligible   
    
Catastrophic 1 
Major   
Moderate   
Minor   
No No understanding 
achieved 
Possible delay in actionfrom either party. 
Negligible 5 
    
Catastrophic   
Major   
Moderate 3 
Minor   
Part of Some 
understanding is 
achieved 
Patients need is communicated(e.g. they 
need a drink), but patient does not know 
what to do in order to consume the drink 
and so patient goes thirsty 
Negligible   
    
Catastrophic   
Major   
Moderate   
Minor 1 
Patient / Clinical 
Staff 
Communication 
Clarity 
Other Than Misunderstanding Posibility of treatnent errors because of 
false responces during an assessment. 
Especially with taking histories. 
Negligible   
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Table Appendix E.3-4 HAZOP of 22 January 2008, Worksheet 3. 
Safeguards Actions Entity Attribute Guideword Interpretation Possible deviations. (May include direct 
harm to the patient or a cascade of events 
which may lead to harm.) 
Severity Likelihood 
(Y / N) (Y / N) 
Catastrophic   
Major   
Moderate   
Minor   
No No knowledge 
of oxygen 
therapy 
  
Negligible   
    
Catastrophic   
Major   
Moderate   
Minor   
Knowledge 
/ Skill 
Part Of Some 
Knowledge of 
oxygen therapy 
  
Negligible   
    
Catastrophic   
Major   
Moderate   
Minor   
No Staff not 
Available 
  
Negligible   
    
Catastrophic   
Major   
Moderate   
Minor   
3. Clinical 
Staff 
Availability 
Part Of Staff Available 
for some of the 
time 
  
Negligible   
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E.4 Hazard Analysis Methods Comparison 
 
In Table Appendix E.4-1’ below, the following symbols and colour codes are 
used: 
 
 
9 Indicates that a hazard has been fully identified 
~ Indicates that a hazard has been only partly identified 
X Indicates that a hazard has not been identified 
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Table Appendix E.4-1 The Comparison of Hazard Analysis Methods. 
Subsystem Component Hazard ID Hazard Type Hazardous Element Initiating Mechanisms 
D
elphi 
FM
EA 
FTA 
H
A
ZO
P
 
Notes 
All All 38 Technical or physical failures 
of the bed or associated 
equipment 
Malfunctioning bed or 
associated equipment 
Equipment failure 
X X X X 
  
All All 5 Non clinical staff rectifying an 
environmental fault 
Unexpected events due to 
non clinical maintenance 
work 
Environmental control 
mechanism failure, Lack of 
vigilance 
X X ~ X 
  
All External - 
Environment 
185 Fire hazard - Faulty nearby 
electrical equipment 
Fire in an oxygen enriched 
environment 
Faulty electrical equipment at 
or near an oxygen enriched 
bed space 
~ 9 9 X 
  
All External - 
Infrastructure 
146 Lifts are shared with all 
building users  
Extended and unpredictable 
transfer times 
No dedicated lift Access for 
patient transfers X X X X 
  
All External - 
Manufacturer 
195 Non-Standard equipment 
fitting sizes 
Non-Standard equipment 
fitting sizes 
Manufacturing error, 
inappropriate modification ~ ~ ~ X 
  
All External - Person 162 Actions of Paediatric Patient's 
Parents 
Inappropriate actions by 
parents of paediatric patients 
Poor communication and 
involvement with parents X X X X 
  
Clinical External - 
Environment 
52 Environmental factor 
obstructing access to the 
patient 
Obstructed access to patient Environmental factor 
X X X X 
  
Clinical External - 
Environment 
33 Surplus equipment cluttering 
the ward area 
Obstructed access or 
confusion 
Cluttered ward area 
X X X X 
  
Clinical External - 
Environment 
39 Interference from an 
environmental factor affecting 
a nurses actions in the use of 
equipment 
Equipment use error Interference from an 
environmental factor 
X 9 ~ X 
  
Clinical External - 
Environment 
51 Environmental factor 
obscuring a clear view of the 
patient 
Obscured view of patient Environmental factor 
X X X X 
  
Clinical External - 
Environment 
27 Environmental factors such as 
noise masking calls for 
assistance 
Unanswered calls for 
assistance 
High levels of ambient noise 
X X X X 
  
Clinical External - 
Environment 
96 A factor relating to design 
within the therapy or the 
environment causes staff to 
be distracted 
Distracted or inattentive staff Human factors: Difficulty in 
administering therapy X X 9 X 
  
Clinical External - 
Infrastructure 
190 Infrastructure - Emergency 
buzzer inaccessible 
Emergency buzzer is out of 
reach or faulty 
Poor room layout, equipment 
fault X X X X 
  
Clinical External - 
Institutional 
149 Lack of or poorly constructed 
guidelines 
Poor guidelines Assessing requirement or 
applying therapy 9 9 9 X 
  
Clinical External - 
Institutional 
97 A latent error in a defined 
procedure causes mistakes 
Latent error in a procedure Incorrectly defined procedure 
~ ~ 9 X   
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Subsystem Component Hazard ID Hazard Type Hazardous Element Initiating Mechanisms 
D
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FM
EA 
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Notes 
Clinical External - 
Institutional 
156 Excessive Work Load for Staff Lack of staff or busy 
environment 
Task overload, ward 
management failure, 
organizational failure 
~ 9 9 9 
  
Clinical External - Other 
Therapy 
159 CPAP/BIPAP Problems Incorrect oxygen 
concentration during CPAP 
or BIPAP 
Setup error, oxygen supply 
failure, equipment failure/use 
error 
X X X X 
  
Clinical External - Other 
Therapy 
197 Other therapies - 
Unauthorized medications 
Unauthorised medications Patient administered or  
unprescribed medication ~ ~ X X 
  
Clinical External - Person 214 Unauthorized administration 
of oxygen 
Oxygen administered by 
unauthorized person or 
without clinical authorization 
Human error, Lack of staff, 
Task overload, ward 
management failure, 
organizational failure, 
procedure/process error 
~ X X X 
  
Clinical Patient 64 Equipment delivering another 
therapy fails causing 
interference with this one 
Interference with the therapy Equipment Failure for another 
therapy X X X X 
  
Clinical Patient 68 Unintentional action by patient 
interferes with the therapy 
Undetected therapy failure Patients actions 9 9 9 9   
Clinical Patient 70 Action taken by a patient 
related to natural relief 
compromises the therapy 
Suspension of therapy Patient leaves the bed to go 
to the toilet 9 9 9 ~ 
  
Clinical Patient 71 Action taken by a patient to 
relieve discomfort 
compromises the therapy 
Suspension of therapy Patient changes position or 
moves between bed and chair 9 9 9 ~ 
  
Clinical Patient 73 Patient has to take action to 
enable them to talk, eat or 
drink 
Suspension of therapy or 
food/drink not consumed 
Patient has to suspend the 
therapy to enable them to 
talk, eat or drink 
9 9 9 X 
  
Clinical Patient 73.1 Patient has to take action to 
enable them to take oral 
meds 
Suspension of therapy or oral 
meds not taken 
Patient has to suspend the 
therapy to enable them to 
take oral meds 
9 ~ ~ X 
  
Clinical Patient 74 Actions by patient causes 
them to become entangled in 
the oxygen tubing 
Patient entanglement Patient movements 
9 ~ X X 
Incomplete FTA and HAZOP is most likely 
cause for not identified. FMEA only mentions 
entanglement with relation to tubing being too 
long. 
Clinical Patient 77 Movements or actions during 
sleep compromise the therapy 
Undetected therapy failure Unintentional patient actions 
or movements 9 ~ 9 X 
  
Clinical Patient 80 Innocent action by patient 
compromises the therapy 
Undetected therapy failure Unintentional 
~ ~ 9 X   
Clinical Patient 91 The patients condition 
minimises communication and 
involvement 
Limited information, patient 
involvement and feedback 
Lack of communication 
X ~ X 9 
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Notes 
Clinical Patient 66 A patient takes action related 
to another therapy, which 
compromises this one 
Undetected therapy failure Patients actions related to 
another therapy ~ ~ X ~ 
  
Clinical Patient 93 Patient vomiting while an 
accessory is in position 
Vomiting into a face mask Lack of vigilance, ineffective 
patient monitoring X ~ ~ ~ 
Patient Error fault tree not complete 
Clinical Patient 153 Smoking Fire Smoking in an oxygen rich 
environment X X X X 
  
Clinical Patient 82 Patient refuses to co-operate 
with the therapy by removing 
an accessory and ignoring 
requests to replace it 
Misplaced accessory Patient co-operation 
9 9 9 9 
  
Clinical Patient 69 Unauthorized or inappropriate 
action by the patient 
Undetected therapy failure Unauthorized or inappropriate 
action by the patient ~ 9 9 9 
  
Clinical Patient 22 Impaired speech due to the 
face mask or other aspect of 
the therapy making 
communication difficult 
Lack of communication 
through impaired speech 
A face mask or other aspect 
of the therapy causing 
impairment X X X ~ 
  
Clinical Patient Monitoring 92 Undetected change in patient 
condition 
Undetected change in patient 
condition 
Lack of vigilance, ineffective 
patient monitoring, 
interference from an 
environmental factor 
~ 9 ~ 9 
Patient Error fault tree not complete 
Clinical Patient Monitoring 127 Failure to adequately monitor 
a patient during treatment 
with another therapy 
Undetected change in patient 
condition 
Lack of vigilance 
X 9 X 9 
This seems like a missed duplicate 
Clinical Patient Monitoring 194 Monitoring equipment - 
Physical harm from sensors 
Sensors left in the same 
position for too long 
Human error, lack of 
knowledge/skill X X X X 
  
Clinical Patient Monitoring 201 Patient monitoring - 
Equipment unavailable 
No patient monitoring 
equipment available 
Equipment management 
error, Patient management 
error 
~ 9 X X 
Incomplete FTA and HAZOP 
Clinical Patient Monitoring 44 Undetected disconnection of 
patient monitoring equipment  
Undetected monitoring failure Monitoring equipment 
disconnection X ~ X X 
Incomplete FTA and HAZOP 
Clinical Patient Monitoring 141 Sensitive alarms and 
persistent nurse calls from 
patients 
Undetected therapy failure Frequently occurring alarms 
X X X X 
  
Clinical Patient/External - 
Person 
188 Inappropriate advice to 
patient from unauthorized 
person 
Incorrect or inappropriate 
advice 
Untrained staff, visitors giving 
advice X X X X 
  
Clinical Patient/Patient 
Monitoring 
47 Patient actions adversely 
affecting patient monitoring 
Interference with patient 
monitoring 
Patients actions 
X X X X 
  
Clinical Patient/Staff 72 Patient refuses to co-operate 
with clinical staff regarding the 
therapy 
Suspension of therapy Lack of patient co-operation 
9 9 X 9 
Incomplete FTA 
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Notes 
Clinical Patient/Therapeutic 
Subsystem 
206 Self Harm - Strangulation with 
oxygen tubing 
Self Harm - Strangulation 
with oxygen tubing 
Patient not assessed as "At-
risk",  Lack of vigilance X X X 9 
  
Clinical Staff 175 Deviations from accepted 
procedure 
Inappropriate deviation from 
accepted procedure 
human error, lack of  
knowledge/skill, insufficient 
process checks 
~ ~ ~ X 
Incomplete HAZOP 
Clinical Staff 14 Administering or adjusting 
another therapy causes 
interference with this one 
Interference from adjustment 
of another therapy 
Human error, lack of 
knowledge/skill, Lack of 
vigilance 
9 X X X 
Why? 
Clinical Staff 65 A required action related to 
another therapy causes a 
distraction which 
compromises this therapy 
Staff distraction Action required for the 
administration of another 
therapy 9 ~ ~ X 
Incomplete HAZOP 
Clinical Staff 9 Inadequacy of pro forma or 
another communication tool 
Information missing or 
incorrect 
An inadequate 
communication tool ~ ~ ~ X 
Incomplete HAZOP 
Clinical Staff 20 Calls for assistance 
unanswered 
Unanswered calls for 
assistance 
Lack of vigilance X X X ~ See 'one way communication' 
Clinical Staff 100 Insufficient staff numbers to 
effectively manage patients 
receiving therapy 
Lack of staff Management error, 
Institutional issue 9 ~ ~ ~ 
Incomplete FTA and HAZOP 
Clinical Staff 109 Incorrect action taken when 
attempting to rectify a setup 
error 
Incorrect action Setup error and human error 
~ ~ ~ ~ 
  
Clinical Staff 18 Process or patient 
management errors moving 
patients from one bed to 
another 
Patient placed in an 
inadequate bed space 
Moving patients between bed 
spaces ~ X X X 
  
Clinical Staff 128 Patient requirement 
incorrectly assessed 
clinical error: 
diagnosis/assessment 
Human error, Lack of 
Knowledge / Skill ~ 9 9 X 
  
Clinical Staff 13 Clinical activity interfering with 
the therapy 
Unexpected influence on 
therapy by routine tasks. 
Interference from clinical 
interventions to patient 
receiving oxygen therapy 
9 X X X 
Why? 
Clinical Staff 167 Communication/Structure - 
refusal to assess patient 
Clinician cannot or will not 
assess patient 
Institutional communication or 
structure errors X X X X 
  
Clinical Staff 7 Latent error causes a failure 
in communication or process 
Latent error in 
communication or process 
methods 
Human error - mistakes in 
process definitions ~ ~ ~ ~ 
  
Clinical Staff 164 Bed spaces not prepared Bed spaces not adequately 
prepared for patients 
requiring therapy 
Lack of staff, Task overload, 
ward management failure, 
organizational failure 
~ X X X 
  
Clinical Staff 6 Distraction caused by activity 
on the ward 
Distraction of clinical staff Unusual or intrusive activity 
on the ward X X ~ X 
Possible missed duplicate? 
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Notes 
Clinical Staff 4 An environmental factor 
promotes inappropriate action 
Inappropriate or incorrect 
action - Staff 
Human factors - An 
environment of excessive 
Noise, Light, Darkness or 
discomfort 
X ~ X X 
Incomplete FTA and HAZOP 
Clinical Staff 143 Staff are allowed to undertake 
tasks without adequate or 
relevant skills or knowledge  
No method available to 
prevent unauthorized staff 
attempting clinical or nursing 
tasks 
Lack of skill/knowledge, 
protocol / procedure error 9 9 9 9 
  
Clinical Staff 1 Incorrect clinical decision or 
action 
Clinical Error - Undetected 
incorrect clinical decision or 
action 
Incorrect information, lack of 
knowledge or skill, human 
error 
9 9 9 X 
Incomplete HAZOP 
Clinical Staff 8 Patient management errors 
when patients arrive after 
transfer 
Patient placed in an incorrect 
ward or bed space. 
Patient Management error 
X X X X 
A 'Forgotten hazard'? 
Clinical Staff 24 Missing or incomplete patient 
notes 
Missing or incomplete patient 
notes 
Human error - Notes mislaid 
or misfiled  ~ 9 ~ X 
  
Clinical Staff 61 Failure to act on a detected 
therapy administration error 
Failure to act on a Therapy 
administration error 
Human error 
~ X X X 
This is surprising 
Clinical Staff 41 Failure of staff to 
communicate regarding 
equipment required in patient 
transfer 
Unavailable equipment Failure to communicate a 
requirement ~ ~ ~ X 
See Top Level Fault Tree (combined system 
and task), bottom event 'C' 
Clinical Staff 30 Prescriptions or treatment 
orders incorrect or not made 
Incorrect action Communication, protocol or 
procedure failure 9 9 9 X 
Incomplete HAZOP 
Clinical Staff 29 Nursing staff not responding 
to requests or orders from 
doctors 
Failure to act Communication or protocol 
failure ~ ~ ~ X 
Incomplete HAZOP 
Clinical Staff 211 Transferring without adequate 
escort 
Patients on oxygen therapy 
transferred without escort 
Human error, Lack of staff, 
Task overload, ward 
management failure, 
organizational failure, 
procedure/process error 
X X X X 
A 'Forgotten hazard'? 
Clinical Staff 46 Failure to respond to patient 
or therapy monitoring alerts 
due to a lack of staff 
No response to monitoring 
alerts 
lack of staff 
9 ~ ~ X 
  
Clinical Staff 21 Patient requests or needs 
unfulfilled 
Unfulfilled patient need Failure to act 
X X X X 
This is something of a general issue 
Clinical Staff 63 Failure to act on a detected 
early therapy termination 
Failure to act on an early 
therapy termination 
Human error 
X X ~ X 
  
Clinical Staff 23 Communication failures at 
patient hand-over  
Poor communication at 
patient handover 
Poorly defined process, not 
following procedure, 
complacency 
9 ~ ~ X 
  
Clinical Staff 26 Poor communication between 
doctors and nursing staff 
regarding setup or adjustment 
Incorrect action or no action Communication failure 
between clinical staff ~ 9 9 X 
Incomplete HAZOP 
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Notes 
Clinical Staff 59 Incorrect actions at patient 
handover 
Protocol/procedure error: 
Incorrect action 
Handing over care from one 
team to another X X X X 
Indirect hazard 
Clinical Staff 25 Incorrect information in 
patient notes 
Incorrect information entered 
into patient notes 
Human error - Mistakes when 
writing notes, wrong patients 
notes written in 
~ ~ X X 
  
Clinical Staff/Cylinder 155 Delays or failures with 
Cylinder 
Replacement/Refilling 
Lack of available cylinders Request for replacement not 
made, request not received or 
handled by porters, 
insufficient central stock 
9 9 9 9 
  
Clinical Staff/Cylinder 161 Cylinder Identification Staff unable to identify 
cylinder contents 
Staff knowledge, improper/ 
unclear or missing content 
label/colour code 
~ ~ 9 ~ 
  
Clinical Staff/Cylinder 216 Use Error - Cylinder not 
switched on 
Cylinder not turned on at 
setup 
Human error, lack of 
knowledge/skill, 
Communication error 
X 9 X X 
  
Clinical Staff/Cylinder 209 Staff knowledge/Skill - not 
able to identify an oxygen 
failure alarm 
Staff unable to identify 
oxygen cylinders 
Unmarked/labelled/coded 
cylinders, lack of 
knowledge/skill 
X X X X 
A 'hidden hazard'? 
Clinical Staff/Cylinder 173 Cylinder management error - 
Not turned off after use 
Cylinders placed in storage 
without being turned off 
Human error 
X X X X 
A 'hidden hazard'? 
Clinical Staff/External - 
institutional 
210 staff unavailable - too busy Staff unavailable Lack of staff, Task overload, 
ward management failure, 
organizational failure 
~ ~ ~ ~ 
  
Clinical Staff/External - 
Person 
203 Procedural error - Delegating 
clinical/nursing tasks to 
parents 
Clinical tasks inappropriately 
delegated to parents 
lack of knowledge/skill, 
Human error, 
procedure/protocol error, lack 
of staff 
X X X X 
A 'hidden hazard'? 
Clinical Staff/Patient 58 Incorrect action when 
responding to a change in a 
patients condition 
Clinical error: incorrect action Change in patients condition 
X ~ X X 
  
Clinical Staff/Patient 134 Other medication interfering 
with this therapy 
Undetected drug interference Communication error, Human 
error, Lack of Knowledge / 
Skill 
9 X X X 
 Why wasn't this transferred to either the FMEA 
or the FTA? 
Clinical Staff/Patient 55 Changing a patients posture 
or position interferes with the 
therapy 
Interference with the therapy Change in patients posture or 
position X X X X 
A 'Forgotten hazard'? 
Clinical Staff/Patient 28 Communication failures 
between clinician and patient 
during an examination 
Incorrect or incomplete 
information or diagnosis 
Misunderstanding between 
doctor and patient X ~ ~ 9 
Could be said to be part of 'Clinical Error' 
Clinical Staff/Patient 56 Preparing a patient for 
transfer interferes with the 
therapy 
Interference with the therapy Preparation for transfer 
9 X X X 
Another serious omission? 
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Clinical Staff/Patient 57 Moving a patient between bed 
and chair causes interference 
with the therapy 
Interference with the therapy Transferring a patient 
between bed and chair X X X X 
A 'Forgotten hazard'? 
Clinical Staff/Patient 139 Confusion with therapies 
common to two patients in 
close proximity 
Bed spaces are in close 
proximity 
Proximity of bed spaces, Poor 
ward layout, Patient 
management error, Ward 
management error, Central 
bed management error 
X X X 9 
A 'Forgotten hazard' identified by HAZOP? 
Clinical Staff/Patient 49 Failure to detect patient 
entanglement in oxygen 
tubing  
Undetected patient 
entanglement 
Lack of vigilance 
9 ~ X ~ 
  
Clinical Staff/Patient 200 Patient left unattended Unattended patient on an 
oxygen cylinder 
Human error, Organizational 
error, Process/protocol error X X X X 
A 'forgotten hazard'? 
Clinical Staff/Patient 158 Retrolental Fibroplasia Oxygen overdose to neonate Human error, Clinical error ~ X X 9   
Clinical Staff/Patient 165 Clinical Error - Making 
decisions without reference to 
diagnostic results 
Decisions made without 
reference to diagnostic 
results 
Urgency, human error, 
delayed results ~ ~ ~ ~ 
  
Clinical Staff/Patient 205 Procedural delay - 
Examination 
Delay in conducting an 
examination 
Human error, lack of staff, 
Task overload, ward 
management failure, 
organizational failure 
~ X X X 
  
Clinical Staff/Patient 148 Incorrect management of 
patients with COPD 
COPD Incorrect therapy or wrong 
dose 9 ~ ~ 9 
  
Clinical Staff/Patient 
Monitoring 
45 Failure to respond to or 
implement patient monitoring 
Undetected therapy failure Patient monitoring error 
through failure to act 9 9 9 X 
  
Clinical Staff/Patient 
Monitoring 
35 Mistakes or equipment 
failures when changing from 
portable to installed 
monitoring or vice-versa 
Ineffective patient monitoring Human error or equipment 
failure when changing 
between monitoring devices 9 X X X 
  
Clinical Staff/Patient 
Monitoring 
43 Human error by clinical staff 
when monitoring patients 
Undetected therapy failure Lack of vigilance through 
patient monitoring error ~ ~ ~ X 
  
Clinical Staff/Therapeutic 
Subsystem 
215 Unsuitable running repairs Inappropriate running repairs 
done to therapy system 
Equipment fault, Lack of 
available replacements, 
procedure/process error, lack 
of knowledge/skill 
X X X X 
An indirect hazard 
Clinical Staff/Therapeutic 
Subsystem 
192 Interference from nursing 
tasks - Accidental therapy 
disconnection 
Accidental disconnection at 
any point in the therapy 
system 
Human error, loose 
connections ~ ~ ~ X 
  
Clinical Staff/Therapy 
Monitoring 
131 Incorrect action when 
responding to or 
implementing patient 
monitoring 
Incorrect action Human error, Lack of 
Knowledge / Skill ~ ~ ~ X 
  
Clinical Staff/Therapy 
Setup 
191 Insufficient cylinder contents 
for transfer 
Insufficient cylinder contents 
for transfer 
Contents not checked before 
transfer, replacement cylinder 
not ordered in time 
~ X X ~ 
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Clinical Staff/Therapy 
Setup 
176 Distraction of staff - Issue with 
this therapy puts other 
patients at risk 
Staff are distracted by 
dealing with a problem with 
oxygen therapy 
Human error, lack of staff, 
Task overload, ward 
management failure, 
organizational failure 
X X X X 
A 'forgoten hazard'? 
Clinical Staff/Therapy 
Setup 
169 Contamination hazard - Used 
accessories not disposed of 
and replaced 
Accessories used by a 
previous patient left at the 
bed space 
Human error, lack of staff, 
Task overload, ward 
management failure, 
organizational failure 
X X X X 
A 'forgoten hazard'? 
Clinical Staff/Therapy 
Setup 
136 Therapy not set up according 
to prescription or treatment 
order 
Undetected setup error  Communication error, Human 
error, Lack of Knowledge / 
Skill 
9 9 9 X 
  
Clinical Staff/Therapy 
Setup 
154 Delayed Action from Staff Delay in specifying, applying 
or adjusting therapy 
Lack of staff or busy 
environment X X X X 
  
Clinical Staff/Therapy 
Setup 
183 Equipment not checked Equipment placed into 
storage for re-use or taken 
for use without being 
checked 
Human error, lack of staff, 
Task overload, ward 
management failure, 
organizational failure 
X X X X 
A 'forgoten hazard'? 
Clinical Therapy Monitoring 40 Failure to respond to an 
equipment alarm or warning 
Undetected therapy failure Lack of vigilance through 
unattended alarms or 
equipment notifications 
X X X X 
A 'forgoten hazard'? 
Clinical Therapy Monitoring 48 Failure of therapy monitoring 
to detect a therapy 
disconnection 
Undetected therapy 
disconnection 
Ineffective patient monitoring 
X X ~ X 
A 'forgoten hazard'? 
Clinical Therapy Monitoring 50 Failure to detect cylinder 
depletion when in use 
Undetected cylinder depletion Lack of vigilance or 
information 9 9 9 9 
  
Clinical Therapy Monitoring 62 Failure to detect that the 
therapy has terminated early 
Undetected therapy 
termination 
Therapy monitoring 
~ ~ ~ X 
  
Clinical Therapy Monitoring 54 Failure to notice an incorrectly 
positioned accessory 
Misplaced accessory Lack of vigilance 
~ ~ ~ X 
  
Clinical Therapy Monitoring 120 Failure by clinical staff to 
notice a patient disconnection 
Undetected therapy 
disconnection 
Lack of vigilance 
~ ~ ~ X 
  
Clinical Therapy Monitoring 129 Failure to respond to or 
implement therapy monitoring 
Undetected therapy failure Human error, Lack of 
Knowledge / Skill ~ 9 9 X 
  
Clinical Therapy Monitoring 2 Failure to recognize and act 
on an imminent therapy 
failure 
Therapy failure (Undetected) Lack of vigilance, knowledge 
or Skill ~ 9 9 X 
Incomplete HAZOP 
Clinical Therapy Setup 15 Wrong type of accessory 
used for a particular therapy 
setup 
Wrong accessory for purpose Human error, lack of 
knowledge/skill, Correct 
accessory not available 
9 9 ~ X 
Incomplete HAZOP 
Clinical Therapy Setup 36 Equipment improperly 
checked 
Unreliable equipment Human error: Equipment 
checks X X X X 
  
Clinical Therapy Setup 60 Incorrect actions during 
patient transfer 
Protocol/procedure error: 
Incorrect action 
Transferring a patient 
between wards/departments X X X X 
FMEA very focussed on system components 
and none are linked to a specific context 
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Clinical Therapy Setup 53 Accessory incorrectly 
administered or moved into 
an incorrect position by 
clinical staff 
Misplaced accessory Staff actions 
~ 9 9 X 
  
Clinical Therapy Setup 113 A change of accessory is 
incorrectly implemented 
Undetected setup error  Human error 
~ ~ ~ X 
Incomplete HAZOP 
Clinical Therapy Setup 126 Wrong type of accessory 
used for a particular therapy 
setup 
Use error  Lack of Knowledge or Skill 
       
Excluded: Duplicated hazard (see 15) 
Clinical Therapy Setup 123 Therapy incorrectly or 
inappropriately set up when 
re-administered after a 
previous termination 
Undetected incorrect or 
inappropriate therapy re-
administration 
Re-administering the therapy 
after a previous termination 
~ ~ ~ X 
Incomplete HAZOP 
Clinical Therapy Setup 122 Flow rate incorrectly or 
inappropriately adjusted 
Dosage error Human error, Lack of 
Knowledge / Skill X ~ 9 X 
  
Clinical Therapy Setup 121 Failure to detect a setup error Undetected setup error  Lack of vigilance 
X X 9 X   
Clinical Therapy Setup 119 Change either way between 
piped supply and cylinder 
incorrectly implemented 
Undetected setup error  Human error 
X X ~ X 
Task and context not well assessed 
Clinical Therapy Setup 207 Setup - Oxygen not turned on Oxygen supply not turned on 
at setup 
Human error, lack of 
knowledge/skill, 
Communication error 
X 9 X X 
  
Clinical Therapy Setup 117 An incorrect adjustment is 
made to the therapy 
Undetected setup error  Human error 
~ 9 9 X Incomplete HAZOP 
Clinical Therapy Setup 107 Mistakes in setting up the 
therapy 
Undetected setup error  Human error 
~ 9 9 X Related to 117 
Clinical Therapy Setup 105 A factor relating to design 
within the therapy or the 
environment causes setup 
error 
Undetected setup error  Human factors: Difficulty in 
administering therapy X X X X 
  
Clinical Therapy Setup 202 Pressure/Abrasion sores from 
accessories 
Poorly fitting accessories left 
in place too long 
Human error, setup error, 
Therapy management error X ~ ~ X 
FMEA mentions discomfort but not harm. FTA 
Not complete. HAZOP not complete. 
Clinical Therapy Setup 137 A human factors issue with 
any equipment causes a 
functional failure because 
Equipment is applied 
differently to its intended use 
Incorrect application of 
equipment 
Equipment use error 
9 9 9 9 
FMEA: 1.4.1, 1.4.3   FTA: Applied Part 
Disconnected.   HAZOP: 1.3.2, 1.3.4 
Clinical Therapy Setup 208 Setup error - Venturi mask Flow rate does not match 
venturi specification 
Human error, lack of 
knowledge/skill X ~ ~ X 
FTA: Setup Error. Applied part error not fully 
assessed.  HAZOP incomplete.   FMEA: 
Insufficient detail in single pass assessment. 
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Clinical Therapy 
Setup/Supply 
212 Transport without oxygen Patients who require oxygen 
therapy are 
transported/transferred 
without 
Human error, lack of 
knowledge/skill, Lack of staff, 
Task overload, ward 
management failure, 
organizational failure, 
procedure/process error 
X ~ ~ X 
FTA and FMEA: The general issue of therapy 
not applied would include this. Specific contexts 
were not assessed. HAZOP incomplete but 
would possibly have the same result. 
Clinical Therapy 
Setup/Supply 
218 Wrong wall port - Suction 
instead of oxygen 
Patient connected to suction 
port instead of oxygen 
lack of knowledge/skill, 
Human error, 
procedure/protocol error 
~ ~ ~ ~ 
The general issue of the wrong wall port being 
used was assessed, but not suction in 
particular. (Highly unlikely). 
Supply All 108 Undetected failed oxygen 
supply 
Undetected supply failure Lack of vigilance and Wall 
port failure, flow meter fault, 
Pipeline and alarm system 
failure or cylinder depletion 
9 9 9 9 
  
Supply Cylinder 170 Cylinder damage - Incorrect 
positioning on trolley 
Aluminium cylinder crushed 
or punctured by bed or trolley 
height adjustment 
Cylinder incorrectly positioned 
X X ~ ~ 
Unsafe cylinder position assessed, but not in 
detail. 
Supply Cylinder 179 Equipment missing - Cylinder Cylinder not in expected 
position 
human error, theft, lack of 
cylinders ~ ~ ~ ~ 
Covered under the general issue of cylinders 
not available. 
Supply Cylinder 174 Cylinder Quality - New 
cylinder empty 
Unused, sealed new cylinder 
is empty 
Manufacturing error, leaking 
cylinder X ~ ~ ~ 
Covered partly under the general issue of 
cylinders not available. 
Supply Cylinder 172 cylinder faulty - leaking  Leaking cylinder Faulty valve, faulty regulator, 
cracked /punctured cylinder ~ 9 ~ ~ 
Partly covered under the general issue of 
cylinder depletion. 
Supply Cylinder 180 Equipment missing - Cylinder 
key 
No cylinder key available to 
turn on gas supply 
human error, theft, lack of 
cylinder keys X 9 X X 
  
Supply Cylinder 32.1 Position of cylinder at the bed 
side causes unknown cylinder 
contents 
Unknown cylinder contents Obscured view of cylinder 
~ ~ X 9 
FMEA not detailed enough to identify this. Also 
based mainly on system diagram and not 
enough on process flow chart. 
Supply Cylinder 32 Position of cylinder at the bed 
side causes Physical 
obstruction 
Physical obstruction at the 
bed side 
Badly positioned Cylinder 
X X ~ 9 
FTA mentions unsafe position but not in detail. 
Supply Cylinder 171 Cylinder Faulty - Cannot turn 
on gas 
Cylinder valve cannot be 
opened 
Damaged nut or faulty valve 
~ ~ X X 
FMEA mentions cylinder valve shut. 
Supply Cylinder 152.1 Wrong cylinder used Wrong gas Human error when applying 
therapy, Different cylinders 
stored together 
9 9 9 9 
  
Supply Cylinder 32.2 Position of cylinders at the 
bed side causes patients 
movements to be restricted by 
tubing position 
Patients movements 
restricted by tubing position 
Cylinder too far from patient 
X X ~ ~ 
Issue of unsafe cylinder position, but not this 
detailed. 
Supply Cylinder 151 Manual Handling - Cylinders Heavy, awkward cylinders Moving or lifting cylinders ~ ~ ~ ~ Falling cylinders, but not general manual handling. 
Supply Cylinder 150 Cylinder management - 
Unsecured/Unrestrained 
Unrestrained cylinders Moving or bumping into the 
cylinder ~ 9 9 9 
FMEA: 1.2.5   FTA: Cylinder Error, E7   
HAZOP: 2.4.2 
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Supply Cylinder/External - 
Institutional 
204 Procedural delay - Cylinder 
restocking 
Delay in replacement of 
empty cylinders 
Ward management error, 
procedure/process error, 
communication error, human 
error 
9 ~ 9 9 
Lack of consideration of external influences in 
the FMEA. 
Supply External - 
Infrastructure 
147 Not enough oxygen outlets for 
the number of patients 
requiring therapy 
Unavailability of piped 
oxygen outlets 
Insufficient number of oxygen 
outlets 9 9 9 9 
  
Supply External - 
Infrastructure 
145 No provision for the safe and 
organized storage of oxygen 
cylinders 
The chaotic storage of used 
and full cylinders together 
Inadequate Storage 
X X 9 9 
HAZOP mentions this explicitly. It is becoming 
clear that the FMEA depends on the hazard ID 
listing while the FTA is less reliant on it 
Supply External - 
Infrastructure 
140 Two or more patients sharing 
a wall port or cylinder 
Confusion with therapies 
common to two patients in 
close proximity 
Shared resources, Human 
error, Ward layout error, 
Patient management error 
X X X ~ 
HAZOP mentions wall ports in close proximity. 
Supply External - 
institutional 
217 Ward management - Empty 
and full cylinders stored 
together 
Empty and full cylinders 
stored together 
Ward management error, 
procedure/process error, 
communication error, human 
error 
        
Excluded as too similar to 145 
Supply External - 
Maintenance 
196 Oil used on oxygen outlet Oil used on the oxygen outlet 
or regulator components 
Lack of Knowledge or Skill, 
maintenance tasks carried out 
by untrained staff ~ X 9 X 
It is surprising that the FMEA did not pick this 
up. This emphasizes the need for hazard 
analyses to be iterative and not just one-off 
processes. 
Supply Flow Regulation 186 Flow meter not properly 
attached to wall port 
Improperly attached flow 
meter falling or being 
expelled out of wall port 
Human error, faulty valve 
~ X X X 
HAZOP incomplete as is the FTA. Not covered 
explicitly in the Delphi, so missed by the FMEA 
too.   
Supply Flow Regulation 157 Flow Meter Fault Incorrect indication of flow 
rate 
Mechanical fault 
X 9 9 X HAZOP incomplete 
Supply Flow Regulation 181 Equipment missing - Flow 
meter 
Flow meter missing from wall 
outlet or cylinder 
human error, theft, lack of 
flow meters ~ 9 9 X 
FMEA: 1.4.2;  FTA: Flow Regulator error. 
Supply Piped 152 Wrong Gas port used Wrong gas Human error when applying 
therapy 9 9 9 9 
FMEA: 1.1.4; FTA: (2 places), Pipeline Error & 
Setup Error,E5. HAZOP: 1.3.2 
Supply Piped 166 Collision between patient and 
pipeline outlet hardware 
Patients colliding with therapy 
outlet hardware 
Patient movements, 
posture/position changes, 
patient transfers 
X X X X 
Some physical hazards were completely 
missed by all the methods on a first pass. 
Supply Piped 168 Contaminated pipeline Contaminants in oxygen 
pipeline 
Ingress at a puncture, 
particles or chemicals from 
maintenance tasks 
9 9 9 9 
HAZOP: 1.1.1; FMEA: 1.1.2; FTA: Piped Supply 
Error, E3.  
Supply Pressure 
Regulation 
163 Regulator Faults Faulty pressure reducing 
regulator on a cylinder 
Mechanical fault 
9 9 9 ~ 
FMEA: 1.3;  FTA: Cylinder Regulator Error;  
HAZOP: 3. The HAZOP analysis of regulators 
was stopped because the opinion was that this 
hazard no longer existed at BH because they 
had changed to encapsulated cylinders, but 
they are still present in even these, so this was 
a faulty deduction. 
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Supply Pressure 
Regulation 
182 Equipment missing - 
Regulator 
Regulator missing from 
cylinder 
human error, theft, lack of 
regulators, not swapped over 
on cylinder replacement 
X 9 9 X 
As above 
Supply Pressure 
Regulation 
199 Oxygen Regulator Fire Fire or explosion of oxygen 
regulator 
Manufacturing error, 
Maintenance error, Oil/debris 
ingress 
9 9 9 X 
FMEA: 1.3.1a, 1.4.1a;   
Therapeutic All 178 Equipment design issue Confusing or difficult to use 
equipment 
Design error or insufficient 
attention to human factors X ~ ~ X 
FMEA: 1.3.2, 1.4.3, 2.2.5, 2.2.6;  FTA: Human 
error is included in Setup Error and Humidifier 
Error. 
Therapeutic All 198 Oxygen flow impeded - 
Accessory blocked 
Occluded accessory Debris or deposits, 
Manufacturing error, setup 
error 
9 9 9 X 
FMEA:  2.3.10;  FTA: Humidifier Error 
Therapeutic External - 
Environment 
42 Environmental issues like 
noise or cramped space 
cause visitors actions to 
interfere with the therapy 
Interference/tampering with 
the therapy 
Visitors actions when reacting 
to the environment 
~ X ~ ~ 
FMEA does not seem to have captured many 
external influences. The top level FTA based on 
both the task and system diagrams reflects this, 
but the one based purely on the system 
diagram does not. This is an example of the 
need for an inclusive assessment. 
Therapeutic External - 
Institutional 
99 A lack of available equipment 
for therapy administration or 
monitoring 
Lack of Equipment Management error, 
Purchasing/stores error 9 9 9 9 
FTA and FMEA: Multiple examples. HAZOP: 
Only went as far as supply equipment. 
Therapeutic External - 
Institutional, 
Humidifier 
193 Lack of resources; sterile 
water for humidifiers 
No sterile water available for 
humidifiers 
Resource management error, 
Central stores stock error X ~ ~ X 
FMEA (2.2.4) and FTA (Humidifier Error) 
mention low water level. FTA also mentions no 
water 
Therapeutic External - Person 3 Unauthorized or inappropriate 
action by others 
Inappropriate or incorrect 
action - unauthorized person 
Lack of vigilance, Visitor 
management failure, 
unrestricted access 9 X 9 ~ 
FTA: Applied Part Displacement;  HAZOP: 
1.3.1.2. FMEA based too heavily on the system 
diagram. FTA includes tampering, but does not 
specify by whom. 
Therapeutic External - Person 10 Innocent action by visitor to 
aid patient comfort 
compromises this therapy 
Incorrect action by an 
unauthorized person 
Therapy parameters are 
changed by uninformed action 
by visitor when patient or 
equipment is moved 
~ X X X 
Too specific. Covered to some extent by 
tampering but no enough to warrant a partial 
score. 
Therapeutic Humidifier 187 Humidifier use error - Refilled 
with saline 
Humidifier refilled with saline Human error, lack of 
knowledge/skill ~ X X X 
Water covered, but not refilling. 
Therapeutic Humidifier 98 Humidifier incorrectly set up, 
used inappropriately or not 
used when it should 
Humidification error Lack of procedure/protocol, 
Lack of knowledge/skill, 
Human factors, Lack of 
equipment 
9 9 9 X 
FMEA: 2.1;  FTA: Humidifier error, E10 
Therapeutic Humidifier 184 Faulty humidifier Humidifier does not provide 
the correct level of 
humidification or dispenses 
an incorrect oxygen 
concentration 
Mechanical fault 
~ X 9 X 
This is a surprising omission in the FMEA. FTA: 
Humidifier Error, J.  
Therapeutic Humidifier 125 Undetected humidifier water 
depletion 
Undetected humidifier water 
depletion 
Lack of vigilance 
X 9 9 X FMEA: 2.2.4;  FTA: Humidifier Error, E9, K 
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Therapeutic Patient Connection 31 Spectacles or other 
obstructions on the face 
Poorly fitting patient 
accessory 
Spectacles or other 
obstructions on the face X ~ 9 X 
FMEA: 2.6.6;  FTA: Equipment Failure. If 
Patient Connection Error tree had been done, 
this might have been present in that too. 
Therapeutic Patient Connection 177 Endotracheal tube blocked Blocked endotracheal tube Setup error, debris 
~ ~ ~ X 
FMEA: 2.6.14 (Very similar issues to 
Tracheostomies.);  FTA: Generic in Equipment 
Failure. 
Therapeutic Patient Connection 160 Tracheostomy Complications Loose or blocked 
tracheostomy 
Setup error, patient 
movement, debris ~ 9 9 X 
FMEA: 2.6.14;  FTA: Generic in Equipment 
Failure. 
Therapeutic Patient Connection 116 An accessory is incorrectly or 
inappropriately disconnected 
by clinical staff 
Undetected accessory 
disconnection 
Human error, Lack of 
Knowledge or Skill ~ X 9 X 
FTA: Equipment Failure 
Therapeutic Patient Connection 115 An accessory is displaced 
when a patient's position or 
posture is changed 
Accessory displacement Changing a patients posture 
or position X 9 9 X 
FMEA: 2.6.7; FTA: Applied Part Displacement, 
E4. 
Therapeutic Patient Connection 101 Failure to correct a displaced 
accessory 
Misplaced accessory Failure to act 
X ~ 9 X FMEA: 2.6.7; FTA: Applied Part Displacement, A. 
Therapeutic Patient Connection 90 The accessory has to be 
changed to relieve patient 
discomfort 
Unsuitable accessory Accessory causes discomfort 
X 9 ~ X 
FMEA: 2.6.1, 2.6.8c;  FTA: Applied Part 
Displacement, E11,K 
Therapeutic Patient Connection 67 Accessory moved into an 
incorrect position by Patient 
Misplaced accessory Patients actions 
X 9 9 X FMEA: 2.6.7a, 3.1.4;  FTA: Applied Part Displacement, E3 
Therapeutic Patient Connection 37 Physical failure of a patient 
connected accessory 
Undetected accessory failure Any physical or functional 
failure of any accessory 9 9 9 X 
FMEA: 2.6.9/10/11/12/13/14;  FTA: Equipment 
Failure 
Therapeutic Tubing 118 Bubble tubing incorrectly cut Undetected setup error  Human error ~ ~ ~ X FMEA: 2.3.1;  Tubing Error mentioned but unexplored. 
Therapeutic Tubing 213 Tubing damaged - Melted due 
to contact with hot surface 
Contact between tubing and 
hot surfaces 
Tubing routing error, Patient 
movements or actions X 9 ~ X 
FMEA: 2.3.5; FTA: Tubing Error mentioned but 
not yet explored. 
Therapeutic Tubing 110 Therapy tubing disconnected 
in error 
Undetected tubing 
disconnection 
Inappropriate or inadvertent 
action 9 9 ~ X 
FMEA: 2.3.6; FTA: Tubing Error mentioned but 
not yet explored. 
Therapeutic Tubing 189 Infection risk - Fungus in 
oxygen tubing 
Fungal growth in oxygen 
tubing 
Non-sterile water in 
humidifier, tubing in use for 
too long 
X X X X 
  
Therapeutic Tubing 34 Tubing pinched in furniture or 
other equipment at the bed 
side 
Damaged or occluded tubing Poor tubing position 
9 9 ~ X 
FMEA: 2.3.9; FTA: Tubing Error mentioned but 
not yet explored. 
 
 
 
